Seidel et al v. Crayton et al

Filing 69

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by District Judge Martha Vazquez GRANTING 35 MOTION for Sanctions Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 11. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Regarding Plaintiffs' Excessive Force, Battery and Malicious Prosecution Claims, Doc. 35 , filed May 17, 2016, is GRANTED. (gr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
WALTER RAY SEIDEL, Jr., MD and
BRENDA LE SEIDEL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

No. CIV 15-00925-MV/CG

CORY CRAYTON, PETE KASSETAS, and
JOHN DOES 1-40,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions Pursuant
to Fed R. Civ. P. 11 regarding Plaintiffs’ Excessive Force, Battery and Malicious Prosecution
Claims, Doc. 35, filed May 17, 2016. This Court, having considered the motion, briefs, relevant
law and being otherwise fully informed, will GRANT Defendants’ Motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented
party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: … (2) the claims,
defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). “[T]he award of Rule 11 sanctions involves two steps.” Adamson v.
Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 672 (10th Cir. 1988). First, the Court must find that a pleading violates
Rule 11. The first step “typically involves subsidiary findings, such as the current state of the law
or the parties’ and attorneys’ behavior and motives within the context of the entire litigation.” Id.

Second, the Court imposes an “appropriate sanction.” Id.
“The standard by which courts evaluate the conduct of litigation is objective
reasonableness – whether a reasonable attorney admitted to practice before the district court
would file such a document.” Id. Accordingly, “[i]f, after reasonable inquiry, a competent
attorney could not form a reasonable belief that the pleading is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law, then such conduct is sanctionable under Rule 11.” Id. (citation
omitted).
The language of Rule 11 “stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts
and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory
Committee Notes (1993 Amendment).

In determining whether the signer’s conduct is

reasonable, “the court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight” and inquire only as to
“what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted.”
Id.
“The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations, such as
striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or censure; requiring
participation in seminars or other educational programs; ordering a fine payable to the court;
referring the matter to disciplinary authorities.” Id. The Court may consider the following
factors: (1) whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; (2) whether it was part of a
pattern of activity, or an isolated event; (3) whether it infected the entire pleading, or only one
particular count or defense; (4) whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other
litigation; (5) whether it was intended to injure; (6) what effect it had on the litigation process in
time or expense; (7) whether the responsible person is trained in the law; (8) what amount, given
the financial resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in

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the same case; and (9) what amount is needed to deter similar activity by other litigants. Id. The
Court has discretion to determine what sanctions, if any, should be imposed for a violation, but
“sanctions should not be more severe than reasonably necessary to deter repetition of the conduct
by the offending person or comparable conduct by similarly situated persons.” Id.
DISCUSSION
I.

Brenda Le Seidel’s Battery and Excessive Force Claims
Defendants first move for sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel based on Plaintiffs’ claims

for battery and excessive force against Mrs. Seidel. They claim that the COBAN1 video of the
incident “completely undermines and undercuts plaintiffs’ allegations.” Doc. 35 at 2. Defendants
assert that the video “shows that Officer Crayton had both of his arms outside of the plaintiffs’
vehicle when he was at the passenger-side door” and that “[t]he video clearly shows that at no
point did Officer Crayton put his forearm into the vehicle and ‘batter’ Mrs. Seidel.” Id. Plaintiffs,
on the other hand, claim that there is an evidentiary dispute which is “more than adequate to
show that there is a factual basis upon which the lawsuit may proceed.” Doc. 43 at 2.
As the Court set forth in its Memorandum Opinion and Order Granting In Part
Defendants’ First Motion for Summary Judgment, entered concurrently with this Opinion, the
issue of whether Officer Crayton made contact with Mrs. Seidel is unresolved. The video of the
incident does not clearly show whether Officer Crayton applied force to Mrs. Seidel. See Doc. 28
at 1:50 to 1:54. The camera is positioned such that Officer Crayton’s hand and forearm are
blocked by Plaintiffs’ SUV. Id. Plaintiffs’ claims are supported by two affidavits and the Court
finds no violation of Rule 11 because there is some evidentiary support and legal basis for these
claims.

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COBAN refers to the brand of camera on Officer Crayton’s dashboard, which recorded the incident.

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II.

Walter Ray Seidel’s False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Claims
Defendants next seek sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel for the claim that Officer

Crayton lacked probable cause to arrest and charge Dr. Seidel with crimes. Doc. 35 at 6.
Probable cause exists where “‘the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge, and of
which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.’” Fogarty
v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1156 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Edwards, 242 F.3d
928, 933. (10th Cir. 2001)). “[T]he probable cause inquiry is not restricted to a particular offense,
but rather requires merely that officers had reason to believe that a crime—any crime—
occurred.” United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337, 1345 (10th Cir. 2009).
Officer Crayton arrested and brought a criminal complaint against Dr. Seidel for (1)
Speeding, (2) Assault on a Peace Officer, (3) Resisting an Officer, and (4) Unlawful Use of 911.
Doc. 26-6 at 1. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs assert the following as the basis for their
claims:
At the time that Crayton arrested and charged Dr. Seidel, he lacked a reasonable
belief that Dr. Seidel had committed any criminal act. Crayton’s arrest of Dr.
Seidel was without probable cause and Crayton knew it was without probable
cause. Further, Crayton knew at the time of the arrest that he was required to
possess probable cause in order to arrest and charge Dr. Seidel with any of the
crimes and continued to arrest and charge Dr. Seidel despite knowing that he
lacked probable cause for the arrest and charges.
Doc. 60 ¶ 13. Further, Plaintiffs claim in Counts II and V of the Complaint that Officer Crayton
charged Dr. Seidel “without probable cause” and in Count III that “Crayton’s actions in charging
Dr. Seidel with the crimes described above despite his lack of probable cause and his knowledge
that Dr. Seidel did not commit the charged crimes constituted a violation of Dr. Seidel’s rights.”
Doc. 60 at ¶¶ 24, 30, 37.

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A.

Speeding

Plaintiffs admit that Officer Crayton observed the SUV speeding and, prior to the current
lawsuit, Dr. Seidel pleaded no contest to the speeding charges. Doc. 26-8 at 1; Doc. 32 at ¶ 1.
Nevertheless, in Count V, Plaintiffs allege that Officer “Crayton arrested Dr. Seidel and charged
him with crimes, all without probable cause. Crayton’s arrest of Dr. Seidel was unreasonable and
violated the Fourth Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Doc. 60 at ¶ 37. Moreover, Plaintiffs restate their position in their Response to Defendants’ First
Motion for Summary Judgment by stating that “speeding is not an arrestable offense in New
Mexico” and “[c]onsequently, Crayton’s arrest of Dr. Seidel was made without probable cause
and thus violated the 4th Amendment.” Doc. 32 at 9.
Plaintiffs contend that “speeding is not an arrestable offense in New Mexico.” Doc. 32 at
9. The extent of Plaintiffs’ legal inquiry on the issue appears to be limited to a review of one
New Mexico statute:
[W]henever a person is arrested for any violation of the Motor Vehicle Code or
other law relating to motor vehicles punishable as a misdemeanor, the arresting
officer, using the uniform traffic citation in paper or electronic form, shall
complete the information section and prepare a notice to appear in court,
specifying the time and place to appear, have the arrested person sign the
agreement to appear as specified, give a copy of the citation to the arrested person
and release the person from custody.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-123 (emphasis added); Doc. 32 at 9.
However, Plaintiff does not cite any authority showing that an arrest for speeding violates
the Fourth Amendment. Even if an arrest for speeding is contrary to New Mexico law, it is
clearly established that such an arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an
individual has committed even a minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without
violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”); Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 167,
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176 (2008) (finding no violation of the Fourth Amendment where Virginia officers arrested a
man for driving on a suspended license, an offense which under state law should ordinarily lead
to a summons and not an arrest); Perea v. Baca, 817 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting
that where “officers saw [the plaintiff] violate Albuquerque traffic ordinances by pedaling
through a stop sign” the officers had authority to effect an arrest).
Plaintiffs’ claim that Officer Crayton’s arrest of Dr. Seidel violated the Fourth
Amendment is not supported by existing law and Plaintiffs do not make any arguments “for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(b)(2). The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel violated Rule 11 in Plaintiffs’ Response to
Defendants’ First Motion for Summary Judgment and is subject to sanctions because he either
failed to make a reasonable inquiry into or disregarded the relevant law.
B.

Assault on a Peace Officer and Resisting, Evading or Obstructing an Officer

Plaintiffs also argue that Officer Crayton lacked probable cause to arrest Dr. Seidel for
Assault on a Peace Officer and Resisting an Officer. See Doc. 32 at 9. The party who certified a
pleading may be sanctioned for violating Rule 11(b)(2) if the legal contentions are unwarranted
or frivolous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). Under New Mexico law, Assault on a Peace Officer may
consist either of “(1) an attempt to commit a battery upon the person of a peace officer while he
is in the lawful discharge of his duties” or “(2) any unlawful act, threat or menacing conduct
which causes a peace officer while he is in the lawful discharge of his duties to reasonably
believe that he is in danger of receiving an immediate battery.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-22-21
(emphasis added). The Resisting, Evading or Obstructing an Officer crime consists of “resisting
or abusing any judge, magistrate or peace officer in the lawful discharge of his duties.” N.M.

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Stat. Ann §30-22-1 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ claim depends on the argument that Officer
Crayton was no longer in the lawful discharge of his duties.
The New Mexico Supreme Court has defined the scope of an officer’s lawful discharge
of duties in State v. Doe. 583 P.2d 464, 467 (N.M. 1978). “[A] police officer is engaged in the
performance of his official duties if, ‘(h)e is simply acting within the scope of what the agent is
employed to do. The test is whether the agent is acting within that compass or is engaging in a
personal frolic of his own.’” Id. Plaintiffs argue that “[o]nce Crayton struck Mrs. Seidel, he was
no longer in the ‘lawful discharge of his duties.’” Doc 32 at 8. The Court disagrees with
Plaintiffs’ conclusion and finds that Officer Crayton acted within the lawful discharge of his
duties. Even though Plaintiffs do not expressly argue for a modification or extension of existing
law, the Court finds that Plaintiffs make a nonfrivolous argument for the extension of existing
law: that an officer who makes contact with the passenger of a vehicle stopped for a traffic
violation ceases to act “within the scope of what [he] is employed to do” and is instead
“engaging in a personal frolic of his own.” State v. Doe, 583 P.2d at 467; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11
Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendment) (“Although arguments for a change of law are
not required to be specifically so identified, a contention that is so identified should be viewed
with greater tolerance under the rule.”).
Additionally, under Rule 11(b)(3), sanctions may not be imposed where “the factual
contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
Rule 11(b)(3). Regarding the alleged assault, the COBAN video shows that Dr. Seidel exited his
vehicle with a gun on his hip, took several steps towards Officer Crayton, pointed at him, and

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responded to Officer Crayton’s demands to put down his gun by stating, “I don’t have a gun,”
before returning to his vehicle. Doc. 28 at 1:54 to 2:03.
Whether the “facts and circumstances” within Officer Crayton’s knowledge were
“sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the Assault on
a Peace Officer crime had been committed is an unresolved question of fact. Fogarty 523 F.3d at
1156. Under New Mexico law, Assault on a Peace Officer includes an attempt to commit a
battery on a peace officer, or any unlawful act, threat, or menacing conduct which causes a peace
officer to reasonably believe that he is in danger of receiving an immediate battery. See N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 30-22-21. The unresolved issue does not preclude summary judgment because the
Court concludes that Officer Crayton had probable cause to arrest Dr. Seidel for speeding and
resisting arrest.
In regards to the alleged resisting, the COBAN recording clearly shows, and Plaintiffs
admit, that Dr. Seidel resisted by refusing to comply with Officer Crayton’s commands, verbally
resisted by stating “No” when told to put his hands behind his back, and physically resisted by
crossing his arms across his chest and by “pulling away from Crayton and folding his arms.”
Doc. 28 at 1:54 to 6:02, 10:01 to 10:06, 11:40 to 12:01, 16:57 to 17:02; Doc. 26 at ¶ 20; Doc. 261 at ¶ 24. These facts are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that the crime of Resisting, Evading or Obstructing an Officer had been committed. See
N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-22-1 (“resisting or abusing any judge, magistrate or peace officer in the
lawful discharge of his duties.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that sanctions under Rule 11(b)(2)
are not warranted for the argument that Officer Crayton lacked probable cause to arrest Dr.
Seidel for Assault on a Peace Officer and Resisting an Officer.

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C.

Unlawful Use of 911

Under New Mexico Statutes Annotated § 63-9D-11.1(A), “[a]ny person who knowingly
dials 911 for the purpose of reporting a false alarm, making a false complaint or reporting false
information that results in an emergency response… is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.” N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 63-9D-11.1(A). In their Response to Defendant’s First Motion for Summary
Judgment, Plaintiffs claim that, “[o]nce Dr. Seidel was met with Crayton un-holstering his
firearm and pointing it at him, he returned to his vehicle and called 911 for help. Dr. Seidel did
not make any false report in the 911 call nor did he abuse the 911 system in any way.” Doc. 32 at
8. Defendants, in their Motion for Sanctions, acknowledge that Dr. Seidel called 911 for the
purpose of seeking assistance; however, they claim that Dr. Seidel “was the instigator/aggressor”
and therefore was not in need of emergency assistance. Doc. 35 at 9.
In his affidavit, Dr. Seidel stated, “I called 911 and asked that they send sheriff’s deputies
to the location. I did not abuse the 911 system or make any false report.” Doc. 32-1 at ¶ 3. The
question of probable cause depends on whether the facts and circumstances available to Officer
Crayton would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is
being committed. See Fogarty 523 F.3d at 1156. Whether Dr. Seidel violated § 63-9D-11.1(A)
and whether Officer Crayton had probable cause to arrest him for Unlawful Use of 911 is an
unresolved question of fact. Because the Court finds that there is a factual issue of whether
Officer Crayton unlawfully arrested and maliciously prosecuted Dr. Seidel for Unlawful Use of
911, the Court will not impose sanctions regarding Plaintiffs’ claims that Officer Crayton
unlawfully arrested and maliciously prosecuted Dr. Seidel for Unlawful Use of 911.

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III.

Appropriate Sanctions for Violation of Rule 11
The Court has considered the relevant factors set forth in the Advisory Committee Notes

to the 1993 Amendment to Rule 11. Several factors weigh in favor of nonmonetary sanctions.
First, the conduct does not appear to be willful; rather, it appears Plaintiffs’ counsel acted
negligently in failing to make a reasonable inquiry into Fourth Amendment case law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee Notes (1993 Amendment). Second, the conduct “infected” only
Count V, and not the entire pleading. Id. Third, this particular conduct did not substantially
increase the time or expense of the litigation because it represents a relatively minor component
of Plaintiffs’ overall argument. Id. On the other hand, this is the second time Plaintiff has been
sanctioned in this case alone, and Plaintiffs’ counsel is trained in the law. See Id. (the Court may
consider “whether [the improper conduct] was part of a pattern of activity, or an isolated event”).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel violated Rule 11(b)(2) by not making a sufficient
inquiry into the legal basis for Plaintiffs’ claim that Officer Crayton violated the Fourth
Amendment by arresting and charging Dr. Seidel for speeding. The Court further finds that a
reprimand will be sufficient to deter Plaintiffs’ counsel and other similarly situated individuals
from repeating this sort of conduct. The Court grants Defendants’ motion for Sanctions and
reprimands Plaintiffs’ counsel for their conduct discussed in this Order.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Regarding Plaintiffs’ Excessive Force, Battery and Malicious Prosecution
Claims, Doc. 35, filed May 17, 2016, is GRANTED.
Dated this 19th day of October, 2017.

__________________________________________
MARTHA VÁZQUEZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Miguel Garcia
John R. Hakanson, P.C.
Attorney for Plaintiffs

Mark D. Standridge
Jarmie & Associates
Attorney for Defendants

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