Jarvis v. United States of America

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge James O. Browning adopting 11 Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition; the Defendant/Movant's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, filed November 4, 2016 [Doc. 1] is DENIED; and this case is dismissed with prejudice. (kg)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Nos. CIV 16-1216 JB/KK
CR 13-2379 JB

JOHANNES “JOHN” JARVIS,
Defendant/Movant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on: (i) the Defendant/Movant’s Motion Under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, filed
November 4, 2016 (Doc. 1)(“Motion”); and (ii) Memorandum of Law and Argument in Support
of Motion to Vacate Set Aside or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2255, filed November
4, 2016 (Doc. 2)(“Memorandum”), pro se, by Defendant/Movant Johannes “John” Jarvis. On
June 30, 2017, the Honorable Kirtan Khalsa, United States Magistrate Judge, entered Proposed
Findings and a Recommended Disposition, filed June 30, 2017 (Doc. 11)(“PFRD”), regarding
Jarvis’ Motion. In her PFRD, Magistrate Judge Khalsa recommended that the Court rule that the
Motion, exhibits, and record conclusively establish that Jarvis is not entitled to the relief he
seeks. See PFRD at 11. Magistrate Judge Khalsa further recommended that the Court dismiss
with prejudice Jarvis’ Motion. See PFRD at 11.
The parties had until on or about Monday, July 17, 2017, to timely object to the PFRD.
See PFRD at 12. As of the date of entry of this Order, no objections have been filed. Upon
review of the record, the Court concludes that Magistrate Judge Khalsa’s PFRD is not clearly

erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion. The Court accordingly
adopts the PFRD.
LAW REGARDING OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
District courts may refer dispositive motions to a Magistrate Judge for a recommended
disposition.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)(“A magistrate judge must promptly conduct the

required proceedings when assigned, without parties’ consent, to hear a pretrial matter
dispositive of a claim or defense . . . .”). Result 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
governs objections to recommendations from a Magistrate Judge and provides: “Within 10 days
after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file
specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Under the rule,
when resolving objections, “the district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate
judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or
modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3)
Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 636 provides:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also
receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The filing of objections to the magistrate’s report enables the district
judge to focus attention on those issues -- factual and legal -- that are at the heart of the parties’
dispute.”

United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, With Building, Appurtenances,

Improvements, and Contents, 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)(“One Parcel”)(quoting

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Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985)). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has noted, “the filing of objections advanced the interests that underlie the Magistrate’s
Act [28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639], including judicial efficiency.” One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1059 (citing
Niehaus v. Kansas Bar Ass’n, 793 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Walters,
638 F.2d 947, 950 (6th Cir. 1981)).
The Tenth Circuit held in One Parcel “that a party’s objections to the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo
review by the district court or for appellate review.” One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060. “To further
advance the policies behind the Magistrate’s Act, [the Tenth Circuit], like numerous other
circuits, ha[s] adopted ‘a firm waiver rule’ that ‘provides that the failure to make timely
objections to the magistrate’s findings or recommendations waives appellate review of both
factual and legal questions.’” One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1059 (citations omitted).
In addition to requiring specificity in objections, the Tenth Circuit has stated that
“[i]ssues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation are
deemed waived.” Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996). See United States v.
Garfinkle, 261 F.3d 1030, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 2001)(“In this circuit, theories raised for the first
time in objections to the magistrate judge’s report are deemed waived.”). In an unpublished
opinion, the Tenth Circuit stated that “the district court correctly held that [a petitioner] had
waived [an] argument by failing to raise it before the magistrate.” Pevehouse v. Scibana, 229 F.
App’x 795, 796 (10th Cir. 2007)(unpublished).
In One Parcel, the Tenth Circuit, in accord with other United States Courts of Appeals,
expanded the waiver rule to cover objections that are timely but too general. See One Parcel, 73
F.3d at 1060. The Supreme Court of the United States -- in the course of approving the United

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States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s use of the waiver rule -- has noted:
It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a
magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard
when neither party objects to those findings. The House and Senate Reports
accompanying the 1976 amendments do not expressly consider what sore or
review the strict court should perform when no party objects to the magistrate’s
report. See S. Rep. No. 94-625, pp. 9-10 (1976)(hereafter Senate Report); H.R.
Rep. No. 94-1609, p. 11 (1976); U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1976, p. 6162
(hereafter House Report). There is nothing in those Reports, however, that
demonstrates an intent to require the district court to give any more consideration
to the magistrate judge’s report than the court considers appropriate. Moreover,
the Subcommittee that drafted and held hearing on the 1976 amendments had
before it the guidelines of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
concerning the efficient use of magistrates. Those guidelines recommended to the
district courts that “[w]here a magistrate makes a finding or ruling on a motion or
an issue, his determination should become that of the district court, unless specific
objection is filed within a reasonable time.” See Jurisdiction of the United States
Magistrates, Hearings on S. 1283 before the Subcommittee on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., 24 (1975)(emphasis added)(hereafter Senate Hearings). The Committee
also heard Judge Metzner of the Southern District of New York, the chairman of
the Judicial Conference Committee on the administration of the magistrate
system, testify that he personally followed that practice. See id., at 11 (“If any
objections come in, . . . I review [the record] and decide it. If no objections come
in, I merely sign the magistrate’s order.”) The Judicial Conference of the United
States, which supported the de novo standard of review eventually incorporated in
§ 636(b)(1)(C), opined that in most instances no party would object to the
magistrate’s recommendation, and the litigation would terminate with the judge’s
adoption of the magistrate’s report. See Senate Hearings, at 35, 37. Congress
apparently assumed, therefore, that any party who was dissatisfied for any reason
with the magistrate’s report would file objections, and those objections would
trigger district court review. There is no indication that Congress, in enacting §
636(b)(1)(C), intended to require a district judge to review a magistrate’s report to
which no objections are filed. It did not preclude treating the failure to object as a
procedural default, waiving the right to further consideration of any sort. We thus
find nothing in the statute or the legislative history that convinces us that
Congress intended to forbid a rule such as the one adopted by the Sixth Circuit.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 150-52 (emphasis in original)(footnotes omitted).
The Tenth Circuit also noted, “however, that ‘[t]he waiver rule as a procedural bar need
not be applied when the interests of justice so dictate.’” One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060 (quoting
Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991)(“We join those circuits that have
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declined to apply the waiver rule to a pro se litigant’s failure to object when the magistrate’s
order does not apprise the pro se litigant of the consequences of a failure to object to findings and
recommendations.”)(citations omitted). Cf. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 154 (noting that, while
“[a]ny party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of any issue need only
ask,” a failure to object “does not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at
the request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard”). In One Parcel, the Tenth Circuit
noted that the district judge had decided sua sponte to conduct a de novo review despite the lack
of specificity in the objections, but the Tenth Circuit held that it would deem the issues waived
on appeal because it would advance the interests underlying the waiver rule. See 73 F.3d at
1060-61 (citing cases from other Courts of Appeals where district courts elected to address
merits despite potential application of waiver rule, but the Courts of Appeals opted to enforce
waiver rule).
Where a party filed timely and specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed
findings and recommendations, “on [] dispositive motions, the statute calls for a de novo
determination, not a de novo hearing.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674 (1980).
“[I]n providing for a ‘de novo determination’ rather than a de novo hearing, Congress intended to
permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to
place on a magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. at 676 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); citing Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 275 (1976)).
The Tenth Circuit requires a “district court to consider relevant evidence of record and not
merely review the magistrate judge’s recommendation” when conducting a de novo review of a
party’s timely, specific objections to the magistrate’s report. In re Griego, 64 F.3d 580, 583-84
(10th Cir. 1995). “When objections are made to the magistrate’s factual findings based on

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conflicting testimony or evidence . . . the district court must, at a minimum, listen to a tape
recording or read a transcript of the evidentiary hearing.” Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d 1005, 1008-09
(10th Cir. 1987).
A district court must “clearly indicate that it is conducting a de novo determination”
when a party objects to the Magistrate Judge’s report “based upon conflicting evidence or
testimony.” Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d at 1009. On the other hand, a district court fails to meet 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)’s requirements when it indicates that it gave “considerable deference to the
magistrate’s order.” Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (10th Cir. 1988).
A district court need not, however, “make any specific findings; the district court must merely
conduct a de novo review of the record.” Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 766
(10th Cir. 2000). “[T]he district court is presumed to know that de novo review is required. . . .
Consequently, a brief order expressly stating the court conducted de novo review is sufficient.”
Northington v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1570 (10th Cir. 1996)(citing In re Griego, 64 F.3d at 58384). “[E]xpress references to de novo review in its order must be taken to mean it properly
considered the pertinent portions of the record, absent some clear indication otherwise.”
Bratcher v. Bray-Doyle Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 42, 8 F.3d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 1993). The Tenth
Circuit has previously held that a district court properly conducted a de novo review of a party’s
evidentiary objections when the district court’s “terse” order contained one sentence for each of
the party’s “substantive claims” and did “not mention his procedural challenges to the
jurisdiction of the magistrate to hear the motion.” Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d at
766. The Tenth Circuit has explained that brief district court orders that “merely repeat the
language of § 636(b)(1) to indicate its compliance” are sufficient to demonstrate that the district
court conducted a de novo review:

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It is common practice among district judges in this circuit to make such a
statement and adopt the magistrate judges’ recommended dispositions when they
find that magistrate judges have dealt with the issues fully and accurately and that
they could add little of value to that analysis. We cannot interpret the district
court’s statement as establishing that it failed to perform the required de novo
review.
In re Griego, 64 F.3d at 584.
Notably, because a district court may place whatever reliance it chooses on a Magistrate
Judge’s proposed findings and recommendations, a district court “may accept, reject, or modify,
in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate,” 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1), as the “Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise
of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate’s proposed findings and
recommendations,” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676 (emphasis omitted). See Bratcher
v. Bray-Doyle Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 42, 8 F.3d at 724-25 (holding that the district court’s
adoption of the Magistrate Judge’s “particular reasonable-hour estimates” is consistent with the
de novo determination that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and United States v. Raddatz require).
Where no party objects to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and recommended
disposition, the Court will still review the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations. In Pablo v. Soc.
Sec. Admin., 2013 WL 1010401 (D.N.M. 2013)(Browning, J.), the plaintiff failed to respond to
the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and recommended disposition, and thus waived his
right to appeal the recommendations, but the Court nevertheless conducted a review. See 2010
WL 1010401, at *3. The Court, thus, does not determine independently what it would do if the
issues had come before the Court first, but rather adopts the proposed findings and recommended
disposition where “[t]he Court cannot say that the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation . . . is
clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion.” Pablo v. Soc.
Sec. Admin., 2013 WL 1010401, at *4. See Alexandre v. Astrue, 2013 WL 1010439, at *4
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(D.N.M. 2013)(Browning, J.)(“The Court rather reviewed the findings and recommendations of
the Honorable Stephan M. Vidmar, United States Magistrate Judge, to determine if they are
clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion. The Court
determines that they are not, and will therefore adopt the PFRD.”); Trujillo v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,
2013 WL 1009050, at *5 (D.N.M. 2013)(Browning, J.)(adopting the proposed findings and
conclusions, noting: “The Court did not review the ARD de novo, because Trujillo has not
objected to it, but rather reviewed the . . . findings and recommendations to determine if they are
clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion, which they are
not.”). This review, which is deferential to the Magistrate Judge’s work when there is no
objection, nonetheless provides some review in the interest of justice, and seems more consistent
with the wavier rule’s intent than no review at all or a full-fledged review. Accordingly, the
Court considers this standard of review appropriate. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. at 151
(“There is nothing in those Reports, however, that demonstrates an intent to require the district
court to give any more consideration to the magistrate’s report than the court considers
appropriate.”).
ANALYSIS
Although no party objected to the PFRD before the deadline to make objections, the
Court has reviewed the PFRD under the appropriate standard of review. Judge Khalsa’s findings
and recommended disposition in the PFRD are not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, obviously
contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion. The Court will, therefore, adopt the PFRD as its own.
IT IS ORDERED that: (i) the Magistrate Judge’s Proposed Findings and a
Recommended Disposition, filed June 30, 2017 (Doc. 11), are adopted as an order of the Court;
(ii) the Defendant/Movant’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

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Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, filed November 4, 2016 (Doc. 1), is denied; and (iii)
this case is dismissed with prejudice.

________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Parties and counsel:
Damon Martinez
United States Attorney
Paige Messec
Assistant United States Attorney
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Mexico
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Attorneys for the Plaintiff/Respondent
Johannes “John” Jarvis
Sheridan Federal Prison Camp
Sheridan, Oregon
Defendant/Movant pro se

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