Holler v. Social Security Administration
ORDER by Magistrate Judge Gregory B. Wormuth denying 17 Motion to Remand to Agency. (bni)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
Civ. No. 17‐241 GBW
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security
ORDER DENYING REMAND
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand the Social
Security Agency (“SSA”) decision to deny Plaintiff Social Security Disability Insurance
benefits (“SSDI”). Doc. 17. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED,
and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
Plaintiff filed an initial application for SSDI on September 9, 2013. AR at 165‐68.
Plaintiff alleged that he had a disability resulting from a fracture of his left tibia, injured
shoulder, foot pain and insomnia. AR at 192. His application was denied on initial review
on October 21, 2013 and again on reconsideration on January 14, 2014. AR at 103‐07, 109‐
14. On February 12, 2014, Plaintiff requested a hearing on the determination by an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), and the hearing before the ALJ took place on May 29,
2015. AR at 125‐26, 61‐101. On July 10, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision,
finding that Plaintiff could return to his past relevant work as a route salesman/sales route
driver and was therefore not disabled. AR at 43‐49. Notwithstanding that finding, the
ALJ proceeded to step five of the five‐step disability evaluation and found in the
alternative that Plaintiff could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the
national economy, including the jobs of kitchen helper, hospital cleaner, or industrial
sweeper/cleaner. AR at 49‐50. The ALJ therefore found that Plaintiff was not disabled.
AR at 50.
Plaintiff appealed the denial of his application to the Appeals Council, which
denied review on December 23, 2016. AR at 1‐3. Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on
February 17, 2017, seeking review of the ALJ’s decision. Doc. 1.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a court may review a final decision of the
Commissioner only to determine whether it (1) is supported by “substantial evidence” and
(2) comports with the proper legal standards. Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 933
F.2d 799, 800‐01 (10th Cir. 1991). “In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, we neither reweigh the
evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d
1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).
Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Casias, 933 F.3d
at 800. “The record must demonstrate that the ALJ considered all of the evidence.” Clifton
v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009‐10 (10th Cir. 1996). “[I]n addition to discussing the evidence
supporting his decision, the ALJ must also discuss the uncontroverted evidence he chooses
not to rely upon, as well as significantly probative evidence he rejects.” Id. at 1010. “The
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent
[the] findings from being supported by substantial evidence.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080,
1084 (10th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by conducting a flawed analysis and
determination of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), and that the Appeals
Council erred by failing to properly consider new qualifying evidence. Doc. 17 at 6‐9.
Defendant argues that the ALJ properly analyzed and determined Plaintiff’s RFC and that
the Appeals Council did not err, because the additional evidence considered by the
Appeals Council does not cast doubt on the ALJ’s decision. Doc. 19 at 7‐11. Ultimately,
the Court concludes that the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s RFC comported with the
applicable legal standards and was supported by substantial evidence, and that the
additional evidence that Plaintiff submitted to the Appeals Council would not have
changed the disability determination.
A. Legal Standard
For purposes of Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, an individual is
disabled when he or she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). To determine whether a person satisfies
these criteria, the SSA has developed a five‐step test. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If the
Commissioner finds an individual disabled at any step, the next step is not taken. Id. §
At the first four steps of the analysis, the claimant has the burden to show: (1) he is
not engaged in “substantial gainful activity;” (2) he has a “severe medically determinable .
. . impairment . . . or a combination of impairments” that has lasted or is expected to last
for at least one year; and that either (3) his impairments meet or equal one of the “Listings”
of presumptively disabling impairments; or (4) he is unable to perform his “past relevant
work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i–iv); Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 2005).
Step four of this analysis consists of three phases. Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017,
1023 (10th Cir. 1996). First, the ALJ determines the claimant’s RFC in light of “all of the
relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). A claimant’s RFC is “the
most [he] can still do despite [physical and mental] limitations.” Id. §
404.1545(a)(1). Second, the ALJ determines the physical and mental demands of the
claimant’s past work. “To make the necessary findings, the ALJ must obtain adequate
‘factual information about those work demands which have a bearing on the medically
established limitations.’” Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1024 (quoting Social Security Ruling (SSR) 82‐
62 (1982)). Third, the ALJ determines whether, in light of the RFC, the claimant is capable
of meeting those demands. Id. at 1023, 1025.
If the ALJ concludes that the claimant cannot engage in past relevant work, the ALJ
then proceeds to step five of the evaluation process. At step five, the burden of proof
shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant is able to perform other work in the
national economy, considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education,
and work experience. Grogan, 399 F.3d at 1257.
B. The ALJ’s Decision
On July 10, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s application for
benefits. AR at 43‐50. In denying Plaintiff’s application, the ALJ applied the five‐step
sequential analysis. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity during the period from his amended alleged onset date of
March 12, 2011 through his date last insured of December 31, 2011. AR at 45. At step two,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe impairment: non‐displaced
lateral malleolus fracture. AR at 45. At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “did
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
severity” of one of the listed impairments. AR at 46.
At step four, the ALJ determined that through the date last insured, Plaintiff had
the RFC to perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(c), with certain
limitations, including that Plaintiff:
can lift 50 pounds occasionally and lift or carry 25 pounds frequently and
push or pull the same. He can stand or walk for 6 hours of an 8‐hour day
and sit for 6 hours of an 8‐hour day with normal breaks. He can occasionally
climb ramps and stairs but never ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. He can
frequently balance and must avoid more than frequent exposure to excessive
vibration and unprotected heights.
AR at 46. As the next part of step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff, through the date last
insured, was capable of performing his past relevant work as a Route Salesman/Sales
Route Driver. AR at 48‐49. Normally, such a finding would justify a determination of
non‐disability at step four without requiring the ALJ to proceed to step five of the analysis.
See Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1988); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
However, the ALJ chose to proceed to step five and made the alternative finding that
Plaintiff could also perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy. AR at 49‐50. Accordingly, at step five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not
disabled. AR at 50.
A. The ALJ Adhered to Proper Legal Standards when Analyzing and
Determining Plaintiff’s RFC
Plaintiff’s first argument in support of his motion to remand is that the ALJ
committed reversible error in his analysis and findings regarding Plaintiff’s RFC. Plaintiff
presents four separate grounds for this argument. Doc. 17 at 6‐8; doc. 20 at 3‐4. First, the
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in failing to describe the functional limitations caused by his
left leg fracture. Second, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to give adequate findings and
reasons for his decision that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform medium work. Third,
Plaintiff argues that his past relevant work as a sales route driver does not qualify him to
perform other sedentary, semiskilled work as a telephone solicitor because his sales route
driver occupation has a mathematical development requirement lower than the telephone
solicitor occupation. Fourth, the Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider
the Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. The Court will address each of these arguments in
1. The ALJ Did Not Err in Failing to Describe the Functional Limitations
Caused by Plaintiff’s Left Leg Fracture
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in failing to explain, specifically, how he found
that Plaintiff could be on his feet for six hours out of each eight‐hour day. Doc. 17 at 7; doc.
20 at 3. However, where the Court “can follow the adjudicator’s reasoning in conducting
our review, and can determine that correct legal standards have been applied, merely
technical omissions in the ALJ’s decision do not dictate reversal.” Keyes‐Zachary v. Astrue,
695 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012). The ALJ’s failure to include a detailed and
independent discussion of Plaintiff’s ability to stand is just such a circumstance.
The ALJ provided sufficient analysis to enable subsequent reviewers to follow his
reasoning. The ALJ notes that Plaintiff testified that he can stand for approximately 45
minutes before needing to sit and rest. AR at 47, 83. Although the ALJ only found
Plaintiff partially credible, and found that Plaintiff’s activities were not consistent with
such allegations, the ALJ gave the Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt when assessing
Plaintiff’s ability to stand. AR at 47. Thus, the ALJ calculated that Plaintiff could stand for
approximately 45 minutes out of every hour. He then multiplied this fraction, 45/60 by 8
hours, the average workday. In doing so, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff could stand
for 6 hours out of every average workday. Based on this calculation, the ALJ posed
hypotheticals to the VE that limited Plaintiff to employment that does not require standing
in excess of 6 hours. AR at 94‐98. Considering the above, the ALJ provided the court with
sufficient guidance to enable subsequent reviewers to follow his reasoning that led him to
determine Plaintiff’s standing RFC. As a result, the Court rejects this argument.
2. The ALJ Provided a Sufficiently Thorough Analysis of How the Evidence
Supports the ALJ’s RFC Determination
In making an RFC determination, the ALJ is to consider “all of the relevant medical
and other evidence,” including medical reports, consultative examinations, the
individual’s statements to medical sources, as well as “descriptions and observations of
[the individual’s] limitations . . . provided by [the individual], [his or her] family, friends,
or other persons” to the SSA. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3); see also SSR 96‐8p, 1996 WL
374184, at *2 (July 2, 1996). Considering this evidence, the ALJ then determines the
individual’s “ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements of
work,” which determines an individual’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(5). The assigned
RFC does not represent the least an individual can do despite his limitations, but the most.
SSR 96‐8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2.
It is axiomatic that ALJs must explain their reasoning for the RFC they assign.
Specifically, “[t]he RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the
evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory findings)
and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” Id. at *7.
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by failing to give adequate findings and reasons
for his decision that Plaintiff maintains the RFC to perform medium work. Doc. 17 at 7.
However, the Court finds that the ALJ provided a thorough analysis and supplied the
guidance necessary for subsequent reviewers to follow his reasoning, which is all that is
required for his RFC determination to comport with proper legal standards. See Hendron,
767 F.3d at 954‐56 (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the RFC assessment was not
supported by a narrative discussion where “[t]he ALJ thoroughly reviewed the medical
evidence” and “described the [plaintiff’s] own report of her abilities.”).
The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can perform medium work is also supported by
substantial evidence. In his decision, the ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms in order to determine Plaintiff’s
RFC. AR at 47. However, the ALJ properly discounted those allegations that he did not
find entirely credible by giving “specific reasons” for his credibility findings that were
“closely and affirmatively linked” to evidence in the record. See Hardman v. Barnhart, 362
F.3d 676, 678‐79 (10th Cir. 2004). For example, the ALJ cited to Plaintiff’s subjective
allegations of pain and contrasted them with the facts that Plaintiff had not been
prescribed any narcotic pain since he was injured, and that Plaintiff is able to engage in
various errands and tasks, including caring for his disabled wife. Id. Further, the ALJ
commented that during Plaintiff’s initial disability interview, a Social Security employee
noted that Plaintiff “showed no obvious signs of pain, had a normal gait, and walked with
no evidence of foot pain.” Id. In addition, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff had stopped
working because his company went out of business, rather than because of an impairment.
AR at 47‐48.
Finally, and of note, the ALJ underscored that “the record reveals that [Plaintiff’s]
attorney advised him not to bear weight or work on his range of motion, which is in sharp
contrast to his physician’s recommendations and diminishes the credibility of [Plaintiff’s]
allegations.” AR at 48. Overall, by means of this credibility analysis, the ALJ determined
the evidence of record was not entirely consistent with Plaintiff’s subjective allegations of
disabling pain. However, despite his determination that Plaintiff was only partially
credible, the ALJ gave Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt and concluded that the Plaintiff’s
RFC should be limited to medium work on the basis that Plaintiff’s pain related to his
impairment caused some limitations in his ability to perform work. AR at 46‐48.
In the same vein, the ALJ analyzed the medical evidence in a specific and detailed
fashion. The ALJ pointed to medical records from Plaintiff’s physician completed six
weeks after his leg fracture advising that Plaintiff could “return to light work,” and
finding that the fracture was “stable” with “no new abnormalities.” AR at 47. Relatedly,
the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s treatment for his allegedly disabling impairment was
“essentially routine and/or conservative in nature.” Specifically, the ALJ noted that
Plaintiff has not had follow‐up care on his leg since six weeks after the injury. Id. After
laying out these factors that explained his reasoning, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s RFC.
This analysis was sufficient, and nothing else is required. See SSR 96‐8P, 1996 WL 374184,
at *7. Therefore, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument on this point.
3. Whether the Career of Telephone Solicitor is Inconsistent with Plaintiff’s
Qualifications is Irrelevant
Plaintiff next argues that his past relevant work as a sales route driver does not
qualify him to perform other sedentary, semiskilled work as a telephone solicitor, because
his sales route driver occupation has a mathematical development requirement lower than
the telephone solicitor occupation. Even if this were true, this conflict is immaterial,
because the job of telephone solicitor is not one of the three jobs that the ALJ listed as a
representative occupation in his alternative findings regarding occupations other than
sales route driver that Plaintiff can perform. AR at 49‐50. Rather, the ALJ, based on the
VE’s testimony, determined that Plaintiff’s RFC qualifies him to be employed as a kitchen
helper, a hospital cleaner, or an industrial sweeper/cleaner. AR at 50. As a result, the
Court rejects this argument as irrelevant.
4. The ALJ Did Not Err in Considering Plaintiff’s Daily Activities
Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s daily activities in order to
determine Plaintiff’s RFC limiting him to medium work. Doc. 17 at 8. Specifically,
Plaintiff cites to an unpublished Tenth Circuit opinion in an attempt to demonstrate that
the ALJ erred in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s daily activities. Berryhill v. Barnhart, 64 F.
App’x 196 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished). In Berryhill, the ALJ relied upon the claimant’s
daily activities to reject her assertions that she was unable to work. Id. at 200. The court
remanded the case, holding not that consideration of such activities was error per se, but
rather that the specific claimant’s “minimal [household] activities . . . [were] insufficient to
establish that she can work on a consistent basis” and that “the record does not contain
substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that Berryhill can even perform these
minimal activities.” Id.
In contrast to Berryhill, Plaintiff’s reported daily activities were not limited to
“minimal activities.” Rather, Plaintiff testified that he was responsible for activities
including cleaning, driving, shopping, preparing meals, and caring for his wife, who was
diagnosed with fibromyalgia. AR at 87. Compared to the claimant in Berryhill, whose
performance of activities was not even supported by substantial evidence, Plaintiff’s
testimony regarding his performance of regular activities reduces the credibility of his
assertions that he is unable to work. Thus, the ALJ properly considered these daily
activities as a factor in determining that Plaintiff is capable of medium‐level work.
The ALJ’s reliance upon Plaintiff’s daily activities to determine Plaintiff’s RFC is
also proper because regulatory guidelines and case law support an ALJ’s consideration of
a claimant’s daily activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (the claimant’s daily activities
should be considered in a disability determination); Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1146
(10th Cir. 2010) (finding that substantial evidence supported ALJ’s decision that claimant
was not disabled when claimant’s description of daily activities did not demonstrate
significant limitations). As a result, the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s daily activities
was appropriate. Therefore, the Court rejects the fourth ground offered in support of
Plaintiff’s first argument.
B. The New Evidence Presented to the Appeals Council was Properly
Considered and Does not Cast Doubt on the ALJ’s Decision.
Second, Plaintiff argues that the case should be remanded because the Appeals Council
did not properly consider the supplemental evidence Plaintiff submitted to it. However,
the Court finds that consideration of the proffered additional evidence would not require a
change in the outcome, because the ALJ’s determination remains supported by substantial
evidence. Plaintiff’s argument on this point is therefore rejected.
A claimant is authorized to submit new and material evidence to the Appeals
Council when seeking review of the ALJ’s decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) (1987).1
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b), the Appeals Council must “consider evidence
submitted with a request for review ‘if the additional evidence is (a) new, (b) material, and
(c) relate[d] to the period on or before the date of the ALJ’s decision.’” Chambers v.
Barnhart, 389 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Box v. Shalala, 52 F.3d 168, 171 (8th
Cir. 1995)). Then, the Appeals Council will look to determine whether the qualifying new
and material evidence “require[s] a change in the outcome.” O’Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 855,
859 (10th Cir. 1994). If the Appeals Council does not consider the material new evidence,
the case should be remanded. Threet v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003).
20 C.F.R. § 404.970 was amended since the time the ALJ issued his decision on July 10, 2015. However, this
citation properly refers to the version of the regulation in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision. See Chapo v.
Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1291 n.5 (10th Cir. 2012). Moreover, the amendment does not alter the analysis herein,
as the new version of the regulation still provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the Appeals Council will
consider additional evidence “that is new, material, and relates to the period on or before the date of the
hearing decision, [if] there is a reasonable probability that the additional evidence would change the
outcome of the decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)(5) (2017).
In the case at bar, Plaintiff submitted several additional medical documents to the
Appeals Council. See AR at 9‐12, 14‐28, 30, 227‐28, 298‐306, 310‐15. Some of those
documents related to the period following December 31, 2011 and were not relevant to the
Appeals Council’s consideration of Plaintiff’s disability status from March 2011 until
December 2011. The Council properly concluded that these documents did not qualify for
consideration. AR at 2.
With respect to the documents related to the period prior to Plaintiff’s last insured
date of December 31, 2011, the Appeals Council considered them. AR at 1‐2. These
documents included an Emergency Department Physician Chart and an Ambulance
Service Patient Care Report from September 9, 2010, and a Formal Health Record from
August 3, 2011. AR at 16, 298‐306, 310‐15.
The Department Physician Chart and Patient Care Report indicate that Plaintiff
received emergency treatment on September 9, 2010 due to a work‐related injury to his left
shoulder area, which was caused when Plaintiff was hit by a forklift. See AR at 298‐306,
310‐15. The report indicates no fracture or dislocation of the shoulder, and determines all
other shoulder conditions to be “unremarkable.” AR at 302. The report also contains
information from a CT scan of Plaintiff’s spine. AR at 303‐06. Specifically, Dr. Cushnyr, in
the report, cited mild multilevel degenerative changes and mild to moderate wedging of
the C5 vertebral body. AR at 303. He further cited chronic disc calcification at the T10/T11
level. AR at 304. Plaintiff has never alleged spinal issues as a basis for his disability claim
in prior applications or briefing.
Next, the Formal Health Record from August 17, 2011 indicates that Plaintiff sought
lab tests in response to erectile function concerns. AR at 16. No information in this record
relates to Plaintiff’s shoulder or leg complaints.
After consideration of the above information, the Appeals Council concluded that
the supplemental information “does not provide a basis for changing the [ALJ’s] decision.”
AR at 2. In response, Plaintiff asserts that the Appeals Council’s consideration was
insufficient, because it “provided no reasoning for its conclusion and did not mention that
the evidence regarding the Plaintiff’s shoulder impairment is new and material and relates
to” the relevant time period between Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date and his date
last insured. Doc. 20 at 3. However, the Appeals Council is not required to make factual
findings as to newly submitted evidence when denying review, even when that evidence
includes a medical source opinion. Lynn v. Colvin, 637 F. App’x 495, 497‐98 (10th Cir. 2016)
(unpublished); see also Martinez v. Barnhart, 444 F.3d 1201, 1207‐08 (10th Cir. 2006).
Further, “our general practice  is to take a lower tribunal at its word when it
declares that it has considered a matter.” Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1172‐73 (10th
Cir. 2005) (rejecting Plaintiff’s complaints that the Appeals Council’s reference to the new
material evidence was perfunctory when writing only that it had considered the additional
evidence submitted “but concluded that neither the contentions nor the additional
evidence provides a basis for changing the [ALJ’s] decision”). Therefore, because the
Appeals Council indicated that it did consider the newly submitted evidence before
concluding that it provided no basis for changing the ALJ’s decision, the Court accepts
that assertion as true.
Even if we did not apply this standard of deference to the Appeals Council’s
statement that it had considered the evidence, Plaintiff’s argument would fail because the
Court agrees that the newly provided evidence does not provide a basis for changing the
ALJ’s decision for several reasons. First, the evidence that Plaintiff provided from August
2011 is unrelated to his disability claim and is therefore irrelevant. That evidence concerns
Plaintiff’s erectile function, which has no impact on Plaintiff’s particular RFC. See AR at
Second, the remaining evidence within the Emergency Department Physician Chart
and Ambulance Service Records from September 2010 does not provide a sufficient basis
to conclude that the ALJ’s determination was not supported by substantial evidence. AR
at 298‐306, 310‐15. While these two reports reveal that Plaintiff suffered a shoulder injury
prior to the March 2011 onset period, there is no evidence that Plaintiff ever followed up
on that injury. Nor is there evidence regarding its continuing severity, such that Plaintiff’s
RFC would be impacted by consideration of those records.
Third, Plaintiff underscores that X‐rays taken on the day of Plaintiff’s injury on
September 9, 2010 indicate certain mild changes in Plaintiff’s spine and should thus be
considered in determining disability. Doc. 20 at 1. However, as already noted, Plaintiff
has never before in any of his applications or pleadings alleged any form of spinal injury
as an impairment underlying his disability claim. In addition, there is no evidence that
Plaintiff followed up on the alleged spinal injury. Nor is there evidence regarding the
continuing severity of any impairment resulting from the spinal injury, such that Plaintiff’s
RFC would be impacted. In light of these considerations, the supplemental evidence does
not require a change in the outcome. As such, the Court finds that the Appeals Council
did not err in denying review of the ALJ’s decision.
Plaintiff has failed to establish that the ALJ committed reversible error.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to Agency for Rehearing (doc. 17) is DENIED,
and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
GREGORY B. WORMUTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Presiding by Consent
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