Environmental Dimensions, Inc. v. EnergySolutions Government Group, Inc.
Filing
227
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge Kea W. Riggs. Defendant's requested attorney's fees are reasonable. The Court approves the requested fee award in the amount of $143,687.50. Defendant's Request for Attorneys' Fe es, on the basis of 222 Barnett's Affidavit in Support of Attorneys' Fees is GRANTED. Defendant shall file on the docket a proposed judgment detailing the specific amounts awarded in this action and submit the same to chambers. (ve)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
_______________________
ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 1:16-cv-1056-KWR-JHR
ENERGYSOLUTIONS GOVERNMENT
GROUP, INC. (n/k/a Atkins Energy
Government Group, Inc.),
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant filed the instant “Affidavit of James L. Barnett in Support of Attorneys’ Fees
for ESGG’s Claim for Open Account” (Doc. 222) on April 2, 2021, pursuant to the Court’s
directive in its Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s
Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Doc. 220). Having reviewed the affidavit and the applicable law, the
Court finds Defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees is reasonable and, therefore, is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
I.
Affidavit of James L. Barnett
Barnett attests that he is a partner at the law firm of Holland & Hart LLP, attorneys for
Defendant, and that he and two associates, Elizabeth Rudolph, and Julia Broggi, cooperated in
litigating this matter. Doc. 222 at ¶¶ 3-6. Barnett attests that he has reviewed the time spent by
himself and these associates “to bring and prevail on [Defendant’s] claim for open account against
Plaintiff…” Id. at ¶ 10. He attests that, in a prior Memorandum and Opinion Order (Doc. 221 at
9), Judge Ritter determined that $350/hour for Barnett, $220/hour for Rudolph, and $295/hour for
Broggi were reasonable fee rates, and that he therefore has applied the same rates in the instant
request for attorneys’ fees. Doc. 222. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff did not argue against these rates in the prior
Memorandum or in the instant matter. Accordingly, the Court adopts them here.
Plaintiff did not respond or object to this matter and pursuant to the Court’s local rules, this
matter is therefore unopposed. D.N.M. LR-Civ. 7.1(b).
DISCUSSION
Defendant requests a total amount of $143,687.50 in attorney’s fees. Id. at ¶ 11 This cost
is broken down as follows:
Attorneys
Hours
Amount
James L. Barnett
139.50
$48,825.00
Elizabeth A. Rudolf
391.1
$86,042.00
Julia Broggi
29.9
$8,820.50
560.50
$143,687.50
Total Attorney Hours/Amount
Id.
Plaintiff has not issued a Response or contested that these hours accurately reflect the time
spent towards litigating Defendant’s open account counterclaim. Thus, the Court will award fees
in the full amount requested by Defendant.
I.
Defendant’s Attorney’s Fees are Reasonable.
Generally, to obtain attorney’s fees, “a claimant must prove two elements: (1) that the
claimant was the ‘prevailing party’ in the proceeding; and (2) that the claimant's fee request is
reasonable.” Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1280 (10th Cir.1998), quoted in Flitton
v. Primary Residential Mortg., Inc., 614 F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 2010); see also Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983). "[A defendant]
prevails when actual relief on the merits of [its] [counter]claim materially alters the legal
relationship between the parties by modifying the [plaintiff’s] behavior in a way that directly
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benefits the [defendant]." Browder v. City of Moab, 427 F.3d 717, 722 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). Here, Defendant prevailed on its counterclaims. As explained
below, Defendant obtained substantial success on its counterclaims.
“The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); see also Robinson,
160 F.3d at 1281 (“[A] court must begin by calculating the so-called ‘lodestar amount’ of a fee, ...
[which] is the product of the number of attorney hours ‘reasonably expended’ and a ‘reasonable
hourly rate.’ ”). The party requesting attorney’s fees bears the burden of proving the two
components used to calculate the fee award: (1) the appropriate hourly rate and (2) the amount of
hours spent on the case. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1233
(10th Cir. 2000). Once the Court makes these two determinations, the fee “claimant is entitled to
the presumption that this lodestar amount reflects a ‘reasonable’ fee.” Robinson, 160 F.3d at 1281.
A.
Hours billed were reasonably expended.
Initially, the Court finds that the billed hours were reasonably expended in this litigation.
The Court reviewed the docket and the evidence before it, including Defendant’s attorneys’ billing
records. Doc. 222-1, Ex. 1. Barnett billed for approximately 139.50 hours in this case. See Doc.
222 at ¶ 11 ($48,825.00 divided by $350 equals 139.50 hours). The firm’s associate Rudolph
billed approximately 391.1 hours. See Id. ($86,042.00 divided by $220 equals 391.1 hours). The
other associate Broggi billed approximately 29.9 hours. See Id. ($8,820.50 divided by $295 equals
29.9 hours). This was an extensively litigated case, spanning over four years, and the case
underwent significant motions practice before the District Court and Magistrate Judges, including
multiple rounds of dispositive motions. Barnett represents that he reduced the firm’s usual fee
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rates1 in line with Judge Ritter’s determination of a reasonable fee. Id. at ¶ 7. Given the complexity
of the claims and the litigation before the Court, the hours expended were reasonable. The Court
finds the numbers of hours billed is in line with the litigation in this case. The billing entries were
sufficiently detailed to determine whether the billed time was reasonable. Plaintiff did not offer
any objection as to the reasonableness of the number of hours expended.
Defendant obtained a high degree of success on the majority of its substantive motions and
counterclaims, successfully obtaining a damages award of $1,041,531.74, in addition to pre and
post-judgment interest. Certain aspects of Defendant’s counterclaims were dismissed by the
Court. “Where a prevailing party succeeds on only some claims, the Court must consider (1)
whether the [defendant’s] successful and unsuccessful [counter]claims were related; and (2)
whether the [defendant’s] overall level of success justifies a fee award based on the hours expended
by [defendant’s] counsel.” Flitton v. Primary Residential Mortg., Inc., 614 F.3d 1173, 1176–77
(10th Cir. 2010). The Court need not cut any fees here because the Defendant’s attorney represents
he reduced the fees to “isolate only the major tasks completed to prosecute,” although Defendant
“actually incurred more fees than requested.” Doc. 222 at ¶ 12. The Court finds Barnett’s
representation credible, and in reviewing each billing entry, the Court sees no evidence that Barnett
billed for unsuccessful efforts to obtain fees on other claims. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
hours were reasonably expended.
B.
Hourly rates are reasonable and reflect prevailing market rate.
Moreover, Barnett and his associates’ hourly rates of $350, $220, and $295 respectively
are reasonable and reflects the prevailing market rate in the relevant community considering the
area in which Barnett and the two associates practice, as well as their respective experience and
1
Barnett attests that his usual, hourly rate is 510/hour, Rudolph’s is $340/hour, and Broggi’s is $330/hour.
4
skill. A court should generally establish an hourly rate based on what evidence shows the market
commands for lawyers of comparable skill and experience practicing in the area of analogous
litigation. The hourly rates requested by counsel must reflect the prevailing market rates in the
community. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995).
Counsel submitted billing records that he attests relate to working on Defendant’s open
account counterclaim amounting to a total of 560.50 hours Plaintiff did not object or show that
the hours were in fact not related to the open account claim. Thus, the Court concludes that
Defendant has established that its counsel reasonably spent a total 560.50 hours. The Court further
concurs with Judge Ritter’s conclusions as to the reasonable hourly rates for Defendant’s attorneys.
See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1234 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“party requesting the fees bears ‘the burden of showing that the requested rates are in line with
those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,
experience, and reputation’ ” (citation omitted)). The Court notes that in 2018 it observed that it
“has previously stated that $200.00 per hour is a ‘relatively low rate’ for attorneys in New Mexico.”
O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal in U.S. v. Duke, 343 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1087 n.14
(D.N.M. 2018). In fact, awards of hourly rates of $275.00 and higher are not atypical in this District
for attorneys with 11 years or more of legal experience. See id. (summarizing awards of attorney
rates in District of New Mexico); see also Rehburg v. Bob Hubbard Horse Transportation, Inc.,
2019 WL 5653958, at *2 n.1 (D.N.M.) (same).
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s fees are reasonable. Plaintiff has not objected
to the reasonableness of this calculation. Therefore, the Court approves Defendant’s requested
attorneys’ fees in the amount of $143,687.50. Defendant is directed to file a proposed judgment
on the docket, specifically itemizing damages and a proposed total. Defendant shall email a
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word document detailing the same to chambers. Plaintiff shall have 14 days from the date of
filing of the proposed judgment to file objections to the Court.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s requested attorney’s fees are reasonable. The Court approves the requested
fee award in the amount of $143,687.50.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Request for Attorneys’ Fees, on the
basis of Barnett’s Affidavit in Support of Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 222) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall file on the docket a proposed
judgment detailing the specific amounts awarded in this action and submit a word document
detailing the same to chambers.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
KEA W. RIGGS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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