Rozier v. Financial Recovery Systems, Inc.

Filing 25

ORDER DENYING Defendant's 13 Motion for Reconsideration - For the reasons set forth in the ATTACHED WRITTEN SUMMARY ORDER, defendant's motion for reconsideration of this court's June 7, 2011 Order denying defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint is DENIED. This case shall proceed under the pretrial supervision of U.S. Magistrate Judge James Orenstein. SO ORDERED by Judge Dora Lizette Irizarry on 7/7/2011. (Irizarry, Dora)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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WILLIAM ROZIER, on behalf of himself and
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all others similarly situated,
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Plaintiff,
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-against:
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FINANCIAL RECOVERY SYSTEMS, INC.,
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Defendant.
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SUMMARY ORDER
10-CV-3273 (DLI) (JO)

DORA L. IRIZARRY, United States District Judge:
On June 7, 2011, the court issued a Memorandum and Order (the “Opinion”), denying
Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. On June 21, 2011, Defendant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Opinion and, on June 23, 2011, Plaintiff filed his opposition. 1 For the
reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is denied.
Defendant brings the instant motion for reconsideration pursuant to Local Rule 6.3. “The
standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally
be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion
reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transport, Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). “The
major grounds justifying reconsideration are an intervening change in controlling law, the
availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”
Hinds County, Miss. v. Wachovia Bank N.A., 708 F. Supp. 2d 348, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Reconsideration is not a proper tool to repackage and
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The court notes that, as of the date of this Summary Order, Defendant had not filed a reply to
Plaintiff’s opposition. Thus, any reply would be time-barred pursuant to Rules 6.1 and 6.3 of the
Local Civil Rules for the Eastern District of New York (“Local Rule” or “Local Rules”).
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relitigate arguments and issues already considered by the court in deciding the original motion.
Id.; United States v. Gross, 2002 WL 32096592, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2002). Nor is it proper
to raise new arguments and issues. Gross, 2002 WL 32096592 at *4.
Here, Defendant fails to meet the standard for reconsideration because it does not present
any controlling legal authority or factual matter overlooked by the court, or any need to correct a
clear error or prevent manifest injustice.

Instead, Defendant argues that the court should

reconsider its decision essentially because Defendant disagrees with the court’s analysis in the
Opinion. Specifically, Defendant argues that its motion for reconsideration should be granted
because it did not have an opportunity to respond to Plaintiff’s June 7, 2011 Supplemental
Submission, (see Docket Entry No. 11), and, in its Opinion, the court: (i) “appears to have placed
considerable reliance upon . . . Beauchamp [v. Fin. Recovery Servs., Inc.,] 2011 WL 891320”
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2011), (ii) “overlooked a key factual finding that distinguishes Beauchamp
from the current case and from Brill,” and (iii) “marks a distinction without difference” when
distinguishing the instant action from the safe harbor language established in Miller v. McCalla,
Raynor, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols & Clark, 214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000).
There was no injustice in the court’s failure to allow Defendant to respond to Plaintiff’s
submission of supplemental authority, because the submission was clearly not relied upon by the
court in its Opinion, as the supplemental authority was submitted less than an hour before the
court issued its ten-page Opinion and the supplemental authority was a case decided several
months prior to the Opinion. (See Docket Entries Nos. 11, 12.)
Furthermore, merely disagreeing with the court’s analysis does not warrant
reconsideration, especially where, as here, Defendant relies entirely on case law that is not
binding on this court. Contrary to Defendant’s assertions in its motion for reconsideration, the

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court did in fact carefully read and analyze the facts of Beauchamp prior to issuing the Opinion.
The Opinion never stated that the facts of Beauchamp were the same as those in the instant case
and the Court did not rely on Beauchamp to distinguish Brill v. Fin. Recovery Servs., Inc.,
2010 WL 5825480 (D. Neb. Nov. 10, 2010), from the instant action.

Instead, the court

referenced Beauchamp only three times in the Opinion in support of various propositions, two of
which were in the context of setting forth the legal standard. Removal of all citations to
Beauchamp cannot reasonably be expected to, and indeed would not, “alter the conclusion
reached by the court.” See Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.
Moreover, in arguing that the court improperly analyzed Brill and Miller, Defendant
merely relies on arguments already raised in its papers in support of its motion to dismiss and
considered by the court in its Opinion. (See Docket Entry Nos. 2, 8, 9.) Also, Defendant’s
reference to a case that was issued in the Northern District of California nine days after the
Opinion was issued here, does not constitute a controlling decision overlooked by the court that
“might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” See Shrader,
70 F.3d at 257.
In sum, Defendant has failed to demonstrate the existence of exceptional circumstances
warranting reconsideration, or controlling decisions or data that would alter the conclusions
reached in the Opinion. Accordingly, Defendant’s request for reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
July 7, 2011
/s/
DORA L. IRIZARRY
United States District Judge

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