Quarrie v. Wells et al
Filing
214
ORDER by Magistrate Judge Gregory B. Wormuth granting in part and denying in part 193 Motion to Compel; granting 197 Motion to Compel. (ts)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
LINDSAY O’BRIEN QUARRIE,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEPHEN WELLS, et al.,
Defendants.
Civ. No. 17‐350 MV/GBW
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS TO COMPEL
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel a
Discovery Response (doc. 193) and Motion to Compel Discovery Responses (doc. 197).
The first motion relates to Defendant Wells’ objections to particular interrogatories, and
the second relates to a disagreement about the number of parties that exist in the case.
For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that there are three Defendants in the
case and will therefore GRANT Plaintiff’s second motion (doc. 197). The Court will
GRANT in part and DENY in part Plaintiff’s first motion (doc. 193) to compel individual
responses to his interrogatories.
I.
NUMBER OF PARTIES
Although the related motion was filed second, the question of the numerical
limitation of Plaintiff’s discovery requests is logically antecedent. Pursuant to the
parties’ Joint Status Report, there is an agreed‐upon maximum of “twenty‐five (25)
interrogatories by each party to any other party.” Doc. 155 at 15. The limitations on
requests for admission and requests for production use the same wording. The Court’s
Order Setting Pretrial Deadlines and Briefing Schedule adopts these limitations, stating:
“Each party shall be limited to twenty‐five (25) interrogatories, twenty‐five (25) requests
for production, and thirty (30) requests for admission to serve or notice on the other
parties.” Doc. 166 at 1. This language is distinct from the limitation on depositions,
which specifies that “[e]ach side shall be limited to ten (10) depositions to serve or notice
on the other side.” Id. (emphasis added).
Plaintiff’s position is that, since three Defendants remain in the case, he is
permitted a maximum of twenty‐five interrogatories against each Defendant, for a total
of seventy‐five. Defendants disagree. Because Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants
Wells and El‐Osery are limited to those defendants’ official capacities, Defendants assert
that there is only one party in the case: the New Mexico Institute of Mining and
Technology (“NMT”).
Defendants’ argument has some theoretical support. It is certainly true that “an
official‐capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the
entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (citation omitted). However, this
principle has generally been applied, as in Graham, to the determination of damages.
The generic statement that an official‐capacity suit should be treated as a suit against
the entity expresses the idea that the entity, not the individual, is responsible for
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damages. It does not alter the fact that officers sued in their official capacities may—as
here—be listed as separate parties on the Court’s docket. Defendants cite no precedent
in direct support of their position, and this Court is aware of none. Moreover, as
Plaintiff points out, the Graham Court also remarked that “implementation of state
policy or custom may be reached in federal court only because official‐capacity actions
for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State.” Id. at 167 n.14
(emphasis added).
There is scant case law on the issue of when multiple parties should be treated as
one, though it has occasionally arisen in other contexts. One court held that two parties
should be treated as one for discovery purposes where plaintiffs had treated them as
such, concluding that “the parties did not intend for [the defendants] to be treated as
separate parties under the DPO [document production order].” Verinata Health, Inc. v.
Sequenom, Inc., 2014 WL 909869, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2014). A court may also
interpret its own discovery order to treat two defendants as one party for purposes of
the discovery limits contained therein. See Ziptronix, Inc. v. Omnivision Techs., 2013
LEXIS 112752, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013). None of the cases cited by Defendants or
discovered by the Court in conducting its independent research establish a general rule
that multiple employees of the same entity, sued in their official capacities, are
automatically treated as one party for discovery purposes.
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In reading the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), it is clear that Plaintiff meant
and understood the defendants to be separate parties, and he has treated them as
separate parties throughout the progression of this case. The plain language of the Joint
Status Report (doc. 155) and the Order Setting Pretrial Deadlines and Briefing Schedule
(doc. 166), combined with the indisputable fact that Defendants are listed as separate
parties on the docket, leads the Court to conclude that they should be treated as
separate parties for the purposes of Plaintiff’s discovery requests.
While there is some logic to the notion that the defendants in this case ought to
be treated as one party for discovery purposes, the time to raise that issue was during
the Rule 16 scheduling conference held on September 20, 2019. See doc. 165. At that
time, Defendants were already aware of the disagreement, see doc. 193 at 2, and no
federal or local rule prohibited them from bringing it to the Court’s attention before the
Order Setting Pretrial Deadlines and Briefing Schedule was issued. Therefore, if
Defendants wish to alter the scheduling order, they must file a motion to that effect and
demonstrate good cause for the alteration. Likewise, if Defendants believe that
Defendants Wells and El‐Osery are not properly named parties in this case, they may
file a dispositive motion.1 Having established that all three defendants count as
The Court acknowledges that Rubio ex rel. Z.R. v. Turner Unified Sch. Dist. No. 202, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1295,
1300 (D. Kan. 2006), cited by Defendants, may support their position that Title VI suits against individual
defendants in their official capacities are duplicative. Even in that case, however, the court granted
dismissal of the individual defendants rather than counting them as one party for discovery purposes.
Defendants did not raise this Title VI argument in their prior Motion to Dismiss, see doc. 76 at 13–14, but
they are free to present it in a future dispositive motion.
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separate parties for discovery purposes, any numerosity objections by Defendants are
hereby overruled.
II.
DEFENDANTS WELLS’ INTERROGATORY RESPONSES
The Court now turns to Defendant Wells’ other objections to Plaintiff’s
individual discovery requests.2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case,
considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether
the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a material
fact more or less probable. Fed. R. Evid. 401. Information “need not be admissible in
evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). However, “Rule 26 vests the trial
judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery narrowly.” Murphy v. Deloitte & Touche
Group Ins. Plan, 619 F.3d 1151, 1163 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Crawford‐El v. Britton, 523
U.S. 574, 598 (1998)).
The Court declines to dispose of Plaintiff’s motion on the basis that he failed to confer in good faith
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) or to seek concurrence under D.N.M.LR‐Civ. 7.1(a). See doc. 200 at 3–5. Based
on the lengthy email exchange detailed in Plaintiff’s first motion, see doc. 193 at 3–4, it appears that
Plaintiff in fact made a good faith effort to resolve this discovery issue prior to filing a motion. Plaintiff’s
compliance with Local Rule 7.1 is more troublesome. While the Court acknowledges his explanation
about a faulty internet connection, see doc. 206 at 5, the Court simply cannot construe an email sent two
hours before the filing of the motion as a good faith effort to seek concurrence. The Court in its discretion
will not summarily deny Plaintiff’s motion on this basis, but Plaintiff is hereby put on notice that more is
required. Future failures to follow this local rule will not be excused.
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1. Interrogatory No. 3
This interrogatory asked Defendant Wells to “[d]escribe in detail Lindsay
O’Brien Quarrie’s academic and professional achievements and activities, including
degrees, certificates, awards, research, publications, work experience, and current
employment position, that you are familiar with or have knowledge of.” Doc. 193 at 16.
Defendant Wells objected on grounds that the interrogatory was overbroad and
irrelevant. However, he proceeded to answer anyway, stating: “I was not President of
NMT at the time of [sic] Plaintiff attended NMT. I do not have personal knowledge of
Plaintiff’s ‘academic and professional achievements and activities.’” Id.
Plaintiff’s academic and professional achievements at the time of his
reapplications to NMT (and Defendant Wells’ knowledge thereof) are clearly relevant to
his claim of Title VI racial discrimination, as such information might tend to establish
that Plaintiff was as qualified as, or more qualified than, comparator applicants. As
noted by Defendant Wells, the interrogatory may be slightly overbroad in its wording,
since only Plaintiff’s achievements at the time of reapplication are relevant;
achievements subsequently attained are not. The Court therefore overrules Defendant
Wells’ objections to Interrogatory No. 3, to the extent that it is limited to Plaintiff’s
achievements as of his most recent date of reapplication to NMT.
The second question is whether Defendant Wells, despite his objections, has
already satisfactorily answered the interrogatory. It is Plaintiff’s position that he has
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not. Plaintiff cites a September 13, 2016 letter to New Mexico State Representative
Stapleton in which Defendant Wells wrote: “Mr. Quarrie did not fulfill the requirements
to be granted a Ph.D. from New Mexico Tech despite receiving several opportunities to
do so.” Id. at 7. Also in this letter, Defendant Wells allegedly “made certain false
allegations against Plaintiff as concerns his academic achievements at NMT between
2009 and 2012 and his professional activities thereafter.” Id. at 6. Finally, on a separate
note, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Wells “should” know about Plaintiff’s academic
and professional achievements and activities because he is the current President of
NMT. See doc. 206 at 6.
The Court is unpersuaded that the statements contained in the September 13,
2016 letter contradict the response given by Defendant Wells. The fact that Plaintiff did
not fulfill the Ph.D. requirements at NMT is not an academic activity, and it certainly is
not an academic achievement. Similarly, Defendant Wells’ statement that Plaintiff had
represented to third parties that he obtained his Ph.D. from NMT, see doc. 200 at 6, does
not relate to an academic or professional achievement or activity. If anything, it might
relate to academic or professional misconduct, which appears unresponsive to
Plaintiff’s interrogatory as written. As for Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant Wells
“should” know about his achievements and activities, even if this is true, it does not
signify that his answer was nonresponsive. Plaintiff asked about Defendant Wells’
actual knowledge of his achievements and activities, not about the information that he
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could discover by reading Plaintiff’s academic file, or the knowledge that he should have
as NMT’s President. The Court therefore finds Defendant Wells’ answer adequate, and
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel as it relates to Interrogatory No. 3.
2. Interrogatory No. 4
This interrogatory asks Defendant Wells to describe in detail “the role you
played in NMT’s decision not to readmit Lindsay O’Brien Quarrie to the PhD program
in Materials Engineering at NMT when he applied for readmission thereto in August
and December of 2016.” Doc. 193 at 17. Defendant Wells objected on the basis that the
interrogatory was “vague and ambiguous,” as “Plaintiff has always alleged that he re‐
applied for admission into NMT in December of 2016, not August of 2016.” Id.
The Court finds this objection to be meritless. In the TAC, Plaintiff specifically
alleges that he reapplied for admission “on June 28, August 19, and December 2, 2016.”
Doc. 150 at 20, ¶ 84. There is nothing vague or ambiguous about Plaintiff’s question,
nor is it evident how Plaintiff could provide any further clarification about the relevant
dates. If indeed there was no reapplication in August 2016, Defendant Wells can
include that proviso in his answer to the interrogatory. The Motion to Compel is
GRANTED as to Interrogatory No. 4.
3. Interrogatory No. 5
Plaintiff has appropriately conceded that, in light of his question’s wording,
Defendant Wells’ response to Interrogatory No. 5 was adequate. See doc. 206 at 7–8.
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Because Plaintiff has effectively withdrawn his Motion to Compel with respect to
Interrogatory No. 5, the Court considers the question no further.
4. Interrogatories No. 6 and 7
Interrogatories No. 6 and No. 7 read as follows:
[Interrogatory No. 6]: Describe in detail what role you played in NMT’s
decision to admit (or readmit) any student to the PhD program in
Materials Engineering at NMT in 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019.
[Interrogatory No. 7]: Describe in detail the academic and professional
qualifications of the students who were admitted (or readmitted) to the
PhD program in Materials Engineering at NMT in 2016, 2017, 2018, and
2019.
Doc. 193 at 17, 18. Defendant Wells objected to both interrogatories on the same bases:
namely, that they are not relevant because Plaintiff’s application was not measured
against other 2016 applicants, and they are not particularized to the needs of the case
because Plaintiff applied in 2016, not in 2017, 2018, or 2019. See doc. 193 at 17–18.
In an unpublished but persuasive disposition, the Tenth Circuit noted that “a
claim of discrimination under Title VI is analyzed using the burden‐shifting analysis
outlined in McDonnell Douglas.” Black Educ. Network, Inc. v. AT&T Broadband, LLC, 154
F. App’x 33, 44 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (citing Freeman v. Fahey, 374 F.3d 663, 665
(8th Cir. 2004)); see also Vesom v. Atchison Hosp. Ass’n, 279 F. App’x 624, 635 (10th Cir.
2008) (unpublished) (citing Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir.
2006)). As observed by the Vesom court, this approach is consistent with published
Tenth Circuit precedent. Id.; see, e.g., Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I‐38, 334 F.3d 928, 930
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(10th Cir. 2003) (applying functionally identical burden‐shifting framework to Title VI
claims); Antonio, 458 F.3d at 1181 (applying McDonnell Douglas framework in the context
of Title VII and § 1981 where there is no “direct evidence of discrimination”). It is also
consistent with case law from other circuits. See, e.g., Jumbo v. Ala. State Univ., 760 F.
App’x 918, 920 (11th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (collecting cases applying the McDonnell
Douglas framework to Title VI claims from the Ninth, Eighth, and Third Circuits);
Maisha v. Univ. of N.C., 641 F. App’x 246, 250 (4th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (“We apply
the familiar McDonnell Douglas test for claims of discrimination under Title VI.”)
(footnote omitted). At least for purposes of discovery, therefore, Plaintiff is well within
the scope of relevance and proportionality to request information relating generally to
the McDonnell Douglas burden‐shifting framework. Under this framework, a plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. He may do this by
demonstrating that other, similarly situated individuals outside of his protected class
were treated differently. Amro v. Boeing Co., 232 F.3d 790, 798 (10th Cir. 2000). Once the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendants to
demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the difference in treatment.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Finally, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff once again to show that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason is
pretextual. Garrett v. Hewlett‐Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002).
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Therefore, Defendants’ argument that they need not provide information about
comparator students because they have not given other students’ qualifications as a
reason for Plaintiff’s rejection is inapposite. See doc. 200 at 9. The question is not
whether Defendants have offered Plaintiff’s inadequate qualifications as a legitimate
reason for his rejection, but whether Plaintiff has chosen to establish his prima facie case
under Title VI by demonstrating that similarly situated students of other races received
more favorable treatment. Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff’s applications were
denied on the basis of the Settlement Agreement rather than a comparison with other
students goes directly to the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, but it has
no effect on the first. The Court therefore finds that the requested information is
relevant.
However, relevant information is not necessarily proportional, and Rule 26
requires both. See Fed. R. Civ. P 26(b)(1). Defendants additionally object that
information about students in 2017, 2018, and 2019 has no bearing on the litigation
because Plaintiff applied for readmission in 2016. See doc. 200 at 8. The scope of
discovery in cases of alleged discrimination can be “extensive” where the evidence
sought is “particularly cogent” to the plaintiff’s claims. Heward v. Western Electric Co.,
1984 WL 15666, at *6 (10th Cir. Jul. 3, 1984) (unpublished) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 343 (10th Cir. 1978)). However,
courts regularly limit the temporal scope of discovery, even in discrimination cases, to
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several years before or after the alleged discriminatory conduct. See, e.g., Olivo v.
Crawford Chevrolet, Inc., 2011 WL 12687969, at *5, (D.N.M. Apr. 20, 2011) (unpublished)
(finding a four‐year period reasonable and noting that “[c]ourts’ decisions in placing
time limitations on discovery requests for a reasonable number of years both prior to
and following claims of discrimination have frequently been upheld”); Horizon
Holdings, L.L.C. v. Genmar Holdings, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 208, 212 (D. Kan. 2002) (collecting
cases; limiting discovery scope to two years before and after the alleged discriminatory
conduct).
In this instance, Plaintiff’s requests are limited to the time period from the date of
the alleged discrimination to three years after. In light of this limited time frame, the
Court finds that both interrogatories are reasonable in scope and therefore proportional
to the needs of the case. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is therefore GRANTED with
respect to Interrogatories No. 6 and 7.
5. Interrogatory No. 8
Interrogatory No. 8 asks Defendant Wells to state how many African American
students have graduated from the Materials Engineering PhD program at NMT over
the past fifty years, and to state the years in which they graduated. Doc. 193 at 9, 18.
Defendant Wells objected that this interrogatory “is overly broad, unduly burdensome,
and seeks information that is not relevant.” Doc. 193 at 18. Relatedly, Defendant Wells
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also alleged that Interrogatory No. 8 is “not limited to a reasonable period of time or
scope.” Id.
Plaintiff has alleged racial discrimination in violation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights of 1964. As a general matter, therefore, NMT’s practice of admitting African
American students to the program into which Plaintiff sought readmission is
undoubtedly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. The question remains whether the
interrogatory is appropriately limited in time and scope. As discussed above, courts
regularly limit the scope of discovery to several years before and after the alleged
discrimination in similar cases. The Court agrees with Defendants that a fifty‐year
timespan is not proportional to the needs of the case and is of highly doubtful
relevance. Consequently, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel as to
Interrogatory No. 8, but only with the limitation that Defendant Wells shall provide the
requested information about African American students admitted within the past eight
years. This shortened timespan encompasses the dates of Plaintiff’s reapplications as
well as a period of approximately five years prior, a scope that should prove ample for
the purposes of Plaintiff’s claims.
6. Interrogatory No. 9
Interrogatory No. 9 asks Defendant Wells to:
Describe in detail why the “No Future Application” restriction in the 2015
Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release between Lindsay O’Brien
Quarrie and NMT (see attached Exhibit A), which states that “Plaintiff
agrees that he will not re‐apply for enrollment at NMIMT now or in the
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future,” does not, in you [sic] view, violate public policy by racially
discriminating against Mr. Quarrie as an African American.
Doc. 193 at 18–19.
Defendant Wells first objected to this interrogatory because it seeks information
that is not relevant and not “particularized to the needs of the case.” Id. at 19. The
Court finds these objections meritless. Because of the possibility that the 2015
Settlement Agreement bars Plaintiff’s present suit, discovery related to its validity and
enforceability is both relevant and particularized to the needs of the case. Assuming
arguendo that the 2015 Settlement Agreement is valid and enforceable, Plaintiff’s entire
case could be subject to dismissal. Consequently, although “[w]hether or not the
Settlement Agreement is in violation of public policy is not a claim that is presently
before this Court,” id., its relevance is clear.
In addition, Defendant Wells had already objected to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No.
6 on the basis that Plaintiff’s reapplication was “viewed as a violation of the terms of the
Settlement Agreement” and was therefore not measured against other 2016
applications. See id. at 17–18. This statement suggests that Defendants intend to
establish step two of the McDonnell Douglas framework by reference to the Settlement
Agreement. If so, the Settlement Agreement has additional relevance to Plaintiff’s
claims.
Defendant Wells next objected that Interrogatory No. 9 improperly “seeks a legal
opinion from NMT as to the validity of a contract upon which a judicial determination
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has been made that Plaintiff may not sue upon its alleged lack of enforceability as he
failed to comply with the 2 year statute of limitation period.” Id. The Court is
unconvinced. The question of the Settlement Agreement’s issue‐preclusive effect has
yet to be resolved, and the Court once again declines to rule until the question is
properly before it. See doc. 137 at 7 (“The Court expresses no opinion on the validity of
Plaintiff’s conclusions and will not decide this complicated issue in the context of a
motion for sanctions.”). Plaintiff and Defendants disagree about whether issue
preclusion applies, and its applicability is therefore in question until raised and
resolved on a dispositive motion. In any event, Plaintiff does not appear to be “su[ing]
upon its alleged lack of enforceability,” as alleged by Defendants. See doc. 193 at 19.
Whether Defendants are liable for breaching the Settlement Agreement is a different
question—albeit closely related—to whether Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the prior
settlement. The Court therefore overrules Defendant Wells’ objection on this point.
Finally, Defendant Wells objected on the basis that Interrogatory No. 9 is an
improper and unduly burdensome contention interrogatory. “Contention
interrogatories” are interrogatories that “inquire into an opinion or contention that
relates to fact or the application of law to fact.” 2 Moore’s Manual Fed. Practice &
Procedure § 15.25. Contention interrogatories are specifically contemplated and
permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “An interrogatory is not
objectionable merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or
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the application of law to fact[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). See also Atchison v. Saddleback
Metro. Dist., 2008 WL 4681915, at *4 (D. Colo. Oct. 21, 2008) (interrogatory requesting
legal opinion from defendant would not be improper). Defendant Wells does not object
to Interrogatory No. 9 because it is a contention interrogatory, but rather on the ground
that it would improperly require him “to provide the equivalent of a narrative account
of [his] case.” Doc. 193 at 19 (quoting Lucero v. Valdez, 240 F.R.D. 591, 594 (D.N.M.
2007)). While a contention interrogatory should not require a party to provide “every
evidentiary fact, details of testimony of supporting witnesses, and the contents of
supporting documents,” they are proper if they “do not encompass every allegation, or
a significant number of allegations, made by a party.” Lucero, 240 F.R.D. at 594.
Interrogatory No. 9 asks for an explanation of Defendant Wells’ position on one discrete
issue: why he believes that the Settlement Agreement signed by Plaintiff did not violate
public policy. The Court does not find that this limited question requires Defendant
Wells to provide an entire narrative account of his case, and overrules his objection on
that basis.
With all of Defendant Wells’ objections overruled, the question remains whether
the response already provided was satisfactory. Defendant Wells finished his response
by stating: “Subject to said objections and without waiving the same, see NMT’s
Answer to Interrogatory No. 1.” Doc. 193 at 19. NMT’s Answer to Interrogatory No. 1,
as Defendants themselves describe it, “provided factual information as to the reasons
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NMT entered into the Settlement Agreement.” Doc. 200 at 11; see doc. 200‐3 at 3–4. After
reading NMT’s response, the Court cannot see how it is responsive to Plaintiff’s
interrogatory to Defendant Wells. It does not at any point provide an explanation as to
“why the ‘No Future Application’ restriction in the 2015 Settlement Agreement … does
not, in [Defendant Wells’] view, violate public policy by racially discriminating against
Mr. Quarrie as an African American.” See doc. 193 at 18–19. Plaintiff’s motion to
compel is therefore GRANTED as to Interrogatory No. 9.
7. Interrogatory No. 10
Interrogatory No. 10 reads:
State in detail how many checks NMT received from Lindsay O’Brien
Quarrie in 2016 and 2017 as reimbursement for the $6,000 that Mr. Quarrie
had received from NMT and the New Mexico Risk Management pursuant
to the Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release (see attached Exhibit A),
when those checks were received, what the exact amounts of those checks
were, who they were made out to, and what you and/or any other NMT
employee did with those checks after NMT received them.
Doc. 193 at 19. As with Interrogatory No. 9, Defendant Wells objected that this
discovery request seeks information that is not relevant because “[w]hether or not the
Settlement Agreement is not a legally enforceable contract, including any actions
Plaintiff took to unilaterally declare the contract void, is not a claim that is presently
before this Court.” Id. at 20. Defendant Wells also objected once again to the request
for a legal opinion about the validity of a contract “upon which a judicial determination
has been made that Plaintiff may not sue upon its alleged lack of enforceability.” Id.
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As explained above, the validity and enforceability of the Settlement Agreement
may be at issue even though Plaintiff may not (and indeed, is not) bringing any claims
against Defendant Wells or NMT for its breach. Defendant Wells’ objections are
therefore overruled and Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED with respect to
Interrogatory No. 10.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses
(doc. 197) is GRANTED in its entirety.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel a Discovery Response (doc. 193) is GRANTED with
respect to Interrogatories No. 4, 6, 7, 9, and 10; and with respect to Interrogatory No. 8
as limited to students who have graduated over the past eight years. Plaintiff’s Motion
to Compel is DENIED with respect to Interrogatory No. 3.
Finally, the Court will DENY Defendants’ requests for attorney’s fees and costs,
see doc. 200 at 11; doc. 202 at 4. Although Plaintiff may not have been compliant with
Local Rule 7.1 in the filing of his second motion, see supra note 2, the Court finds no
material failure to confer under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). Particularly given the merits of
Plaintiff’s motions, the request for attorney’s fees and costs is properly denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_____________________________________
GREGORY B. WORMUTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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