New York Life Insurance Company v. Saul et al

Filing 106

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge Kenneth J. Gonzales denying 99 Defendant Saul's Motion for Reconsideration. (tah)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civ. No. 17-621 KG/KK

ROGER SAUL, ROSEANNE SILVA, and
ESTATE OF JAMES SILVA, deceased,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon pro se Defendant Roger Saul’s “Defendants
[sic] Motion for Reconsideration of ‘Declaration of Validity’” (Motion for Reconsideration),
filed November 1, 2018. (Doc. 99). Saul requests that the Court reconsider its October 11,
2018, Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 97) in which the Court granted Plaintiff’s
Opposed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 57). Plaintiff responded to the Motion for
Reconsideration on November 14, 2018. (Doc. 100). Saul replied on December 14, 2018; filed
a “Supplement/Exhibit” on December 20, 2018; and filed a “Bates Ordering Supplement” on
December 26, 2018. (Docs. 102, 103, and 104). Having considered the Motion for
Reconsideration, the accompanying briefing and supplements, and the Memorandum Opinion
and Order (Doc. 97), the Court denies the Motion for Reconsideration.
Saul does not specify if he is bringing the Motion for Reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Court construes a motion to reconsider a judgment as
either a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment or a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from
judgment or order, depending on its filing date. Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241,

1243 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating Rule 59(e) and 60(b) are distinct, and noting that which rule
applies depends on when motion for reconsideration served). Because Saul filed the Motion for
Reconsideration within 28 days of the Court’s entry of the Memorandum Opinion and Order
(Doc. 97) and the accompanying Final Summary Judgment and Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 98),
the Court construes the Motion for Reconsideration as a Rule 59(e) motion. See id. (observing
that “[i]f a motion is served within [28] days of the rendition of judgment, the motion ordinarily
will fall under Rule 59(e). If the motion is served after that time it falls under Rule 60(b).”)
(internal citations omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (stating that “motion to alter or amend a
judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment”).
A Rule 59(e) movant carries the burden of demonstrating that the Court should alter or
amend a judgment. See, e.g., Winchester v. Wilkinson, 2015 WL 2412175, at *2 (E.D. Okla.)
(ruling that “court finds petitioner has failed to meet his burden for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e)”). “Grounds warranting a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e)
‘include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously
unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’” Alpenglow
Botanicals, LLC v. United States, 894 F.3d 1187, 1203 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Servants of the
Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000)). Rule 59(e), however, does not allow a
losing party to “revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have been
raised in prior briefing.” Servants of the Paraclete, 204 F.3d at 1012. Moreover, “[r]aising a
mere disagreement with a court’s prior decision[] is insufficient” to grant a motion to reconsider.
Buzz Bee Toys, Inc. v. Swimways Corp., 20 F. Supp. 3d 483, 516-17 (D.N.J. 2014) (citation
omitted).

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To begin with, the Court will not consider Saul’s arguments that simply rehash previous
arguments nor will the Court consider arguments which Saul could have raised before now. The
Court further notes that Saul has not provided the Court with either new controlling law or new
evidence not available previously. The question, then, is whether the Court should vacate its
Memorandum Opinions and Order (Doc. 97) and the Final Summary Judgment and Declaratory
Judgment (Doc. 98) to “correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”
The Tenth Circuit has defined “clear error” as “an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or
manifestly unreasonable judgment.” Wright ex rel. Trust Co. of Kan. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259
F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 2001). Although the Tenth Circuit has not precisely defined
“manifest injustice” within the meaning of Rule 59(e), courts commonly define that term as “[a]
direct, obvious, and observable error in a trial court ....” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
Saul has not convinced the Court that the analyses and conclusions in the Memorandum Opinion
and Order (Doc. 97) are either arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.
Furthermore, Saul fails to demonstrate that the Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 97)
contains direct, obvious, and observable error. Hence, Saul has not shown that the Court should
alter or amend the Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. 97) or the Final Judgment and
Declaratory Judgement (Doc. 98) “to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”
In sum, Saul simply disagrees with the Court’s decision to grant Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment. Consequently, Saul has not carried his burden of showing that he is entitled
to Rule 59(e) relief. The Court, therefore, DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 99).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

________________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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