Papaspiridakos v. Education Affiliates, Inc.
Filing
61
MEMORANDUM & ORDER: Defendant's 53 motion for summary judgment is granted. Forwarded for judgment. Ordered by Judge Raymond J. Dearie on 9/11/2013. (Chee, Alvin)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------- ](
NICK PAPASPIRIDAKOS,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff,
10 CV 5628 (RJD) (JO)
- against -
EDUCATION AFFILIATES, INC.,
Defendant.
-------------------------------------------------------- ](
DEARIE, District Judge.
Plaintiff, a former nursing student at St. Paul's School of Nursing ("St. Paul's"), brings
this action against Education Affiliates, Inc., the corporation that took ownership ofthe school
during his enrollment. In the wake of his suspension, plaintiff seeks damages for breach of
contract, complaining about the school's facilities, the faculty, and the administration of the
school under its new leadership. He.also brings a claim for deceptive trade practices, arguing
that the school misrepresented its accreditation and affiliation with a national nursing
organization. Defendant moves for sununary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56.
For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion for sununary judgment is granted.
Several of plaintiff s claims are unsupported by the record. The remaining claims are backed
predominantly by plaintiffs own testimony, which is largely conclusory and does not support the
weight of his assertions. Plaintiff s breach of contract claim would also require this Court to
second-guess the informed opinion of the New York State Department of Education, which
found that plaintiff s claims about the quality of education at St. Paul's lack merit. We decline to
do so.
I. BACKGROUND'
A. The Parties
Plaintiff Nick Papaspiridakos is a resident of Queens, New York. ECF Docket # 55,
Defendant's Local Rule 56.1 Statement ("Def. R. 56.1") ~ 1. In March 2009, he was accepted to
the two-year Associate's degree program at Saint Vincent Catholic Center's School of Nursing
("St. Vincent"). Id.
~
program in 2007. Id.
2. Plaintiff applied to St. Vincent after his wife graduated from the
~
7.
By the time plaintiff began attending classes in September 2009, St. Vincent had been
renamed St. Paul's. Def. R. 56.1
~
9. The name change was sparked by the takeover of
defendant Education Affiliates, Inc. ("EN'), a Baltimore, Maryland-based corporation. Id.
~
2.
St. Vincent selected EA to take over the school's operation, with approval from the State Board
of Regents, after the school was financially unable to continue in 2006. Id.
~
3. Since assuming
control, EA has "spent several million dollars to subsidize operating losses, upgrade the
educational infrastructure, and support expanded enrollment." Id.
~
4. St. Paul's also retained
many of the same senior educators "in an effort to maintain continuity." Id.
B. Plaintiffs Conflict with St. Paul's
Plaintiff argues that he "noticed several material problems with the new school" during
his brief time there. ECF Docket # 50, Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law ("Plaintiff Mem.") at 2.
Specifically, he complains about the adequacy oflaboratory facilities, the quality and
performance of the faculty, the efficacy of student evaluations, and faculty non-compliance with
set hours of instruction and office hours. Plaintiff Mem. at 8-12.
I Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant's Rule 56.1 Statement. Accordingly, the facts set forth in that statement
are deemed admitted for the purposes of this motion. See Local Rule 56.1; Gubitosi v. Kapica, 154 F.3d 30, 31 n.1
(2d Cir. 1998).
2
Plaintiff s dissatisfaction with St. Paul's came to a head during his second semester,
when a series of conflicts with a faculty member lead to his temporary suspension. Def. R. 56.1
~~
15-17. Plaintiff had been struggling in one of his classes, and on March 16, 2010, he met with
his professor to "dispute" one of the answers to a recent exam question. PlaintiffMem. at 3; Def.
R. 56.1
~
12. When the professor informed plaintiffthat he was using an outdated version ofthe
textbook, plaintiff became visibly agitated and loud, and requested a meeting with the professor
and the Director of Nursing. Def. R. 56.1
~
12. When the professor declined, plaintiff proceeded
to the Director's office, where he had to be asked to lower his voice. Id.
~
13. Plaintiff
approached his professor again later that afternoon, this time in front of two other faculty
members. Id.
~
14. The conversation was similarly unavailing; plaintiff admits that he remained
"frustrated" and "got loud." rd.
Within a few days of his suspension, plaintiff was permitted to return to school on the
condition that ,he attends an anger management program. Id.
~~
15-17. Plaintiff refused the
school's remedial option and chose to remain suspended from the program. Id. He maintains
that he was wrongfully dismissed, mistreated and "vilified" by St. Paul's and Education
Affiliates because of his efforts to address the school's issues. Compl. ~ 13, 38.
c.
Procedural History
On May 22, 2010, plaintiff submitted a formal complaint to the New York State
Education Department, Office of Professions ("NYSED"), the governing body for nursing
education institutions in New York.
Def. R. 56.1
~
18. Following an investigation of the
complaint, the NYSED concluded that plaintiff had been afforded due process and that his
complaints about the quality of St. Paul's nursing education were without merit. Id.
3
~
21.
On December 6, 2010, plaintiff commenced this lawsuit seeking damages under two
chums. First, plaintiff alleges breach of contract based on promises set forth in the St. Paul's
School of Nursing's Student Handbook for 2009-2010 ("Handbook") and the St. Paul's School
of Nursing's 2010 Catalog ("Catalog").
Plaintiff brings a second claim for deceptive trade
practices pursuant to New York General Business Law ("NY GBL") § 349 with respect to the
school's public representations about its affiliation with and accreditation by the National League
of Nursing ("NLN").
II. DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, tlris Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any claim that
plaintiff was improperly dismissed from St. Paul's. Such a challenge to a school's administrative
decision would be properly brought within four months in a state Article 78 proceeding. See
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("N.Y. C.P.L.R.") §§ 217(1), 7801 (McKinney 2013)
("Relief previously obtained by writs of certiorari to review, mandamus or prohibition shall be
obtained. in a proceeding under this article"); Gaily v. Columbia Univ., 22 F.Supp.2d 199, 205
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Proceedings under Article 78 are typically the avenue for parties challenging
administrative actions by government agencies or by the decision-making bodies of private
entities."). Because plaintiff does not seek to compel any action by Defendant, and instead seeks
monetary damages for breach of contract and deceptive business practices, plaintiffs action is
properly before this Court.
Defendant argues that plaintiff merely "couches Iris claims as claims for breach of
contract," but that they must be brought in an Article 78 action because they effectively
"challenged the internal administrative, and academic determinations" of the school. ECF Docket
4
# 58, Defendant's Reply Memorandum ("Reply Mem.") at 7 (internal quotations omitted). We
disagree.
Although plaintiff references his suspension as evidence of the school's animus
towards him, he does not directly challenge St. Paul's decision in this action.
And while
plaintiff s suspension may have been the impetus for this lawsuit, the fact that he was suspended
does not preclude him from bringing a separate suit for breach of contract and deceptive
practices. 2 See Alexson v. Hudson Valley Cmty. Coll., 125 F.Supp.2d 27, 29 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)
(permitting student to bring action for breach of contract and deceptive trade practices after his
alleged expulsion).
We have subject matter jurisdiction over these claims on diversity grounds. Fed. R.
Civ. P. § 1332 (a).
B. Summary Judgment
Surmnary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and
... the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). "The movant
bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a question of material fact." Moccio v. Cornell
Univ., 889 F. Supp. 2d 539, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
"In making this determination, the Court
must view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. (quoting Celotex v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). "The ultimate inquiry is whether a reasonable jury could find
for the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented, the legitimate inferences that couId be
drawn from the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, and the applicable burden of proof."
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). "However, the non-moving
party must offer more than conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated speculation to defeat
2 We note that plaintiff was not required to withdraw from St. Paul's unconditionally, but chose not to comply
with the school's conditions for remaining in the program. To that extent, plaintiffs suspension was as much a
decision on his part to withdraw.
5
summary judgment; the non-moving party must offer some hard evidence showing that its
version of the facts is not wholly fanciful." Shelton v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 369 Fed.
App'x. 200, 201 (2d Cir. 2010). (internal quotations omitted).
C. Breach of Contract for Specified Services
In the wake of his suspension, plaintiff alleges that the St. Paul's Student Handbook
and program Catalog outline several unfulfilled "promises" made by the school, entitling him to
damages for breach of contract. Defendant argues that these allegations are non-cognizable
claims of educational malpractice.
In New York, the relationship between a university and its students is contractual in
nature.
Deen v. New School Univ., 2007 WL 1032295 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), at *2.
When a
prospective student is admitted to a school, an implied contract forms, and the terms of the
agreement are "supplied by the bulletins, circulars and regulations made available to the
student." Dasrath v. Ross Sch. of Med., 494 Fed. App'x. 177, 178 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Gally,
22 F. Supp. 2d at 206). Also implicit in this contract is that the university must act in good faith
in dealing with the student, and the student, in turn, must "fulfill [his1 end of the bargain by
satisfying the university's academic requirements and complying with its procedures ... " Id. at
178 (internal quotations omitted).
However, "not every dispute between a student and a university is amenable to a
breach of contract claim." Gaily, 22 F. Supp. at 206. As a matter of public policy, New York
courts consistently decline to entertain actions sounding in tort-based "educational malpractice,"
where "the essence of the complaint is that the school breached its agreement by failing to
6
provide an effective education.,,3 Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (2d Dep't 1982).
This policy recognizes that "professional educators-not judges-are charged with the
responsibility for dete=ining the method of learning that should be pursued for their students."
rd. at 873. It also acknowledges that schools are subject to oversight by the Department of
Education, which sets forth regulations, oversees licensing, and has the power to step in when a
school fails to meet its obligations. rd. at 872. "To entertain a cause of action for educational
malpractice would require the courts not merely to make judgments as to the validity of broad
educational policies ... but, more importantly, to sit in review of the day-to-day implementation
of these policies." Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (1979).
General claims about the quality of an education "are not statements of fact capable of proof, but
rather opinions which should not provide a basis for the imposition of liability." Alligood v.
Cnty. of Erie, 749 N.Y.S.2d 349 (2002).
Thus, to be successful in a breach of contract claim, a student must not request judicial
review of purely academic dete=inations that would require the Court to evaluate "the course of
instruction" or "the soundness of educational methodology." Paladino, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 872-73.
A student may, however, bring a claim for failure to provide "certain specified services" for
which she has contracted, such as "a designated number of hours of instruction, rd. at 873, or a
specific name on her diploma as set forth in the student catalogue, Deen, 2007 WL 1032295, at
*3-4.
Plaintiff must establish: (1) an agreement; (2) adequate performance by plaintiff, (3)
breach by defendant, and (4) damages. Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337,348 (2d Cir. 1996).
We address each of plaintiffs allegations below.
These public policy concerns are "equally applicable when the action is brought against a private educational
institution and is formulated in contract." Andre v. Pace Univ., 655 N.Y.2d 777,779 (2d Dep't, 1996); Paladino,
454 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
3
7
1. Laboratory Equipment
Plaintiff argues that defendant failed to provide "adequate classroom facilities" and
"[l]abs [ ] delivered in equipped laboratories," as promised in the Catalog. Plaintiff Mem. at 8;
P!. Exh. B, Catalog, at 4, 9. However, plaintiff offers no evidentiary support for his assertion.
Plaintiff s brief points only to the Amended Complaint, which alleges that "a class of
approximately 20 students would be forced to share [four] microscopes," and that the laboratory
contained "a solitary plastic skeleton, which was rarely, if ever used." PlaintiffMem. at 8 (citing
ECF Docket # 55, Amended Complaint ("Comp!.")
~
1). Such unsupported allegations cannot
withstand a motion for summary judgment.
Furthermore, plaintiff has not identified any specific promise that students would have
their own microscopes or that more than one skeleton is necessary for laboratory instruction.
Nor does plaintiff explain how the student-to-microscope and student-to-skeleton ratios were
objectively inadequate or deprived him of the benefit of his bargain with the university. See ~
Gaily, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 208, n.8. (noting that plaintiff did not allege that her accusations of
rampant cheating among students actually affected her performance). Instead, plaintiffs claim
necessarily entails an evaluation of the adequacy and quality of the laboratory facility itself.-a
task that we are not only ill-equipped to carry out, but would require 'Judicial displacement of [ ]
educational determinations" that are best left to the educational community.
Andre, 655
N.Y.S.2d at 780 (finding that the court below "improperly engaged in judicial evaluation of a
course of instruction" where it ruled on the suitability of a particular textbook and the
effectiveness of the pedagogical method chosen by the professor). Such claims of educational
malpractice are not cognizable by this Court.
8
2. Faculty Quality and Performance
Plaintiff makes two complaints about the St. Paul's faculty, whom he describes as
"disinterested, malicious, [and] intentionally incompetent." Plaintiff Mem. at 11. First, he argues
that the school breached its promise to deliver "qualified instructors," as promised in the Catalog.
PI. Ex. B., Catalog, at 9. Second, he complains about the way he was treated by the faculty,
suggesting that he was judged and disrespected in violation of standards set forth in the Student
Handbook. PI. Ex. A, Handbook, at 46-47 ("Faculty have the responsibility to recognize and
respect students [sic] point of view.
Faculty have the responsibility to maintain a non-
judgmental environment of academic freedom where both teachers and students have the right to
express opinions.").
Notwithstanding the inflammatory, conclusory nature of these allegations, they are
also non-cognizable claims of educational malpractice. A school's faculty is the bedrock of any
education.
We cannot make any assessments about the qualification of educators without
rendering a comprehensive judgment of the quality of the education plaintiff received. This is a
classic claim of "educational malpractice" that courts in this state properly defer to the New
York State Department of Education.
Plaintiff s argument regarding mistreatment by faculty members is similarly
unavailing. In support, plaintiff points only to his testimony regarding the events surrounding his
suspension, which the New York Department of Education determined was fair and afforded him
due process. Because this claim "sounds in [the] tort" of educational malpractice, and essentially
"asks the Court to involve itself in the subjective professional judgments of trained educators," it
will not survive merely because plaintiff "couches [his] claim in terms of breach of contract."
9
Gaily, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 207-08 (dismissing plaintiffs claim of mistreatment by a professor,
which the Court held is "better left to the sound handling of school administrators").
3. Student Evaluations
Plaintiff also criticizes the school's method of evaluating student performance,
complaining that professors would post grades by identification number, and that grades would
change without explanation.
He also complains that graded quizzes and tests were never
returned or shown to students. PI. Ex. D, Plaintiff Deposition ("Dep.") at 143, 144, 149. His
breach of contract claim is premised on language in the Student Handbook, which states:
"Faculty have the responsibility to evaluate student performance in an objective manner and use
an equitable grading system which is understood by students." PI. Ex. A, Handbook, at 46-47.
First, the New York State Department of Education investigated plaintiff s claim and
found that it lacked merit. But notwithstanding the fact that this claim sounds in educational
malpractice, we do not see any evidence of a breach of contract for a specific service. The
language does not guarantee that individual students understand other students' grades or
changes in those grades, but merely that students understand the grading "system." Nor does it
make a specific promise that students are entitled to see their quizzes or exams.
Finally, plaintiff does not explain how he was at all prejudiced by the current system.
Although plaintiff claims that he never had quizzes or exams returned to him, he cannot say that
the professors never reviewed exam material. For example, he testified about a review session
covering three 35 question quizzes, wherein the professor selected an assortment of 20 questions
to review with students. PI. Ex. D, Plaintiff Dep. at 144-45. He also asserts that he was a
"model student" with a 3.9 grade point average, making it difficult to see how he has a viable
claim for damages.
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4. Hours ofInstruction
We also dismiss the following claims regarding hours of instruction because they are
unsubstantiated by the record and cannot be considered a material breach of contract. Plaintiff
generalizes that professors would leave for 20-30 minutes to make copies of handoutsdepriving students of their entitlement to 50 minutes of class instruction per hour, as specified in
the Catalog. PI. Ex. B, Catalog, at 10. While courts have acknowledged that a school's failure to
provide "a designated number of hours of instruction" might be the basis for a breach of contract
claim, plaintiff does not put forth any substantive evidence that he was deprived of instruction in
any meaningful way. Clarke v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 1996 WL 609271, at *5 (quoting
Paladino, 89 A.D.2d at 92). Plaintiffs only support for this allegation is his own testimony that
one professor was unprepared and left the class to make copies on "at least two days." PI. Ex. D,
Plaintiff Dep. at 139. No reasonable fact-finder could find a material breach of an implied
contract with the school.
Plaintiffs claim regarding the faculty's failure to maintain office hours is also
frivolous. Plaintiff Mem. at 8. Again, he cites only one example: a professor who "fail [ed] to
appear at a number of scheduled office hours." Compl.
~
25-26 (emphasis added). Because
plaintiff cannot say that office hours were never posted or that the faculty, as a whole, was
routinely unavailable to students, this claim cannot withstand defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
D. Deceptive Acts or Practices
Plaintiff also brings a claim for deceptive business practices under Section 349 of New
York General Business Law. N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 349(a) (McKinney 2013). He argues that by
displaying a National League of Nursing ("NLN") plaque at the school, defendant
11
misrepresented St. Paul's as a member of and accredited by NLN.
Plaintiff contends that
because of the school's lack of membership and accreditation, he is "not able to easily transfer
credits to a school" that holds those affiliations. Plaintiff Mem. at 16; Compl.
~
49. Plaintiff
fails to tender any evidence in support of this allegation.
To succeed on a claim under NY GBL § 349, plaintiff must demonstrate that
defendant "has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct that is (2) materially misleading and
that (3) plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice." City of
N.Y. v. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., 911 N.E.2d 834, 838· (N.Y. 2009).
Under the objective
standard of NY GBL § 349, the challenged representation or omission must be one that is "likely
to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances."
Stutman v.
Chemical Bank, 731 N.E.2d 608 (N.Y. 2000).
Plaintiff s claim fails because he cannot, as a matter of law, demonstrate that
defendant's actions were materially misleading. First, NLN is not an accrediting organization,
but a professional organizationthat offersillembershipfor a fee. PI. Ex., Expert Report of Janet
Mackin, at 12. We find no evidence in the record that plaintiffs misunderstanding was the result
of any deception on defendant's part. Furthermore, the plaque in question states that St. Vincent
was a "member" ofNLN in 2000, which is true. On that basis, no reasonable juror could find it
materially misleading.
We also agree with defendant that plaintiff lacks standing to bring this claim.
Defendant Mem. at 18-19; Smoke-Spirits.com, Inc., 911 N.E.2d at 838. By his own admission,
plaintiff did not even see the. plaque in question until after his suspension. Nor does he make any
12
assertion that he was indirectly misled by others who had seen it or by any independent research
that he conducted.
4
Plaintiffs other complaints also fail to state a claim under NY GBL § 349.
Plaintiff
makes the same arguments raised under his breach of contract claim, suggesting that these
grievances are also compensable under NY GBL. Plaintiff Mem. at 16. For the reasons cited
above, we find no evidence that any representations about the quality of the school or facilities
were materially misleading.
Furthermore, plaintiff s grievances with the financial aid
department fail because they are not supported by the record before this Court.
5
III. CONCLUSION
For all ofthe foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
September 4,2013
/s/ Judge Raymond J. Dearie
RAY'VI.1J ''''11
Plaintiff testified that other than speaking with his wife, he did not do additional research on St. Paul's prior to
commencing his education in September of2009. Defendant Mem. at 9.
5 Beyond allegations in the Amended Complaint and one tuition billing statement documenting a correction made by
the school, plaintiff offers no evidence supporting his claim. Nor does plaintiff explain how the school's conduct
4
was "consumer-oriented" or "materially misleading," as opposed to mere mismanagement of plaintiffs unique
account.
13
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