Brown v. City of New York et al

Filing 69

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Defendants motion in limine to preclude plaintiff, Naeem Brown, from claiming damages for the post-indictment deprivation of his liberty is denied. Ordered by Judge Frederic Block on 2/25/2014. (Innelli, Michael)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------x
NAEEM BROWN,
Plaintiff,
-against-

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
08-CV-5095 (FB) (MDG)

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, New York
City Police Department Officer
(“P.O.”) EVAGELOS
DIMITRAKAKIS, and P.O. BOBBY
MOHIP,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------x
Appearances:
For the Plaintiff:
ROSE M. WEBER, ESQ.
225 Broadway, Suite 1608
New York, NY 10007

For Defendants:
ZACHARY W. CARTER, ESQ.
Corporation Counsel of the City of New York
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
By:

MORGAN D. KUNZ, ESQ.
Senior Counsel
Special Federal Litigation Division

BLOCK, Senior District Judge:
Defendants move in limine to preclude plaintiff, Naeem Brown, from claiming
damages for the post-indictment deprivation of his liberty. For the following reasons, the
motion is denied.
“When a police officer creates false information likely to influence a jury’s
decision and forwards that information to prosecutors, he violates the accused’s

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------x
NAEEM BROWN,
Plaintiff,
-against-

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
08-CV-5095 (FB) (MDG)

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, New York
City Police Department Officer
(“P.O.”) EVAGELOS
DIMITRAKAKIS, and P.O. BOBBY
MOHIP,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------x
Appearances:
For the Plaintiff:
ROSE M. WEBER, ESQ.
225 Broadway, Suite 1608
New York, NY 10007

For Defendants:
ZACHARY W. CARTER, ESQ.
Corporation Counsel of the City of New York
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
By:

MORGAN D. KUNZ, ESQ.
Senior Counsel
Special Federal Litigation Division

BLOCK, Senior District Judge:
Defendants move in limine to preclude plaintiff, Naeem Brown, from claiming
damages for the post-indictment deprivation of his liberty. For the following reasons, the
motion is denied.
“When a police officer creates false information likely to influence a jury’s
decision and forwards that information to prosecutors, he violates the accused’s

constitutional right to a fair trial, and the harm occasioned by such an unconscionable
action is redressable in an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C.
Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997). Probable cause is not a defense to such a
claim. See Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003). Although originally described
as a denial of the right to a fair trial, subsequent cases have clarified that the injury suffered
is a deprivation of liberty without due process:
The liberty deprivation is the eight months [plaintiff] was
confined, from his bail revocation (after his arrest) to his
acquittal, and the due process violation is the manufacture of
false evidence. The complaint alleges that the deprivation of
the liberty interest was the result of the due process violation.
Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 348 (2d Cir. 2000).1
Officers are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability based on their
trial testimony, see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983), and on their grand jury
testimony, see Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1506 (2012). They are not, however,
absolutely immune from liability based on fabrication of evidence outside of those contexts.
See, e.g., Rentas v. Ruffin, 2013 WL 4498668, at *4 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Plaintiff argues that
Defendants lied to the prosecutors in an attempt to goad prosecutors to bring a case against
him. The Supreme Court has found that this type of claim is viable[.]” (citing Rehberg, 132
S. Ct. at 507 n. 1)).
Brown wishes to argue that he would not have been prosecuted—and, as a
1

Brown asks the Court to describe this claim to the jury as a claim based on a
deprivation of liberty due to fabrication of evidence rather than on a violation of the
right to a fair trial. The Court agrees that Brown’s proposed description is more apt and
less like to confuse the jury.
2

constitutional right to a fair trial, and the harm occasioned by such an unconscionable
action is redressable in an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C.
Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997). Probable cause is not a defense to such a
claim. See Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003). Although originally described
as a denial of the right to a fair trial, subsequent cases have clarified that the injury suffered
is a deprivation of liberty without due process:
The liberty deprivation is the eight months [plaintiff] was
confined, from his bail revocation (after his arrest) to his
acquittal, and the due process violation is the manufacture of
false evidence. The complaint alleges that the deprivation of
the liberty interest was the result of the due process violation.
Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 348 (2d Cir. 2000).1
Officers are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability based on their
trial testimony, see Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326 (1983), and on their grand jury
testimony, see Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1506 (2012). They are not, however,
absolutely immune from liability based on fabrication of evidence outside of those contexts.
See, e.g., Rentas v. Ruffin, 2013 WL 4498668, at *4 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Plaintiff argues that
Defendants lied to the prosecutors in an attempt to goad prosecutors to bring a case against
him. The Supreme Court has found that this type of claim is viable[.]” (citing Rehberg, 132
S. Ct. at 507 n. 1)).
Brown wishes to argue that he would not have been prosecuted—and, as a
1

Brown asks the Court to describe this claim to the jury as a claim based on a
deprivation of liberty due to fabrication of evidence rather than on a violation of the
right to a fair trial. The Court agrees that Brown’s proposed description is more apt and
less like to confuse the jury.
2

result, detained for 13 months—had Officer Dimitrakakis not lied to prosecutors about
what he observed. Because that argument does not rely on Officer Dimitrakakis’s grand
jury or trial testimony, neither Briscoe nor Rehberg forecloses it.

Whether Officer

Dimitrakakis lied to prosecutors and, if so, whether those lies brought about the decision
to prosecute are matters for the jury.
SO ORDERED.

_/S/Frederic Block_
FREDERIC BLOCK
Senior United States District Judge
Brooklyn, New York
February 24, 2014

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result, detained for 13 months—had Officer Dimitrakakis not lied to prosecutors about
what he observed. Because that argument does not rely on Officer Dimitrakakis’s grand
jury or trial testimony, neither Briscoe nor Rehberg forecloses it.

Whether Officer

Dimitrakakis lied to prosecutors and, if so, whether those lies brought about the decision
to prosecute are matters for the jury.
SO ORDERED.

_/S/Frederic Block_
FREDERIC BLOCK
Senior United States District Judge
Brooklyn, New York
February 24, 2014

3