Wilson v. Gonzales et al

Filing 8

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 5 MOTION to Amend/Correct by Chief Judge M. Christina Armijo. (vv)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

CHARLES WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 16-CV-00604-MCA-CG

DENISE R. GONZALES, ROBERTA
ORTEGA, CATHY CATANACH, LIA
ARCHULETA,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court, sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), on Plaintiff
Charles Wilson’s civil rights complaint [Doc. 1], filed on June 17, 2016, and Motion for Leave
To File An Amended Complaint, filed on July 25, 2016 [Doc. 5]. Plaintiff is incarcerated,
appears pro se, and is proceeding in forma pauperis. For the reasons set out below, Plaintiff’s
motion to amend the complaint will be denied as moot, Plaintiff’s original civil rights complaint
and amended complaint will be construed collectively as the operative pleading, and certain of
Plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed.
The Court has the discretion to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint sua sponte under
§ 1915(e)(2) “at any time if . . . the action . . . is frivolous or malicious; [or] fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted.” “Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is
proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it
would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th
Cir. 2007). The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a complaint that contains “sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id.

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements do not suffice.” Id.
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and “[a] pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed
liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Therefore, “if the court can reasonably read the
pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the
plaintiff’s failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor
syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Id. At the
same time, however, it is not “the proper function of the district court to assume the role of
advocate for the pro se litigant.” Id.
Plaintiff, whose name legally was changed to his religious name of Sala-Din Abdul
Shaheed Rahman, claims in his complaint [Doc. 1] that Defendants Denise R. Gonzales, Roberta
Ortega, Cathy Catanach, and Lia Archuleta have refused his requests to use his religious name
on his legal mail and identification, in violation of his rights under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA). Plaintiff’s complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory
and punitive damages. [Doc. 1 at 19]
On July 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion For Leave To File An Amended Complaint
[Doc. 5], which seeks to add additional parties and additional claims. Specifically, Plaintiff

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seeks to add claims under the First Amendment and RLUIPA against Defendants Jerry Roark,
Summit Boyd, and Calvin Robinson for their alleged failure to provide him with halal meals,
despite his sincerely held religious beliefs. Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint [Doc. 5 at 328] seeks injunctive relief and punitive damages. [Doc. 5 at 15].
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(A) provides that “[a] party may amend its
pleading once as a matter of course within . . . 21 days after serving it.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)(A). Plaintiff’s complaint has not yet been served and, therefore, Plaintiff may amend
his complaint as a matter of right. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion For Leave To File An
Amended Complaint will be denied as moot and the Clerk of the Court will be directed to file the
proposed amended complaint [Doc. 5 at 3-28] on the docket as an amended complaint and to add
Defendants Roark, Boyd, and Robinson to the caption as defendants. Because it appears that
Plaintiff wishes to add additional claims and defendants, rather than to supersede the existing
claims and defendants, the Court will treat the original complaint and the amended complaint
collectively as the operative pleading for the purpose of its review under § 1915(e).
I.

RLUIPA
RLUIPA provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial

burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, . . . unless
the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person . . . is in furtherance of
a compelling government interest; and . . . is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling government interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Monetary damages are not available
under RLUIPA—the statute “is limited to official capacity claims for equitable relief.” Pfeil v.
Lampert, 603 F. App’x 665, 668 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); see Sossamon v. Texas, 563
U.S. 277, 293 (2011) (holding that a suit for monetary damages against a state or its officials is

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barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity); Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 1335 (10th Cir.
2012) (holding that “there is no cause of action under RLUIPA for individual-capacity claims”).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims against Defendants in their individual capacities, and his
official-capacity claims under RLUIPA seeking monetary damages, will be dismissed for failure
to state a claim on which relief may be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints seek declaratory and/or injunctive relief
under RLUIPA against the following Defendants acting in their official capacities:

(1)

Defendant Gonzales, hearing officer at Western New Mexico Correctional Facility (WNMCF);
(2) Defendant Ortega, Warden at WNMCF; (3) Defendant Catanach, Bureau Chief of Offender
Management Services, (4) Defendant Archuleta, classification officer at WNMCF; (5) Defendant
Roark, Director of Adult Prisons; (6) Defendant Boyd, food administrator at WNMCF; and (7)
Defendant Robinson, the Senior Chaplain. [Docs. 1, 5] Defendant was incarcerated at WNMCF
at the time his original and amended complaints were filed. [See Docs. 1, 5] He has since been
transferred, however, to Central New Mexico Correctional Facility (CNMCF). [See Doc. 6]
“When a prisoner files suit against prison officials who work in the institution in which
he is incarcerated, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis of the alleged wrongful
conduct by those officials, and then that prisoner is subsequently transferred to another prison or
released from the prison system, courts are presented with a question of possible mootness.”
Jordon v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1027 (10th Cir. 2011). “Where the prisoner’s claims for
declaratory or injunctive relief relate solely to the conditions of confinement at the penal
institution at which the prisoner is no longer incarcerated, courts have concluded that they are
unable to provide the prisoner with effective relief.” Id. “However, where a prisoner brings a
lawsuit challenging policies that apply in a generally uniform fashion throughout a prison

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system, courts have been disinclined to conclude that the prisoner’s declaratory or injunctive
claims are moot, even after he has been transferred to another prison in that system.” Id. at 1028.
To determine whether a transferred prisoner’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are
moot, the Court must focus on whether the prisoner has “sued defendants who were actually
situated to effectuate any prospective relief that the courts might see fit to grant.” Id.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims against the WNMCF officials,
namely, Defendants Gonzales, Ortega, Archuleta, and Boyd, are moot because these officials are
not actually situated to effectuate any prospective relief that the Court might see fit to grant. See
id. at 1027 (noting that courts routinely dismiss “penitentiary-specific conditions-of-confinement
claims as moot” after the plaintiff’s transfer or release). Therefore, Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims
against Defendants Gonzales, Ortega, Archuleta, and Boyd will be dismissed without prejudice
as moot.
II.

First Amendment
Title 42 of the United States Code, section 1983 “provides a cause of action against state

officials who violate constitutional or other federally protected rights.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.
3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 2013). However, “government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983

suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. To impose § 1983 liability on a defendantsupervisor, the plaintiff must demonstrate an “affirmative link” between the supervisor and the
alleged constitutional violation. Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010). A
plaintiff can establish an “affirmative link” by “demonstrating (1) defendant promulgated,

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created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2)
caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to
establish the alleged constitutional violation.” Id. at 1199.
Plaintiff’s original complaint contends that Defendant Ortega, Warden at WNMCF,
violated his First Amendment right to use his religious name on his legal mail and identification.
[Doc. 1] However, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant Ortega personally participated in the
alleged constitutional violation or that she implemented or possessed responsibility for the
continued operation of a policy that caused the alleged constitutional violation. Instead, the
complaint simply alleges that Defendant Ortega “verbally direct[ed] Plaintiff to the grievance
process on 4-11-16.” [Doc. 1 at 6]. This factual allegation is insufficient to establish an
affirmative link between Defendant Ortega and the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights and, therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant Ortega will be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The original complaint further contends that Defendant Gonzales violated Plaintiff’s First
Amendment right to use his religious name by denying his formal grievance. [Doc. 1] However,
the “denial of a grievance, by itself without any connection to the violation of constitutional
rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983.” Gallagher v.
Shelton, 587 F. 3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009). Because Plaintiff’s only allegation involving
Defendant Gonzales “relate to the denial of his grievance[], he has not adequately alleged any
factual basis to support an ‘affirmative link’ between [Defendant Gonzales] and any alleged
constitutional violation.” Id. Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant Gonzales

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will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The foregoing analysis also is dispositive of the § 1983 claims in Plaintiff’s amended
complaint [Doc. 5] against Defendants Roark and Robinson. Plaintiff contends that Defendants
Roark and Robinson violated his First Amendment right to a halal diet by denying his formal
grievance and appeal.

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Robinson denied his

formal grievance without conducting any “reasonable research” on the requirements of a halal
diet. [Doc. 5 at 9] Plaintiff further contends that Defendant Roark denied his appeal without
“forward[ing] anything” to the Chaplain for religious review or conducting any research into the
requirements of a halal diet. [Doc. 5 at 11] These factual allegations are insufficient to establish
an “affirmative link” between Defendants Roark and Robinson and the alleged violation of
Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants
Roark and Robinson will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which
relief may be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints also seeks declaratory and/or injunctive relief
under § 1983 against Defendant Archuleta, Classification Officer at WNMCF, and Defendant
Boyd, Food Administrator at WNMCF. [Docs. 1, 5] As explained in part I of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order, “penitentiary-specific conditions-of-confinement claims” seeking equitable
relief are rendered moot by a plaintiff’s transfer to a different prison facility. Jordan, 654 F.3d at
1028-29. Because Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendants Archuleta and Boyd are specific
to the conditions of his confinement at WNMCF, Plaintiff no longer is incarcerated at WNMCF,
and Defendants Archuleta and Boyd are not in a position to effectuate prospective relief at any

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institution other than WNMCF, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims seeking
declaratory and/or injunctive relief against Defendants Archuleta and Boyd are moot.
Lastly, Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints seeks monetary damages against
Defendants Archuleta, Boyd, and Catanach under § 1983, acting in their official and individual
capacities, for the alleged violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. [Doc. 5] However, in
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), the United States Supreme Court
held that state officials, acting in their official capacity, are not “persons” under § 1983 subject to
suit. See id. (holding that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are
‘persons’ under § 1983”); cf. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991) (holding that “state officials,
sued in their individual capacities, are ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983”). Therefore,
Plaintiff’s official-capacity § 1983 claim against Defendants Archuleta, Boyd, and Catanach for
monetary damages will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief
may be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
III.

Conclusion
The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints state a colorable

claim for declaratory and/or injunctive relief under RLUIPA against Defendants Catanach,
Roark, and Robinson, acting in their official capacities.

The Court further concludes that

Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints state a colorable claim for monetary damages under
§ 1983 against Defendants Archuleta, Boyd, and Catanach, acting in their individual capacities,
and for declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant Catanach, acting in her official
capacity. Therefore, the Court will direct the Clerk of the Court to mail notice and waiver of
service forms, along with a copy of the original and amended complaints [Docs. 1, 5] and this
Memorandum Opinion and Order, to Defendants Catanach, Roark, Robinson, Archuleta, and

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Boyd. All other claims in Plaintiff’s original and amended complaints [Docs. 1, 5] will be
dismissed without prejudice for the reasons explained above.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave To File An Amended
Complaint [Doc. 5] is DENIED as moot;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to file the proposed
amended complaint [Doc. 5 at 3-28] on the docket as an amended complaint and to add
Defendants Roark, Boyd, and Robinson to the caption as Defendants;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims against Defendants in their
individual capacities, and his official-capacity RLUIPA claims seeking monetary damages, are
DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s official-capacity RLUIPA claims for
declaratory and/or injunctive relief against Defendants Gonzales, Ortega, Archuleta, and Boyd
are DISMISSED without prejudice as moot;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Ortega,
Gonzales, Roark, and Robinson are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); and Defendants Ortega and Gonzales are
DISMISSED as parties to this action;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendants Archuleta
and Boyd for declaratory and/or injunctive relief are DISMISSED without prejudice as moot;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s official-capacity § 1983 claims against
Defendants Archuleta, Boyd, and Catanach for monetary damages are DISMISSED without
prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to mail notice and
waiver of service forms, along with a copy of the original and amended complaints [Docs. 1, 5]
and this Memorandum Opinion and Order to: (1) Defendant Catanach at the New Mexico
Corrections Department Offender Management Services, P.O. Box 27116, Santa Fe, NM 8750201106; (2) Defendant Roark at the New Mexico Corrections Department, P.O. Box 27116, Santa
Fe, NM 87502-01106; (3) Defendant Robinson at 4337 NM 14, Santa Fe, NM 87508; (4)
Defendant Archuleta at WNMCF, P.O. Drawer 250, Grants, NM 87020; and (5) Defendant Boyd
at WNMCF, P.O. Drawer 250, Grants, NM 87020.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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