Manning et al v. Portland Orthopaedics Limited et al
Filing
45
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER by Sr. District Judge Robert C. Brack Granting 16 MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction ; Request for Jurisdictional Discovery is Denied (jjs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
DALE MANNING and
SHARON MANNING,
Plaintiffs,
v.
No. CIV 17-1252 RB/GBW
PORTLAND ORTHOPAEDICS
LIMITED, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Symmetry Medical Inc.’s Rule 12(b)(2)
Motion to Dismiss, filed on April 5, 2018. (Doc. 16.) Having considered the motion, briefs, and
relevant law, the Court finds that the motion should be granted.
Plaintiff Dale Manning (Mr. Manning), a resident of New Mexico, received a total left hip
replacement in 2009 at a medical facility in Arizona. The hip prosthesis, known as the M-COR
Hip System, contained a component that had been shown to be susceptible to fatigue failures since
at least 2008. Defendant Symmetry Medical Inc. (Symmetry) manufactured femoral neck
components, which are a part of the M-COR Hip System (M-COR) prone to failure. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants, including Symmetry, had notice of multiple failures of M-COR devices
and knew or should have known that these components were defective and unsafe for use at the
time of Mr. Manning’s hip replacement procedure. Symmetry, which is incorporated in Delaware
with its principal place of business in Indiana, moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
I.
Factual Background
On December 2, 2009, Mr. Manning’s treating surgeon implanted an M-COR into Mr.
Manning’s left hip. (Doc. 1 (Compl.) ¶¶ 21, 71.) While Mr. Manning was (and still is) a resident
of New Mexico, he traveled to Arizona for the procedure. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 21, 71.) In late 2015, Mr.
Manning was at home in New Mexico when the M-COR fractured and failed prematurely. (Id. ¶¶
75, 78.) Mr. Manning had to have the M-COR replaced with a second hip prosthesis, and both
Plaintiffs have suffered injuries and damages because of the M-COR’s premature failure. (Id. ¶¶
79–80, 161–66.)
Symmetry manufactured femoral neck components—part of the M-COR that allegedly
failed. 1 (See Docs. 16 at 2; 18 at 1–2.) Symmetry made the “femoral neck components pursuant to
detailed and modified written specifications provided by Portland Orthopaedics, Inc. (Portland)”
(Doc. 16 at 2), which is a corporation that served “as the United States affiliate or subsidiary of”
Portland Orthopaedics Limited (Portland Ltd.) (see Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6). Portland Ltd. and Portland
manufacture and distribute the M-COR System and are also defendants in this lawsuit. (See Compl.
¶¶ 5, 6; see also Doc. 16 at 2–3.) Portland Ltd. is “a foreign corporation existing under the laws of
Australia with its principal place[s] of business” in Australia and Minnesota (Compl. ¶ 5), and
Portland is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Minnesota (id. ¶ 6). Symmetry
shipped the femoral neck components to Portland Ltd.’s Australia facility. (Doc. 16 at 3.)
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Symmetry asserts that it “tracked . . . unique lot numbers and other identifying criteria” on all femoral neck
components it made. (Doc. 16-1 ¶ 17.) According to Mr. Manning’s medical records, the femoral neck component in
his hip prosthesis came from Lot 2264. (Id. ¶ 18.) Symmetry avers that it investigated its records and determined that
it did not manufacture any femoral neck components from Lot 2264. (Id. ¶ 19.) Symmetry contends, therefore, that it
did not manufacture the femoral neck component that failed in Mr. Manning’s hip prosthesis. (Id. ¶ 20; see also Doc.
16 at 3, 8.) Plaintiffs argue, however, that the “femoral neck at issue in this case was manufactured in July 2007[,]
. . . within the timeframe that Symmetry was manufacturing femoral neck components for use in M[-]Cor devices.”
(Doc. 18 at 2 (citing Doc. 18-A ¶¶ 3–6).) The Court construes this disputed fact in Plaintiffs’ favor.
2
Symmetry is a resident of Delaware (where it is incorporated) and Indiana (where it has its
principal place of business). (Compl. ¶ 7.) Symmetry submitted the declaration of Mr. Steve
Hinora, the Executive Vice President, Quality and Regulatory, for Tecomet, Inc., the company that
acquired Symmetry in 2014. (See Doc. 16-1 ¶ 1.) Mr. Hinora has been employed by Symmetry
and/or Tecomet, Inc. since 1988. 2 (See id. ¶ 3.) Mr. Hinora examined Symmetry’s corporate
records from 2001 to the present and attested that Symmetry has never: “been involved in the
marketing, advertising, sale, or distribution of the [M-COR] System”; “designed, manufactured,
marketed, or advertised its products in the State of New Mexico”; “solicited business from any
customers or entities in New Mexico”; “sold or shipped its products to customers in New Mexico”;
“received revenues from a New Mexico customer”; “offered services or other assistance regarding
its products to customers in New Mexico”; “registered to do business” in New Mexico; “had a
registered agent in the State of New Mexico”; nor “had a place of business, offices or other
operations, employees in residence, bank accounts, or real property in the State of New Mexico.”
(Id. ¶¶ 4, 10–16.)
Plaintiffs submitted an image of Symmetry’s website from 2007, which describes
Symmetry as “a global market leader . . . [w]ith 20 strategically located facilities throughout the
United States and Europe . . . .” (See Doc. 18-B.) Plaintiffs also submitted Symmetry’s 2013 Form
10-K Annual Report, which indicates that Symmetry “conduct[ed] business with ‘virtually every
hospital in the [United States]” and had “intentions of ‘cross selling’ products to its existing
customers.” (See Doc. 18-C at 3, 4.)
II.
Legal Standard
“Motions to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) test a
2
Symmetry was previously known as Othy but changed its name to Symmetry in 1996. (See Doc. 16-1 ¶ 3.)
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plaintiff’s theory of personal jurisdiction as well as the facts supporting personal jurisdiction. . . .
When a defendant challenges the court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that jurisdiction exists.” Davis v. USA Nutra Labs, No. CV 15-01107 MV/SCY,
2016 WL 9774945, at *3 (D.N.M. Dec. 21, 2016) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.,
298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995)).
“Plaintiff’s burden is light in the early stages of litigation before discovery.” Arnold v. Grand
Celebration Cruises, LLC, No. CV 17-685 JAP/KK, 2017 WL 3534996, at *3 (D.N.M. Aug. 16,
2017) (citing Wenz, 55 F.3d at 1505).
“[W]here there is no evidentiary hearing and the jurisdictional question is decided on the
parties’ affidavits and written materials, Plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of
personal jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Wenz, 55 F.3d at 1505). “The plaintiff may make the required
prima facie showing by coming forward with facts, via affidavit or other written materials, that
would support jurisdiction over the defendant if true.” Davis, 2016 WL 9774945, at *3 (citing OMI
Holdings v. Royal Ins. Co., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1998)). “The Court accepts as true all
well-pleaded facts (that are plausible, non-conclusory, and non-speculative) alleged by Plaintiff
unless Defendant controverts those facts by affidavit.” Arnold, 2017 WL 3534996, at *3 (citing
Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011)). “The Court resolves factual disputes
in the parties’ affidavits in Plaintiff’s favor.” Id. (citing Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts,
Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008)).
III.
Discussion
“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires that a defendant be subject to
a court’s personal jurisdiction before a judgment can be rendered against it.” Davis, 2016 WL
9774945, at *3 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 301 (1980)). “To obtain
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personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a diversity action, a plaintiff must show that
jurisdiction is legitimate under the laws of the forum state and that the exercise of jurisdiction does
not offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Far W. Capital,
Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1074 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted)).
“In New Mexico, a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
only to the extent that the state’s long-arm statute permits.” Id. (citing Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Phila.
Resins Corp., 766 F.2d 440, 442 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986)). New
Mexico’s long-arm statute “‘extends the jurisdictional reach of New Mexico courts as far as
constitutionally permissible,’ such that jurisdiction is authorized by the long-arm statute only if it
is permitted under the Due Process Clause.” Id. (quoting Tercero v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 48
P.3d 50, 54 (N.M. 2002) (internal citation omitted); citing Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210,
1217 (10th Cir. 2006)). “To satisfy Due Process requirements, the defendant must have (1)
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state (2) such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” McManemy v. Roman Catholic
Church of Diocese of Worcester, 2 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1198 (D.N.M. 2013) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal citations omitted)).
A.
Plaintiffs have not shown that Symmetry has sufficient minimum contacts with
New Mexico.
“A plaintiff satisfies the ‘minimum contacts’ standard by showing that the court may
exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. at 1199 (citing Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).
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1.
Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Court may exercise general
jurisdiction over Symmetry.
A court may exercise general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when the plaintiff
demonstrates that the defendant’s general business contacts with the forum state “are so
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home” there. Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (citing Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317); see
also Trujillo, 465 F.3d at 1218 n.7. “The defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state
must be such that the defendant ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’”
Ellsworth v. Lea Reg’l Hosp., L.L.C., No. 12-CV-59 WJ/KBM, 2012 WL 13080112, at *1 (D.N.M.
June 7, 2012) (quoting Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 1523, 1534 (10th
Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted)). General jurisdiction allows a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, even if the cause of action “is unrelated to the
defendant’s contacts with the state.” See id. (quoting Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1533) (internal citation
omitted); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 414.
“In order for general jurisdiction to lie, a foreign corporation must have a substantial
amount of contacts with the forum state.” Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1533 (citation omitted). “For
corporations, ‘the place of incorporation and principal place of business are paradig[m] . . . bases
for general jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). While Symmetry is neither incorporated in nor has its
principal place of business in New Mexico, general jurisdiction is not limited to these two
locations. To determine whether a defendant has the “continuous and systematic” contacts with a
forum necessary to exercise general jurisdiction, courts consider the following factors:
(1) whether the corporation solicits business in the state through a local office or
agents; (2) whether the corporation sends agents into the state on a regular basis to
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solicit business; (3) the extent to which the corporation holds itself out as doing
business in the forum state, through advertisements, listings or bank accounts; and
(4) the volume of business conducted in the state by the corporation.
Kuenzle v. HTM Sport-Und Freizeitgerate AG, 102 F.3d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Trierweiler, 90 F.3d at 1533 (internal citation omitted)).
With respect to the first and second factors, Symmetry submitted Mr. Hinora’s declaration
to establish that it has not “solicited business from any customers or entities in New Mexico[,]”
“registered to do business” in New Mexico, “nor had a registered agent in the State of New
Mexico.” (Doc. 16-1 ¶¶ 12, 15.) With respect to the third factor, Mr. Hinora attested that Symmetry
has neither “designed, manufactured, marketed, or advertised its products in the State of New
Mexico” nor “had a place of business, offices or other operations, employees in residence, bank
accounts, or real property in the State of New Mexico.” (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12, 16.) And with respect to the
fourth factor, Mr. Hinora attested that Symmetry has never “sold or shipped its products to
customers in New Mexico and has never received revenues from a New Mexico customer.” (Id. ¶
13.)
Plaintiffs do not submit an affidavit, declaration, or other material that contradicts Mr.
Hinora’s declaration. (See Doc. 18.) Instead, Plaintiffs argue that Symmetry’s 2013 Form 10-K
Annual Report establishes sufficient contacts to establish general jurisdiction. (Doc. 18 at 7–8.)
The Report indicates that Symmetry “conduct[ed] business with ‘virtually every hospital in the
[United States]’” and had “intentions of ‘cross selling’ products to its existing customers.” (Id. at
8 (quoting Doc. 18-C at 3, 4).) Symmetry counters that these sentences in its Report are both
aspirational and insufficient to meet Plaintiffs’ burden. (Doc. 22 at 3.) The Court agrees. The 2013
Report does not controvert the facts Mr. Hinora attested to in his declaration. Based on the
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uncontroverted facts, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie showing of general personal
jurisdiction over Symmetry.
2.
Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Court may exercise specific
jurisdiction over Symmetry.
“In contrast to general, all-purpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to
adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes
jurisdiction.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “To establish
specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff must show that the defendant ‘purposefully directed’ [its]
activities at residents of the forum, and that the plaintiff’s injuries ‘arise out of or relate to’ those
activities.” McManemy, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 1199 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 472 (1985) (internal quotations omitted)). “A defendant ‘purposefully directs’ activities in a
forum where the defendant makes (a) an intentional action that was (b) expressly aimed at the
forum state (c) with knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the forum.” Id. (citing
Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1239–40). “This ensures that an out-of-state defendant is not bound to appear
in the forum to account for merely ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts’ with the forum.”
Id. (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475 (alterations in original, internal citations omitted)).
It must be defendant’s own actions that create a “substantial connection with the forum.”
Davis, 2016 WL 9774945, at *4 (citing OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1090–91 (“the injury must
arise out of ‘actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial connection with the forum
state’”) (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (internal
quotations omitted))). “Binding Tenth Circuit precedent provides that ‘mere foreseeability’ is not
enough to establish the purposeful availment requirement for personal jurisdiction . . . .” Id.
(quoting Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1077); see also OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1094 (noting that the
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Supreme Court “has cautioned that foreseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause”) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
at 295) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, “a plaintiff ‘must establish . . . not only that
defendant[] foresaw (or knew) that the effects of [its] conduct would be felt in the forum state, but
also that defendant[] undertook intentional actions that were expressly aimed at that forum state.’”
Id. (quoting Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1077) (subsequent citation omitted).
Plaintiffs do not point to any intentional action Symmetry took that was aimed at New
Mexico. (See Doc. 18.) Instead, Plaintiffs argue that specific jurisdiction is appropriate under New
Mexico’s “stream of commerce” standard and urge the Court to follow the New Mexico Court of
Appeals’ reasoning in Sproul v. Rob & Charlies, Inc., 304 P.3d 18 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). (See
Doc. 18 at 8–12.) Under Plaintiffs’ reading of Sproul, New Mexico courts do not require that a
defendant purposefully directs its actions toward the forum state, but instead will exercise specific
jurisdiction where “the defendant place[s its] product into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that it will be purchased by users in the forum state.” (Id. at 9 (quoting Sproul, 304
P.3d at 28–29) (internal citation omitted).) But see J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S.
873, 886 (2011) (holding that conduct must be purposefully directed at a forum state in order to
support specific personal jurisdiction there). The Court declines to comment on whether Sproul
diverges from binding federal precedent. At any rate, this Court is not bound by Sproul, but must
follow Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent to determine “whether minimum contacts exist
to satisfy due process under the federal constitution . . . .” Davis, 2016 WL 9774945, at *4 (quoting
Raffile v. Exec. Aircraft Maint., 831 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1270 (D.N.M. 2011)). Moreover, “New
Mexico’s long-arm statute only confers personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted under the Due
Process Clause.” Id. (citing Tercero, 48 P.3d at 54; Trujillo, 465 F.3d at 54). Even New Mexico’s
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“stream-of-commerce [standard] cannot supersede either the mandate of the Due Process Clause
or the limits on judicial authority that Clause ensures.” See J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 886.
The United States Supreme Court held in J. McIntyre Machinery “that a New Jersey court
did not have specific personal jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer that did not engage in
conduct purposefully directed at New Jersey.” See Davis, 2016 WL 9774945, at *4 (discussing J.
McIntyre Machinery, 564 U.S. at 877). The plaintiff there injured his hand in a machine in New
Jersey and sued the machine’s foreign manufacturer, J. McIntyre. J. McIntyre Machinery, 564 U.S.
at 878. J. McIntyre was incorporated in and manufactured the machines in England, but it sold the
machines to a U.S. distributor and attended conventions to help advertise its “machines alongside
the distributor” in various states, but not in New Jersey. Id. “[N]o more than four machines . . .
ended up in New Jersey.” Id. The Supreme “Court held that ‘[i]n products-liability cases like this
one, it is the defendant’s purposeful availment that makes jurisdiction consistent with traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Davis, 2016 WL 9774945, at *4 (quoting J. McIntyre
Machinery, 564 U.S. at 880 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). “In particular, ‘[t]he
defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant
can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might
have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.’” Id. (quoting J. McIntyre Machinery, 564
U.S. at 882).
Here, Mr. Hinora stated that Symmetry has “never been involved in the marketing,
advertising, sale, or distribution of the [M-COR] System.” (Doc. 16-1 ¶ 10.) Rather, Symmetry
manufactured the femoral neck components and then shipped them to Portland Ltd. at its facility
in Australia. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs make no allegations in either their Complaint or in their responsive
brief to rebut Mr. Hinora’s declaration or to create a prima facie showing that Symmetry
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purposefully availed itself of the New Mexico market. Nor do Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Manning’s
injury arose out of Symmetry’s actions that created a connection to New Mexico. Plaintiffs argue
that Symmetry’s action of placing the femoral neck components into the stream of commerce with
the expectation that they would be sold in the United States is sufficient to invoke specific
jurisdiction. (See Doc. 18 at 10–11.) Such an expectation, without more, is not enough. “The
‘substantial connection’ between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of
minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward
the forum State.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476; citing Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).
Like the defendants in both J. McIntyre and Davis, there are no allegations and no evidence
that Symmetry had control over its distributor. See J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 878; Davis, 2016 WL
9774945, at *5. Without this, the Court cannot find that Symmetry acted to purposefully avail itself
of doing business in New Mexico. See Davis, 2016 WL 9774945, at *5. Consequently, the Court
cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Symmetry “purely on the basis that it put
products into the stream of commerce with the intention that they be sold generally.” See id.
Plaintiffs have not made the necessary prima facie showing that Symmetry purposefully availed
itself of the New Mexico market, or that Mr. Manning’s injury arose from Symmetry’s connection
to New Mexico. Because Plaintiffs have not shown that Symmetry has minimum contacts with
New Mexico, the Court will not examine whether exercising personal jurisdiction will “offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” McManemy, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 1198
(quotation omitted). The Court will grant Symmetry’s motion to dismiss.
B.
The Court denies Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery.
Plaintiffs alternatively seek “jurisdictional discovery relating to Symmetry’s contacts with
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New Mexico.” (Doc. 18 at 1, 8, 13.) Granting a request for jurisdictional discovery is within this
Court’s broad discretion. See Quimbey by Faure v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. CV 14-559
KG/KBM, 2015 WL 13651242, at *4 (D.N.M. Sept. 22, 2015); Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v.
Heliqwest Int’l, Ltd., 385 F.3d 1291, 1299 (10th Cir. 2004). As the party seeking discovery,
Plaintiffs must show “that jurisdictional discovery is necessary.” Quimbey, 2015 WL 13651242,
at*4 (citing Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173,
1190 (10th Cir. 2010)). “A party must support his request for jurisdictional discovery by more than
a mere ‘hunch that it might yield jurisdictionally relevant facts.’” Id. (quoting Breakthrough Mgmt.
Grp., 629 F.3d at 1190) (internal citation omitted)). An unsupported request for discovery is not
enough, as “discovery is meant to ‘allow the parties to flesh out allegations for which they initially
have at least a modicum of objective support.’” Id. (quoting McManemy, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 1195)
(internal quotation omitted). “[A] court abuses its discretion to deny a jurisdictional discovery
request only if the denial prejudices a litigant.” Id. (citing Sizova v. Nat’l Inst. of Standards &
Tech., 282 F.3d 1320, 1326 (10th Cir. 2002)). “Prejudice occurs where ‘pertinent facts bearing on
the question of jurisdiction are controverted . . . or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts
is necessary.’” Id. (quoting Sizova, 282 F.3d at 1326) (internal quotations omitted).
While Plaintiffs generally seek discovery on “the extent of Symmetry’s contacts with New
Mexico” (Doc. 16 at 8), Plaintiffs fail to controvert Mr. Hinora’s declaration or come forward with
any other jurisdictional facts to support their request. Thus, Plaintiff’s unsupported “request for
discovery demonstrates nothing more than an attempt to conduct a fishing expedition based on a
hunch.” See Quimbey, 2015 WL 13651242, at *4. Because Plaintiffs have not shown that any
jurisdictional facts are controverted nor that discovery is necessary, the Court finds that denying
Plaintiffs’ request will not be prejudicial. See id. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’
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jurisdictional discovery request. If Plaintiffs later discover facts that would support a basis for
personal jurisdiction over Symmetry, they may move to re-add Symmetry as a defendant.
THEREFORE,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Symmetry Medical Inc.’s Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 16) is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery is
DENIED.
________________________________
ROBERT C. BRACK
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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