Alfaro-Huitron et al v. WKI Outsourcing Solutions, LLC et al

Filing 305

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO OVERRULE CLERK'S ORDER SETTLING COSTS by Magistrate Judge Gregory J. Fouratt. Plaintiffs' 296 "Motion for Court Review of Clerk's Order Settling Costs" is DENIED. (gbg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
ESTEBAN ALFARO-HUITRON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civ. No. 15-210 GJF/JHR

JAIME CAMPOS, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
TO OVERRULE CLERK’S ORDER SETTLING COSTS
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Plaintiffs’ “Motion for Court Review of Clerk’s
Order Settling Costs” [ECF 296] (“Motion”). The Motion is fully briefed. See ECFs 297, 301.
For the reasons stated below, the Court will DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion.
I.

BACKGROUND
In April 2014, Plaintiffs, U.S. agricultural workers who are represented by the Texas

RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc., filed a lawsuit that eventually included nine Defendants. See ECFs 1,
103. Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants recruited them under false pretenses, thereby violating
provisions of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1801 et seq., and New Mexico common law. See ECF 1. In January and September 2018, the
Court granted the summary judgment motions of two Defendants, Cervantes Agribusiness and
Cervantes Enterprises Inc. (the “Cervantes Defendants”). See ECFs 232, 246. 1
Shortly thereafter, in October 2018, the Cervantes Defendants filed a Bill of Costs,
requesting that the Clerk tax costs against Plaintiffs in the amount of $8,076.72. ECF 247.
Plaintiff’s did not contest any of the itemized charges in this Bill of Costs, and in May 2019, the
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Plaintiffs, who settled their claims with all other Defendants, appealed these summary judgments decisions to the
Tenth Circuit on June 5, 2019, and this appeal is pending as of the date of this order. See ECFs 296, 299, 304.

Clerk granted the Bill of Costs in its entirety. See ECF 295 (noting that “Plaintiff’s failure to
respond to Defendant’s Bill of Costs constitute[d] consent to grant the motion” (citing D.N.M. LRCiv 7.1(b)). Plaintiffs then filed the instant Motion, asking this Court to find that the taxation of
costs against them is inappropriate and to thus deny any award of costs to the Cervantes
Defendants. ECF 296 at 1, 4.
Plaintiffs argue that the Court should not award costs to Cervantes Defendants as the
prevailing party because (1) Plaintiffs are indigent and cannot afford such costs and (2) awarding
such costs would punish Plaintiffs and “create a chilling effect on local farmworkers’ ability to
redress future violations.” Id. at 2-3; see also ECF 301 at 2.
II.

LAW
Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[u]nless a federal

statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should
be allowed to the prevailing party.” This Rule thus “creates a presumption that the district court
will award costs to the prevailing party.” Cantrell v. Int’l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 69 F.3d 456, 45859 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 2 Therefore, “[t]o deny a prevailing party its costs is ‘in the
nature of a severe penalty,’ such that there ‘must be some apparent reason to penalize the prevailing
party if costs are to be denied.’” Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 668 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir.
2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Klein v. Grynberg, 44 F.3d 1497, 1507 (10th Cir. 1995)).
Furthermore, “the non-prevailing party [has the burden] to overcome the presumption that these
costs will be taxed.” In re Williams Sec. Litig. – WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1144, 1148 (10th Cir.
2009).

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See also Debord v. Mercy Health Sys. of Kan., Inc., 737 F.3d 642, 659 (10th Cir. 2013) (“We presume a prevailing
party is entitled to costs.” (citation omitted)); Rodriguez v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 360 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2004)
(noting “the established rule . . . that costs are generally awarded to the prevailing party” (citations omitted)).

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“[A] district court may properly deny costs to a prevailing party” when, inter alia, “the
nonprevailing party is indigent.” Debord, 737 F.3d at 659-60 (citing Cantrell, 69 F.3d at 459). 3
But while indigent circumstances may be considered, “a district court does not abuse its discretion
in awarding costs to the prevailing party simply because the non-prevailing parties were indigent.”
Bryant v. Sagamore Ins. Co., 618 Fed. Appx. 423 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (citing Rodriguez
v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 360 F.3d 1180, 1190-91 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming an award of costs—
despite the plaintiffs’ indigent status—because plaintiffs failed to show that the prevailing party
should be penalized)).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs have not overcome the presumption that costs should be awarded to the Cervantes
Defendants as the prevailing party. Although “[t]he burden is on [Plaintiffs], . . . they have not
offered any reason why [the Cervantes Defendants] should be penalized in this case.” Rodriguez,
360 F.3d at 1190-91. Instead, Plaintiffs refer to their own indigency and how paying such costs
will affect them (e.g., through a chilling effect on future AWPA litigation) as justification for
denying an award of costs to the Cervantes Defendants. See ECF 296 at 2-3. Plaintiffs have not,
for example, alleged that these Defendants were “obstructive,” “acted in bad faith,” or that they
otherwise deserve to be penalized. Debord, 737 F.3d at 660.
While the Court “may” deny awarding such costs to the Cervantes Defendants because the
Plaintiffs are indigent—thereby inflicting a “severe penalty” on these Defendants—the Court is
not required to do so. Furthermore, the Court is hesitant to penalize the Cervantes Defendants,

3
A district court may also deny costs when “[1] the prevailing party is only partially successful, [2] the prevailing
party was obstructive and acted in bad faith during the course of the litigation, [3] damages are only nominal, . . . [4]
costs are unreasonably high or unnecessary, or [5] the issues are close and difficult.” Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).

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who are presumed to be entitled to such costs, simply to avoid penalizing Plaintiffs. 4 Although
Plaintiff argues that such a punishment would generally chill their (and others’) ability to redress
future AWPA-related violations, the issue is whether the Cervantes Defendants—who were
deemed not liable and who did not initiate this lawsuit—“should be penalized.” Rodriguez, 360
F.3d at 1190. And as no adequate justification for penalizing these Defendants has been presented
to this Court, it will DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

________________________________________
THE HONORABLE GREGORY J. FOURATT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Presiding by Consent

4

Defendants are also likely to incur significant additional costs defending themselves before the Tenth Circuit, given
that Plaintiffs have appealed the summary judgments decisions against them.

4