Matlock v. Social Security Administration

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Kirtan Khalsa granting 22 MOTION to Remand to Agency FOR A REHEARING WITH SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM. (kc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

CHRISTINE MATLOCK,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civ. No. 16-1215 KK

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER2
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Social Security Administrative Record
(Doc. 15) filed April 26, 2017, in support of Plaintiff Christine Matlock’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint
(Doc. 1) seeking review of the decision of Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration, (“Defendant” or “Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s
claim for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI supplemental security income
benefits. On July 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed her Motion to Remand or Reverse (“Motion”).
(Doc. 22.) The Commissioner filed a Response in opposition on September 22, 2017 (Doc. 24),
and Plaintiff filed a Reply on October 11, 2017. (Doc. 25.) The Court has jurisdiction to review
the Commissioner’s final decision under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). Having meticulously
reviewed the entire record and the applicable law and being fully advised in the premises, the
Court finds the Motion is well taken and is GRANTED.
1

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Nancy A. Berryhill is substituted for Carolyn Colvin as the Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

2

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to the undersigned to conduct any or all proceedings, and to
enter an order of judgment, in this case. (Docs. 6, 9, 10.)

I. Background and Procedural Record
Claimant Christine Matlock (“Ms. Matlock”) alleges that she became disabled on July 15,
2009, at the age of forty because of fibromyalgia, back pain, foot pain, neck pain, chronic
sleeping disorder, depression, mood disorder, blurred vision, breathing problems, and thyroid
problems. (Tr. 252, 271.3) Ms. Matlock completed high school in 1986, and completed lab
assistant, surgical technician, and certified nurse assistant courses in 2004, 2005 and 2006,
respectively. (Tr. 272.) Ms. Matlock worked as a caregiver, clerk/cashier, lab assistant, surgical
technician, office clerk, and waitress/cook. (Tr. 257.) Ms. Matlock stopped working on July 15,
2009, because of her medical conditions. (Tr. 271.)
On November 26, 2012, Ms. Matlock protectively filed an application for Social Security
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42
U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Tr. 219-222, 253.) Ms. Matlock concurrently filed an application for
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq.
(Tr. 223-28.) Ms. Matlock’s applications were initially denied on February 22, 2013. (Tr. 6982, 83-96, 97, 98, 131-35.) They were denied again at reconsideration on August 9, 2013.
(Tr. 99-113, 114-28, 129, 130, 138-41.) On October 1, 2013, Ms. Matlock requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 142-43.) ALJ Myriam C. Fernandez Rice
conducted a hearing on May 14, 2015. (Tr. 33-67.) Ms. Matlock appeared in person at the
hearing with attorney representative Michael Armstrong. (Id.) The ALJ took testimony from
Ms. Matlock (Tr. 39-59, 60-63), and an impartial vocational expert (“VE”), Judith Beard.
(Tr. 59-61, 63-66.) On June 22, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 14-27.)

3

Citations to “Tr.” are to the Transcript of the Administrative Record (Doc. 15) that was lodged with the Court on
April 26, 2017.

2

On September 3, 2016, the Appeals Council issued its decision denying Ms. Matlock’s
request for review and upholding the ALJ’s final decision. (Tr. 1-4.) On November 4, 2016,
Ms. Matlock timely filed a Complaint seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final
decision. (Doc. 1.)
II. Applicable Law
A.

Disability Determination Process

An individual is considered disabled for purposes of Social Security disability insurance
benefits if she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Social Security Commissioner has adopted the familiar five-step
sequential analysis to determine whether a person satisfies the statutory criteria as follows:
(1)

At step one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in
“substantial gainful activity.”4 If the claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity, she is not disabled regardless of her medical condition.

(2)

At step two, the ALJ must determine the severity of the claimed physical
or mental impairment(s). If the claimant does not have an impairment(s)
or combination of impairments that is severe and meets the duration
requirement, she is not disabled.

(3)

At step three, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant’s impairment(s)
meets or equals in severity one of the listings described in Appendix 1 of
the regulations and meets the duration requirement. If so, a claimant is
presumed disabled.

(4)

If, however, the claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal in severity
one of the listing described in Appendix 1 of the regulations, the ALJ must
determine at step four whether the claimant can perform her “past relevant
work.” Answering this question involves three phases. Winfrey v. Chater,

4

Substantial work activity is work activity that involves doing significant physical or mental activities. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1572(a), 416.972(a). Work may be substantial even if it is done on a part-time basis or if you do less, get
paid less, or have less responsibility than when you worked before. Id. Gainful work activity is work activity that
you do for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(b), 416.972(b).

3

92 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996). First, the ALJ considers all of the
relevant medical and other evidence and determines what is “the most
[claimant] can still do despite [her physical and mental] limitations.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). This is called the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Id. §§ 404.1545(a)(3),
416.945(a)(3). Second, the ALJ determines the physical and mental
demands of claimant’s past work. Third, the ALJ determines whether,
given claimant’s RFC, the claimant is capable of meeting those demands.
A claimant who is capable of returning to past relevant work is not
disabled.
(5)

If the claimant does not have the RFC to perform her past relevant work,
the Commissioner, at step five, must show that the claimant is able to
perform other work in the national economy, considering the claimant’s
RFC, age, education, and work experience. If the Commissioner is unable
to make that showing, the claimant is deemed disabled. If, however, the
Commissioner is able to make the required showing, the claimant is
deemed not disabled.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005);
Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005). The claimant has the initial burden of
establishing a disability in the first four steps of this analysis. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,
146, n.5, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294, n. 5, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987).

The burden shifts to the

Commissioner at step five to show that the claimant is capable of performing work in the
national economy. Id. A finding that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the
five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Serv., 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991).
B.

Standard of Review

This Court must affirm the Commissioner’s denial of social security benefits unless
(1) the decision is not supported by “substantial evidence” or (2) the ALJ did not apply the
proper legal standards in reaching the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365
F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004); Langley v. Barnhart, 373 F.3d 1116, 1118 (10th Cir. 2004);
Casias, 933 F.2d at 800-01. In making these determinations, the Court “neither reweigh[s] the
4

evidence nor substitute[s] [its] judgment for that of the agency.’” Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d
1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008). A decision is based on substantial evidence where it is supported
by “relevant evidence . . . a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118. A decision “is not based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed
by other evidence in the record[,]” Langley, 373 F.3d at 1118, or “constitutes mere conclusion.”
Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). The agency decision must “provide
this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have been
followed.” Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005). Therefore, although an
ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence, “the record must demonstrate that the
ALJ considered all of the evidence,” and “the [ALJ’s] reasons for finding a claimant not
disabled” must be “articulated with sufficient particularity.” Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007,
1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996).
III. Analysis
The ALJ made her decision that Ms. Matlock was not disabled at step four of the
sequential evaluation. She found that Ms. Matlock had the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a).
Specifically, the claimant is able to lift up to 20 pounds on an occasional basis; lift
or carry up to 10 pounds frequently; stand or walk for approximately six hours per
eight-hour workday; and sit for approximately six hours per eight-hour workday,
with normal breaks. From a mental standpoint, the claimant is able to understand,
remember, and carry out detailed, but not complex instructions; make decisions;
attend and concentrate for extended periods of time; accept instructions; and
respond appropriately to changes in routine work settings. She should have only
occasional in person interaction with the public and co-workers, but no limitations
with telephone interactions.

5

(Tr. 22.) Based on the RFC and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Matlock
was capable of performing her past relevant work as a medical coder and that she was not
disabled. (Tr. 27.)
Ms. Matlock argues in support of her Motion that (1) the ALJ’s decision does not include
a necessary function-by-function assessment of Ms. Matlock’s ability to do sustained
work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis;
and (2) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinions of State agency examining
psychological consultant Louis Wynne, Ph.D., State agency nonexamining psychological
consultant Carol Mohney, Ph.D., and Treating Psychologist Bradley Samuel, Ph.D. (Doc. 22 at
8-16.) The Court finds grounds for remand as discussed below.
A.

Mental Impairment Medical Opinion Evidence
1.

State Agency Examining Psychological Consultant Louis
Wynne, Ph.D.

On February 3, 2012, Ms. Matlock presented to State agency examining psychological
consultant Louis Wynne, Ph.D., for a disability determination examination.5

(Tr. 378-81.)

Ms. Matlock reported a medical history of fibromyalgia, possible heart murmur, periodic
breathing difficulties, a microplasm, Chlamydia-pneumonia, hypothyroidism, an auto-immune
condition related to her eyes, spine issues, and possible degenerative disc disease. (Tr. 380.)
She also described falling off a swing as a child and hitting her head; falling off a horse as a child
and hitting her head on a rock; and hitting her head against bunk beds more than once as a child
– all without medical attention. (Tr. 379.) Ms. Matlock reported a mental health history of
5

On October 20, 2010, Dr. Wynne performed a disability determination examination related to an earlier claim for
disability. (Tr. 534-36.) Dr. Wynne’s Axis I diagnoses were major depression, mood disorder/depression, r/o
cognitive disorder, r/o borderline intellectual functioning. (Tr. 536-37.) Dr. Wynne’s assessed then that
Ms. Matlock “could read and understand basic written instructions but her concentration and ability to persist at
simple work tasks are at least mildly impaired. She could interact with the general public and her coworkers but she
might have difficulty interacting with her supervisors. She also might have difficulty adapting to changes in the
workplace. She could recognize obvious hazards but she could not manage her own benefit payments.” (Tr. 536.)

6

depression in her mid-20s due to an abusive relationship. (Tr. 380.) Dr. Wynne noted that
(1) Ms. Matlock maintained good eye contact, related easily, and was cooperative; (2) her affect
was flat, but she was alert and knew the purpose of the examination; (3) she spoke clearly, and
loudness, emphasis, tonality, and amount of speech were all within normal limits; (4) she denied
any alterations in consciousness and her sensorium seemed clear with no indication of any drugs
or psychotic process; and (5) she was not a good historian. (Tr. 378.) On mental status exam,
Ms. Matlock was (1) able to copy a pair of intersecting pentagons; (2) remember and carry out a
written three-part set of directions; (3) count backwards from 100 both by threes and by sevens;
(4) remember a set of four digits forwards and backwards; (5) spell a common five-letter word
backwards; (6) remember two of three words at an interval of three minutes with two intervening
tasks; and (7) unevenly perform operations of simple arithmetic. (Tr. 379.) Dr. Wynne observed
that Ms. Matlock’s judgment, based on her answers to Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-type
comprehension questions, was unimpaired.

(Id.)

Dr. Wynne estimated Ms. Matlock was

probably of average intelligence before puberty, but that her current intelligence was probably
lower. (Id.)
Dr. Wynne summarized that
[Ms. Matlock] is a 43-year-old woman who looked her age. She cooperated fully
with this examination and there is no reason to suspect malingering or
dissimulation.
She can read and understand basic written instructions and her concentration and
ability to persist at simple work tasks are no more than mildly impaired. She
could not interact well with the general public, her coworkers, or her supervisors,
and she also might have difficulty adapting to changes in the workplace. She
could recognize obvious hazards and manage her own benefit payments.
(Tr. 380.) Dr. Wynne’s Axis I diagnoses included major depression, recurrent, severe, without
psychotic features, and mood disorder/depression due to severe chronic illness. (Tr. 381.)

7

Dr. Wynne noted an Axis III diagnosis of history of head injury “[p]er claimant allegations.”
(Id.) Dr. Wynne assessed a GAF score of 48.6 (Id.)
The ALJ accorded only partial weight to Dr. Wynne’s opinion explaining that (1) a good
portion of his opinion was based on Ms. Matlock’s self reports of a history of head injuries;
(2) Dr. Wynne indicated that Ms. Matlock was a poor historian and her claims should be verified
before any reliance was placed on them; (3) Ms. Matlock performed well on the mental exam
testing; (4) Ms. Matlock was currently attending a certificate course for medical billing/coding,
which involves more than basic simple instructions and tasks; and (5) Dr. Wynne does not have a
treating relationship with the claimant and his evaluation was only a snapshot of the claimant’s
overall functional limitations. (Tr. 24-25.)
2.

State Agency Nonexamining Psychological Consultant Carol
Mohney, Ph.D.

On February 21, 2013, State agency nonexamining psychological consultant Carol
Mohney, Ph.D., reviewed Ms. Matlock’s records at the initial level of evaluating Ms. Matlock’s
disability claim.7 (Tr. 75-76, 79-80.) Dr. Mohney prepared a Psychiatric Review Technique
Form (“PRTF”)8 and a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (“MRFCA”). (Id.) In

6

The GAF is a subjective determination based on a scale of 100 to 1 of “clinician’s judgment of the individual’s
overall level of functioning.” Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.
2000) at 32. GAF score of 41-50 indicates serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals,
frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends,
unable to keep a job). Id. at 34.
7

Dr. Mohney reviewed Dr. Louis Wynne’s consultative exam findings and Ms. Matlock’s reported activities of
daily living. (Tr. 75.)
8

“The psychiatric review technique described in 20 CFR 404.1520a and 416.920a and summarized on the
Psychiatric Review Technique Form (PRTF) requires adjudicators to assess an individual’s limitations and
restrictions from a mental impairment(s) in categories identified in the “paragraph B” and “paragraph C” criteria of
the adult mental disorders listings. The adjudicator must remember that the limitations identified in the “paragraph
B” and “paragraph C” criteria are not an RFC assessment but are used to rate the severity of mental impairment(s) at
steps 2 and 3 of the sequential evaluation process.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *4. Dr. Mohney assessed that
Ms. Matlock had mild restrictions in activities of daily living; moderate difficulties in maintaining social

8

Section I of the MRFCA, Dr. Mohney assessed that Ms. Matlock had no limitations in her ability
to (1) to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting; (2) to be aware of normal hazards
and take appropriate precautions; (3) to travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation;
and (4) to set realistic goals or make plans independently of others. (Tr. 80.) Dr. Mohney
assessed that she was not significantly limited in her ability (1) to remember locations and worklike procedures; (2) to understand and remember very short and simple instructions; (3) to carry
out very short and simple instructions; (4) to perform activities within a schedule, maintain
regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances; (5) to make simple workrelated decisions; (6) to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable
number and length of rest periods; (7) to ask simple questions or request assistance; and (8) to
maintain socially appropriate behavior and to adhere to basic standards of neatness and
cleanliness. (Tr. 79-80.) Dr. Mohney assessed that Ms. Matlock was moderately limited in her
ability to (1) understand and remember detailed instructions; (2) to carry out detailed
instructions; (3) to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; (4) to sustain an
ordinary routine without special supervision; (5) to work in coordination with or in proximity to
others without being distracted by them; (6) to interact appropriately with the general public;
(7) to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; and (8) to get
along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes. (Id.)
In Section III of the MRFCA, Dr. Mohney explained that “[b]ased on the MER and ADLs, the
claimant is capable of performing simple, unskilled work involving limited interactions with
others.” (Tr. 80.)

functioning; moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence and pace; and no repeated episodes of
decompensation. (Tr. 75.)

9

The ALJ noted in her determination, without more, that “[t]he State agency determined
that the claimant could perform simple unskilled work with limited interactions with others[.]”
(Tr. 26.)
3.

State Agency Nonexamining Psychological Consultant Paul
Cherry, Ph.D.

On August 1, 2013, State agency nonexamining psychological consultant Paul Cherry,
Ph.D., reviewed Ms. Matlock’s records at the reconsideration level of evaluating Ms. Matlock’s
disability claim.9 (Tr. 105-06, 109-111.) Dr. Cherry’s MRFCA findings and assessment were
identical to Dr. Mohney’s, (Tr. 79-80, 109-111), and Dr. Cherry concluded that based on the
medical evidence record and Ms. Matlock’s activities of daily living that Ms. Matlock was
capable of performing simple, unskilled work involving limited interactions with others. (Tr.
111.)
The ALJ noted in her determination, without more, that “[t]he State agency determined
that the claimant could perform simple unskilled work with limited interactions with others[.]”
(Tr. 26.)
4.

Treating Psychologist Bradley Samuel, Ph.D.

On September 23, 2014, Ms. Matlock presented to Bradley Samuel, Ph.D., at the
University of New Mexico’s Department of Family and Community Medicine. (Tr. 471-72.)
Ms. Matlock was referred by her primary care physician Valerie Carrejo, M.D., who stated
“[t]his patient has a history of depression, anxiety and is requesting counseling.” (Tr. 471.)
Ms. Matlock reported a history of chronic pain in the form of fibromyalgia, sleeplessness,

9

Dr. Cherry reviewed Dr. Louis Wynne’s consultative exam findings and Ms. Matlock’s reported activities of daily
living. (Tr. 106.) Dr. Cherry also added a “Recon Discussion,” that noted his review of records from a February 7,
2013, “well woman” exam, and July 2, 2013, family practice visit with subjective complaints of fatigue and
depression. (Id.) Dr. Cherry concluded that “[p]rior unskilled still appears reasonable.” (Id.)

10

problems with blurry vision, depression, anxiety, and reports that all were chronic conditions.
(Id.) She reported depression on and off since childhood. (Id.) She stated that her medical
conditions began 20 years ago related to multiple causes, but in particular that she “swallowed a
filling at a dentist’s office” resulting in high mercury in her blood. (Tr. 470-71.) Ms. Matlock
described her symptoms of depression and fibromyalgia as “foggy brain, chronic pain, as noted
sleeping, hypersensitive to food, meds, thirst.” (Tr. 471.) She also described depression as
sadness, “at which point she became tearful.” (Id.) Ms. Matlock endorsed passive suicidal
ideation. (Id.)
On mental status exam, Dr. Samuel noted that Ms. Matlock was (1) very laid back, calm
demeanor; (2) described herself as a “pushover”; (3) oriented in all spheres; (4) very talkative
and anxious; (5) suicidal ideation noted – risk deemed low to moderate – will monitor;
(6) attention, memory and concentration intact; and (7) tearful when asked to check in with
herself and breath. (Id.)
Dr. Samuel admitted Ms. Matlock to the Behavioral Health Clinic and anticipated 6-12
sessions to address her depression, anxiety, and chronic pain. (Tr. 472.) Dr. Samuel’s discharge
diagnoses were (1) major depressive disorder, recurrent, moderate, and will assess for
posttraumatic stress disorder. (Id.)
Ms. Matlock saw Dr. Samuel again on October 13, 2014. (Tr. 470.) Dr. Samuel noted
that “[s]omatic concerns/sleep problems remain salient focus of treatment.” (Id.) He noted that
Ms. Matlock listed all of her ideas about her various medical problems, including “high mercury
in [her] blood,” and worried when the medical community didn’t take her seriously. (Id.)
Dr. Samuel noted that Ms. Matlock (1) reported emotional pain; (2) was quite tearful and sad;
(3) was angry because of not feeling safe in the interpersonal sphere. (Id.) Dr. Samuel explained

11

that Ms. Matlock conveyed she was not safe or comfortable in her own body, and that it was hard
for her to trust doctors because they don’t believe her. (Id.) Dr. Samuel indicated he was left
wondering about the role anxiety and social anxiety played in Ms. Matlock’s decision making.
(Id.)
Dr. Samuel’s discharge diagnosis on this date was major depressive disorder, recurrent,
moderate. (Tr. 470.) Dr. Samuel indicated that Ms. Matlock was “unable to work due to
multiple somatic medical conditions.” (Id.) He planned to rule out conversion disorder and
somatic disorder. (Id.)
On May 28, 2015, Dr. Samuel completed a Medical Assessment of Ability To Do WorkRelated Activities (Mental). (Tr. 530-31.) In the category of “Understanding and Memory
Limitations,” Dr. Samuel assessed that Ms. Matlock had moderate limitations in her ability to
understand and remember detailed instructions. (Tr. 530.) He made no assessment regarding
Ms. Matlock’s ability (1) to remember locations and work-like procedures and (2) to understand
and remember very short and simple instructions. (Id.) Dr. Samuel explained that he was unable
to comment because he had only seen Ms. Matlock twice, but that she reported memory and
concentration difficulties and he noted at intake that she reported “foggy brain.” (Id.) In the
category of “Sustained Concentration and Persistence Limitations,” Dr. Samuel assessed that
Ms. Matlock had slight limitations in her ability to make simple work-related decisions;
moderate limitations in her ability (1) to maintain attention and concentration for extended
periods of time (i.e., 2-hour segments); and (2) to sustain an ordinary routine without special
supervision. (Id.) He assessed she had marked limitations in her ability (1) to carry out detailed
instructions; and (2) to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance and be
punctual within customary tolerance.

(Id.)

Dr. Samuel made no assessment regarding

12

Ms. Matlock’s ability (1) to carry out very short and simple instructions; (2) to work in
coordination with/or proximity to others without being distracted by them; and (3) to complete a
normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychological based symptoms and to
perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. (Id.)
Dr. Samuel explained that he was unable to evaluate “most of the above” because Ms. Matlock
was seen for two one hour appointments and the focus was on treatment for depression and less
on assessment for work. (Id.) In the category of “Social Interaction Limitations,” Dr. Samuel
assessed that Ms. Matlock had moderate limitations in her ability (1) to interact appropriately
with the general public; and (2) to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from
supervisors. (Tr. 531.) He assessed marked limitations in her ability to ask simple questions or
request assistance. (Id.) Dr. Samuel made no assessment regarding Ms. Matlock’s ability (1) to
get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremities;
or (2) to maintain socially appropriate behavior and adhere to basic standards of neatness and
cleanliness. (Id.) Dr. Samuel referred to Ms. Matlock’s medical records and explained that he
was unable to comment or assess this category in full. (Id.) Finally, the category of “Adaptation
Limitations,” Dr. Samuel made no assessments, and explained that he was unable to evaluate
based on only two medical notes. (Id.)
Dr. Samuel described Ms. Matlock’s mental limitations as “emotionally compromised /
somatic complaints / “foggy brain” / sadness – chronic pain / difficulty tracking conversation.”
(Tr. 531.)
Dr. Samuel also completed a 12.04 Affective Disorders form and indicated that
Ms. Matlock had depressive syndrome characterized by sleep disturbance, decreased energy,
difficulty concentrating or thinking, and thoughts of suicide, that resulted in marked restrictions

13

of activities of daily living, marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and marked
difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (Tr. 532.) Dr. Samuel also
checked that Ms. Matlock had a medically documented history of a chronic affective disorder of
at least 2 years’ duration that has caused more than a minimal limitation of ability to do basic
work activities, with symptoms or signs currently attenuated by medication or psychosocial
support. (Id.)
The ALJ accorded Dr. Samuel’s opinion little weight because he indicated he was unable
to assess Ms. Matlock’s limitations in several functional areas, because he had a limited
treatment history with her, and because he indicated that he relied on her self-reports of
symptoms to reach his conclusions. (Tr. 25.)
B.

The ALJ Failed To Properly Evaluate the Medical Opinion Evidence
Related to Ms. Matlock’s Mental Impairments

Ms. Matlock argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinion evidence
related to her mental impairments. Specifically, she argues that (1) the ALJ’s reasons for
rejecting Dr. Wynne’s opinion are not legitimate and were based, in part, on speculation (2) the
ALJ failed to evaluate Dr. Mohney’s opinion at all, and to the extent the ALJ inadvertently
adopted certain of Dr. Mohney’s limitations, she rejected others without explanation; and (3) the
ALJ applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating Dr. Samuel’s opinion and failed to provide
legitimate reasons for rejecting his opinion. (Doc. 22 at 11-16.) The Commissioner contends
that the ALJ’s RFC adequately accounted for Ms. Matlock’s mental limitations. (Doc. 24 at 69.) The Commissioner specifically asserts that (1) the ALJ reasonably relied on Ms. Matlock’s
testimony regarding her online participation in a medical billing/coding class to determine that
Ms. Matlock was capable of more than unskilled work; (2) the ALJ adequately captured the
social limitations assessed by the various medical opinions, and (3) the ALJ reasonably called
14

into question Dr. Samuel’s status as a treating physician and properly relied on the constraints
Dr. Samuel himself placed on his opinion. (Id.) The Commissioner concludes that although the
ALJ’s decision may be technically imperfect, the ALJ’s reasoning is discernable and remand is
not warranted. (Id.)
“An ALJ must evaluate every medical opinion in the record, although the weight given
each opinion will vary according to the relationship between the disability claimant and the
medical professional.” Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1215.

Specifically, when assessing a claimant’s

RFC, an ALJ must explain what weight is assigned to each opinion and why. SSR 96-5p, 1996
WL 374183 at *5.10 “An ALJ must also consider a series of specific factors in determining what
weight to give any medical opinion.” Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1215 (citing Goatcher v. United
States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 52 F.3d 288, 290 (10th Cir. 1995)).11 An ALJ need not
articulate every factor; however, the ALJ’s decision must be “sufficiently specific to make clear
to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical
opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir.
2007). In deciding how much weight to give a treating source opinion, an ALJ must first
determine whether the opinion qualifies for controlling weight. Langley, 373 F.3d at 1119
(citing Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003)).

Even if a treating

physician’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, “[t]reating source medical opinions are
still entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the [regulatory] factors.”

Id.

10

The Social Security Administration rescinded SSR 96-5p effective March 27, 2017, only to the extent it is
inconsistent with or duplicative of final rules promulgated related to Medical Source Opinions on Issues Reserved to
the Commissioner found in 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920b and 416.927 and applicable to claims filed on or after March 27,
2017. 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5845, 5867, 5869.
11

These factors include the examining relationship, treatment relationship, length and frequency of examinations,
the degree to which the opinion is supported by relevant evidence, the opinion’s consistency with the record as a
whole, and whether the opinion is that of a specialist. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2)-(6) (evaluating opinion
evidence for claims filed before March 27, 2017).

15

Generally the opinion of a treating physician is given more weight than that of an examining
consultant, and the opinion of a non-examining consultant is given the least weight of all.
Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004). Ultimately, ALJs are required to
weigh medical source opinions and to provide “appropriate explanations for accepting or
rejecting such opinions.” SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 at *5 (emphasis added); see KeyesZachary v Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e)(2)(ii))).
1.

The ALJ’s Reasons for According Partial Weight to
Dr. Wynne’s Opinion Are Not Supported by Substantial
Evidence
a.

The ALJ’s First Explanation

In discounting Dr. Wynne’s opinion, the ALJ first explained that “a good portion of
[Dr. Wynne’s] opinion was based on Ms. Matlock’s self reports of a history of head injuries.”
(Tr. 24.) The Court’s review of Dr. Wynne’s report does not support this explanation. In his
report, Dr. Wynne documented Ms. Matlock’s childhood medical history, in which she reported
hitting her head on different occasions. (Tr. 379.) Dr. Wynne then noted an Axis III (general
medical conditions)12 diagnosis that “[p]er claimant allegations, history of head injury.” (Tr.
381.) Dr. Wynne also noted Axis I (clinical disorder) diagnoses of major depression and mood
disorder.13 (Tr. 381.) In summarizing his conclusions and impressions, Dr. Wynne explained
that his “impressions [were] based on [his] estimation of the claimant’s psychological condition
and not on any medical limitations that might be present.” (Tr. 380.) (Emphasis added.) There
is no indication explicitly or implicitly in Dr. Wynne’s report to suggest that a “good portion” of
his functional assessment was based on Ms. Matlock’s history of head injuries.

At best, the

12

General medical conditions can be regarded as being directly related to mental disorders, being important to the
overall diagnostic picture, or not having a sufficient relationship. http://www.psyweb.com/DSM_IV/jsp/Axis_III.jsp.

13

Axis I is the top-level of the DSM multiaxial system of diagnosis. It represents acute symptoms that need
treatment. http://www.psyweb.com/DSM_IV/jsp/Axis_I.jsp.

16

ALJ’s first explanation amounts to mere speculation, which is not allowed, and is not supported
by substantial evidence. See generally Langley, 373 F.3d at 1121 (an ALJ may not make
speculative inferences from medical reports).
b.

The ALJ’s Second Explanation

The ALJ next explained that Dr. Wynne indicated that Ms. Matlock was a poor historian
and that her claims should be verified before any reliance was placed on them. (Tr. 24.)
However, the ALJ mischaracterized Dr. Wynne’s statement. Dr. Wynne made no reference to
discounting Ms. Matlock’s “claims” based on being a poor historian. Instead, Dr. Wynne stated
that the details in the following account of her various histories (childhood, education, family,
employment and medical) should be verified before any reliance is placed on them because she
was not a good historian. (Tr. 379.) Importantly, Dr. Wynne stated elsewhere in his opinion that
Ms. Matlock cooperated fully with the examination and there was no reason to suspect
malingering or dissimulation.

(Tr. 380.)

The ALJ’s second explanation mischaracterizes

Dr. Wynne’s statement and is not supported by substantial evidence.
c.

The ALJ’s Third Explanation

The ALJ next explained that she discounted Dr. Wynne’s opinion because Ms. Matlock
performed well on the mental status exam.

However, Dr. Wynne was well aware of

Ms. Matlock’s performance on the mental status exam and nonetheless diagnosed her with major
depression and mood disorder and assessed her with certain functional limitations.

“[A]

psychological opinion may rest either on observed signs and symptoms or on psychological
tests,” and Dr. Wynne’s observations about Ms. Matlock’s limitations constituted “specific
medical findings.” Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the
ALJ’s third explanation, without more, amounts to substituting her lay opinion for that of

17

Dr. Wynne’s, which is not allowed. See generally Langley, 373 F.3d at 1121 (an ALJ may not
reject a medical opinion due to her own lay opinion).
d.

The ALJ’s Fourth Explanation

The ALJ’s fourth explanation, that Ms. Matlock was “currently attending a certificate
course for medical billing/coding, which involves more than basic simple instructions and tasks,”
is not supported by substantial evidence. (Tr. 24.) At the Administrative Hearing, Ms. Matlock
testified that she was enrolled in an at-home study course for medical billing and coding. (Tr.
39.) She further testified that she previously worked as an “on-the-job training” medical coder in
2003. (Id.) The ALJ asked Ms. Matlock
Q.

And how long have you been trying to, this most recent attempt? When
did that start?

A.

About a year and four months ago, I started it.

Q.

How long of a course is it?

A.

It’s self-pace, and I’m about 80% done.

Q.

And how many credit hours is it?

A.

It – I feel bad. I don’t think it has credit hours. It’s like a certificate
program.

Q.

Okay. What’s the normal – if you were to do this full time, 40 hours a
week, how quick would it, would you be able to accomplish it?

A.

Oh, finish the school, you mean?

Q.

Yes.

Atty: Speak up.
A.

Oh, speak up? Trying to think. I want to say a year.

Q.

How many hours a week do you engage in study for this program?

A.

I probably study about three days a week.
18

Q.

And is that in evenings, throughout the day?

A.

Yeah, I pretty much do it during the night, because I sleep in the day and
then stay awake at night. So, pretty much, I study all night.
...

Q.

And the medical billing you’re doing – school you’re doing now, do you
expect to finish that?

A.

Yeah, um-hum.

Q.

And is that a job you think you’d be able to do?

A.

I’m hoping, that’s why I’m doing it. It’s been a struggle for me to find
work that I can do. My – the reason I – I heard it on the radio, and they
were making a big deal about working at home, so that’s kind of why I
thought, oh, that’s, you know, something I could probably do. And, you
know, so I’m trying to – hope that I can – when I’m done I can do that at
home, basically.

Q.

Okay. Are you struggling at all with the material, comprehension.

A.

Off and on. Like, I try to do, like, certain things that help my – I get brain
fog, but – I know it sounds strange. Sometimes I have, like, an ionizer or
the TENS unit that I use on my back. I know it’s some – for some reason
it might stimulate my brain and kind of help me with memory and stuff.
So I use that and the ionizer rocks, and that seems to help. I don’t know
why, but I just have it nearby when I’m studying, so that seems to help.

...
Atty: So the reason that you’re going through this medical coding and billing is
because you had experience doing this back in 2003, and you’re hoping
that maybe you could do that from home?
A.

Yes.

Atty: You don’t think that you could work eight hours a day, five days a week at
a job site?
A.

Oh, no.

Atty: Okay. Why not?

19

A.

I’ve just tried it. I’ve been down that road, tried really hard, and it just –
yeah, because of my – all of my health issues just, kind of accumulate
from the stress. . . .

(Tr. 39-40, 48-49.) The ALJ subsequently determined, based on this testimony, that since
Ms. Matlock was in school for a semi-skilled job, she must have the mental capacity for
semi-skilled work. The ALJ then concluded that Ms. Matlock was capable of performing her
past relevant work as a medical coder. (Id.)
There are several problems with the ALJ’s conclusion. First, the ALJ failed to make any
of the necessary findings about the mental work demands of Ms. Matlock’s previous “on-the-job
training” medical coder position, which an ALJ must do in the second phase of the step four
findings. The Tenth Circuit clearly instructs that
[a]t the second phase of the step four analysis, the ALJ must make findings
regarding the physical and mental demands of the claimant’s past relevant work.
. . . When the claimant has a mental impairment, “care must be taken to obtain a
precise description of the particular job duties which are likely to produce tension
and anxiety, e.g., speed, precision, complexity of tasks, independent judgments,
working with other people, etc., in order to determine if the mental impairment is
compatible with the performance of such work.”
Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1024 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Henrie v. United States Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., 13 F.3d 359, 361 (10th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis added). Here, the ALJ
made no inquiry into, or any findings specifying, the mental demands of Ms. Matlock’s past
relevant work as she actually performed it or as it is performed in the national economy. This is
error. Id.
Second, the ALJ improperly relied on Ms. Matlock’s enrollment in a self-study course,
without more, as substantial evidence to support that Ms. Matlock could perform semi-skilled
work. Here, other than Ms. Matlock’s testimony about her enrollment in the course, the ALJ
failed to obtain or provide in the record any objective evidence about the course itself. For

20

example, there is no objective evidence regarding the educational online institution offering the
course; what, if any, prerequisites were required for taking the course; the course’s level of
complexity; Ms. Matlock’s performance in the course; the average time it should take to
complete the course in comparison to the time Ms. Matlock is actually taking;14 whether
completion of the course includes certification or whether certification testing is separate; or
what Ms. Matlock would be qualified to do if she were to complete the course; i.e., medical
coding and/or medical billing. In other words, there is nothing in the record to support the ALJ’s
conclusion that Ms. Matlock is capable of semi-skilled work simply because she is enrolled in an
online class that may or may not qualify her for a potential job that is classified as semiskilled.
Moreover, the ALJ’s conclusion flies in the face of the uncontradicted medical opinion evidence
in this case that Ms. Matlock’s mental impairments limited her to simple, unskilled work.15
Finally, and contrary to the ALJ’s statement that Ms. Matlock indicated she was not
having difficulty with the course material (Tr. 26), Ms. Matlock testified that she struggled with
comprehending the material “off and on” due to brain fog (Tr. 48). Ms. Matlock further testified
that even though she was hoping to find some kind of work she could do at home, she was
incapable of working full time at a job site and had not worked full time since 2003 due to her
medical conditions. (Tr. 49.) Thus, the ALJ mischaracterized Ms. Matlock’s testimony, and

14

When asked, Ms. Matlock thought that if someone were taking the course full time, forty hours a week, that it
would take a year to complete the course. (Tr. 40.)

15

On February 2, 2012, Dr. Wynne assessed, inter alia, that Ms. Matlock could read and understand basic written
instructions and her concentration and ability to persist at simple work tasks was no more than mildly impaired. (Tr.
380.) He further assessed that Ms. Matlock could not interact well with the general public, her coworkers, or her
supervisors. (Id.) On February 21, 2013, Dr. Mohney assessed that Ms. Matlock could perform simple unskilled
work with limited interactions with others. (Tr. 80.) On August 1, 2013, Dr. Cherry assessed that Ms. Matlock
could perform simple unskilled work with limited interactions with others. (Tr. 111.) On May 28, 2015, Dr. Samuel
assessed, inter alia, that Ms. Matlock had moderate limitations in her ability to understand and remember detailed
instructions and marked limitations in her ability to carry out detailed instructions. (Tr. 530-31.) He further
assessed that Ms. Matlock had moderate limitations in her ability to interact with the general public and accept
instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (Tr. 531.)

21

failed to consider whether Ms. Matlock was capable of performing the work on a continuing
basis if she were to successfully complete her at-home course.16 See SSR 96-8p, WL 374184, at
*7 (explaining that the ALJ must discuss the individual’s ability to perform sustained work in an
ordinary work setting).
For these reasons, the ALJ’s fourth explanation for discounting Dr. Wynne’s opinion is
not supported by substantial evidence.
e.

The ALJ’s Fifth Explanation

Finally, the ALJ explained that Dr. Wynne did not have a treating relationship with the
claimant and his evaluation was only a snapshot of her overall functional limitations. In Chapo
v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1291 (10th Cir. 2012), the Tenth Circuit held that a limited treatment
relationship does not, by itself, form a proper basis for rejecting a medical-source opinion
because “otherwise the opinions of consultative examiners would essentially be worthless, when
in fact they are often fully relied on as the dispositive basis for RFC findings.” Id. Although the
ALJ provided other reasons for according little weight to Dr. Wynne’s opinion, they are not
supported by substantial evidence. And, because Dr. Wynne’s consultative examiner’s opinion
cannot be discounted solely on that basis, the ALJ’s fifth explanation for discounting
Dr. Wynne’s opinion is also erroneous.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ’s reasons for discounting
Dr. Wynne’s opinion are not supported by substantial evidence.

16

Although briefly touched on here, the Court does not fully analyze Ms. Matlock’s argument that the ALJ’s
decision does not include a necessary function-by-function assessment of Ms. Matlock’s ability to do sustained
work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis.

22

2.

The ALJ’s Failure To Evaluate the State Agency
Nonexamining Psychological Consultant Opinions Is Not
Harmless Error

“‘It is the ALJ’s duty to give consideration to all the medical opinions in the record.
[S]he must also discuss the weight [s]he assigns to such opinions,’ including the opinions of state
agency medical consultants.” Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 578 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012)). Further, the need for express
analysis is only weakened “[w]hen the ALJ does not need to reject or weigh evidence
unfavorably in order to determine a claimant’s RFC.” Id. (quoting Keyes-Zachary, 695 F.3d at
1162).

The failure to weigh a medical opinion involves harmless error if there is no

inconsistency between the opinion and the ALJ’s assessment of residual functional capacity. Id.
at 578-79 (citing Keyes-Zachary, 695 F.3d at 1162-63).

In that case, the claimant is not

prejudiced “because giving greater weight to [the opinion] would not have helped her.” Id.
(quoting Keyes-Zachary, 695 F.3d at 1163).

Here, the ALJ mentioned the State agency

psychological consultant opinions only by stating that they “determined that the claimant could
perform simple unskilled work with limited interactions with others[.]” (Tr. 26.) This is
insufficient. In this case, the State agency psychological consultant opinions are inconsistent
with the ALJ’s mental RFC, and giving them greater weight could have altered the ALJ’s mental
RFC.

Further, in implicitly rejecting their opinions, the ALJ was required to provide an

appropriate explanation for doing so. She did not. For these reasons, the ALJ’s failure to
consider and weigh the State agency nonexamining psychological consultant opinions is not
harmless error.

23

3.

The ALJ Applied the Incorrect Legal Standard for Weighing
Dr. Samuel’s Opinion and Her Reasons for According It Little
Weight Are Not Supported by Substantial Evidence

The ALJ failed to apply the correct legal standard in evaluating Dr. Samuel’s opinion.
See Langley, 373 F.3d at 1119 (describing what has come to be known as the treating physician
rule for evaluating and weighing treating physician opinions). Instead, the ALJ incorrectly
evaluated Dr. Samuel’s opinion in accordance with SSR 06-03. SSR 06-3 clarifies how the
Administration considers both opinion evidence from sources who are not “acceptable medical
sources” and decisions by other governmental and nongovernmental agencies on the issue of
disability or blindness, neither of which applies to Dr. Samuel. SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939,
at *1. But Dr. Samuel is a clinical psychologist at the University of New Mexico Health
Sciences’ Department of Family & Community Medicine, and as such, is an acceptable medical
source.17 Moreover, on September 23, 2014, Dr. Samuel engaged in a treating relationship with
Ms. Matlock to address her depression, anxiety, and chronic pain. (Tr. 472.) Thus, he was also a
treating physician.
The ALJ also failed to provide legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. Samuel’s
assessment. The ALJ first explained that she discounted Dr. Samuel’s opinion because he was
unable to assess Ms. Matlock’s limitations in several functional areas. (Tr. 25.) However, in
completing the medical source statement, Dr. Samuel explained that he had only seen
Ms. Matlock twice and that the focus of their sessions was on her depression and not on
assessing her capacity for work. (Tr. 530.) Nonetheless, Dr. Samuel assessed certain functional
limitations while leaving blank the areas of inquiry he determined he was unable to evaluate.
17

“Acceptable medical sources” are licensed physicians, licensed or certified psychologists, licensed optometrists,
licensed podiatrists, and qualified speech-language pathologists. SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *1. (Effective
March 27, 2017, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 was amended to include licensed audiologists, licensed advanced practice
registered nurses, and licensed physician assistants as acceptable medical sources, but only with respect to claims
filed on or after March 27, 2017. 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, 5863 (2017)).

24

(Id.) The ALJ had a duty to evaluate Dr. Samuel’s assessed limitations by applying the factors
set out in the regulations. See Langley, 373 F.3d at 1119 (even if a treating physician’s opinion
is not entitled to controlling weight, “[t]reating source medical opinions are still entitled to
deference and must be weighed using all of the [regulatory] factors.” Id. It was, therefore,
improper for the ALJ to outright reject Dr. Samuel’s assessed functional limitations simply
because there were areas of functional limitation he determined he was unable to evaluate.
The ALJ next explained that she discounted Dr. Samuel’s opinion because of the limited
nature of their treatment history and because Dr. Samuel indicated that he relied on
Ms. Matlock’s self-reports of symptoms to reach his conclusion. (Tr. 25.) As to the former,
although the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination is one of the
factors an ALJ must consider in evaluating and weighing a treating source opinion, it is not the
only one. Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1215. Here, the ALJ failed to consider at all that Dr. Samuel was
a treating source and that his assessed limitations were consistent with the other medical opinions
in the record.18 As to the latter, having found Ms. Matlock not credible, the ALJ could discount
Dr. Samuel’s findings to the extent they relied on what Ms. Matlock told him. Beard v. Colvin,
642 F. App’x 850, 852 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). However, “a psychological opinion may
rest either on observed signs and symptoms or on psychological tests,” and Dr. Samuel’s
observations about Ms. Matlock limitations constituted “specific medical findings.” Robinson,
366 F.3d at 1083. Here, the ALJ failed to discuss that Dr. Samuel diagnosed Ms. Matlock with
major depressive disorder, and planned to rule out post-traumatic stress disorder, conversion
disorder, and somatic disorder. (Tr. 470, 472.) The ALJ failed to discuss that Dr. Samuel

18

See fn. 15, supra.

25

concluded that Ms. Matlock was “unable to work due to multiple somatic medical conditions.”19
(Tr. 470.)

The ALJ failed to discuss Dr. Samuel’s description of Ms. Matlock’s mental

limitations as emotionally compromised, somatic complaints, “foggy brain,” sadness – chronic
pain, and difficulty tracking conversation. (Tr. 531.) The ALJ failed to discuss that Dr. Samuel
opined that Ms. Matlock met the listing criteria for 12.04 Affective Disorder.20 (Tr. 532.) In
short, the ALJ failed to discuss and provide any reasons for rejecting Dr. Samuel’s objective
diagnoses and descriptions of Ms. Matlock’s mental impairments. For these reasons, the ALJ’s
explanation for according Dr. Samuel’s opinion little weight is not supported by substantial
evidence.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical opinion
evidence related to Ms. Matlock’s mental impairments and the ALJ’s mental RFC is not
supported by substantial evidence. As such, this case requires remand.
C.

Remaining Issues

The Court will not address Ms. Matlock’s remaining claims of error because they may be
impacted by the ALJ’s treatment of this case on remand. Wilson v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297,
1299 (10th Cir. 2003).

19

The Court is aware that the ALJ is responsible for determining whether Ms. Matlock is disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1). However, an ALJ must consider and review opinions from medical sources that
a claimant is disabled. Id.

20

See §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2) (explaining that the ALJ will consider opinions from medical sources on
issues such as whether a claimant’s impairment(s) meet or equal the requirements of any impairment in the Listing
of Impairments in appendix 1).

26

IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Ms. Matlock’s Motion to Remand or Reverse (Doc. 22) is
GRANTED.

_____________________________________
KIRTAN KHALSA
United States Magistrate Judge,
Presiding by Consent

27