Kennicott et al v. Sandia Corporation

Filing 170

ORDER DENYING 156 Motion to Stay by Magistrate Judge Gregory J. Fouratt. (kdj)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
LISA A. KENNICOTT, LISA A.
GARCIA, SUE C. PHELPS, and
JUDI DOOLITTLE, on behalf
of themselves and a class of those similarly
situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civ. No. 17-188 JB/GJF

SANDIA CORPORATION d/b/a SANDIA
NATIONAL LABORATORIES,
Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Sandia Corporation’s (“Sandia’s”) “Motion
to Stay Discovery Pending Ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Class Claims” (“Motion to
Stay”) [ECF No. 156]. The Motion to Stay is fully briefed. See ECF Nos. 158 (Plaintiffs’
Response) and 166 (Sandia’s Reply). 1 Because Sandia has not met its difficult burden of
justifying the suspension of the discovery process that has been ongoing for more than a year, the
Court will DENY the motion and require that discovery proceed as ordered.
I.

SUMMARY OF PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
In its Motion to Stay, Sandia asserts that the temporary stay it requests will advance three

principal purposes: (1) promoting judicial economy, (2) minimizing potentially unnecessary
litigation costs, and (3) increasing the possibility of settlement. Def.’s Mot. to Stay 1, ECF No.
156. Sandia contends that a temporary stay pending a decision on its “Motion to Dismiss

1

In a discovery management conference on August 30, 2018, the Court inquired whether the parties desired oral
argument on the Motion to Stay. See Clerk’s Mins. 2, ECF No. 161 (Aug. 30, 2018) (Discovery Management
Conference). Both parties declined. See id.

1

Plaintiffs’ Class Claims” (“Motion to Dismiss”) [ECF No. 155] is justified because Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint “abandons Plaintiffs’ original class claims and fails to plausibly assert any
new claims that can satisfy the requirements for proceeding as a class action.” Id. at 3. Sandia
also argues that the amount of documentary and digital discovery it already has produced will
ensure that Plaintiffs are not prejudiced by the granting of the stay. Id. at 5. In sum, Sandia
posits that granting a temporary stay for the purposes it has identified will “further the ‘just,
speedy and inexpensive determination’ of this matter in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.” Id. at 4.
Plaintiffs object to the stay for several reasons. First, they predict that Sandia is not likely
to prevail on its Motion to Dismiss. Pls.’ Resp. to Mot. to Stay (“Pls.’ Resp.”) 1, ECF No. 158.
They also assert that Sandia’s Motion to Dismiss does not seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ disparate
treatment class claim, but only the disparate impact class claim, a circumstance that will require
class discovery to proceed irrespective of the decision on the Motion to Dismiss. Id. Plaintiffs
next contend that Sandia has not claimed nor demonstrated any undue burden associated with
ongoing class discovery. Id. Rather, according to Plaintiffs, the requested stay is merely the
latest salvo in Sandia’s long-running campaign of delaying disclosure. Id. Finally and overall,
Plaintiffs contend that the requested stay will actually frustrate the three purposes proffered by
Sandia as reasons for granting the stay. Id., passim.
In reply, Sandia argues that Plaintiffs are misconstruing its Motion to Dismiss, insisting
that its motion seeks dismissal of all class claims in the Amended Complaint. Def.’s Reply to
Pls.’ Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Stay 2 (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 166. In addition, Sandia repeats
that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint jettisoned the principal legal theory on which this putative
class action was originally based. Id. at 4. This turn of events, according to Sandia, warrants a

2

temporary stay of discovery until the Court can decide whether Plaintiffs’ change in legal theory
is fatal to their class claims. Id.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS
The parties do not quarrel with the axiom that federal trial courts have broad discretion to

regulate discovery. See, e.g., Morales v. E.D. Etnyre & Co., 229 F.R.D. 661, 662 (D.N.M. 2005)
(Browning, J.). Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, upon a
showing of good cause, a court may “issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” which may include forbidding or
suspending disclosure or discovery. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(A). Accord Miller v. Regents of the
Univ. of Colo., No. 98-1012, 1999 WL 506520, at *12 (10th Cir. July 19, 1999) (unpublished
table decision) (reasoning that “[t]he district court is in the best position to weigh these variables
and determine the appropriate limits because, unlike an appellate court, the district court has the
ability to view firsthand the progression of the case, the litigants, and the impact of discovery on
parties and nonparties”).
“It is the party seeking the protective order who has the burden to show good cause for a
protective order.”

Velasquez v. Frontier Med. Inc., 229 F.R.D. 197, 200 (D.N.M. 2005)

(Browning, J.); accord Anderson Living Tr. v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, No. CIV 12-0040
JB/KBM, 2013 WL 5934394, at *3 (D.N.M. Oct. 17, 2013) (unpublished) (Browning, J.). The
party seeking the protective order must submit “a particular and specific demonstration of fact,
as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S.
89, 102 n.16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
III.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR STAYS OF DISCOVERY
A court has broad discretion in managing its docket, which includes staying all or

3

portions of a civil case. Pueblo of Pojoaque v. New Mexico, 214 F. Supp. 3d 1028, 1084
(D.N.M. 2016) (Browning, J.) (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997) (citing Landis
v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)).
[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket
with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of
judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an
even balance.
Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55. Whether to stay discovery depends to a substantial degree on the
facts and procedural progress of each individual case. Anderson, 2013 WL 5934394 at *5;
Swepi, LP v. Mora County, No. CIV 14-0035 JB/SCY, 2014 WL 7474084 at *16 (D.N.M. Dec.
19, 2014) (Browning, J.).
The party seeking a stay faces a “difficult burden.” Pueblo of Pojoaque, 214 F. Supp. 3d
at 1084 (citing Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 708 (“The proponent of a stay bears the burden of
establishing its need.”)). “In particular, where a movant seeks relief that would delay court
proceedings by other litigants he must make a strong showing of necessity because the relief
would severely affect the rights of others.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Chilcott
Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 713 F.2d 1477, 1484 (10th Cir. 1983). “The underlying principle clearly
is that ‘[t]he right to proceed in court should not be denied except under the most extreme
circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Klein v. Adams & Peck, 436 F.2d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1971)).
The Tenth Circuit has acknowledged a district court’s discretion in issuing discovery
stays. In Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch., 43 F.3d 1373 (10th Cir. 1994), the defendants argued “that
they had an absolute right to a stay of discovery” after they filed a motion for qualified
immunity, and appealed to the Tenth Circuit because the district court imposed conditions on the
stay. Id. at 1386. The Tenth Circuit rebuffed the strict rules that the defendants suggested:
4

As a general rule, discovery rulings are within the broad discretion
of the trial court. The trial court’s decision on discovery matters
will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and
firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment
or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.
Id.
IV.

ANALYSIS
For the following reasons, the Court in its discretion will deny the stay. 2 The Court

recognizes that the parties vigorously dispute the merits of Sandia’s Motion to Dismiss, even
including whether that motion takes aim at all or only some of the class claims in the Amended
Complaint. The merits of these disputes are squarely before Judge Browning in the pending
Motion to Dismiss. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 155, Pls.’ Resp. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot.
to Dismiss, ECF No. 157, and Def.’s Reply to Pls.’ Resp. in Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No.
165. It is enough to observe that there appears to be merit in each party’s position on these
issues. Certainly, if Judge Browning were to agree with Plaintiffs that Sandia’s motion stopped
short of requesting dismissal of all class claims – or on the larger issue of whether the Amended
Complaint adequately states class claims – there would be no need at all to stay class discovery
and doing so would work even further delay in a discovery process that has at times been
sluggish. On the other hand, if Sandia’s argument carries the day and all of the class claims are
dismissed, then any class-specific discovery accomplished in the meantime may have been for
naught. Regardless, it would be presumptuous for this Court to attempt to forecast how Judge
Browning will decide these legal issues and then grant or deny the stay based on its hunch. The
2

As an initial matter, the Court found none of the cases cited by the parties to be especially persuasive in resolving
this motion. That observation should not be taken as criticism of the parties, but rather as a recognition of the notion
that protective orders in discovery turn on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. Although illuminating
for their application of the general rules associated with deciding whether to grant a stay, each of the cases cited by
the parties had facts and procedural postures significantly different from this case. Given the substantial asymmetry
between those cases and this one, the Court is left to apply its wide discretion regarding stays of discovery to the
facts and procedural posture of this case.

5

better course for this Court is to maintain the status quo and leave the discovery process
untouched.
The Court is also not convinced that the three principal purposes that Sandia has
identified will in fact be served by granting the requested stay. In terms of promoting judicial
economy, the Court is not concerned that its resources will be unnecessarily expended in
refereeing any class discovery disputes that arise in the interim before Judge Browning rules on
the Motion to Dismiss. Currently, there are no pending motions to compel even though the
parties have now re-engaged in discovery. See Def.’s Reply 5 n.1. Even if such a motion was
filed and fully briefed in the interim, the judicial resources required to resolve it would not be so
substantial as to actually disserve judicial economy. The same is true for the periodic discovery
management conferences this Court holds in this case. To the contrary, the Court believes that
judicial economy would better be served by having the parties persist in discovery with the
ultimate goal of ending this case sooner rather than later.
As for reducing the litigation expense of what Sandia predicts will be unnecessary
discovery, Sandia’s argument is sound only as far as it goes. It is true enough that money spent
on a task that later may turn out not to have been necessary is money that cannot be recouped.
But in the Court’s view, the marginal savings associated with temporarily staying the completion
of class discovery tasks, some of which Sandia has represented are at or near completion, are
insufficient to justify such a stay. See, e.g., Joint Discovery Status Report #13, ECF No. 154
(Sandia “completing its review of ESI relating to 25 custodians, which includes tens of
thousands of documents, and anticipates making an initial production in early-to-mid August”
pending its requested stay of discovery). Without belaboring the point, the Court believes that
the balance between advancing a case – that soon enough will begin its third year – toward its

6

ultimate conclusion versus saving a well-resourced and robustly-defended corporate litigant a
small amount of litigation expense comes down decidedly in favor of the former. This is
especially true given the absence of any demonstrable showing by Sandia that continuing to
engage in class discovery will saddle it with an “undue” burden.
With respect to the requested stay enhancing the prospects of settlement, the Court will
accept at face value Plaintiffs’ position that a stay will leave them without sufficient information
on which to make reasonably informed settlement decisions. See Pls.’ Resp. 4 n.2. Plaintiffs’
position is understandable, given the enormous differences in value (and exposure) embodied in
the class claims compared to the individual claims. The Court will also note that Sandia’s
suggestion that granting a stay “may prompt meaningful settlement discussions,” Def.’s Mot. 5,
does not rest comfortably alongside its assertion that settling this case is unlikely until after the
presiding judge has decided whether to certify a class. See Clerk’s Mins. 5, ECF No. 144 (Jun.
28, 2018) (Discovery Status Conference) (Sandia “would not be willing to discuss a class
settlement without there first being an order certifying a class”); see also Clerk’s Mins. 6, ECF
No. 111 (May 2, 2018) (Hearing on Motion to Compel).
In the final analysis, as the proponent of the stay, Sandia bore the “difficult burden” of
convincing this Court that the extraordinary measure of staying discovery – particularly in a case
in which discovery has been ongoing (and contentious) for well more than a year – is
appropriate. For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Sandia has not satisfied its
burden.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Ruling on
Sandia’s Motion to Dismiss Class Claims [ECF No. 156] is DENIED.

7

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in accordance with the Interim Discovery Order
[ECF No. 162], the parties shall submit a joint proposed revised schedule or competing proposed
revised schedules not later than seven days from the date on which this Order is filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

________________________________________
THE HONORABLE GREGORY J. FOURATT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8