Jones v. US Department of Housing and Urban Development et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM & ORDER: HPD's and HUD's motions to dismiss are granted in their entirety. Plaintiff's claims against defendant Allen Affordable are dismissed sua sponte. All of plaintiff's federal law claims are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's pendant state law claims are dismissed without prejudice. C/M. Forwarded for judgment. Ordered by Judge Raymond J. Dearie on 5/25/2012. (Chee, Alvin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------------- l{
FREDERICK JONES,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff,
II CV 0846 (RJD)(JMA)
- againstUS DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT; NYC DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT; NYC
HOUSING PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT
DIVISION OF CODE ENFORCEMENT; ALLEN
AFFORDABLE HDFC,
Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------------------- l{
DEARIE, District Judge.
This matter is pro se plaintiffs fourth lawsuit in just over sil{ years against some
combination of the same three defendants-United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD"), New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development
("HPD"), I and community based not-for-profit, Allen Affordable HDFC ("Allen Affordable")alleging violations of federal and state law arising out of the same underlying housing issue.
Plaintiff now alleges an assortment of claims, many of which have already been---or could have
been-litigated in past proceedings, but some of which purportedly pertain to new violations of
plaintiffs rights under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., False Claims
Act ("FCA"), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and various state laws and regulations. Plaintiff also alleges that the

I HPD's Division of Code Enforcement, a named defendant, is a subdivision of HPD. HPD, in turn, is a non-suable
agency of the City of New York. See N.Y.C. Charter § 396 ("All actions and proceedings for the recovery of
penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any
agency, except where otherwise provided by law."). Because plaintiff is proceeding I!ffi se, the Court will construe
plaintiffs complaint against HPD as a claim against the City of New York, yet still refer to HPD as such.

federal law violations give rise to claims under 41 U.S.C § 1983 ("Section 1983"). Before the
Court presently are HPD's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted and HUD's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(l), (6). For the reasons set forth below, HPD's and HUD's motions are granted in their
entirety. Although Allen Affordable did not move to dismiss, the Court sua sponte dismisses all
claims brought against it.

I. BACKGROUND
Familiarity with the general factual backdrop of this case is assumed given the number of
lawsuits filed by this plaintiff against these same defendants relating to the same underlying
property.2

In brief, plaintiff is the last remaining tenant in a building that was slated in 2006 for
rehabilitation by HPD and Allen Affordable pursuant to a federal grant program administered by
HUD. See ECF Docket # 1, Complaint ("Compl.")

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4. Rehabilitation has since been stalled both

because of plaintiffs refusal to relocate during renovations, as well as his ongoing complaints
against defendants HPD and Allen Affordable relating to poor living conditions at his property.
Plaintiff once again seeks federal court intervention to remedy his housing difficulties. Plaintiffs
In 2006, plaintiff sued HUD, HPD, and Allen Affordable in the Southern District of New York for their failure to
provide adequate relocation assistance and comply with federal and state housing laws. Judge Loretta Preska first
granted HUD's and HPD's motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6), and later granted Allen
Affordable's motion for summary judgment. See Jones v. Dep't of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., No. 06 Civ. 2085(LAP),
2007 WL 582751 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2007); Jones v. Dep't ofHous. PreseTV. & Dev., No. 06 Civ. 2085(LAP), 2008
WL 5155725 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2008). Plaintiff then sought relief in 2008 in New York Supreme Court against
HPD, making new and additional allegations concerning HPD's failure to comply with federal. state, and local laws
with regard to the property's inclusion in the Neighborhood Redevelopment Program ("NRP"), but the petition was
dismissed as time-barred. See Jones v. Dep't of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., Index No. 1059/08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 22,
2008). Finally, plaintiff brought an action in 2009 before this Court, raising claims against HPD and Allen
Affordable regarding the distribution offederal funds relating to the property's inclusion in the NRP, the termination
of plaintiff as superintendent of the building, and again, HPD's enforcement of the New York City Housing
Maintenance Code. This Court granted HPD and Allen Affordable's motions to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(l) and
12(b)(6). See Jones v. Dep't of Hous. Preserv. & Dev., No. 09-CV-2104 (RJD)(LB), 2010 WL 3942996 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2010).
2

2

present complaint is long on legal conclusions and short on facts. The thrust of plaintiffs
complaint seems to be that his current "substandard living conditions" are the result of
intentional discrimination by defendants HPD and Allen Affordable. The claims against HUD
generally pertain to the federal agency's alleged failure to ensure that HPD and Allen Affordable
comply with applicable HUD regulations and the FHA. Plaintiff does not allege discrimination
on the part of HUD.
II. DISCUSSION

HPD moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In deciding such
a motion, the Court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations set out in plaintiffs
complaint, draw inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and
construe the complaint liberally." Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 2001). "A pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted). HUD has moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(I) for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "After [c]onstruing all ambiguities and drawing all inferences
in a plaintiffs favor, a district court may properly dismiss a case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(I) if it lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it."
Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc. 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citations
and quotations omitted) (modification in original). As with 12(b)(6) motions, when adjudicating
Rule 12(b)(l) motions the court holds pro se litigants "to less stringent standards." See Erickson,
551 U.S. at 94.
Allen Affordable has not moved to dismiss. A "district court has the power to dismiss a
complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim so long as the plaintiff is given notice and an

3

opportunity to be heard." Wachtler v. Cnty. of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994)
(affirming sua sponte dismissal of defendant who never appeared or moved for dismissal where
plaintiff was given notice that other defendants were moving to dismiss and had responded with
an opposition memorandum) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Sua sponte dismissal is
appropriate where, as here, plaintiff s claims against a non-appearing defendant, Allen
Affordable, parallel those claims made against an appearing defendant, HPD. See Hecht v. Com.
Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 26 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Sua sponte dismissal of the complaint
with respect to [non-appearing defendant] is appropriate here, because the issues concerning
[non-appearing defendant] are substantially the same as those concerning the other defendants,
and [plaintiff] ... had notice and a full opportunity to make out his claim against [non-appearing
defendant]."); Rodriguez v. Mt. Vernon Hosp., No. 09 Civ. 569 I (GBD)(JLC), 2011 WL
3874814, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2011) (Daniels, J.) (dismissing claim sua sponte where claims
against private defendant "ar[o]se out of the same conduct that underl[ay] [plaintiffs] claim
against the State Defendants").
A. Claims Against HPD and Allen Affordable Barred by Res Judicata
Under the doctrine of res judicata, "[a] final judgment on the merits of an action
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised
in that action." Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 400 F.3d 139, 141 (2d Cir.
2005) (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, all of plaintiffs claims against HPD and Allen
Affordable pertaining to plaintiffs termination as building superintendent are barred because
they either were, or could have been raised before this Court in plaintiff s 2009 lawsuit. See
Compl.

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13, 15,28. It is immaterial that plaintiff has restyled his termination allegations as

claims under the Vietnam Era Veteran's Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974. See id.

4

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15,28.

"Even claims based upon different legal theories are barred provided they arise from the same
transaction or occurrence." Cieszkowska v. Gray Line New York, 295 F.3d 204, 205 (2d Cir.
2002) (internal quotations omitted). Likewise, plaintiffs claim that HPD, through its attorney,
made a false statement in a proceeding before Judge Preska in the course of litigating plaintiff s
first case in 2006,

Compl.~

14, could also have been raised in plaintiffs complaint before this

Court in 2009. Plaintiffs claim against Allen Affordable for improperly "attempt[ing] to evict
plaintiff and residents," id.

~

25, is also barred because it could have been raised at any of

plaintiff s earlier proceedings.
Though a close call, the remainder of plaintiff s claims against HPD and Allen
Affordable are not barred by res judicata. Liberally construing pro se plaintiffs complaint, this
Court finds that the regulatory violations and current living conditions complained of are the
result of allegedly new episodes of discriminatory conduct. See Waldman v. Vill. of Kiryas Joel,
207 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (,,[RJes judicata will not bar a suit based upon legally
significant acts occurring after the filing of a prior suit that was itself based upon earlier acts.")
(emphasis in original). Mindful that application of res judicata "must be given a flexible,
common-sense construction that recognizes the reality of the situation," Interoceanica Corp. v.
Sound Pilots, Inc., 107 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. I 997), plaintiffs remaining claims are not barred by
res judicata. They are, however, barred for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
B. Non-barred Claims Against Defendants HPD and Allen Affordable
I. Fair Housing Act
Plaintiff makes various allegations that the Court reads to concern HPD and Allen
Affordable's "fail[ure] to assure the plaintiff ... will receive and enjoy the benefits, services and
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entitlements pursuant to the [FHA]." Compl. '1[ 18. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that HPD and
Allen Affordable have sanctioned "substandard living conditions" at his residence, including
lack of heat, hot water, a working refrigerator, and lighting, id. '1['1[9-11, have failed to enforce the
NYC Housing Maintenance Code at his residence, id. '1['1[ 22-24, 26, and have failed to comply
with HUD federal regulations with regard to his residence. 3 Id. '1['1[ 12, 17, 27-28. Although
plaintiff does not cite to any specific provision of the FHA, the one provision bearing on
plaintiffs claims provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful ... [t]o discriminate against any person ... in the
provision of services or facilities in connection [with the "sale or rental of
a dwelling"] because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). Plaintiffs mere legal conclusion that HPD and Allen Affordable have
"intentionally deprived plaintiff ... [of] benefits, goods, services, and entitlements, and due
process protections based on race, color, disability, age, veteran status, and class" is insufficient
to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Compl. '1['1[20, 30.
It is true that an "[FHA] violation can be established without proof of discriminatory

intent." Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir.
1988), affd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). Indeed, "[a] plaintiff in stating a claim under the FHA need
allege only discriminatory effect .... " Soules v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 967 F.2d
817,822 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted). To make out a "disparate treatment" c1aim4

Plaintiff has no independent authority to sue HPD or Allen Affordable for violations of HUD regulations. The
FHA does, however, expressly provide a private right of action to any "aggrieved person ... to obtain appropriate
relief with respect to ... [aJ discriminatory housing practice or breach." 42 U.S.C. § 3613. A "discriminatory
housing practice," in turn, is defined, in part, as "an act that is unlawful under section 3604," 42 U.S.C. § 3602(1),
which, as wiH be described infra, requires proof of at least discriminatory treatment.
4 This is decidedly not a case involving a claim of "disparate impact," where "[aJ plaintiff alleges that an entire class
or category of minorit[iesJ ... are adversely affected by [aJ ... facially neutral policy .... " Hudson v. Inn Bus.
3

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under Section 3604(b) of the FHA, however, plaintiff would still ultimately be required to meet
the burden-shifting framework set forth by the Supreme Court in in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which at the very least would demand an allegation of "differential
treatment of similarly situated persons or groups." Huntington, 844 F.2d at 933; see Robinson v.
12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (2d Cir. 1979) (adopting Title VII McDonnell test
for disparate treatment claims under the FHA). Although plaintiff is not required to satisfy this
prima facie burden at the pleading stage, see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510
(2002), any disparate treatment claim will ultimately fail because plaintiff is the only remaining
tenant in his dwelling. Under no circumstance will plaintiff be able to make the minimal required
showing under the FHA "that a member of a statutorily protected class was ... not provided the
same 'services or facilities in connection [with the sale or rental of a dwelling], made available
to others under circumstances giving rise to a reasonable inference of prohibited
discrimination."s Estrella v. Sucuzhanay, No. 10-CV-3650 (NGG)(LB), 2011 WL 5156285, at
*3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2011) (Garaufis, J.) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)).
What is more, plaintiffs own filings submitted to this Court-previously and with regard
to the instant action-belie his claims of being singled out or treated differently on a
discriminatory basis by defendants HPD or Allen Affordable. Plaintiff appended to his instant
complaint communications from HPD regarding heat and hot water issues, which show that HPD
has, in fact, been responsive to plaintiffs complaints: in late 2010, HPD even issued violations
and instituted a lawsuit against Allen Affordable in response to plaintiffs complaints. See

Machines Com., 620 F.2d 35 I, 355 (2d Cir. 1980). In individual "disparate treatment" actions like this one, the
particular plaintiff "must establish that he has been discriminated against." .!ll
5 Nor has plaintiff alleged or identified "a comparator" outside of his residence "against which his own treatment
should be judged." Bunn v. City of Poughkeepsie, No. 10 Civ. 2297(PAE), 2012 WL 1621563, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May
9,2012) (Engelmayer, J.).

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Compl. at pgs. 18-19. Moreover, in plaintiffs 2009 complaint, plaintiff stated that prior to
relocation, the residents of the subject property were "African American, Latinos and
[individuals of] European decent ... [and] seniors, disabled, and children." 09-CV-2104, ECF
Docket # I, Complaint '1['1[7-8. Plaintiffs 2009 complaint alleged improper treatment on the part
of HPD and Allen Affordable against all of these concededly diverse tenants, without regard to
background or status. See generally id. The fact that defendants' action or inaction now happens
to disproportionately impact plaintiff is plaintiffs own doing, and not the result of discriminatory
animus: Mr. Jones decided to stay put while all of the other tenants agreed to be relocated by the
city pending the building's rehabilitation, a process which has long been stalled by plaintiffs
hold-out status.
Plaintiff s FHA claims against HPD and Allen Affordable, therefore, are dismissed for
failure to state a claim for relief.
2. False Claims Act
Plaintiff alleges that HPD and Allen Affordable violated the FCA. Compl. at 1. To plead
a violation of the FCA, the plaintiff "must show that defendants (I) made a claim, (2) to the
United States government, (3) that is false or fraudulent, (4) knowing of its falsity, and (5)
seeking payment from the federal treasury." Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 695 (2d Cir. 2001).
To this end, plaintiff makes three separate allegations, all of which are conclusory and without
merit.
First, plaintiff claims that HPD's alleged role in allowing for "substandard living
conditions ... constitutes Fraud [sic] and false certification." Compl. '1['1[9-12. Absent from this
particular claim, however, is any allegation that HPD "made a claim." Second, plaintiff claims
that both HPD and Allen Affordable "failed to file a [sic] annual reports [sic] to Secretary of
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Labor [sic] regarding compliance with Affirmative action programs for disabled veterans .... "
Id. '\1'\115, 28. Again, plaintiff alleges that this "conduct constitutes fraud and false certification."
Id. '\1'\1 16, 29. Here too there is no allegation that any claim was made; to the contrary, the
complaint itself alleges that HPD and Allen Affordable "failed to file ... annual reports." Id. '\I
15, 28 (emphasis added). Third and lastly, plaintiff claims that "HPD and Allen Affordable ...
continue to apply and request money from the U.S. treasury, while failing to submit accurate
certifications pre requisites, [sic] This [sic] is fraud and false certification to fraud the
government." Id. '\I 31. HPD correctly points out that the complaint is devoid of "any allegation
concerning what form the alleged misrepresentation took, when it occurred, who made it, to
whom it was made, or even how the alleged misrepresentation related to claims for funds relating
to HPD's Neighborhood Redevelopment Project." ECF Docket # 20, HPD Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss at 13. This claim must be dismissed because it fails to satisfy even
the forgiving notice pleading standards of Rule 8, let alone the heightened pleading standards set
forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 68 F.3d 1475,
1476-78 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that FCA claims must comply with Rule 9(b».
3. Equal Protection
Plaintiffs complaint can also be read to allege a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, ostensibly predicated upon differential treatment based on "race,
color, disability, age, veteran status, and class," Compl. '\I 20. This claim must be dismissed as a
matter of law because plaintiff has failed adequately to allege that a "government actor
intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his race." Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221
F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 2000). As discussed supra, Part ILB.I, plaintiff cannot even satisfy the
lesser standards required to make out a "disparate treatment" claim.

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4. Procedural Due Process
Plaintiffs complaint may also be read to claim a violation by the HPD of his procedural
due process rights. See Compl.

~

20 ("HPD has intentionally deprived plaintiff ... [of] due

process protections .... "). Where, as here, plaintiff alleges state action that is not the "result of
some established state procedure," Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541, 543 (1981), overruled on
other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), but rather the result of "random,
unauthorized conduct," a post-deprivation remedy "is all the process the State can be expected to
provide, and is constitutionally sufficient." Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 115 (1990).
Assuming-without deciding-that plaintiff has suffered a deprivation of a property interest as a
result of state action in this case, plaintiff s procedural due process claims must be dismissed as a
matter of law because of the availability-and adequacy---of an Article 78 proceeding under
New York State law to address a tenant's claims of building mismanagement. See Katz v.
Klehammer, 902 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1990) ("To the extent that the Housing Law and state
and city regulations compel the supervising and other city officials to perform certain acts,
Article 78 may thus serve to enforce such requirements when officials fail to fulfill these
obligations.") (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (McKinney 1981)).
5. Section 1983
"It is well settled that § 1983 does not create any new substantive rights, but merely

provides a federal cause of action for violations of certain federal rights." Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi,
832 F.2d 748, 754 (2d Cir. 1987). Because I have already concluded that plaintiff has failed to
allege a viable claim of any violation of any federal law, plaintiffs claims under Section 1983
are dismissed as a matter oflaw.

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C. Claims Against HUD
Plaintiff alleges that HUD "failed to require," per agency regulations, HPD and Allen
Affordable "to submit a [sic1 annual performance report" and a filing concerning analysis,
improvement, and record-keeping to HUD. CampI.

'If'lf 5-6, 8. Plaintiff further claims that by

making grants to HPD and Allen Affordable, HUD violated its own regulations, which allow for
grantmaking "only if grantees make" the above-stated submissions. Compl.

'If 8. Plaintiff

additionally alleges broader failures on the part of HUD to "enforce compliance with the FHA
and related authorities" and "to take appropriate actions to overcome the effects of impediments"
to the redevelopment project that has plagued plaintiffs residence. Compl.

'If'lf 6-7. All of these

claims, however, must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P.
l2(b)(l).
While it is true that the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), which plaintiff invokes
in his complaint, Compl. at pg. 1, waives the sovereign immunity of the United States and
provides a statutory right of judicial review to plaintiffs "suffering legal wrong because of
agency action," 5 U.S.C. § 702, the APA only allows suits to remedy agency action6 when "there
is no other adequate remedy in a court." 5 U.S.C. § 704. As already discussed, supra note 3, the
FHA expressly provides for a private right of action in federal court against the alleged
perpetrators of discriminatory practices. 42 U.S.C. § 3613. Accordingly, several courts in and
outside of this circuit have ruled that the FHA provides an "other adequate remedy in a court,"
barring judicial review under the APA. See, ~ Marinoffv. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
892 F. Supp. 493, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (adopting report and recommendation), affd 78 F.3d 64
(2d Cir. 1996); Turner v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 449 F.3d 536, 540 (3d
See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) ("[A]gency action includes ... failure to act") (emphasis added); 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(2)
('''[A]gency action' hats] the meaning[] given [to it] by section 551 of this title").

6

lJ

Cir. 2006); Godwin v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 356 F.3d 310, 312 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per
curiam). Here, plaintiff can-and indeed has-brought his action directly against the actual
alleged perpetrators of housing discrimination under the FHA. Bringing an action against HPD
and Allen Affordable-whether or not relief is ultimately granted-"is not only sensible but is
also fully consistent with-and in some cases even necessary to-the orderly enforcement of the
statute." Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 705-06 (1979) (interpreting Title IX). Because
plaintiff"ha[s] an adequate alternative legal remedy against someone else" the Court "may not ..
. entertain the claim against the agency .... " N.Y.C. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. S.E.C., 45 F.3d 7, 14 (2d
Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs APA claim against HUD is, therefore, dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
D. Pendant State Law Claims
Plaintiff brings an assortment of state law claims against HPD and Allen Affordable. As
all parties are domiciled in New York State, the Court cannot exert diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1332. Because I have dismissed all of plaintiffs claims under federal
law, the Court no longer retains jurisdiction over the matter and any potential state law claims
are hereby dismissed without prejudice. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726 (1966); 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
E. Leave to Amend
Although leave to amend "should [be] freely give[n] ... when justice so requires," Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and "particularly ... where the complaint is filed by a pro se litigant,"
Narumanchi v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 201 F.3d 432, 432 (2d Cir. 1999) (Table), the
Court is unwilling to afford plaintiff a fifth bite at the apple. The Court is not insensitive to the
clear emotional toll that the city's intended rehabilitation project has taken on Mr. Jones. In the

12

words of the great American poet, Maya Angelou: "The ache for home lives in all of us, the safe
place where we can go as we are and not be questioned." Mr. Jones seems sincerely concerned
about change and fearful that his home, his own "safe place," might be improperly taken from
him. The Court appreciates this concern and expects that the city and all parties involved in the
rehabilitation of his residence will move forward expeditiously and professionally so that Mr.
Jones, and all of the residents who have now been displaced for years, can return home to
adequate and safe housing. This will only be able to happen, however, if Mr. Jones allows the
authorities to do their job.
Plaintiffs repetitive and meritless filings have taken up valuable time, resources, and
energy and have only served to delay that which plaintiff ultimately seeks. Plaintiff should be
aware that the Court is empowered to issue "an injunction prohibiting [plaintiff] from filing
future complaints ... without first obtaining permission from a judge" of the federal court in
which such future complaint may be filed and/or to impose sanctions, including monetary
penalties. See Malley v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 112 F.3d 69, 69 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming district
court's issuance of injunction barring repetitive proceedings); Maduakolam v. Columbia Univ.,
866 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that Rule II sanctions "appl[y] both to represented and
pro se litigants"). The Court will refrain from taking such action for now, but enough is enough.
Mr. Jones would be well-advised to limit his submissions to this or any other Court.

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III. CONCLUSION

HPD's and HUD's motions to dismiss are granted in their entirety. Plaintiff's claims
against defendant Allen Affordable are dismissed sua sponte. All of plaintiff's federal law claims
are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's pendant state law claims are dismissed without
prejUdice.
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

Broo~I~New

York

May4.,z,2012

s/ Judge Raymond J. Dearie
ARIE

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