Escarcega v. Corrections Company of America et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge Kenneth J. Gonzales dismissing 1 Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights; Plaintiff is granted leave to file and amended complaint on or before December 3, 2018. (tah)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
NATANAEL ESCARCEGA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
No. CV 17-00335 KG/WPL
CORRECTIONS COMPANY OF AMERICA
(CORE CIVIC) N.M.D.O.C. CENTURIAN L.L.C.,
and ANY AN ALL WHO ARE EMPLOYED
BY THEM,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B) on the
Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights filed by Plaintiff Natanael Escarcega on March 13, 2017.
(Doc. 1). The Court dismisses the Complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.
Plaintiff Escarcega is incarcerated at Northwest New Mexico Correctional Facility. (Doc.
1 at 6, 11). He is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Escarcega filed his Complaint for
Violation of Civil Rights on March 13, 2017. In his Complaint, he makes a number of vague,
generalized allegations of constitutional violations:
“1) My constitutional & civil rights were violated by C.C.A. (A private prison)
and New Mexico Department of prisons by violating (Depriving me of visits, by
having them behind glass) when I passed their state wide shake-down an
urinalises
2) C.C.A. Deprive me of my constitutional & civil rights for cruel and unusual
punishment by not letting me have access to recreation during this time period.
3) C.C.A. & Department of correctional (N.M.) did in fact mass punish all
of us here at N.N.M.C.F. Grants NM by treating all of us as drug-users.
4) C.C.A. did treat us unfairly when 2 of their employees were caught in
compromising positions: Mass punishment Due process violations.
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5) C.C.A. violates our constitutional & civil rights by not following policy &
procedures described by N.M.D.O.C. concerning grievances: excedera:
6) Substandard training of corrections officers.
7) Denial of adequate medical care: No confidence in healthcare provider
& medical staff: Centurian L.L.C.
8) Substandard meals by Kitchen: Trinity
9) This is an accident waiting to happen.
10) Denial of phones: laundry: legal access: sanitory living conditions.”
(Doc. 1 at 12-13). Escarcega names, as Defendants, Corrections Company of America (Core
Civic), Centurian L.L.C., C.C.A.-Core Civic, Corrections Center of America, New Mexico
Department of Corrections, Trinity Food Service, B. Judd: Warden, J.. Lopez: Assistant Warden,
J. Doman: Chief of Unit Managers, Mr. Soloman: G-Unit Manager, Ms. Woodard: G-Unit
Manager, Mr. Aragon: Unit Management, Ms. Willy: G-Unit Management, Dr. Bailey, Dr. I, and
all employees of C.C.A., C.C.A-Core Civic, and Centurian L.L.C. (Doc. 1 at 1-3, 13). The
allegations of the Complaint do not factually specify any individual conduct by any Defendant or
how any conduct by an individual violated Plaintiff Escarcega’s constitutional rights.
1. Standards for Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiff Escarcega is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on civil rights claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has the discretion to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint sua
sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under either Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) or 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) the Court must accept all
well-pled factual allegations, but not conclusory, unsupported allegations, and may not consider
matters outside the pleading. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Dunn v.
White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 1989). The Court may dismiss a complaint under rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim if “it is ‘patently obvious’ that the plaintiff could not prevail on
the facts alleged.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting McKinney v.
Oklahoma Dep’t of Human Services, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991)). A plaintiff must allege
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“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A
claim should be dismissed where it is legally or factually insufficient to state a plausible claim for
relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss the complaint at any time it determines the
action fails to state a claim for relief or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 915(e)(2)(B)(2). The
authority granted by Section 1915 permits the Court the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly
baseless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). See also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d at
1109. The authority to “pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations” means that a court is
not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept
without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33
(1992). The Court is not required to accept the truth of the plaintiff's allegations but, instead, may
go beyond the pleadings and consider any other materials filed by the parties, as well as court
proceedings subject to judicial notice. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33.
In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court liberally construes the factual allegations. See
Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1992). However, a pro se plaintiff’s
pleadings are judged by the same legal standards that apply to all litigants and a pro se plaintiff
must abide by the applicable rules of court. Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir.
1994). The Court is not obligated to craft legal theories for the plaintiff or to supply factual
allegations to support the plaintiff’s claims. Nor may the Court assume the role of advocate for the
pro se litigant. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1110.
In deciding whether to dismiss the complaint, in whole or in part, the Court is to consider
whether to allow plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint. Pro se plaintiffs should be given
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a reasonable opportunity to remedy defects in their pleadings. Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d
124, 126 (10th Cir. 1990). The opportunity to amend should be granted unless amendment would
be futile. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1109. An amendment is futile if the amended claims would
also be subject to immediate dismissal under the Rule 12(b)(6) or § 1915(e)(2)(B) standards.
Bradley v. Val-Mejias, 379 F.3d 892, 901 (10th Cir. 2004).
2. Escarcega’s Complaint Fails to State a Claim for Relief
Plaintiff Escarcega seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is the exclusive
vehicle for vindication of substantive rights under the United States Constitution. See Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (Section
1983 creates no substantive rights; rather it is means through which plaintiff may seek redress for
deprivations of rights established in Constitution); Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129 (10th
Cir. 2006). Section 1983 provides:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage of any State . . .subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must assert acts
by government officials acting under color of law that result in a deprivation of rights secured by
the United States Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). There
must be a connection between official conduct and violation of a constitutional right. Conduct that
is not connected to a constitutional violation is not actionable under Section 1983. See Trask v.
Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir. 1998).
Further, a civil rights action against a public official or entity may not be based solely on a
theory of respondeat superior liability for the actions of co-workers or subordinates. A plaintiff
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must plead that each government official, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009).
Plaintiff must allege some personal involvement by an identified official in the alleged
constitutional violation to succeed under Section 1983. Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162
(10th Cir. 2008). In a Section 1983 action, it is particularly important that a plaintiff’s complaint
“make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with
fair notice as to the basis of the claim against him or her.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242,
1249-50 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in the original). Nor do generalized statements that defendants
caused the deprivation of a constitutional right, without plausible supporting factual allegations,
state any claim for relief. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d at 1249-50. The Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Section 1983.
Plaintiff Escarcega’s Complaint does not allege personal involvement by an identified
official in any alleged constitutional violation. Escarcega’s Complaint fails to specify any conduct
on the part of any Defendant, much less show a connection between official conduct and violation
of a constitutional right. The Complaint fails to state a claim for relief against any individual
Defendant. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d at 1046.
Nor does the Complaint state a claim for relief against Corrections Company of America,
C.C.A., Core Civic, Centurian L.L.C., or Trinity Food Service. In Monell v. Dep't of Social
Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a state actor cannot be
held vicariously liable for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is now well settled that
Monell extends to private defendants sued under Section 1983. See e.g., Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc.,
336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir.2003) (collecting circuit court cases); Smedley v. Corr. Corp. of
Am., 175 F. App'x 943, 944 (10th Cir. 2005). As such, a private actor “cannot be held liable solely
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because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words ... cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in original). Therefore, in order
to hold a private entity liable for the alleged tortious acts of its agents, a plaintiff must show that
the entity instituted an official policy of some nature and that policy, in turn, was a direct cause or
moving force behind the constitutional violations. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,
480–85 (1986); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 820 (1985); Smedley v. Corr. Corp.
of Am., 175 F. App'x at 946.
Although Escarcega makes generalized allegations that the entity defendants did not follow
policies or procedures, he does not identify any specific policy that was instituted by Corrections
Company of America, C.C.A., Core Civic, Centurian L.L.C., or Trinity Food Service. Nor does he
factually specify how any policy of any entity defendant directly caused a violation of his
constitutional rights. The Complaint fails to state any factually sufficient Section 1983 claim
against Corrections Company of America, C.C.A., Core Civic, Centurian L.L.C., or Trinity Food
Service. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480–85; Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336
F.3d at 1216.
Last, the New Mexico Corrections Department is a state agency. As such, the claims
against it are claims against the State of New Mexico. Section 1983 is a “remedial vehicle for
raising claims based on the violation of constitutional rights.” Brown v.Buhman, 822 F.3d 1151,
1161 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). It does not abrogate the states’ sovereign
immunity and neither the states nor their agencies qualify as “persons” under Section 1983. See
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67, 71 (1989); Wood v. Milyard, 414 F. App’x
103, 105 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished). The State is not a “person” within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, there is no remedy against the State under Section 1983. Therefore,
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the claims against the New Mexico Corrections Department will be dismissed. Will v. Michigan
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1989).
3. Escarcega is Granted Leave to File an Amended Complaint
The Complaint is factually insufficient and fails to state any claim for Section 1983 relief.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The Court will dismiss the Complaint and will grant Escarcega the
opportunity to file an amended complaint specifying individuals, the individualized actions at
Northwest New Mexico Correctional Facility, and how Escarcega claims those actions resulted in
violation of constitutional rights. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1110, nt. 3 (pro se litigants are to be
given reasonable opportunity to remedy defects in pleadings). The amended complaint must state
the facts of each separate claim and why Plaintiff believes Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were
violated. Escarcega should include names of individual defendants and their official positions, a
description of their individual actions, and relevant dates, if available. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519
F.3d at 1249-50.
Plaintiff Escarcega may assert claims against Corrections Company of America, C.C.A.,
Core Civic, Centurian L.L.C., or Trinity Food Service in his amended complaint, but only if
Escarcega alleges that the defendant entity caused a constitutional violation by instituting a
specific, identified, official policy of some nature. That policy, in turn, must be a direct cause or
moving force behind the constitutional violations. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480–85. Escarcega may
not re-assert claims against the New Mexico Department of Corrections. Will, 491 U.S. at 63-64.
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Natanael Escarcega’s Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights is DISMISSED for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted; and
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(2) Plaintiff Escarcega is granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days
of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
_______________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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