Locurto v. United States of America

Filing 134

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, For the foregoing reasons, Ground Three of the Petition (Dkts. 1, 62) is DISMISSED as procedurally barred and Ground Four of the Petition is DISMISSED as time-barred. The request for evidentiary hearings as to Ground Three and G round Four are DENIED. The parties are DIRECTED to confer and contact the court's Deputy at 718-613-2545 to schedule a status conference to discuss scheduling the evidentiary hearing on Ground One of the Petition. So Ordered by Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis on 2/28/2018. (Lee, Tiffeny)

D F
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-X

STEPHEN LOCURTO,
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

lO-CV-4589(NGG)

-againstUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.
-X

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS,United States District Judge.

Before the court is Petitioner Stephen LoCurto's petition for a writ of habeas corpus

brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(the "Petition").^ (Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct
Sentence ("Pet.")(Dkt. 1); Am. Mot. to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence("Am.Pet.")

(Dkt. 62).) Petitioner asserts four legal claims—Grounds One through Four(defined below)—
and requests an evidentiary hearing with respect to each claim. (See Pet'r Suppl. Mem.ofLaw
in Supp. ofPet. ("Pet'r Suppl. Mem.")(Dkt. 21); Pet'r Mem.in Supp. of Am.Pet.("Pet'r Am.
Pet. Mem.")(Dkt. 112).) In its Memorandum and Order dated August 11, 2016,the court(1)
ordered an evidentiary hearing on Ground One ofthe Petition; and (2)denied Ground Two in its

entirety. (See Aug. 11,2016, Mem.& Order(Dkt. 87)at 7,19.) For the reasons set forth below.
Grounds Three and Four are DISMISSED.

'
"The Petition" refers to the claims raised in Petitioner's original petition as well as his amended petition.
1

1.

BACKGROXJND

A. Factual Background

The court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts ofPetitioner's criminal case. See

United States v. Rizzuto. No.03-CR-1382(NGG); United States v. Amato.306 F. App'x 630

(2d Cir. 2009)(summary order), cert, denied. 558 U.S. 940(2009).
B. Procedural Histoiy^
On October 4,2010,Petitioner filed his initial pro se petition for relief pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255, alleging(1)ineffective assistance oftrial counsel with respect to plea

negotiations("Ground One");(2)ineffective assistance of appellate counsel("Ground Two");
and(3)that the Government suppressed impeachment evidence in violation ofBradv v.
Marvland. 373 U.S. 83(1963), and Giglio v. United States. 405 U.S. 150(1972)("Ground

Three").^ (See Pet.; Pet'r Mem.ofLaw in Supp. ofPet.("Pet'r Mem.")(Dkt. 2).)

On April 17, 2012, Magistrate Judge James Orenstein"* appointed Alan M.Nelson as
habeas counsel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act("CJA").^ (Apr. 17, 2012, Order(Dkt. 11).)
Petitioner filed a supplemental memorandum oflaw in support ofthe Petition. (Pet'r Suppl.

Mem.) The Government opposed the Petition. (Gov't Mem.ofLaw in Opp'n to Pet.("Gov't

Opp'n")(Dkt. 28).) Petitioner filed a reply memorandum oflaw in further support of his
Petition. (Pet'r Reply Mem.in Supp. ofPet.("Pet'r Reply")(Dkt. 30).)

^ This section only provides the procedural history relevant to Grounds Three and Four.
^ Petitioner also appears to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the umbrella of Ground Three:
Petitioner argues that "trial coimsel was made ineffective because the prosecution was not forthright and truthful in
its Bradv obligations." (Pet'r Mem. at 12.)

"The court referred Petitioner's motion to appoint counsel to Judge Orenstein for decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 72(a). (July 22,2011, Order(Dkt. 9).)
^ Attorney Bernard Freamon was later granted leave to act as co-counsel in this matter. (See Aug. 1,2013, Order
(Dkt. 45).)
2

On August 5,2014, nearly four years after Petitioner filed his initial petition, Petitioner
simultaneously moved to amend his Petition and filed an amended petition, which supplemented
his argument as to Ground Three and added a fourth claim, alleging that trial counsel falsely
advised him that additional funds for expert witness services were unavailable under the CJA
and,thus, that trial counsel was ineffective("Ground Four"). (See Mot. to Amend Pet.(Dkt. 60);
Am.Pet.; Pet'r Mem.ofLaw in Supp. of Mot. to Amend Pet.(Dkt. 63).) The Government did
not object to the filing of an amended petition but reserved the right to argue that Petitioner's
claims are untimely. (See Feb. 22, 2016, Letter from Gov't(Dkt. 75).)

The court set a briefing schedule for the Amended Petition. (See Oct. 24,2016, Order
(Dkt. 104).) On December 9, 2016,Petitioner filed a supplemental memorandum oflaw in
support ofthe Amended Petition. (Pet'r Am.Pet. Mem.) The Government submitted its

opposition briefon January 20,2017. (Gov't Opp'n to Am.Pet.("Gov't Am.Pet. Opp'n")(Dkt.
119).) The Amended Petition has been fully briefed since February 3,2017, when Petitioner
submitted his reply memorandum oflaw in further support ofthe Amended Petition. (Pet'r
Reply Mem.of Law in Supp. ofAm.Pet.("Pet'r Am.Pet. Reply")(Dkt. 120).)
n.

LEGAL STANDARD

A federal prisoner may file a petition in the sentencing court"to vacate, set aside, or
correct" a conviction or sentence that was imposed "in violation ofthe Constitution or laws of
the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A federal habeas petitioner bears the burden of proof

by a preponderance ofthe evidence. See Triana v. United States. 205 F.3d 36,40(2d Cir. 2000).
In this section, the court describes(1)two procedural bars that preclude certain federal habeas
claims, and(2)the legal standard governing requests for evidentiary hearings.

A. Procedural Bars

"Because collateral challenges are in 'tension with society's strong interest in the finality
ofcriminal convictions, the courts have established rules that make it more difficult for a

defendant to upset a conviction by collateral, as opposed to direct, attack.'" Yick Man Mui v.
United States. 614 F.3d 50,53(2d Cir. 2010)(quoting Ciak v. United States. 59 F.3d 296, 301
(2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Mickens v. Tavlor. 535 U.S. 162(2002)).
First,"the so-called mandate rule bars re-litigation ofissues already decided on direct

appeal," including both "matters expressly decided by the appellate court" and "issues impliedly
resolved by the appellate court's mandate." Id (citations omitted); see also id. at 53-54
(explaining that the mandate rule applies in habeas proceedings under Section 2255).
Second,courts apply a "general rule that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be
raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice." Massaro v. United
States. 538 U.S. 500,504(2003)(emphasis added): see also Yick Man Mui.614 F.3d at 54.
This bar does not apply to claims ofineffective assistance of counsel, however. "[T]he Supreme
Court has explained that 'in most cases[,] a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct
appeal for deciding claims ofineffective assistance.'" United States v. Rosa.666 F. App'x 42,
44(2d Cir. 2016)(summary order)(quoting Massaro. 538 U.S. at 504).
B. Evidentiary Hearings

Courts are directed to hold evidentiary hearings in proceedings under Section 2255
"[ujnless the motion and the files and records ofthe case conclusively show that the prisoner is

entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). "A [petitioner] seeking a hearing on an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim 'need establish only that he has a plausible claim ofineffective
assistance of counsel, not that he will necessarily succeed on the claim.'" Ravsor v. United
4

States. 647 F.Sd 491,494(2d Cir. 2011)(quoting Puglisi v. United States. 586 F.3d 209,213

(2d Cir. 2009)). This determination is "analogous" to summary judgment proceedings: "If
material facts are in dispute, a hearing should usually be held, and relevant findings offacts

made." Id (quoting Puglisi. 586 F.3d at 213). The Second Circuit has held that in "cases
involving claims that 'can be, and [are] often made in any case,' the judge may properly rely on

his or her knowledge ofthe record and may permissibly forgo a full hearing and instead request
letters, documentary evidence, and affidavits to aid in its resolution ofthe claim." Id. at 215.
The trial judge is also in a position, based on the knowledge gained in the underlying criminal
proceeding and in the role as trier offact in the habeas proceeding, to determine that the
petitioner had no chance of overcoming counsel's explanation. Id
III.

DISCUSSION
A. Ground Three

In Ground Three ofthe Petition, Petitioner argues that the Government suppressed

impeachment information about witness Frank Lino in violation ofBradv v. Maryland. 373 U.S.
83(1963), Giglio v. United States. 405 U.S. 150(1972), and Nanue v. Illinois. 360 U.S. 264
(1959). (Am.Pet.f 7.) Petitioner specifically asserts that the Government failed to disclose
information concerning Lino's involvement in the murder of Wilfired "Willie Boy" Johnson

("Wilfred Johnson") and heroin dealing, and argues that there is a reasonable probability that had
this information been disclosed to the defense,the outcome ofPetitioner's trial would have been

different. (Am.Pet.^ 43.) He further argues that Lino testified falsely by failing to disclose his
involvement in the murder of Wilfred Johnson and that the Government "must have known about

[Lino's] involvement" in the murder, yet intentionally suppressed this information. (See Pet'r
Am.Pet. Reply at 27; Am.Pet. ^ 7.)
5

Petitioner also appears to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the
umbrella of Ground Three.^ Petitioner avers that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed

to follow up with George Webb,a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation, about
various affidavits he swore to concerning Lino's drug trafficking. (Am.Pet. ^ 42.)

For the following reasons, the court holds that Petitioner's Bradv/Giglio and Napue

claims are procedurally barred, and Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, while not

procedurally barred, fails as a matter oflaw. Accordingly, Petitioner's request for an evidentiary
hearing as to the claims raised in Ground Three is DENIED and Ground Three is DISMISSED.
1. Bradv/Giglio Claim

Petitioner concedes that he did not raise his Bradv/Giglio claim on direct appeal of his

conviction. (Pet'r Am.Pet. Reply at 1-2.) Notwithstanding this, Petitioner argues that he has

demonstrated "cause and prejudice" sufficient to overcome the procedural default.^ (Pet'r Am.
Pet. Reply at 2(citing Strickler v. Greene.527 U.S. 263,282-83(1999)).) For the reasons set
forth below. Petitioner's argument fails.

To prevail on a Bradv/Giglio claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that:(1)the evidence
at issue is favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching;(2)the Government

suppressed the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3)the evidence was material to
the defense. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281;
^Giglio. 405 U.S. at 154(holding that the rule stated

in Bradv applies to evidence imdermining witness credibility). For purposes of determining
^ Petitioner states that "[wjhile [he] did allege in his initial petition that the failure to disclose Brady material
rendered his counsel ineffective, the gravamen of his claim, as alleged in his amended petition, is that the facts
concerning Frank Lino's involvement in the Johnson murder were totally and completely suppressed by the
Government." (Pet'r Am.Pet. Reply at 3.)

'
Petitioner does not argue that he is actually innocent—another potential basis for excusing procedural default. See
Zhang V. United States. 506 F.3d 162,166(2d Cir. 2007)("[T]he procedural default bar may be overcome only
where the petitioner establishes either(1)'cause' for the failure to bring a direct appeal and 'actual prejudice' from
the alleged violations; or(2)'actual innocence.'"(internal citation omitted)).
6

whether default is excused,"cause and prejudice parallel two ofthe three components ofthe
alleged Brady violation itself." Strickler. 527 U.S. at 282. A petitioner shows "cause" when the
reason for his failure to develop facts on appeal was the Government's suppression ofthe
relevant evidence. Banks v. Dretke. 540 U.S. 668,691 (2004). Prejudice exists when the
suppressed evidence is "material" for Bradv purposes. Id.

Even ifthe facts were fully developed and Petitioner could demonstrate "cause"for his
procedural default—^i.e., that the Government suppressed the impeachment evidence—^Petitioner
cannot establish the materiality ofthe evidence at issue and thus cannot establish "prejudice"

resulting from the error.^ "[EJvidence is material only ifthere is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result ofthe proceeding would have been
different." United States v. Baglev. 473 U.S. 667,682(1985). The Second Circuit has

repeatedly held that "[n]ew impeachment evidence is

material, and thus a new trial is not

required when the suppressed impeachment evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on
which to impeach a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable."
United States v. Parkes. 497 F.3d 220,233(2d Cir. 2007)(internal quotation marks and citation

omitted); see also United States v. Avellino. 136 F.3d 249,256-57(2d Cir. 1998)("[Wjhere the
undisclosed evidence merely flimishes an additional basis on which to challenge a wimess whose
credibility has already been shown to be questionable or who is subject to extensive attack by

® On November 30,2016,the court denied Petitioner's request for discovery concerning Ground Three, holding that
Ihe allegedly suppressed impeachment evidence was not material under Bradv/Giglio. (Nov. 30,2016, Mem.&
Order(Dkt. 109)at 3-4.)
7

reason of other evidence, the undisclosed evidence may be cumulative, and hence not

material.").^
Here, evidence concerning Lino's alleged heroin dealing and his involvement in the
murder of Wilfred Johnson would merely provide additional bases on which to impeach Lino
and to undermine his credibility, which was already attacked at Petitioner's trial. Lino testified

at trial that he had committed six murders and one attempted murder, among other crimes.(Trial
Tr. in United States v. Locurto. 03-CR-1382(NGG)("Tr.") 2026:15-2031:3,2044:1-23.)
Petitioner's trial counsel, Harry Batchelder, vigorously cross-examined Lino about these murders

as well as Lino's prior drug crimes and loan-sharking activities. (Id. 2205:1-2231:11,2352:242353:1,2367:3-6.)

Petitioner argues that the murder of Wilfred Johnson was "qualitatively different and in
the eyes ofthe law, much more serious than the other murders" that Lino admitted to because, at
the time of his murder, Johnson was"a government informant with special protections under...

criminal law." (Pet'r Am.Pet. Reply at 6.) "None ofthe murders he [admitted] to involved
efforts to obstructjustice or otherwise impede or disrupt a federal investigation." Qd. at 4.)
Petitioner maintains that if ajury had known about Lino's involvement in Johnson's murder, it

"could well have affected [the jury's] assessment of[Lino's] testimony because such knowledge
showed that [Lino] was capable ofthe highest form of corruption—murder to obstructjustice."
(Id at 6.)

The court finds this argument unconvincing. There is no basis to conclude that the jury
would have considered the murder of an FBI informant to be substantively different than the

'
Moreover,the Second Circuit has instructed that "the strength ofthe independent evidence of[defendant's] guilt
increases the degree ofsignificance that would need to be ascribed to the withheld impeachment evidence in order
for it reasonably to undermine confidence in the verdict." United States v. Orena. 145 F.3d 551,559(2d Cir. 1998).
8

killing of any other individual—or,indeed, of six other individuals. Lino's credibility was
seriously attacked during Petitioner's trial. His involvement in multiple murders was jfront and
center for the jury's consideration. The court, therefore, determines that the new impeachment
evidence is cumulative and cannot be considered "material" under controlling Second Circuit
case law. See, e.g.. Parkes. 497 F.3d at 233; Avellino. 136 F.3d at 256-57.
Because Petitioner cannot show that the evidence that the Government allegedly

suppressed was material, he cannot demonstrate prejudice sufficient to excuse his procedural
default. S^ Strickler. 527 U.S. at 282. Accordingly,Petitioner's Bradv/Gielio claim is

dismissed as procedurally barred.^®
2. Napue Claim

A conviction must be set aside if:(1)it was obtained using perjured testimony;(2)the
prosecution knew,or should have known,ofthe perjury; and(3)"there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment ofthe jury." United States

V. Agurs. 427 U.S. 97,103(1976)(citing Napue). Petitioner argues that Lino testified falsely by
failing to disclose his involvement in the murder of Wilfred Johnson and that the Government
"knew at the time that[Lino] testified that he was not telling the truth" and yet "failed to take

steps to correct his testimony and did not bring his falsehoods to the attention ofthe court or
defense counsel." (See Am.Pet. ^3.) Even assuming arguendo that these allegations are true,
the court is unpersuaded that there is a "reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have
affected the judgment ofthe jury." Agurs.427 U.S. at 103.

See also Graves v. Phillips. 531 F. App'x 27,29(2d Cir. 2013)(summary order)(rejecting petitioner's argument
that he was denied due process where district court failed to conduct evidentiary hearing on Bradv claim where the
allegedly suppressed evidence was not material); Bouloute v. United States. 645 F. Supp. 2d 125,133(E.D.N.Y.
2009)(denying petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing where "the allegedly withheld information [was]
insufiBciently material to satisfy the prejudice requirement").
9

The allegedly false testimony at issue concerns a collateral issue (i.e. Lino's criminal
history) and "d[oes] not refute any of[Lino's] testimony against" Petitioner. United States v.
Reyes,49 F.3d 63,68(2d Cir. 1995). There is therefore no reason to think that"knowledge of

th[e]... impeaching [facts], in addition to the numerous others used on cross-examination,
would persuade a fact-finder to disbelieve [Lino's] testimony against [Petitioner]." Ostrer v.
United States. 577 F.2d 782,787(2d Cir. 1978k see United States v. White.972 F.2d 16, 22

(2d Cir. 1992)(holding that newly discovered evidence that witness may have lied about his drug
use "would have been merely the sort of cumulative impeachment material that is routinely held
insufficient to warrant a new trial").

Even ifthe jurors had known that Lino omitted reference in his testimony to one of his
many prior crimes,the court finds it improbable that this would have created sufficient doubt in
the jurors' minds to affect the result ofPetitioner's trial. As the Second Circuit has explained:
[N]ew impeachment evidence may satisfy the 'reasonable
likelihood' standard where a conviction depends on the testimony
of a smgle government witness, or on a witness whose credibility
was not attacked on cross-examination . . . . But where

independent evidence supports a defendant's conviction, the
subsequent discovery that a witness's testimony at trial was
perjured will not warrant a new trial.
United States v. Wong.78 F.3d 73, 82(2d Cir. 1996)(intemal citation omitted). Here,there is

ample evidence supporting Petitioner's conviction ofracketeering conspiracy, separate and apart
from Lino's testimony. In response to special interrogatories, the jury found that the

Government proved all three racketeering acts alleged against Petitioner:(1)the murder of
Joseph Platia;(2)the marijuana distribution conspiracy; and (3)the ecstasy distribution
conspiracy. (See Jury Verdict(Dkt. 914), United States v. Locurto. 03-CR-1382(NGG).)
Several cooperating witnesses connected Petitioner to the killing of Joseph Platia. (See, e.g. Tr.
10

346-47,915-16.) Moreover,there was testimony thatjust after the murder occurred, police

ofidcers stopped Petitioner near the murder scene and recovered a hot .38 caliber revolver from
his jacket pocket. (See id. 736:9-738:12,3178:6-11). Ballistics analysis showed that the gun
Petitioner possessed was the weapon used to kill Platia. (Id. 851:5-13). As for his narcotics
trafficking. Petitioner pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute marijuana(id 1192:18-1194:11)
and ecstasy (id 2487:22-2490:13). In light ofthis powerful evidence of guilt, the court finds that
there is not a reasonable likelihood that Lino's alleged peijury on a collateral issue would have
affected the outcome of Petitioner's trial.

Accordingly,Petitioner's Napue claim is procedurally barred.
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

To the extent that Grround Three advances a claim ofineffective assistance ofcounsel,

that claim is not procedurally barred.

Yick Man Mui.614 F.3d at 54(holding that the

procedural bar rule does not apply to ineffective assistance ofcounsel claims). The claim is
nonetheless denied because, as articulated above. Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced

by trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness. See Strickland v. Washington.466 U.S. 668,687
(1984)(holding that to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must

show that "counsel's performance was deficient" and "the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense").
B. Ground Four

In Ground Four, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel, Harry C. Batchelder, rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel pre-trial and at trial because Batchelder "gave him false
information concerning the availabihty of additional funds under the Criminal Justice Act

[("CJA")]to secure an expert witness." (Am.Pet. at 18.) Petitioner asserts that Batchelder lied
11

to liim when he said there were no funds available to retain an additional expert witness because

Batchelder could have applied to the court for additional funds

(Id. at 18-19.) According to

Petitioner,"[t]his falsehood, and the failure to seek additional funds, unconstitutionally

prejudiced the Petitioner at trial in that, but for trial counsel's unprofessional conduct,the
outcome ofthe trial would have been different." (Id. at 18.)
1. Section 2255(f)(4)

Section 2255 petitions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations that runs, most

generously to Petitioner, from "the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(f)(4).

Petitioner argues that Ground Four is timely pursuant to Section 2255(f)(4). (Am.Pet.

at 18-19.) He asserts that he "only became aware ofthe fact that he had been lied to about the
availability offunds for retention ofan expert witness and the legal significance ofthat fact
after" learning ofthe Supreme Court's decision in Hinton v. Alabama. 134S. Ct. 1081 (2014).
(Am.Pet. at 18.) In a "straightforward application" of Strickland, 466 U.S. 668,and its progeny,

the Supreme Court held in Hinton that trial counsel's performance was deficient where counsel
"fail[ed] to seek additional funds to hire an expert" and "that failure was based not on any

strategic choice but on a mistaken beliefthat available funding was capped at $1,000." 134. S.
Ct. at 1087-88.^^ LoCurto alleges that "[ujpon learning ofthe decision in Hinton." he "thereafter
exercised due diligence and discovered that additional funds for expert witness services were
U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(3) provides that compensation for investigative, expert or other services "shall not exceed
$2,400,... unless payment in excess ofthat limit is certified by the court,... as necessary to provide fair
compensation for services of an imusual character or duration, and the amount ofthe excess payment is approved by
the chiefjudge ofthe circuit."

The Supreme Court remanded the case for "reconsideration of whether Hinton's attorney's deficient performance
was prejudicial under Strickland." 134 S. Ct. at 1090.
12

indeed available to bim and that trial counsel had lied to him concerning the availability ofsuch

funds." (Pet'r Am.Pet. Mem. at 10.) He maintains that "[s]uch circumstances are sufficient to
invoke the statutory 're-set' provisions under 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(4)." (Id.(intemal citation
omitted).)

The Government counters that Ground Four is untimely under Section 2255(f)(4). (Gov't

Am. Pet. Opp'n at 13.) The Government argues that "Hinton does not provide LoCurto a

legitimate basis for a delay in filing as the facts to support his alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel claim were discoverable with an exercise of due diligence long before Hinton...."

(Gov't Opp'n to Mot.for Disc.(Dkt. 105)at 4.) According to the Government, Petitioner "has
known which witnesses testified since the time of his trial in 2006,and has not demonstrated anv

investigation in this counsel's alleged failing for a period of approximately eight years."^^
(Gov't Am.Pet. Opp'n at 14.)

The court agrees with the Government's position and finds that Ground Four is untimely.
Under § 2255(f)(4),'"[t]ime begins when the prisoner knows(or through diligence could
discover)the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.'" Hasan
v.Galaza,254 F.3d 1150,1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001)fciting Owens v. Bovd. 235 F.3d 356, 359

(7th Cir. 2000)(analyzing the time limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), which mirrors the
limitation in § 2255(f)(4))); see also Matera v. United States. 83 F. Supp. 3d 536,547(S.D.N.Y.
2015). The Supreme Court's decision in Hinton did not bring to light any ofthe facts relevant to
Petitioner's claim; accordingly,time does not begin from the date ofthe Hinton decision.
Rather, the clock starts "when a duly diligent person in petitioner's circumstances" would have

The Government further asserts that Hinton "did not form a new legal basis for relief triggering the limitations

period under 28 U.S.C. 2255(f)(3). (Gov't Opp'n at 14.) Petitioner does not appear to dispute this point. (Pet'r
Mem. ofLaw in Further Supp. of Mot.for Disc.(Dkt. 108)at 40.) The court therefore does not address it.
13

discovered that his trial counsel misrepresented the availability of additional CJA funds. Wims
V. United States. 225 F.3d 186,190(2d Cir. 2000).
Petitioner has known since 2006 which witnesses testified at trial. In fact, on direct

appeal. Petitioner argued that Batchelder rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he
called Dr. Peter Deforest—a medical expert who had testified for the prosecution in Petitioner's

state trial regarding the same murder alleged in the federal case—^as a defense expert. (See Br.

ofAppellant. United States v. LoCurto, Nos. 06-CR-5117,07-CR-0712(2d Cir. Nov. 1,2007).)
Furthermore,in its opinion in the direct appeal,the Second Circuit made statements that should

have put Petitioner on notice at least ofthe possibility that Petitioner could have retained and
called another medical expert: While addressing the facts that(1)the medical expert who had
testified for Petitioner in Petitioner's state trial was no longer alive and that his testimony from

the state trial was inadmissible hearsay, and(2)Petitioner had objected to Batchelder calling Dr.

Deforest as a defense expert,the Second Circuit stated: "Ifthe [testimony ofthe] medical expert
[called by Petitioner in his state trial] was sound, surely another [i.e., a third] medical expert
could have been procured ...." United States v. Amato. 306 F. App'x 630,632(2d Cir. 2009).
Petitioner has also known since even before his trial that Batchelder was using CJA funds

to pay for the services of expert witnesses. (See Am.Pet.^ 12.) At trial, Batchelder told
Petitioner that he could not retain another expert witness because they had expended all ofthe
CJA funds available for expert services. (Id. 116.) While a reasonably diligent person in
Petitioner's circumstances would not necessarily have looked into the issue unmediately after

trial, he or she would have considered that iftrial counsel was not truthfril about having difficulty

in obtaining an expert opinion and then called Dr. Deforest as a witness after Petitioner objected.
The Second Circuit rejected this claim. United States v. Amato. 306 F. App'x 630,633(2d Cir. 2009).
14

that trial counsel may have also lied about the availability of CJA funds. (Pet'r Mem.in Resp. to

Suppl. Affirm, of Harry C. Batchelder, Jr.("Pet'r Resp. to Suppl Affirm")(Dkt. 133)
at 6.)

Section 2255(f)(4)requires that Petitioner exercise reasonable diligence.

Wims,225

F.3d at 190("The statute does not require the maximum feasible diligence, only 'due,' or

reasonable, diligence."). Petitioner has not demonstrated that he exercised reasonable diligence
to ascertain the facts supporting the claim or claims.
2.

Equitable Tolling

Having determined that Ground Four does not meet the requirements of Section

2255(f)(4),the court next tums to whether the period oflimitation should be equitably tolled. "A
'petitioner' is 'entitled to equitable tolling' only if he shows '(1)that he has been pursuing his
rights diligently, and(2)that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented
timely filing." Holland v. Florida. 560 U.S. 631,649(2010)(citing Pace v. DiOuglielmo,544
U.S. 408,418(2005)); see also Baldavaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145,153(2d Cir. 2003)

(explaining that a petitioner must show that"the extraordinary circumstances caused his petition
to be untimely").

As already discussed, however, it is neither the case that Petitioner has been pursuing his
rights diligently nor that an extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
filing. Thus,in the court's view,the period oflimitation should not be equitably tolled.

15

>

\

TV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ground Three ofthe Petition(Dkts. 1,62)is DISMISSED as

procedurally barred and Ground Four ofthe Petition is DISMISSED as time-barred. The request
for evidentiary hearings as to Ground Three and Ground Four are DENIED. The parties are
DIRECTED to confer and contact the court's Deputy at 718-613-2545 to schedule a status

conference to discuss scheduling the evidentiary hearing on Ground One ofthe Petition.
SO ORDERED.

s/Nicholas G. Garaufis

Dated: Brooklyn,New York
February
2018

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIf
United States District Judge

16