The Gerffert Company, Inc. et al v. Dean et al
Filing
351
MEMORANDUM & ORDER: The Court GRANTS 331 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and, correspondingly, declines to address Plaintiffs' FRCP 56(d) cross-motion (Dkt. No. 336 ). For the reasons stated in this Memorandum & Order, the Court (i) DISMISSES Plaintiffs federal Lanham Act claim of trade dress infringement with prejudice and (ii) DISMISSES their related state-law claims without prejudice to be re-filed in state court. The parties shall bear their own fees and costs. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly, and close this case. Ordered by Judge Pamela K. Chen on 8/29/2014. (Lo, Justin)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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THE GERFFERT COMPANY, INC. &
STEPHEN PANIGEL,
Plaintiffs,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
-against-
09-CV-266 (PKC)
JAMES DEAN, et al.,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------------------------------x
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:
The Gerffert Company, Inc.’s catalogs 1
William J. Hirten Co., LLC’s catalogs
The main question raised by Defendants’ summary judgment motion is:
were The
Gerffert Company, Inc.’s catalogs 2 for religious products, featuring the iconic artwork of Fratelli
1
To echo Judge Richard Posner on the Seventh Circuit: “In intellectual property cases, a
picture, or, better, the very object claimed to infringe, is worth a thousand words of brief.”
Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 343 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1088 (1999).
2
(Dkt. Nos. 332-1–334 & 337-1–337-8 (“Defs.’ Exs.”), Ex. 4, at Ex. K (“Inspirational
Wall Decor” catalog); Dkt. Nos. 335-3–335-67 (“Pls.’ Exs.”), Ex. L (“Frame/Magnet & Key
Bonella, 3 protectable trade dress infringed upon by William J. Hirten Co., LLC’s catalogs 4 for
the same product line? Because the Court answers this question in the negative, it grants
summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ federal Lanham Act claim, and declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims. 5
I. Background 6
A. The Facts 7
Plaintiff The Gerffert Company, Inc. (“Gerffert”), during the time period relevant to this
lawsuit, was a New York distributor of Catholic-themed religious products, including prayer
Chain” catalog); Pls.’ Ex. O (“Micro-Perforated Prayer Cards” catalog); Pls.’ Ex. EE
(“Everlasting Laminated Holy Cards” catalog).)
3
Fratelli Bonella was originally formed as a partnership, but later became the Italian
equivalent of a limited liability company, or an “s.r.l.,” which stands for “società a responsabilità
limitata.” For purposes of this decision, Fratelli Bonella’s corporate form is irrelevant.
4
(Pls.’ Ex. BB (“Everlasting Laminated Holy Cards” catalog); Pls.’ Ex. CC (“Micro
Perforated Prayer Cards” and other “Holy Cards” catalog); Pls.’ Ex. DD (“Catholic Art
Creations” catalog); Pls.’ Ex. FF (“Full Line” catalog).)
5
Because the Court has already dismissed certain of Plaintiffs’ claims (Counts 1-9) for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 350), it only addresses their remaining claims
(Counts 10-16) and the facts relevant for deciding these claims.
6
Citations to “ECF” reference the pagination of the Court’s Electronic Court Filing
system, and not the particular document’s internal pagination.
7
The Court construes any disputed facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as the
non-moving parties, for purposes of Defendants’ summary judgment motion. See Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-59 (1970) (Harlan, J.). However, where Plaintiffs either
(i) admit or (ii) deny without citing to admissible evidence certain of the facts asserted in
Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement (Dkt. No. 344 (“Defs.’ 56.1”)), the Court may deem any
such facts undisputed. See Local Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York 56.1(c)-(d); see also Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 288
F.3d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sotomayor, J.) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 does not impose an obligation
on a district court to perform an independent review of the record to find proof of a factual
dispute.”) (collecting cases). Standalone citations to “Defs.’ 56.1” denote that the Court has
deemed certain of Defendants’ asserted facts undisputed and also incorporate by reference any
documents cited therein. Where relevant, however, the Court may cite directly to such
documents.
2
cards and framed prints. (Dkt. No. 335-1 (“Panigel Decl.”) ¶ 3.) As of 1984, Gerffert’s owner
and president was Plaintiff Stephen Panigel (“Panigel”). (Id. ¶¶ 3, 11.) Defendant James Dean
(“Dean”) was first employed by Gerffert, from 1988 to 2005, as an independent sales
representative 8 and then, beginning in 2005, as an actual employee.
(Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 64.)
Defendant Fratelli Bonella (“Bonella”), an Italian company, produces religious artwork. (Id.
¶ 1.) Since 2005, Bonella’s owners have been Defendant Andrea Bonella (“Andrea”) and three
other members of the Bonella family. (Id.)
For approximately five decades, between the late 1950s and May 2007, Gerffert served as
the sole distributor of Bonella artwork in the United States. 9 (Id. ¶ 2.) In particular, Gerffert
developed and sold products that incorporated Bonella artwork (“Bonella-related products”).
(Id. ¶ 70; Panigel Decl. ¶¶ 25-27.)
According to Panigel, Gerffert also devised a “unique
numbering system” for Bonella-related products, consisting of (i) a “series” identifier for the
type of product (e.g., “81” for prints in 10-inch by 12-inch walnut frames; “800” for Englishlanguage laminated holy cards; “M” for non-gold micro-perforated prayer cards; “FM” for
magnetic framed prints; “KC” for key chains) followed by (ii) a three-digit “image” number for
the Bonella artwork. 10 (Panigel Decl. ¶¶ 3, 29, 32, 34, 40, 43, 45, 47-48.)
8
Gerffert sold its products through independent sales representatives, who also worked for
a number of other companies. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 65.)
9
The dispute over whether this exclusive distribution arrangement was legallyenforceable, and/or in writing (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 3, 112), is the subject of the claims that the Court
has already dismissed. (Dkt. No. 350.)
10
Andrea, however, claims that Bonella, not Gerffert, created this numbering system. To
support his claim, Andrea points out that Bonella uses the same series identifiers and image
numbers as Gerffert for the sale of Bonella-related products in “other countries, including Japan,
South Africa, New Zealand, Argentina and Australia.” (Defs.’ Ex. 1 ¶¶ 6, 8, 14, 17.) But, as
Panigel argues, there is no evidence to establish that the products associated with particular
series identifiers and image numbers outside of the United States are the same as the products
associated with those identifiers and numbers in the United States. (Panigel Decl. ¶¶ 36-37, 49.)
3
In terms of Gerffert’s marketing, Plaintiffs allege, but do not provide any evidence to
establish, that Gerffert, in general, spent “in the millions of dollars” on “publicity and promotion
of [its] products and services.” (Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 112, 115.) Plaintiffs further allege
that such marketing entailed “the use of catalogs, membership in trade groups and appearances at
annual trade shows and conventions” by Gerffert, without indicating what portion of its
advertising expenditures went toward catalogs for Bonella-related products. 11 (Id. ¶ 114.)
Gerffert incorporated certain basic elements consistently throughout its catalogs for
Bonella-related products: a decorative cover; general descriptions of the products in the series,
including their dimensions and composition, atop every page; individual photographs for the
products, arranged in rows on a solid background; and a series identifier and image number
below each photograph. (See Defs.’ Ex. 4, at Ex. K; Pls.’ Ex. L; Pls.’ Ex. O; Pls.’ Ex. EE.)
Andrea also points out that Bonella had U.S. copyrights on the series identifiers and
image numbers, and a catalog containing those identifiers and numbers, for some of the Bonellarelated products that Gerffert sold. (Defs.’ Ex. 1 ¶¶ 11-12.) At best, Andrea suggests that
Bonella created the image numbers, not the series identifiers, for certain products. For instance,
Bonella had a registered copyright for the image called the “Immaculate heart of Mary. No. 10112,” which Gerffert sold in the form of a micro-perforated prayer card as “M-101-12.” (Defs.’
Ex. 1, at Ex. C, at ECF 42; Pls.’ Ex. O, at 18.) Bonella also had a registered copyright for a
catalog that contained the “Alba 01” image of Jesus, which Gerffert sold as “M-ALBA-01.”
(Defs.’ Ex. 1, at Ex. D, at ECF 81; Pls.’ Ex. O, at 21.)
Because the factual issue regarding the creation of this numbering system ultimately
remains in dispute, the Court will construe it in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, and assume
that Gerffert devised the system. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157-59 (holding that disputed
evidence “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party” on summary
judgment).
11
With respect to Bonella-related products, Panigel merely states that Gerffert bought
“1,000 floor stands and a similar amount of counter-top displays” to market its laminated holy
cards featuring Bonella artwork. (Panigel Decl. ¶ 38.) Panigel also stated, in a November 2008
e-mail to Dean, that Gerffert spent a “great deal of money” inputting the series identifiers and
image numbers for Bonella-related products into its customers’ “computer systems.” (Defs.’ Ex.
4, at Ex. J.) None of these statements give any indication of Gerffert’s expenditures on the
subject trade dress in this case, namely, its catalogs.
4
But, in other ways, these catalogs also varied widely in their designs. First, one of these
catalogs had a cover that bore the Gerffert and Bonella logos, reproduced below, and the Bonella
slogan (“The World’s Very Best”) (Pls.’ Ex. EE); another only bore on its cover the Bonella logo
and slogan, with no reference to Gerffert (Pls.’ Ex. O); a different one had a cover that only bore
the Gerffert logo, but referenced “The Bonella Line” (Defs.’ Ex. 4, at Ex. K); and a fourth had a
cover that only bore the Gerffert logo, with no reference to Bonella (Pls.’ Ex. L).
Gerffert logo
Bonella logo
Second, two catalogs had copyright stamps for Bonella, not Gerffert, at the bottom of every page
(Pls.’ Ex. O; Pls.’ Ex. EE); another had a disclaimer of copyrights belonging to Bonella and
Gerffert beneath the table of contents (Defs.’ Ex. 4, at Ex. K); and one attributed no copyrights to
Bonella whatsoever (Pls.’ Ex. L).
There is no evidence of Gerffert’s success in generating sales from Bonella-related
products, except for Panigel’s inapposite statement that its sales from all product lines
“eventually reach[ed] over $5,000,000.00 annually.” (Panigel Decl. ¶ 50.) The evidence, in fact,
belies such success. Starting in and around 2000, although Gerffert continued to send out its
catalogs for Bonella-related products to customers, 12 Gerffert’s sales of these products declined.
For instance:
12
Gerffert’s “Inspirational Wall Decor” catalog seems to be the only one of its catalogs,
provided to the Court, which Gerffert published before 2000. (See Defs.’ Ex. 4, at Ex. K (1996);
see also Pls.’ Ex. G (1986).) The other catalogs seem to have post-dated the sales decline, in and
around 2000. (See Pls.’ Ex. L (2006); Pls.’ Ex. O (2006); Pls.’ Ex. EE (2000).)
5
•
Panigel acknowledges that there was growing concern among the Bonella family
about Gerffert’s “falling sales” of Bonella-related products, beginning in “about
January 2000.” (Id. ¶ 52 (emphasis added); see also Compl. ¶ 27 (same).)
•
In July 2004, the Bonella family stated, in a letter to Panigel, that “the survival of
Fratelli Bonella itself is in danger,” citing the fact that “the business is not increasing
but strongly decreasing” and that, since 1995, Bonella had “lost 70% of [its]
profitability in [the] USA.” (Pls.’ Ex. Q (emphasis added).) According to this letter,
with annual sales of $1.2 million in 2003, Gerffert’s line of Bonella-related products
failed to generate any profit; and, with annual sales of $876,000 in 2002 and projected
annual sales of $900,000 in 2004, respectively, the product line actually lost money.
(Id.)
•
In an e-mail later that month, the Bonella family stated that “the time of the big
monthly orders [of Bonella-related products] is over” and that they, along with
Gerffert, needed a “way to substitute the decrease in our traditional products.” (Pls.’
Ex. S (emphasis added).)
•
In May 2007, Panigel e-mailed the Bonella family, stating that he had endeavored to
“salvage the situation” with respect to “sales of the Bonella line” which needed to be
improved. (Compl., at Ex. C, at ECF 52.)
In August 2007, against this backdrop of declining, and increasingly unprofitable, sales in
Bonella-related products by Gerffert, a new company, William J. Hirten Company, LLC (“New
Hirten”), was created by Andrea, Dean, and Defendant Dolores King (“King”). 13 (Defs.’ 56.1
¶ 42; Defs.’ Ex. R1-15 ¶ 18.) According to Panigel, New Hirten began selling, and immediately
replaced Gerffert as the sole distributor of, these products. 14 (See Panigel Decl. ¶ 76 (stating
that, although Bonella “used New Hirten as its exclusive distributor in the United States” as of
August 2007, Gerffert remained a “valid, existing entity ready, willing, and able to distribute
13
King previously owned William J. Hirten Company, Inc., a New York distributor of other
Catholic-themed religious products, including communion items and prayer books. (Defs.’ 56.1
¶ 8; Panigel Decl. ¶ 54; see also Compl. ¶ 31 (same).) The dispute over whether Andrea and
Dean improperly terminated any other negotiations with Gerffert, and created New Hirten with
King instead (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 30-31, 33, 108-109), is also the subject of the claims that the Court
has already dismissed. (Dkt. No. 350.)
14
Defendants, however, suggest that, in the “late summer of 2007,” Gerffert chose to
“stop[] submitting purchase orders [for Bonella artwork]” and “instructed Bonella to hold off on
shipping previously placed orders.” (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 41.)
6
Fratelli Bonella artwork”).) Indeed, in November 2007, Panigel formally instructed Bonella to
bill and ship any future orders of Bonella artwork to New Hirten, instead of Gerffert. (Defs.’
56.1 ¶¶ 50-51.)
Like Gerffert, New Hirten catered to institutional customers, i.e., other religious product
companies, and not individual customers. (Id. ¶ 96.) Panigel states, without any evidence to
support the statement, that, from the perspective of former Gerffert customers, “placing an order
for [a Bonella-related] product from New Hirten was the same as placing an order with Gerffert,”
implying that customers invariably confused the two companies. (Panigel Decl. ¶ 48.) On the
contrary, in November 2007, Panigel confessed that certain Gerffert customers had asked him
whether, after “many years of buying from Gerffert,” they should now buy Bonella-related
products from the “new company,” i.e., New Hirten, and that he specifically assured them “it was
O.K.” (Defs.’ Ex. 1, at Ex. I (emphasis added); see also Defs.’ Ex. 4 ¶ 40 (“During Gerffert’s
winding up process, Gerffert employees also directed customers to New Hirten if Gerffert was
out of stock of a particular Bonella item.”).) Moreover, in January 2008, New Hirten sent a letter
to all potential customers, identifying itself as the “new distributor of the Bonella line” and
indicating that “much of the stock available to you now was out of stock by the previous
distributor,” i.e., Gerffert. (Defs.’ Ex. 4, at Ex. E (emphasis added); see also Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 92
(same).)
After its January 2008 letter, New Hirten began sending out catalogs for Bonella-related
products to potential customers. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 93.) New Hirten’s catalogs not only contained
similar, if not the same, products as Gerffert’s catalogs, but also a nearly-identical spread of
7
product descriptions, photographs, 15 and series identifiers and image numbers. 16 (Panigel Decl.
¶¶ 79-84; see Pls.’ Ex. BB; Pls.’ Ex. CC; Pls.’ Ex. DD; Pls.’ Ex. FF.) As an example, the
laminated holy cards catalogs for New Hirten and Gerffert, reproduced at the beginning of this
decision, both have:
•
a cover which bears the Bonella logo and colorful photographs of holy cards featuring
Bonella artwork;
•
a table of contents listing three series of holy cards with similar bulleted text (e.g.,
“800 Series – English Text”; “700 Series – Spanish Text”; “Overall Size – 2½’ x
4½’”; “All Laminated Cards Are Packed 25 Per Poly Bag”; “All of the above Series
are not available as paper prayer cards”) and a photograph next to each series; and
•
product pages with (i) the same descriptions at the top (i.e., “Everlasting Laminated
Holy Cards”; “Crystal Clear”; “Hard Lamination”; “2½’ x 4½’”; “With Prayers In
Full Color”), (ii) nearly-identical photographs of the fronts and backs of every holy
card in each series and their series identifiers and image numbers, arranged in threeby-four rows on a blue background, and (iii) copyright stamps for Bonella.
(Compare Pls.’ Ex. BB, with Pls.’ Ex. EE.)
In November 2008, having requested and received copies of New Hirten’s catalogs
throughout the year, Panigel e-mailed Dean, in his capacity as an owner of New Hirten, to
complain about the catalogs (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 99-100):
I received Hirten’s new Wall Décor catalog that you sent me in the mail the other
day, and I must say, I am appalled and disappointed at what I saw in it. You, Andrea
and Dolores have copied, wholesale, much of Gerffert’s Wall Décor line. Who gave
15
Some photographs came from Starr Digital Photo, Inc. (“Starr”), which helped to design,
and previously took the photographs of Bonella-related products for, certain of Gerffert’s
catalogs. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 88-89.) According to the owner and president of Starr, Gerffert only
purchased the “non-exclusive right to use” these photographs in its catalogs. (Defs.’ Ex. 14 ¶ 4.)
In Fall 2007, New Hirten bought these photographs from Starr, and also retained Starr to design,
and shoot other photographs of Bonella-related products for, New Hirten’s catalogs. (Defs.’ 56.1
¶¶ 89-90.)
16
Indeed, Defendants do not dispute that New Hirten’s catalogs contained the “same or
similar” Bonella-related products identified by the “same series and item numbers.” (Defs.’ 56.1
¶¶ 97-98.)
8
you permission to use Gerffert’s proprietary item numbers, Gerffert’s proprietary
series numbers, [and] Gerffert’s page headers?
*
*
*
The Wall Décor catalog is not the first example of Hirten hijacking Gerffert’s
proprietary line. In Hirten’s laminated holy card catalog as well as its micro-perf
catalog, you, Andrea and Dolores have done the same thing.
(Defs.’ Ex. 4, at Ex. J (emphasis added).)
As of 2013, Gerffert was no longer in business. (Panigel Decl. ¶ 105.) Indeed, pursuant
to an asset purchase agreement with a third-party company, Gerffert agreed that it would stop
using its name for the sale of any products in the United States. (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶ 130.) Panigel
states that Andrea, Dean, and King, through their ownership of New Hirten, were the “sole
reason Gerffert is out of business,” and that these three individuals are now “operating New
Hirten on the back of Gerffert.” (Panigel Decl. ¶ 106.)
B. Procedural History
In January 2009, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint. The Complaint asserts “Diversity of
Citizenship Claims” (Counts 1-9). (Compl., at 5.) As stated supra at note 5, the Court recently
dismissed these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, without prejudice to be re-filed in
state court. (Dkt. No. 350.)
The Complaint also asserts “Claims Arising Under 15 U.S.C. § 1121, et seq [i.e., the
federal Lanham Act] and Pendent State Claims” (Counts 10-16). (Compl., at 26.) Plaintiffs
characterize their federal Lanham Act claim (Count 10) as a “trade dress” claim pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a), based on the allegation that New Hirten “divert[ed]” Gerffert customers by
sending them catalogs that used the “proprietary stock numbers, item numbers, photography,
header language or page layouts” that Gerffert’s catalogs used for the “same” Bonella-related
products. (Id. ¶¶ 121-24, 140-43; Dkt. No. 336 (“Pls.’ Br.”), at 8-11.) Plaintiffs’ related state-
9
law claims (Counts 11-16) involve allegations about the companies’ catalogs, along with other
allegations about New Hirten’s improper use of Gerffert’s customer lists and purportedly untrue
statements by New Hirten to potential customers. (Compl. ¶¶ 144-84.)
After more than four years of discovery, Defendants filed this summary judgment
motion, which was fully briefed on October 29, 2013. (Dkt. No. 331.) In opposing this motion,
Plaintiffs also cross-moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 56(d) for a
deferral of summary judgment to permit further discovery.
(Pls.’ Br., at 3-8.)
Plaintiffs,
however, do not argue for discovery with respect to their federal trade dress claim, but only with
respect to certain of their related state-law claims. (See id. at 8 (opposing summary judgment,
“[n]otwithstanding the paucity of documentary discovery conducted thus far,” on Counts 10-12
and Count 15), 13 (“Additional discovery is needed to establish the motives for the defendants’
conduct [with respect to Count 13].”).)
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
To obtain summary judgment in their favor on a “claim or defense” in this case,
Defendants, as the moving parties, must establish that “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact,” and, thus, that they are “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Defendants’ ability to satisfy this standard as to any “essential element” of a claim, for
which Plaintiffs would “bear the burden of proof at trial,” “necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.).
The summary judgment standard places on Defendants the initial burden to show that the
evidence does not give rise to a “genuine” dispute over the facts legally relevant to Plaintiffs’
10
claim, 17 or any element thereof—to wit, a dispute that would allow a “reasonable jury” to “return
a verdict for” Plaintiffs. 18 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. There is “no
express or implied requirement” that Defendants “negat[e] [Plaintiffs’] claim” with evidence of
their own, as long as they “point[] out to the district court . . . that there is an absence of evidence
to support [Plaintiffs’] case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 325 (emphasis omitted); see also
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that one of the “two ways”
for the defendants to establish their “prima facie entitlement” to summary judgment dismissing
the plaintiff’s claim is to “identify those portions of [the plaintiff’s] evidence that demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact”).
Once Defendants have met their burden under this standard, Plaintiffs must “do[] more
than simply rely on the contrary allegation[s] in [their] complaint,” and “go beyond the
pleadings” to “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Adickes,
398 U.S. at 160; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added; quotations omitted); see also
D’Amico v. City of N.Y., 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff “may not
rely on mere conclusory allegations nor speculation, but instead must offer some hard evidence”
to defeat summary judgment dismissing his claims) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 911
(1998). That is, “a plaintiff opposing summary judgment may not rely on his complaint to defeat
the motion.” Champion v. Artuz, 76 F.3d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
17
“Material” facts are legally-relevant ones, i.e., facts that “might affect the outcome of the
suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
(White, J.).
18
Disputes over facts that are “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” or
amount to a “scintilla . . . in support of [Plaintiffs’] position,” are not “genuine.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249, 252.
11
B. Federal Trade Dress Claim
Defendants conclude that they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ federal
Lanham Act claim of trade dress infringement based on the catalogs for Bonella-related
products. (Dkt. No. 330 (“Defs.’ Br.”), at 41-44; Dkt. No. 337 (“Defs.’ Reply”), at 23-24.)
Upon review of the available evidence and applicable law, the Court reaches the same
conclusion, though, unlike Defendants who focus their analysis on the liability element of this
claim (“likelihood of confusion”), the Court’s analysis focuses on the protectability elements
(“non-functionality” and “distinctiveness”).
Because Gerffert’s catalogs for Bonella-related
products are not “inherently distinctive” and did not become distinctive by acquiring “secondary
meaning,” they are not protectable trade dress.
The Federal Lanham Act not only protects the trademarks for products, but also their
trade dress. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (providing a “civil action for trade dress infringement under
this chapter”); 19 see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc. (“Samara Bros.”), 529 U.S.
205, 209 (2000) (Scalia, J.) (indicating that 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) “embrace[s] not just word
marks, . . . but also ‘trade dress’”).
Trade dress includes the “design or packaging of a
product.” TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28 (2001) (Kennedy, J.);
see also Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 209-10 (same) (collecting cases). Catalogs, like packaging,
can also dress products by promoting and displaying them for sale to potential customers. See
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc. (“Am. Eagle Outfitters”), 280 F.3d
619, 630 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]rade dress has been held to include . . . the layout and appearance
19
The broad language of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) prohibits infringing uses of “any word, term,
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof” that are “likely to cause confusion . . . as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [one’s] goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
12
of a mail-order catalog[.]”) (citing Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening
Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d 654 (4th Cir. 1996)); Hofmann v. Kleinhandler, No. 93-CV-5638, 1994 WL
240335, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1994) (Leisure, J.) (“[C]ourts in this Circuit have held that
brochures and catalogues can constitute trade dress.”) (collecting cases). 20
Like trademark
protection, “protection for trade dress exists to promote competition.” TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S.
at 28.
To prevail on the federal trade dress claim, Plaintiffs must prove that their trade dress is
(i) non-functional; 21 (ii) inherently distinctive or distinctive through its acquisition of secondary
meaning; and (iii) likely to be confused with Defendants’ allegedly infringing trade dress. See
Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 210-11 (holding that, for trade dress claims, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
requires a showing of non-functionality and likelihood of confusion, and that, although
“[n]othing in [the statute] explicitly requires” a showing of distinctiveness, “courts have
universally imposed that requirement”). 22 The non-functionality and distinctiveness elements
20
See also SGC Commc’n Res., LLC v. Seminar Ctr., Inc., No. 98-CV-2724, 2001 WL
274053, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2001) (addressing a trade dress claim based on the plaintiff’s
catalog); cf. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992) (White, J.)
(noting that the “trade dress of a product,” i.e., its “total image,” includes “particular sales
techniques”) (quotations omitted); Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d
993, 999 (2d Cir. 1997) (indicating that the “displays and other materials used in presenting the
product to prospective purchasers” are also trade dress) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition § 16 cmt. a (1995)).
21
The non-functionality element is further explained infra at Section II.B.1.
22
Although courts have inconsistently set forth the ordering for the three elements of
federal trade dress claims, the Court here adopts the above ordering for purposes of resolving
Plaintiffs’ claim on summary judgment, even though only the second element and not the first
element is dispositive. Accord TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 33 (“Functionality having been
established, whether [the subject trade dress] has acquired secondary meaning need not be
considered.”); Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 210 (“[W]ithout distinctiveness the trade dress would
not cause confusion[.]”) (quotations omitted).
13
relate to the protectability of Plaintiffs’ trade dress, 23 whereas the likelihood of confusion
element relates to whether Defendants are liable for copying it. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769-70;
Am. Eagle Outfitters, 280 F.3d at 629. As stated above, in the following analysis, the Court
focuses on the protectability elements.
1. Non-Functionality24
Trade dress is non-functional if it is neither traditionally, nor esthetically, functional:
(i) “traditional” functionality exists when any feature of a product is “essential to [the product’s]
use or purpose” or “affects [its] cost or quality”; and (ii) “esthetic” functionality exists when that
feature is otherwise a “competitive necessity,” i.e., the absence of that feature would “put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at
32-33 (quotations omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs’ burden of proof at trial would be to establish
that Gerffert’s catalogs, as trade dress for Bonella-related products, do not satisfy either standard
23
The protectability elements are designed to ensure that protection under federal law only
extends to trade dress that “serves to identify the product[s] with [their] manufacturer or source.”
TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 28. Together, courts and Congress have determined that purely
functional and/or non-distinctive trade dress cannot serve a source-identifying purpose; thus, it is
not essential to “preserv[ing] our competitive economy,” and possibly detrimental to
competition, to protect against the copying of such trade dress. Id. at 28-29; see also Yurman
Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 116 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Both principles [of nonfunctionality and distinctiveness] ensure that a trademark right does not unduly stifle
competition.”); Fun-Damental Too, 111 F.3d at 1002 (“If [trade dress] is functional, promotion
of fair competition between producers demands that such trade dress be denied Lanham Act
protection.”).
24
The non-functionality element overlaps with the distinctiveness element: trade dress
which combines elements that make it functional, as a whole, “should be regarded as
unprotectable or ‘generic.’” Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32
(2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added); see also Yurman Design, 262 F.3d at 116 n.5 (“The
nonfunctionality requirement substantially overlaps with the prohibition on overbroad [i.e.,
generic] marks discussed above.”); Publ’ns Int’l, 164 F.3d at 340 (“[F]unctionality and
distinctiveness are intertwined issues.”); Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d
1431, 1442 (3d Cir. 1994) (“In trade dress law, the inquiry into functionality resembles the
genericness inquiry in trademark law[.]”).
14
of functionality. The Court finds that Plaintiffs could prove non-functionality at trial, and that
there is at least a triable issue of fact with respect to this element.
In terms of traditional functionality, it is in no way clear, and indeed Defendants fail to
argue, that Gerffert’s catalogs shaped the “use or purpose” or “cost or quality” of Bonella-related
products. Id.; see Scan-Plast Indus., Inc. v. Scanimport Am. Inc., 652 F. Supp. 1156, 1162-63
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (McLaughlin, J., adopting Report-Recommendation of Amon, Mag. J.) (finding
that “there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether copied features of plaintiffs’ brochures, e.g.,
the color coding and numbering systems, are non-functional” and that “the defendant does not
argue that these features are essential to the use of the product or impact upon the quality or cost
of the product”); (Defs.’ Br., at 42 (arguing only that the “catalog elements” are functional,
“since they are necessary for customers to identify the product to place an order,” i.e., a
competitive necessity). 25 The potential argument, if one were made, that these catalogs allowed
Gerffert to charge more for, and improved the perceived value of, such products is tenuous.
Therefore, there is sufficient evidence upon which a jury could find that Gerffert’s catalogs are
not “traditionally” functional and, thus, potentially protectable.
Whether a jury could find that Gerffert’s catalogs are not “esthetically” functional is a
closer call. On the one hand, Gerffert’s catalogs primarily contained design elements that are
competitively necessary, at least in the abstract, e.g., Bonella-related product descriptions,
numbering, and photographs. The inability of rival companies to describe, designate, or display
images of their products would impose on them a “significant non-reputation-related
25
See also Am. Eagle Outfitters, 280 F.3d at 641 (finding a triable issue as to whether the
“design of the catalog,” as a “device for selling clothing,” was “functional in the traditional
sense”).
15
disadvantage.” TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 32-33 (quotations omitted). 26 On the other hand,
the specific descriptions, numbering, and photographs of such products by Gerffert are not
competitive necessities. See Scan-Plast Indus., 652 F. Supp. at 1163 (finding that, because of the
“other combinations [of colors and numbers] defendants could have used [to identify the product
parts]” in their brochures, “[the defendant’s] ability to compete would not be hindered by
extending protection to these features [in the plaintiffs’ brochures]”). 27
Nor is Gerffert’s
particular arrangement of these elements on the catalog pages, e.g., rows and solid backgrounds,
which can best be described as an ascetic design, a competitive necessity. See Am. Eagle
Outfitters, 280 F.3d at 644 (collecting cases). 28
Accordingly, there is an issue for trial with respect to the non-functionality element,
because, on balance, a reasonable jury could find that Gerffert’s catalogs are not traditionally or
esthetically functional.
26
Cf. Chelo Publ’g Inc. v. Focus Publ’g Ltd., No. 94-CV-123, 1994 WL 391668, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1994) (finding that the general inclusion of magazine titles and article names
on the covers of magazines are “functional features necessary to attract the fleeting attention of
consumers from among many competing products at the newsstand point of sale”).
27
See also Tools USA, 87 F.3d at 659 (finding that certain information “might be useful,”
but the “exact wording” used to convey that information is not necessary); cf. Ideal Toy Corp. v.
Chinese Arts & Crafts Inc., 530 F. Supp. 375, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that the use of “solid
colors” on a Rubik’s Cube could be an “advantageous way to display the product to consumers,”
but there are “other functional ways to package or display the product, or to dress the cube”).
28
See also Tools USA, 87 F.3d at 659 (“[W]hile this information may be functional, its
placement . . . is not.”) (emphasis in the original); Dana Braun, Inc. v. SML Sport Ltd., No. 03CV-6405, 2003 WL 22832265, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003) (“Although several of these
elements of [the plaintiff’s catalog], in and of themselves, are not distinctive and could be
construed as functional, the entire presentation . . . is distinctive.”); cf. Publ’ns Int’l, 164 F.3d at
342 (“Although none of the functional features of [the plaintiff’s] cookbooks can be appropriated
to serve as a trade dress, it doesn’t follow that the ensemble cannot be.”).
16
2. Distinctiveness
The distinctiveness of trade dress is assessed based on the same four classifications that
Judge Henry Friendly on the Second Circuit articulated for trademark claims in Abercrombie &
Fitch Company v. Hunting World, Incorporated (“Abercrombie”), 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976):
(i) generic, (ii) descriptive, (iii) suggestive, and (iv) arbitrary or fanciful. See Paddington Corp.
v. Attiki Imps. & Distribs., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that “the Abercrombie
classifications apply to trade dress”). 29 “Arbitrary or fanciful” and “suggestive” trade dress is
“inherently distinctive”; “descriptive” trade dress is distinctive only if it acquires “secondary
meaning”; and “generic” trade dress is never distinctive. Paddington, 996 F.2d at 583; cf. Two
Pesos, 505 U.S. at 776 (“[P]roof of secondary meaning is not required to prevail on a claim
under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act where the trade dress at issue is inherently distinctive[.]”). In
other words, Plaintiffs here would have the burden of proving at trial that Gerffert’s catalogs for
Bonella-related products are inherently distinctive, i.e., arbitrary/fanciful or suggestive; or that
these catalogs are descriptive and became distinctive through their acquisition of secondary
meaning. The Court finds that Plaintiffs can prove to a jury that these catalogs are descriptive at
best, but that no jury could conclude that they acquired secondary meaning.
i. Inherently or Non-Inherently Distinctive
The first issue is whether Gerffert’s catalogs fall into one of the inherently distinctive
classifications (arbitrary/fanciful or suggestive) or non-inherently distinctive classifications
(descriptive or generic). The arbitrary/fanciful classification extends to trade dress “applied in an
29
See also Fun-Damental Too, 111 F.3d at 999-1000 (same). The only exception is that
Judge Friendly’s Abercrombie classifications do not extend to product-design trade dress claims,
which Plaintiffs’ claim is not. Id. at 1000 (distinguishing Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71
F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995), as a “product configuration case, separate from product packaging, the
category of trade dress at issue in this case”).
17
unfamiliar way,” or “invented solely,” to designate specific goods. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11
n.12. The suggestive classification extends to trade dress that “requires imagination, thought and
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of [the] goods.” Id. at 11. The descriptive
classification extends to trade dress that “forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients,
qualities or characteristics of the goods.” Id. Finally, the generic classification extends to trade
dress that simply “refers . . . to the genus of which the [goods] [are] a species.” Id. at 9.
Although the Second Circuit in Mana Products, Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., Inc.,
65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995), 30 explained that granting a defendant’s summary judgment motion
on the basis of non-inherent distinctiveness is “not generally favored,” it ultimately held that,
“when the possibilities of the ultimate trade dress for a product are limited,” a finding on that
basis is appropriate. Id. at 1069-70. 31 In Mana Products, the Second Circuit rejected the claim
that the plaintiff’s makeup compacts, “with their rectangular and square designs,” were
inherently distinctive trade dress for its cosmetic products, because “the compacts’ size and
shape” were “common characteristics of the entire genre of makeup compacts.” Id. at 1070.
Therefore, the makeup compacts in Mana Products were, “at best, descriptive,” but “not
inherently distinctive.” Id.
The Court reaches the same conclusion in this case. Gerffert’s particular use of catalogs
is not an “unfamiliar” method, or something newly “invented,” solely for marketing its Bonella30
In their opposition (Pls.’ Br., at 9), Plaintiffs quote Ivy Mar Co., Inc. v. C.R. Seasons Ltd.,
No. 95-CV-508, 1998 WL 704112, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1998), which, in turn, quotes Mana
Products for this proposition.
31
In Publications International, Judge Posner added that “distinctiveness is not really an
issue of fact,” but is “classified with issues of fact for purposes of drawing the line between the
jury’s authority and that of the judge and the reviewing court.” 164 F.3d at 340 (emphasis
added). Judge Posner noted that a “grant of summary judgment” on the basis of nondistinctiveness is proper, “if no reasonable trier of fact could conclude otherwise.” Id.
18
related products. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11 n.12. Indeed, as compared to the “endless
options” for packaging a company’s products, there are “common” constraints on the ways that a
company like Gerffert can present its products through catalogs, i.e., catalogs are formatted as
books and their pages contain basic product information. Mana Prods., 65 F.3d at 1069-70; cf.
Publ’ns Int’l, 164 F.3d at 343 (noting that “book genres” contain various “look-alikes that do
not, however, confuse consumers about the identity of the publisher of any particular book”).
Nor do Gerffert’s catalogs demand any sort of “imagination, thought and perception” to discern
what they are actually selling, i.e., Bonella-related products. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11. On
the contrary, the primary aim of these catalogs is to inform potential customers of the Bonellarelated products available for purchase through Gerffert. In short, there is nothing to suggest that
these catalogs are so distinctive that they are inherently “capable of identifying a particular
source of the product.” Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 771.
At the same time, Gerffert’s catalogs are not so “commonplace” that their appearance
simply “refers . . . to the genus” of Bonella-related products. Mana Prods., 65 F.3d at 1070
(emphasis added); Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9. That is, these catalogs are bound to look similar,
but not necessarily identical, to catalogs for Bonella-related products sold by other companies.
See Regal Jewelry Co., Inc. v. Kingsbridge Int’l, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 477, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(finding that the plaintiff’s “box designs” to package its novelty items were descriptive, and not
generic, because they were “similar to those of the other manufacturers” but not the “singular
custom in the industry”).
On balance, the four corners of Gerffert’s catalogs, as they should, “forthwith convey[]
an immediate idea” about the Bonella-related products for sale and are, thus, descriptive in
nature. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11; (see Defs.’ Br., at 41 (conceding that Gerffert’s catalogs
19
are “descriptive at best”)). Other courts have implicitly affirmed this conclusion by assessing the
secondary meaning of catalogs, which is only a requirement for descriptive trade dress claims.
See Am. Eagle Outfitters, 280 F.3d at 639 (holding that “[the plaintiff] can meet the
distinctiveness requirement by showing attachment of secondary meaning to its designs,”
including that of a mail-order clothing catalog). 32
Judge Posner’s opinion in Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604 (7th
Cir. 1986), is also instructive. There, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s advertisement,
containing a “schematic, graphic, or metaphoric representation” of the areas which it serviced,
was “descriptive” trade dress, akin to a “source of information [to potential customers] about
[its] service areas” and not a “symbol or mnemonic designed to fix [the plaintiff] or its service in
the reader’s mind.” Id. at 609-10. By analogy, Gerffert’s catalogs in this case are collections of
representations—graphic, numeric, or otherwise—which informed potential customers about the
Bonella-related products that it was offering to sell them. Such informative, and not symbolic,
representations about a company’s products and services are nothing more than descriptive trade
dress.
32
See also Tools USA, 87 F.3d at 657, 659-60 (noting the jury’s finding that the plaintiff’s
catalog was “not inherently distinctive,” and only considering on appeal whether the jury should
have found that the catalog had “secondary meaning”); Dana Braun, 2003 WL 22832265, at *12
(considering whether “plaintiff’s catalog has acquired secondary meaning”); Crown Awards, Inc.
v. Trophy Depot, No. 03-CV-2448, 2003 WL 22208409, at *18-19 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2003)
(finding no evidence that the plaintiff’s “catalogues, website and advertisements” had “acquired
secondary meaning”); Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 287, 297-99 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) (analyzing the “secondary meaning” of the plaintiff’s “product numbering system,” which
the defendant used “in a catalogue,” with respect to a false designation of origin claim under 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)), rev’d on other grounds, 304 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002); but see SGC
Commc’n Res., 2001 WL 274053, at *6-8 (declining to find, “as a matter of law,” whether the
plaintiff’s catalog is “arbitrary and fanciful” or “generic,” but still considering the issue of
“secondary meaning”); Ivy Mar, 1998 WL 704112, at *5-6 (same).
20
Accordingly, there is no issue for trial with respect to the non-inherently distinctive
classification of Gerffert’s catalogs. These catalogs are descriptive at best and, thus, require the
acquisition of secondary meaning to be deemed protectable.
ii. Secondary Meaning
The second issue is whether Gerffert’s catalogs, as descriptive trade dress, somehow
acquired secondary meaning. Secondary meaning requires that, “in the minds of the public,” the
“primary significance of a product feature,” such as its trade dress, is “to identify the source of
the product rather than the product itself.” Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844,
851 n.11 (1982) (O’Connor, J.) (emphasis added). To evaluate the secondary meaning of trade
dress, the Court must consider the following six factors:
“(1) advertising expenditures,
(2) consumer studies linking [the trade dress] to a source, (3) unsolicited media coverage of the
product, (4) sales success, (5) attempts to plagiarize [the trade dress], and (6) length and
exclusivity of [the trade dress’s] use.”
Mana Prods., 65 F.3d at 1071 (quoting Centaur
Commc’ns, Ltd. v. A/S/M Commc’ns, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1222 (2d Cir. 1987)).
Plaintiffs, in this case, have neither alleged, nor cited any evidence of, “consumer
studies” equating Gerffert with its catalogs for Bonella-related products, “unsolicited media
coverage” of these products, or other “attempts to plagiarize” these catalogs, apart from
Defendants’ attempts with New Hirten’s catalogs. Id. Meanwhile, the “sales success” factor, at
a minimum, does not support the presence of secondary meaning, and, if anything, is indicative
of the absence of such meaning. Id. The sales that Gerffert generated from Bonella-related
products declined, and became unprofitable, despite the company’s publication of catalogs for
these products. See supra Section I.A.
In terms of “advertising expenditures,” Plaintiffs’ mere allegation in the Complaint that
Gerffert spent “millions of dollars” on advertising may not properly defeat summary judgment.
21
Mana Prods., 65 F.3d at 1071; see Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160 (requiring the non-moving parties on
summary judgment to “do[] more than simply rely on the contrary allegation[s] in [their]
complaint”); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (same); supra Section I.A. Furthermore, Plaintiffs fail to
specify how much was spent by Gerffert on its catalogs. Cf. Urban Grp. Exercise Consultants,
Ltd. v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., No. 12-CV-3599, 2013 WL 866867, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8,
2013) (“[T]here is no contention that any of those advertisements or promotions stressed or
emphasized the alleged trade dress.”) (collecting cases).
The only factor which remotely supports the finding that Gerffert’s catalogs acquired
secondary meaning is the “length and exclusivity” with respect to its use of these catalogs.
Mana Prods., 65 F.3d at 1071. Gerffert sold Bonella-related products on an exclusive basis for
close to five decades, though the available evidence only suggests that the company published or
distributed catalogs for these products in the last two decades, between 1986 and 2007. See
supra Section I.A & note 12.
However, certain inconsistences in Gerffert’s catalogs throughout that period undermine
the existence of secondary meaning based on the “length and exclusivity” of their use. See Regal
Jewelry, 999 F. Supp. at 490 (“While [the plaintiff] had been using some form of its trade dress
for five years at the time of the alleged infringement, [its] inconsistent use of its theme trade
dress undermines this factor.”). 33 Indeed, certain of these catalogs displayed Bonella logos
and/or copyright stamps, including one that made no mention of Gerffert whatsoever, whereas
other catalogs did not. See supra Section I.A. Such inconsistences might have caused the
33
See also Waddington N. Am. Bus. Trust v. EMI Plastics, Inc., No. 02-CV-3781, 2002 WL
2031372, at *5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2002) (finding no secondary meaning, because, although the
plaintiff exclusively sold “for over 8 years” the products as to which it asserted a product-design
trade dress claim, “the designs are not used consistently to designate the source of the products”)
(quotations omitted).
22
“minds of the public” to associate these catalogs with Gerffert or Bonella, and not necessarily to
attribute the “primary significance” of these catalogs to Gerffert as the sole “source” of Bonellarelated products. Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 851 n.11.
In short, Plaintiffs may only point, tenuously at best, to one of the six factors in arguing
that Gerffert’s catalogs acquired secondary meaning. While every factor “need not be proved,”
Thompson Med. Co., Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 1985), where “only one of the
factors probative of secondary meaning” is proved, or only those factors not supported by
customer-related “surveys, quantitative evidence or testimony” are proved, such proof cannot
sustain a finding of secondary meaning. Mana Prods., 65 F.3d at 1071; Braun Inc. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992). As the First Circuit has further articulated:
Proof of secondary meaning requires at least some evidence that consumers associate the
trade dress with the source. Although evidence of the pervasiveness of the trade dress
may support the conclusion that a mark has acquired secondary meaning, it cannot stand
alone. To find otherwise would provide trade dress protection for any successful
product, or for the packaging of any successful product.
Yankee Candle Co., Inc. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC, 259 F.3d 25, 44 (1st Cir. 2001) (first
emphasis in the original; second emphasis added) (considering similar factors as the Second
Circuit).
In Mana Products, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff had not proven secondary
meaning, because it only provided evidence of its multi-million dollar “advertising budget” and
“failed to submit any consumer surveys, information as to the relative market share of its
[products], unsolicited media coverage, or the amount of time that [the trade dress] made
exclusive use of the challenged design.” 65 F.3d at 1071. Likewise, in Braun, the Federal
Circuit, in applying the same factors as the Second Circuit, found that the jury’s finding of
secondary meaning was unsupported, in light of the plaintiff’s “limited evidence as to
advertising, sales and media attention, standing alone.” 975 F.2d at 826. In Yankee Candle, the
23
First Circuit similarly concluded that the plaintiff’s “circumstantial evidence” of secondary
meaning, i.e., the length of trade dress usage, advertising expenses, and sales success, did not
suffice to overcome the lack of any evidence showing a “conscious connection by the public
between the claimed trade dress and the product’s source.” 259 F.3d at 44-45. 34
Plaintiffs rely on Ivy Mar in arguing that a jury could find that Gerffert’s catalogs had
secondary meaning. (See Pls.’ Br., at 10.) Such reliance is misplaced. In that case, the district
court found a triable issue of secondary meaning, in light of the plaintiffs’ direct “evidence
indicating that their customers relied upon the stock numbers and the layout of the merchandise
in the catalogs as a means of identifying [the plaintiffs] as the source of the merchandise.” Ivy
Mar, 1998 WL 704112, at *6; see also id. at *2 (citing “documents” from one of the plaintiffs’
customers). 35
Moreover, the district court’s analysis neither mentioned, nor discussed, the
secondary meaning factors in support of its finding. Id. at *6.
Here, the only evidence that Plaintiffs have presented with respect to any relevant factor,
i.e., the “length and exclusivity” of Gerffert’s catalog usage, is insufficient to establish secondary
meaning as a matter of law. Accordingly, there is no issue for trial with respect to whether
Gerffert’s catalogs, as descriptive trade dress, failed to acquire such meaning.
Because no reasonable jury could find that these catalogs were inherently distinctive or
distinctive through their acquisition of secondary meaning, Plaintiffs’ federal trade dress claim is
dismissed with prejudice.
34
See also Rosco, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 297-98 (refusing to find that “[the plaintiff’s]
numbering system has obtained second-class meaning with consumers,” where “[n]o evidence of
advertising expenditures, consumer studies, or unsolicited media coverage was presented at
trial”).
35
Similarly, the district court in SGC Communication Resources only decided against a
grant of summary judgment on the secondary meaning issue, because the plaintiff put forth some
evidence of all of the relevant factors except for “consumer surveys.” 2001 WL 274053, at *7-8.
24
Having dismissed this claim on the basis of non-distinctiveness, the Court declines to
consider the likelihood of confusion element. 36 See Samara Bros., 529 U.S. at 210 (“[W]ithout
distinctiveness the trade dress would not cause confusion[.]”) (quotations omitted); Thompson
Med., 753 F.2d at 218-19 (“Only if the district court rules that [the trademark] has acquired
secondary meaning must it comprehensively examine the Polaroid factors to determine whether
there exists a likelihood of confusion as to source.”).
C. Related State-Law Claims
The Court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over Plaintiffs’ related
state-law claims, if, among other things, it has already “dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction,” i.e., their federal Lanham Act claim of trade dress infringement. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). In the “usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial,” the
so-called Gibbs factors of “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity,” which the
Court should also consider before declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c), will “point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining statelaw claims.”
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill (“Cohill”), 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)
(Marshall, J.) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs (“Gibbs”), 383 U.S. 715 (1966)
(Brennan, J.)); see also Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726 (“Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed
36
Even if the Court were to consider the likelihood of confusion element, it would probably
conclude that several of Judge Friendly’s well-accepted Polaroid factors, designed to assess this
element, disfavor Plaintiffs: (i) Gerffert’s catalogs have minimal “strength” as descriptive trade
dress; (ii) Bonella-related products sold by Gerffert and New Hirten lacked temporal
“proximity,” because these products were never on the market at the same time; (iii) potential
customers in the market for Bonella-related products were “sophisticat[ed]” institutions, not
individuals; and (iv) there was no “actual confusion” between both sources of Bonella-related
products, because potential customers were notified that New Hirten was a new company, not to
be confused with Gerffert. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961); see supra Section I.A.
25
before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be
dismissed as well.”).
In Blau Plumbing, upon affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s advertisement-based
trade dress claim on summary judgment, Judge Posner concluded that the district court was
“wrong to go on and decide the merits of [the plaintiff’s] state law claim for false advertising.”
781 F.2d at 611. “State law claims should not be retained for adjudication in federal court when
the sole remaining basis for federal jurisdiction is the judge-made doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, unless there are pressing reasons for retention; none has been shown here.” Id. at
612. This case is no different.
First, judicial resources are better conserved by dismissing the related state-law claims.
These claims, which involve more than the allegations concerning Gerffert’s and New Hirten’s
catalogs, would require “resolving additional issues of fact.” N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v.
IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2007) (dismissing the plaintiff’s
state-law claims, after dismissing its “federal copyright claim”), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1259
(2008). Furthermore, while discovery in this case has largely been completed over the last four
years, Plaintiffs are seeking, in the context of their FRCP 56(d) cross-motion, more discovery
relating to certain of these claims. 37 See Valencia v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 306 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“Although most of the anticipated pretrial discovery had been completed, this was a relatively
early stage of the case.”); supra Section I.B.
Second, a dismissal without prejudice of the related state-law claims is still convenient
for, and fair to, the parties. Because the Court previously dismissed other state-law claims for
37
Because the Court dismisses without prejudice the related state-law claims, it need not
address Plaintiffs’ FRCP 56(d) cross-motion with respect to such claims (Pls.’ Br., at 3-8).
26
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the parties may now pursue all of these claims in a single case
before the state court, without duplicating their discovery efforts. See Tishman v. Associated
Press, No. 05-CV-4278, 2007 WL 4145556, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2007) (holding that
“plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by the dismissal of their [state and city law claims],” because
(i) N.Y. C.P.L.R. 205(a) “allows a plaintiff to recommence a dismissed suit within six months
without regard to the statute of limitations,” and (ii) “it does not appear that any discovery would
need to be repeated if plaintiffs’ pendent claims were brought in state court”) (quotations
omitted).
Finally, the interest in comity with state courts is served as well. Resolving the related
state-law claims, which involve factual issues separate from the federal trade dress claim, would
result in a “[n]eedless decision[] of state law.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. The more extensive
scope of these claims also suggests that this case is an “effort to impose upon [the Court] what is
in effect only a state law case,” to which the federal claim is a mere “appendage.” Id. at 727. 38
This case, therefore, is the “usual” one in which the Gibbs factors “point toward” the
Court’s dismissal of the related state-law claims without prejudice, upon its dismissal of the
federal trade dress claim with prejudice. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 & n.7.
III. Conclusion 39
For the reasons set forth above, the Court (i) dismisses Plaintiffs’ federal Lanham Act
claim of trade dress infringement with prejudice and (ii) dismisses their related state-law claims
38
In this case, the Court may also, but need not, dismiss such claims on the basis that they
“substantially predominate[]” over the federal trade dress claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).
39
The Court also declines to address Defendants’ collateral estoppel and res judicata
defenses (Defs.’ Br., at 6-15), which are moot in light of its decision.
27
without prejudice to be re-filed in state court. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter
judgment accordingly, and close this case.
SO ORDERED:
/s/ Pamela K. Chen
PAMELA K. CHEN
United States District Judge
Dated: August 29, 2014
Brooklyn, New York
28
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