Martinez v. Schlumberger Technology Corporation, et al.

Filing 69

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge Judith C. Herrera; IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits 28 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint 23 is GRANTED. (mjr)

Case 1:16-cv-00945-JCH-KRS Document 69 Filed 03/28/18 Page 1 of 9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
SAUL MARTINEZ, JR., on Behalf of
Himself and on Behalf of All Others
Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civ. No. 16-945 JCH/KRS

SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint [Doc. 23] and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits [Doc. 28]. For the
reasons more fully explained below, the Court will grant the motion to exceed page limits in part,
and will grant the motion for leave to amend.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Saul Martinez (“Martinez”) is a former employee of Defendant Schlumberger
Technology Corporation (“Schlumberger”), an oil field services company.1 According to the
Complaint [Doc. 1], Schlumberger employed Martinez as a Field Engineer Trainee from
approximately January of 2014 until October of 2014, during which time he performed nonexempt manual labor. Martinez alleges that Schlumberger required him, and others like him, to

1

Martinez’s Complaint originally included claims against a second defendant, Schlumberger
Limited (Schlumberger N.V.). However, on February 6, 2017, Martinez filed Plaintiff’s Notice
of Dismissal Without Prejudice as to this defendant.

Case 1:16-cv-00945-JCH-KRS Document 69 Filed 03/28/18 Page 2 of 9

work more than 40 hours per week but refused to pay them overtime wages by improperly
classifying them as “exempt” employees. He asserts claims against Schlumberger for violations
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) and the New Mexico Minimum
Wage Act (“NMMWA”), N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50-4-22 et seq. Martinez seeks to assert a
nationwide collective action for the FLSA claim, and a New Mexico class action for the
NMMWA claim.
Martinez seeks leave to file a first amended complaint that would broaden his collective
and class actions. While his original Complaint was brought on behalf of “Field Engineer
Trainees” in the “Well Services Segment,” he wishes to amend his complaint to also include all
workers employed as “Field Engineer Trainees” or “Field Specialist Trainees” in either the Well
Services Segment or the Wireline Segment. Doc. 23 at 2; see also Plaintiff’s proposed First
Amended Complaint, Doc. 23-1. Schlumberger opposes the motion to amend on the grounds that
“it seeks to expand the alleged classes to include job positions Plaintiff never has held in
divisions where Plaintiff has never worked.” Doc. 24 at 1. Schlumberger argues that it would be
futile to permit this expansion because Martinez can neither represent the expanded class he
proposes nor meet the certification requirements of the FLSA and Rule 23.
Martinez filed a reply [Doc. 27] in support of his motion for leave to amend that is
sixteen pages in length, which exceeds the twelve-page limit imposed by our Local Rules.
Attached to this reply are two complete, unhighlighted depositions totaling almost 200 pages—
well in excess of the 50 page limit for exhibits imposed by our Local Rules. Martinez did not
request permission to exceed these page limits before he filed his reply, but rather filed the reply
first and then, one day later, filed his Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limit. Doc. 28.
Schlumberger opposes the motion to extend the page limits. Doc. 29.
2 

Case 1:16-cv-00945-JCH-KRS Document 69 Filed 03/28/18 Page 3 of 9

DISCUSSION
I.

Motion to Extend Page Limits
In filing a reply of sixteen pages, Martinez violated several of our Local Rules. First, he

violated Local Rule 7.5, which limits reply briefs to twelve pages. Next, in attaching almost 200
pages of exhibits, Martinez violated Local Rule 10.5, which restricts exhibits to a maximum of
50 pages (unless all parties agree otherwise) and requires parties to file “only those pages of an
exhibit which are to be brought to the Court’s attention.” In fact, most of the exhibit pages filed
by Martinez are irrelevant to his reply. Martinez’s filing also violated Local Rule 10.6, which
requires parties to clearly mark the portions of the exhibit they wish to bring to the Court’s
attention. Finally, Martinez waited until after filing its non-compliant reply brief before it sought
consent to the page extension from Schlumberger and then filed his motion for extension of the
page limit.
Martinez contends that the four extra pages of briefing in his reply are necessary to fully
address the issues raised in Schlumberger’s response brief. Martinez also requests an opportunity
to refile his reply exhibits so that they comply with Local Rules 10.5 and 10.6. Schlumberger
opposes the four-page extension on the reply brief on two grounds. First, it contends that the
extension is unreasonable in light of the fact that Schlumberger’s response brief was only seven
pages in length and raises no novel issues. Second, Schlumberger opposes the request as
untimely because Martinez filed it after he filed his overlong reply brief. Finally, Schlumberger
argues that the page extension should be denied because the reply brief addresses issues, such as
standing, that are not raised in the response brief.2

2

Based upon the tone of the briefs and the email correspondence attached thereto, it appears that
counsel for the parties have had difficulty cooperating in this case. This is best illustrated,
3 

Case 1:16-cv-00945-JCH-KRS Document 69 Filed 03/28/18 Page 4 of 9

The Court will grant the motion to extend page limits in part. The Court will accept
Martinez’s overlong reply brief on this occasion only. Having given this one chance, the Court
will not overlook any further violations of the Local Rules by Plaintiff. However, the motion to
extend the page limit for the exhibits is denied, there being no valid reason for the Court to
consider those depositions in their entirety. The Court will consider only those pages specifically
cited in the reply brief; the remainder of the pages are hereby stricken.

II.

Motion for Leave to Amend
A.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that, after a responsive pleading has
been served, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or
the court’s leave.” The Rule specifies that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” The purpose of the Rule is to provide litigants “the maximum opportunity for each
claim to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural niceties.” Hardin v. Manitowoc–
Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 449, 456 (10th Cir. 1982). “Refusing leave to amend is generally only
justified upon a showing of undue delay, undue prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith or
dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or futility of
amendment.” Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365 (10th Cir. 1993).

perhaps, by the amount of energy counsel appear to have expended over a four-page extension
on a reply brief. This Court has limited patience for these types of pointless battles. Counsel are
hereby forewarned that the Court will not tolerate incivility and lack of professionalism among
counsel.
4 

Case 1:16-cv-00945-JCH-KRS Document 69 Filed 03/28/18 Page 5 of 9

B.

Analysis

As discussed above, Martinez moves the Court for leave to file an amended complaint
that broadens the original class of plaintiffs from “Field Engineer Trainees” in the Well Services
Segment to all workers employed as “Field Engineer Trainees” as well as “Field Specialist
Trainees” in the Well Services and Wireline Segments. Schlumberger opposes the motion for
leave to amend on the grounds that it is futile.3 Schlumberger argues that the proposed amended
complaint would improperly expand the class of plaintiff employees “to reach jobs that Plaintiff
has never held and working in divisions in which Plaintiff has never worked,” and therefore
Plaintiff cannot properly represent those other putative plaintiffs under either Rule 23 or the
FLSA. Thus, the question before the Court is whether it can determine at this stage, based on the
record before it, that the proposed amended complaint cannot state a claim for collective action
under either the FLSA or Rule 23. In order to make that judgment, one must understand the
standards for certifying collective actions under those respective statutes.
1.

FLSA

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has approved a two-tiered, “ad hoc” approach to
determine whether named and prospective plaintiffs are “similarly situated” such that
certification is proper. Thiessen v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir.
2001). The standard for certifying an FLSA collective action is fairly loose initially, until
discovery is completed. During this initial “notice stage,” courts require only “substantial
allegations that the putative class members were together the victims of a single decision, policy,

3

Schlumberger also opposed the motion on the grounds that it prolonged and did not resolve the
dispute over whether the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over co-defendant Schlumberger
Limited (Schlumberger N.V.). As Schlumberger Limited is no longer a party in the case, that
argument is moot.

5 

Case 1:16-cv-00945-JCH-KRS Document 69 Filed 03/28/18 Page 6 of 9

or plan.” Id.; Morisky v. Pub. Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 493, 497 (D.N.J. 2000).
At this stage, the Court “does not weigh the evidence, resolve factual disputes, or rule on the
merits” of the plaintiffs’ claims. Greenstein v. Meredith Corp., 948 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1267 (D.
Kan. 2013) (citation omitted). Then, the parties send notice to prospective class members and
discovery proceeds. The prospective class members must affirmatively express their desire to
join the litigation.4 After the completion of discovery, the defendant may file a motion for
decertification. Because at that point the record has been fully developed, the court applies a
“stricter standard,” analyzing factors, such as “(1) disparate factual and employment settings of
the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available to defendant which appear to be
individual to each plaintiff; (3) fairness and procedural considerations ....” Thiessen, 267 F.3d at
1102-03 (quoting Vaszlavik v. Storage Tech. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 672, 678 (D. Colo. 1997)).
Based on the record before the Court at this time, it cannot conclude at this stage that the
proposed amendment would be futile. Martinez has made substantial allegations that the groups
of employees included in his putative class were together the victims of a single policy by
Schlumberger to misclassify certain employees as exempt. Even if the current record contained
evidence to contradict that allegation—which it does not—this is not the proper stage at which to
resolve such disputes. It may be that Martinez’s attempt to certify a collective action will
ultimately fail. However, at this stage he has done enough to win leave to amend, particularly in
light of the policy in favor of liberally granting such motions.

4

This “opt in” procedure required under the FLSA is dissimilar to a standard class action under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where all potential plaintiffs are bound by the
judgment unless they “opt out.” The requirements of Rule 23 do not apply to FLSA actions and
no showing of numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation need be
made. See Ansoumana v. Gristede’s Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
6 

Case 1:16-cv-00945-JCH-KRS Document 69 Filed 03/28/18 Page 7 of 9

2.

Rule 23

Rule 23 sets forth the requirements for certifying a class action under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. All classes must satisfy: (i) all the requirements of
Rule 23(a); and (ii) one of the three sets of requirements under Rule 23(b), where the three sets
of requirements correspond to the three categories of classes that a court may certify. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a)-(b). Rule 23(a) states:
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) (emphasis added). Even “factual differences in the claims of the individual
putative class members should not result in a denial of class certification where common
questions of law exist.” In re Intelcom Group Sec. Litig., 169 F.R.D. 142, 148 (D. Colo. 1996).
See Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 676 (10th Cir. 1988) (“That the claims of individual
putative class members may differ factually should not preclude certification under Rule 23(b)(2)
of a claim seeking the application of a common policy.”); Lopez v. City of Santa Fe, 206 F.R.D.
285, 289 (D.N.M. 2002)(Vázquez, J.)(“Commonality requires only a single issue common to the
class, and the fact that ‘the claims of individual putative class members may differ factually
should not preclude certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of a claim seeking the application of a
7 

Case 1:16-cv-00945-JCH-KRS Document 69 Filed 03/28/18 Page 8 of 9

common policy.” (citations omitted)). A single common question will suffice to satisfy rule
23(a)(2), but the question must be one “that is central to the validity of each one of the claims.”
Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).
Schlumberger argues that Martinez’s claims cannot be, as a matter of law, typical of the
new groups of employees that he seeks to add because he did not work in the Wireline Segment,
nor did he work as a Field Specialist Trainee. Doc. 24 at 4-5. For the same reasons, it asserts that
Martinez cannot fairly and adequately represent the interests of the new groups of employees he
seeks to add. Id. It would have been helpful to Schlumberger’s argument if it had explained in its
response the difference between a Field Specialist Trainee and a Field Engineer Trainee, or had
distinguished between the Wireline and Well Services Segments. Without the benefit of such
explanation, the Court is at a loss to evaluate Schlumberger’s contention that Martinez cannot
possibly properly represent these employees. Similarly, Schlumberger states in conclusory
fashion that the proposed expansion of the class “also poses significant manageability concerns
due to the significant overlap of these proposed groups with class and collective actions currently
pending in other jurisdictions.” Doc. 24 at 4 n.4. In the absence of any specific information on
this point, the Court concludes that this concern is premature at this stage and can be addressed
when Martinez moves for class certification.
In sum, the Court concludes that the motion for leave to amend should be granted.
Schlumberger is free to reassert its arguments at the class certification stage.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Exceed Page
Limits [Doc. 28] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as described herein.

8 

Case 1:16-cv-00945-JCH-KRS Document 69 Filed 03/28/18 Page 9 of 9

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint [Doc. 23] is GRANTED. Plaintiff must file his amended complaint no later than ten
days after entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

___________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

9