Aragon v. Social Security Administration

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Steven C. Yarbrough granting 17 MOTION to Remand to Agency With Supporting Memorandum. (kc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
CATALINA J. ARAGON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civ. No. 17-554 SCY

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1
THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Social Security Administrative Record
(Doc. 14)2 filed October 6, 2017, in connection with Plaintiff’s Motion to Reverse and Remand
for Rehearing With Supporting Memorandum, filed December 5, 2017. Doc. 17. Defendant
filed a Response on February 6, 2018. (Doc. 19.) And Plaintiff filed a Reply on February 22,
2018. Doc. 20. The Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final decision under 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). Having meticulously reviewed the entire record and the
applicable law and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion is
well taken and shall be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Catalina J. Aragon (Ms. Aragon) alleges that she became disabled on
November 6, 2012, at the age of forty, because of a learning disability, anxiety attacks,
posttraumatic stress syndrome, depression, ganglion cyst, carpal tunnel syndrome, diabetes, and

  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to the undersigned to conduct any or all proceedings, and to
enter an order of judgment, in this case. (Docs. 7, 10, 11.)

1

 Hereinafter, the Court’s citations to Administrative Record (Doc. 14), which is before the Court as a transcript of the
administrative proceedings, are designated as “Tr.”
2

arthritis. (Tr. 172, 176.) Ms. Aragon completed the eleventh grade in 1990, and has worked as a
truck stop cook, motel housekeeper, gas station cashier, and cotton field laborer. Tr. 177.
Ms. Aragon protectively filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)
under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq., on January 15, 2013. Tr. 15, 151-57.
Ms. Aragon’s application was denied at the initial level, Tr. 64, 65-79, 98-101, and at
reconsideration, Tr. 80-94, 95, 105-09. Upon Ms. Aragon’s request, Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) Ann Farris held a hearing on August 5, 2015. Tr. 30-53. On January 13, 2016, ALJ Farris
issued a written decision concluding that Ms. Aragon was “not disabled” pursuant to the Act.
Tr. 12-25. On March 16, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Ms. Aragon’s request for review,
rendering ALJ Farris’s January 13, 2016, decision the final decision of Defendant the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. Tr. 1-3. Ms. Aragon timely filed a
complaint on May 16, 2017, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision.
Doc. 1.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A.

Disability Determination Process

A claimant is considered disabled for purposes of Social Security disability insurance
benefits or supplemental security income if that individual is unable “to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(A). The Social Security Commissioner has adopted a five-step sequential analysis to
determine whether a person satisfies these statutory criteria. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The steps of the analysis are as follows:

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(1)

Claimant must establish that she is not currently engaged in “substantial
gainful activity.” If Claimant is so engaged, she is not disabled and the
analysis stops.

(2)

Claimant must establish that she has “a severe medically determinable
physical or mental impairment . . . or combination of impairments” that
has lasted for at least one year. If Claimant is not so impaired, she is not
disabled and the analysis stops.

(3)

If Claimant can establish that her impairment(s) are equivalent to a listed
impairment that has already been determined to preclude substantial
gainful activity, Claimant is presumed disabled and the analysis stops.

(4)

If, however, Claimant’s impairment(s) are not equivalent to a listed
impairment, Claimant must establish that the impairment(s) prevent her
from doing her “past relevant work.” Answering this question involves
three phases. Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996).
First, the ALJ considers all of the relevant medical and other evidence and
determines what is “the most [Claimant] can still do despite [her physical
and mental] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). This is called the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Id. § 404.1545(a)(3).
Second, the ALJ determines the physical and mental demands of
Claimant’s past work. Third, the ALJ determines whether, given
Claimant’s RFC, Claimant is capable of meeting those demands. A
claimant who is capable of returning to past relevant work is not disabled
and the analysis stops.

(5)

At this point, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that Claimant
is able to “make an adjustment to other work.” If the Commissioner is
unable to make that showing, Claimant is deemed disabled. If, however,
the Commissioner is able to make the required showing, the claimant is
deemed not disabled.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731
(10th Cir. 2005).
B.

Standard of Review

A court must affirm the denial of social security benefits unless (1) the decision is not
supported by “substantial evidence” or (2) the ALJ did not apply the proper legal standards in
reaching the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 933 F.2d
799, 800-01 (10th Cir. 1991). In making these determinations, the reviewing court “neither
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reweigh[s] the evidence nor substitute[s] [its] judgment for that of the agency.’” Bowman v.
Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008). For example, a court’s disagreement with a
decision is immaterial to the substantial evidence analysis. A decision is supported by substantial
evidence as long as it is supported by “relevant evidence . . . a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support [the] conclusion.” Casias, 933 F.3d at 800. While this requires more than a
mere scintilla of evidence, Casias, 933 F.3d at 800, “[t]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the] findings from being supported by
substantial evidence.” Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Zoltanski v.
F.A.A., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004)).
Similarly, even if a court agrees with a decision to deny benefits, if the ALJ’s reasons for
the decision are improper or are not articulated with sufficient particularity to allow for judicial
review, the court cannot affirm the decision as legally correct. Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007,
1009 (10th Cir. 1996). As a baseline, the ALJ must support his or her findings with specific
weighing of the evidence and “the record must demonstrate that the ALJ considered all of the
evidence.” Id. at 1009-10. This does not mean that an ALJ must discuss every piece of evidence
in the record. But, it does require that the ALJ identify the evidence supporting the decision and
discuss any probative and contradictory evidence that the ALJ is rejecting. Id. at 1010.
III. ANALYSIS
The ALJ made her decision that Ms. Aragon was not disabled at step five of the
sequential evaluation. (Tr. 24-25.) The ALJ determined that Ms. Aragon had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since January 15, 2013, the date of her application. Tr. 17. She found
that Ms. Aragon had severe impairments of affective disorder, anxiety disorder, personality

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disorder, drugs/substance addiction disorder, carpal tunnel syndrome, and obesity.3 Tr. 17. The
ALJ determined, however, that Ms. Aragon’s impairments did not meet or equal in severity one
of the listings described in the governing regulations, 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Tr. 18-19. Accordingly, the ALJ proceeded to step four and found that Ms. Aragon had the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). The
ALJ also found that Ms. Aragon
is limited to no kneeling, crouching, crawling and only occasional overhead
reaching. The claimant is also limited to simple work related decisions with few
workplace changes. Finally, the claimant should have only occasional and
superficial interactions with the general public.
Tr. 20. The ALJ concluded at step four that Ms. Aragon had no past relevant work. Tr. 24. At
step five, the ALJ determined that based on her age, education, work experience, RFC, and the
testimony of the VE, that there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy
that Ms. Aragon could perform, and she was, therefore, not disabled. Tr. 24-25.
Ms. Aragon argues that: (1) the ALJ failed to give specific, legitimate reasons for
rejecting the opinion of examining psychological consultative examiner Richard Reed, Ph.D.;
(2) the ALJ failed to incorporate all of the “moderate” limitations assessed by the nonexamining
State agency psychological consultants; and (3) the ALJ failed to include a function-by-function
assessment of Ms. Aragon’s mental work-related abilities. Doc. 17 at 14-25. The ALJ’s
ultimate conclusion may be correct – Ms. Aragon may not be disabled. The process the ALJ
followed in reaching this conclusion, however, was flawed and requires remand for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

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The ALJ found no medically determinable impairments related to Ms. Aragon’s complaints of knee pain, back pain,
and learning disorder. (Tr. 18.)

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A.

Relevant Mental Impairment Evidence
1.

Presbyterian Medical Services

On February 23, 2012, LPCC Pam Hartman of Presbyterian Medical Services completed
a Behavioral Health Assessment of Ms. Aragon. Tr. 265-77. Ms. Aragon presented with
complaints of severe depression and anxiety due to physical problems and a long history of
abuse by family members. Tr. 265. LPCC took Ms. Aragon’s various histories and made Axis I
diagnoses of Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent, Severe (Code 296.33) and Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (Code 309.81). Tr. 274. LPCC Hartman assessed a GAF score of 30.4 (Id.)
On March 22, 2012, a medical doctor at Presbyterian Medical Services5 evaluated
Ms. Aragon and performed a mental status exam. Tr. 278-80. The doctor made Axis I diagnoses
of Panic Disorder without agoraphobia; Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; and Major Depressive
Disorder. Tr. 280. The doctor discussed prescription drug therapy options, recommended that
Ms. Aragon continue to see a therapist, and scheduled a follow up appointment.6 Id.
2.

Richard Reed, Ph.D., P.A.

On June 24, 2013, Ms. Aragon presented to examining State agency psychological
consultant Richard Reed, Ph.D., P.A., for a mental status evaluation. Tr. 338-41. Dr. Reed
reviewed certain documents7 and took Ms. Aragon’s histories. Tr. 338-39. Dr. Reed performed

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A GAF score of 21-30 indicates that behavior is considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations or serious
impairment in communication or judgment (e.g., sometimes incoherent, acts grossly inappropriately, suicidal
preoccupation) or inability to function in almost all areas (e.g., stays in bed all day; no job, home, or friends). See
Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 2000) at 34.
5

The physician’s signature is illegible; however, LPCC Hartman indicated in her Behavioral Assessment notes that
Ms. Aragon would be psychiatrically evaluated by Dr. Hauser. (Tr. 275.)

6
The Administrative Record does not contain any additional records from Presbyterian Medical Services related to
Ms. Aragon’s alleged mental impairments.
7

Dr. Reed reviewed an August 31, 1989, note related to Ms. Aragon’s being teased about being pregnant in high
school; a February 2, 2010, consultative evaluation by Dr. Lev; a March 22, 2012, initial evaluation related to
Ms. Aragon’s mental impairments; and a letter provided by Attorney Michael Armstrong. (Tr. 338.)

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a mental status exam and observed that Ms. Aragon did not appear anxious during the
evaluation, was mildly depressed, was able to sit through the evaluation without difficulty,
communicated well and was pleasant, had normal thought content and processes, and had fair to
poor insight and judgment. Tr. 339. Dr. Reed estimated that her current level of cognitive
functioning was in the low average range of intelligence. Id. Dr. Reed made Axis I diagnoses of
Dysthymic Disorder; Marijuana Abuse Disorder; r/o Posttraumatic Stress Disorder; r/o Anxiety
Disorder, NOS; and r/o Learning Disorder, NOS. Id. Dr. Reed assigned a GAF score of 55.8
Dr. Reed assessed that Ms. Aragon had moderate functional limitations in her ability to
(1) understand and remember detailed or complex instructions; (2) maintain attention and
concentration; (3) concentrate and persist at tasks of basic work; (4) interact with co-workers;
(5) interact with supervisors; (6) adapt appropriately to changes in the work place; and (7) use
public transportation or travel to unfamiliar places. Tr. 340. Dr. Reed further noted that
Ms. Aragon had a problem with alcohol or other substances of abuse that would affect her ability
to function in a work setting. Id.
3.

Susan Daugherty, Ph.D.

On March 29, 2013, nonexamining State agency psychological consultant Susan
Daugherty, Ph.D., reviewed the medical evidence record9 and found that Ms. Aragon had
moderate limitations in her ability to (1) carry out detailed instructions; (2) maintain attention

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A GAF score of 51-60 indicates moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic
attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers
or co-workers). See Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 2000) at
34.
9

Dr. Daugherty reviewed Ms. Aragon’s Adult Function Report; a February 1, 2010, mental status consultative exam
report; a March 22, 2012, mental health evaluation; and Dr. Reed’s mental status evaluation report. (Tr. 75-76.)

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and concentration for extended periods; (3) sustain an ordinary routine without special
supervision; (4) complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable
number and length of rest periods; (5) accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism
from supervisors; (6) respond appropriately to changes in the work setting; and (7) set realistic
goals or make plans independently of others. Tr. 74-75. Dr. Daugherty assessed that
Ms. Aragon was “able to perform work where interpersonal contact is incidental to work
performed, e.g., assembly work; complexity of tasks is learned and performed by rote, few
variables, little judgment; supervision required is simple, direct and concrete (unskilled).” Tr.
76.
4.

Paul Cherry, Ph.D.

On October 1, 2013, nonexamining State agency psychological consultant Paul Cherry,
Ph.D., reviewed Ms. Aragon’s medical evidence record at reconsideration and affirmed
Dr. Daugherty’s March 29, 2013, assessment. Tr. 90-92.
B.

The ALJ’s Reasons for the Weight She Accorded the Examining and
Nonexamining Psychological Consultant Opinion Evidence Are
Insufficient and Incapable of Meaningful Review

The ALJ accorded the examining and nonexamining State agency psychological
consultant opinion evidence partial weight. In doing so, she explained, as to Dr. Reed, that
(1) he had only examined Ms. Aragon once; (2) did not base his opinion on the most recent
evidence of record; and (3) did not have the benefit of the entire record available at the time of
the hearing. Tr. 22. The ALJ explained, as to Drs. Daugherty and Cherry, that (1) they did not
have the benefit of the entire record presented at the hearing; and (2) they did not have the
opportunity to examine Ms. Aragon. Tr. 23. Ms. Aragon argues that the reasons the ALJ offered

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for the weight she accorded Dr. Reed’s opinion are neither specific nor legitimate, and that the
ALJ engaged in picking and choosing from Dr. Daugherty’s and Dr. Cherry’s opinions resulting
in an incomplete and incorrect RFC. Doc. 17 at 14-21. The Commissioner contends that the
ALJ reasonably considered the State agency psychological consultant opinions and that the
ALJ’s RFC of restricted, unskilled work is generally compatible with the moderate functional
limitations they assessed. Doc. 19 at 9-16.
The applicable regulations and case law require an ALJ to consider all medical opinions
and discuss the weight assigned to those opinions. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(c) and
416.927(e)(2)(ii); see also Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[a]n ALJ
must evaluate every medical opinion in the record, although the weight given each opinion will
vary according to the relationship between the disability claimant and the medical
professional.”). “An ALJ must also consider a series of specific factors in determining what
weight to give any medical opinion.” Hamlin, 365 F.3d at 1215. (citing Goatcher v. United
States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 52 F.3d 288, 290 (10th Cir. 1995)).10 An ALJ’s decision
need not expressly apply each of the six relevant factors in deciding what weight to give a
medical opinion. Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F3d. 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007). However, the
decision must be “sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the
adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinions and reasons for that weight.” Watkins
v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003). The ALJ’s decision for according weight to

10

For claims filed before March 27, 2017, these factors include the examining relationship, treatment relationship,
length and frequency of examinations, the degree to which the opinion is supported by relevant evidence, the
opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole, and whether the opinion is that of a specialist. See 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(c)(2)-(6).

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medical opinions must be supported by substantial evidence. Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d
1168, 1174 (10th Cir. 2005).
The parties debate whether an ALJ can reject or reduce the weight of opinions from
examining and consulting doctors simply because those doctors necessarily have limited or no
interactions with a claimant. Doc. 17 at 17-18, Doc. 19 at 13. The “conflict” in the parties’
respective positions, however, is illusory - both are correct. Just because an ALJ cannot reject
the opinion of a treating or consulting doctor simply because that doctor had limited or no
interaction with a patient does not mean the extent of a doctor’s interaction is irrelevant.
In their debate, the parties really just point out that there is a hierarchy among doctors.
See Robinson v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[t]he opinion of an examining
physician is generally entitled to less weight than that of a treating physician, and the opinion of
an agency physician who has never seen the clamant is entitled to the least weight of all.”). This
hierarchy is largely based on the extent to which a doctor has examined or treated a claimant.
Treating doctors have the most extensive relationship with a claimant and so are given the most
deference. Id. And, all other things being equal, the opinion of a treating doctor who has seen a
claimant more is placed above the opinion of a treating doctor who has seen a claimant less.
Next come examining doctors, whose opinions (all other things being equal) are placed above
the opinions of consulting doctors, who have never seen a patient. Id.
This hierarchy provides a mechanism for ALJs to resolve the opinions of various doctors
that might be in conflict. In this case, the ALJ does not discount the opinions of the consulting
and examining doctors by comparing those opinions to conflicting opinions of other doctors.
This fact begs the question, “if the ALJ is giving only ‘partial weight’ to these examining and
consulting doctors, to whose other opinion is the ALJ deferring?” An ALJ, who is not a

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medical provider, must rely on medical providers to determine a claimant’s medical condition. If
the record contains no contrary medical evidence, on what is the ALJ relying to discount the
opinion of the doctors whose opinions are part of the record? Thus, the problem with the ALJ’s
discounting is not that she considered the limited interaction the treating and consulting doctors
had with claimant but, rather, that she cited no alternative medical opinion.
The only other basis the ALJ provides for discounting the opinions of the doctors on the
record is that, at the time these doctors reached their opinions, they did not have the benefit of
the entire record that was available to the ALJ. (Tr. 22-23). But this alternative basis is just as
incomplete. It raises a question very similar to that above – what in the record not available to
these doctors undermines their opinions? The ALJ never says. While an ALJ may discount the
opinions of examining and consulting doctors, the ALJ must provide a valid reason for doing so.
Because the ALJ failed to provide valid reasons for discounting the opinions of the examining
and consulting doctors, the ALJ committed reversible error.
And the Commissioner’s post hoc rationalization cannot cure this error. Although, as
evidence of Ms. Aragon’s “normal” mental status, the Commissioner discussed certain primary
care treatment provider notes that were generated in the months after the State agency
psychological consultants rendered their opinions, the ALJ’s decision is silent as to any of this
evidence.11 As a result, assuming without deciding that the Commissioner came up with an
otherwise winning argument, because the argument did not originate from the ALJ’s decision,
the Court may not adopt it. Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301; Haga v. Astrue, 482 F.3d 1205, 1207-08

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Most of the post-opinion treatment notes are from the Center for Aesthetic Medicine where Ms. Aragon received
her primary care. Many of the treatment notes reflect prescription therapy for ongoing anxiety. (Tr. 487-88, 492-93,
503-04, 505-06, 521-22.)

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(10th Cir. 2007) (finding the court may not create or adopt post-hoc rationalizations to support
the ALJ's decision that are not apparent from the ALJ's decision).
The ALJ’s failure to explain her reasons for reducing the opinions of the examining and
consulting physicians to “partial weight,” however, does not end the Court’s analysis. The
Commissioner also argues that, by limiting Ms. Aragon to simple unskilled work, the ALJ did in
fact incorporate the moderate limitations of the examining and consulting doctors into
Ms. Aragon’s residual functional capacity. Doc. 19 at 10. This argument fails for at least two
reasons.
First, the RFC does not limit Ms. Aragon to “simple unskilled work.” Instead, the ALJ
finds, “[t]he claimant is also limited to simple work related decisions with few workplace
changes.” (Tr. 20). Saying that a person can make only simple work-related decisions is
different than saying a person can perform only simple work.
Second, even assuming a limitation to “simple work related decisions” means a claimant
can perform only simple work, a limitation to simple work does not address some of the
moderate limitations at issue. For instance, doctors Reed, Daugherty, and Cherry all found
Ms. Aragon to have moderate limitations interacting with coworkers and supervisors. “The basic
mental demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work include the abilities (on a
sustained basis) to understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions; to respond
appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with changes in a
routine work setting. SSR 85–15, 1985 WL 56857, at *4 (1985). The Tenth Circuit quoted this
regulation and, although unpublished, issued a persuasive decision addressing a similar situation
in Jaramillo v. Colvin, 576 F. App’x 870 (10th Cir. 2014).

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In Jaramillo, the ALJ restricted the claimant to simple, routine, repetitive, and unskilled
tasks in an effort to accommodate, among other things, a psychologist’s finding that the claimant
was moderately limited in his ability to work without supervision. Id. at 876. The Tenth Circuit
examined the requirements of unskilled work and held that none of the basic mental abilities of
unskilled work captured a moderate limitation on the ability to work without supervision. Id.
Significantly, the court also rejected the argument that a moderate limitation on the ability to
work without supervision was accounted for in an RFC limiting the claimant to simple, routine,
and repetitive tasks. See id. (“None of the basic mental abilities of unskilled work ... captures any
of the three moderate limitations Dr. Mellon found (carry out instructions, attend and
concentrate, and work without supervision), nor do the additional limitations to simple, routine,
and repetitive tasks.”). Similarly, the RFC in this case fails to address the moderate limitation in
Ms. Aragon’s ability to work without supervision.
In addition, doctors Daugherty and Cherry determined Ms. Aragon to have moderate
limitations in her ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions
from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an
unreasonable number and length of rest periods. Tr. 74-75. As stated in POMS § DI 25020.010,
the mental abilities needed to understand, carry out and remember simple instructions and the
“mental abilities critical for performing unskilled work” include the ability to “complete a
normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and
perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods.” The
Commissioner makes no specific argument and cites no authority that the ALJ accounts for this
moderate limitation in determining Ms. Aragon’s RFC. Thus, the Court concludes that the ALJ
failed to account for this moderate limitation as she was required to do. As a result, regarding

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the moderate limitations set forth in the above two paragraphs, the Court rejects any contention
that the ALJ adequately addressed these limitations by limiting Ms. Aragon’s RFC to simple
work related decisions.12
C.

Remaining Issues

The Court will not address Plaintiff’s remaining claims of error because they may be
affected by the ALJ’s treatment of this case on remand. Wilson v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1299
(10th Cir. 2003).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Ms. Aragon’s Motion to Reverse and Remand for a
Rehearing With Supporting Memorandum is GRANTED. The Court reverses the
Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff benefits and remands this action to the Commissioner
to conduct further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

_____________________________________
STEVEN C. YARBROUGH
United States Magistrate Judge,
Presiding by Consent

 The ALJ’s decision itself also undermines the Commissioner’s argument. Immediately after reducing the opinion
of Dr. Reed to “partial weight”, the ALJ stated that “[s]ome of Dr. Reed’s findings are consistent with the residual
functional capacity above.” The ALJ’s statement that some, and so not all, of Dr. Reed’s findings are consistent
with Ms. Aragon’s RFC refutes any argument that the RFC incorporates all of Dr. Reed’s limitations.

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