287 Franklin Avenue Residents' Association et al v. Meisels et al

Filing 352

ORDER. For the reasons set forth in the annexed memorandum and order, Mr. Sasmor's motion for reconsideration 343 is respectfully DENIED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to vacate all entries of default dated April 12, 13, 15, 19, 21, and 25, 2011; March 12, 2012; and September 26, 2012 (ECF Nos. 20, 22, 24-27, 93, and other undated ECF docket entries) in light of the court's grant of defendants' motions for summary judgment on the sole federal RICO claim and the co urt's decision to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction on plaintiffs' state law claims. The Clerk of Court is further respectfully requested to enter judgment in favor of defendants on the federal claim and close this case. Ordered by Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto on 9/30/2016. (Jacobson, Jonathan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------X
287 FRANKLIN AVENUE RESIDENTS’
ASSOCIATION, et al.,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
11-CV-976(KAM)(JO)

Plaintiffs,
-againstCHAIM MEISELS, et al.,
Defendants.
-------------------------------------X
MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs Lisa Lin, William Osterweil, Kurt Fletcher,
Vilija Skubutyte, Jon Sasmor (“Mr. Sasmor”), and the 287 Franklin
Avenue Residents’ Association initiated this civil action bringing
claims

under

the

federal

Racketeer

Influenced

and

Corrupt

Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. and state
law, relating to their tenancies at 287 Franklin Avenue, Brooklyn,
New York (“287 Franklin”). (ECF No. 41.) Mr. Sasmor subsequently
moved for partial summary judgment, and certain other defendants
moved for summary judgment and dismissal for failure to state a
claim. (ECF Nos. 275, 285, 296, 309.) By order dated September 17,
2015,

this

court

adopted

the

Report

and

Recommendation

of

Magistrate Judge Orenstein dated July 20, 2015 (ECF No. 338),
denying Mr. Sasmor’s motion for partial summary judgment and
granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment. (ECF No. 341.)
On

September

reconsideration

of

the

30,

2015,

court’s

Mr.

decision.

Sasmor
(ECF

No.

moved
344.)

for
The

relevant defendants opposed Mr. Sasmor’s motion. (ECF Nos. 34648.) Mr. Sasmor submitted a reply. (ECF No. 351.) For the reasons
provided

herein,

Mr.

Sasmor’s

motion

for

reconsideration

is

respectfully DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The court assumes familiarity with the facts in this
action, which have been set out in detail in prior decisions. See,
e.g., 287

Franklin

Ave.

v.

Meisels,

No.

11-CV-0976,

2015

WL

5457959, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 2015), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom. 287 Franklin Ave. Residents' Ass'n v. Meisels,
No. 11-CV-976, 2015 WL 5457967 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015).
LEGAL STANDARD
Motions for reconsideration are governed by Local Rule
6.3. In

general,

“[t]he

standard

for

granting

[a

motion

for

reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be
denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions
or data that the court overlooked - matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by
the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d
Cir. 1995). Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy to be
employed sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation
of scarce judicial resources.” In re Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). A motion for reconsideration is not

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a vehicle for the relitigation of issues that were already decided.
See Darnley v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. 06-CV-4265, 2010 WL
1037971, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010).
DISCUSSION
Mr. Sasmor contends that the court, in granting summary
judgment to the relevant defendants and denying Mr. Sasmor’s motion
for partial summary judgment:
(1)

Overlooked, in addressing the “enterprise” element of
his RICO claim: (a) certain briefs he filed; (b) a
purportedly conclusive state appellate court judgment;
and (c) both direct and circumstantial evidence that
would meet the “enterprise” element under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962;

(2)

Failed

to

appropriately

analyze

the

proximate

cause

element of his RICO claim and overlooked evidence that
would support his contention that a direct relationship
exists between his injury and the defendants’ injurious
conduct, and that he would not have been injured in the
absence of the RICO violation; and
(3)

Unjustly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
of his state law claims after dismissing the only federal
claims.
The court has carefully reviewed Mr. Sasmor’s arguments,

as well as the defendants’ responses and the voluminous record.

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The

court

addresses

Mr.

Sasmor’s

arguments

in

favor

of

reconsideration in turn.
First, the court, which adopted the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation as its own opinion, closely evaluated
the parties’ respective arguments as well as the evidence in the
record in addressing the “enterprise” element of Mr. Sasmor’s RICO
claim.

(ECF

No.

341,

at

9-11.)

Neither

the

direct

nor

the

circumstantial evidence cited by Mr. Sasmor (ECF No. 344, at 3-5;
ECF No. 351, at 6-7), which the court in any event has already
considered, would be sufficient to justify reconsideration of the
court’s

determination

that

“no

reasonable

jury

would

find

plaintiffs’ evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an
enterprise.” (ECF No. 341, at 11.)
Second, the magistrate judge provided an exceptionally
detailed and thorough analysis as to why Mr. Sasmor failed to raise
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he was “injured
in his business or property by reason of [the criminal] violation.”
(ECF No. 338, at 12-20 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).) For the
reasons discussed in Judge Orenstein’s outstanding Report and
Recommendation, and for the reasons that the court adopted the
Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 341, at 8-9), the court declines
Mr. Sasmor’s request for reconsideration of the court’s decision
regarding the failure to establish RICO injury as well as the

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failure to establish the but-for and proximate cause element of
his RICO claim.
Finally, addressing Mr. Sasmor’s contention that the
court should have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over his
state law claims, “[i]n most circumstances, a district court should
decline supplemental jurisdiction if all federal claims have been
dismissed at the pleading stage.” Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318
F.3d 113, 130 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Haynes v. Zaporowski, 521
F. App'x 24, 28 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We conclude that, as all federal
claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court
should have declined to entertain supplemental jurisdiction over
Haynes's state-law claims, and the judgment should have dismissed
the latter claims without prejudice.”). Mr. Sasmor has not met the
high

bar

for

reconsideration

of

the

court’s

decision

not

to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Sasmor’s motion for
reconsideration is respectfully DENIED. The Clerk of Court is
respectfully requested to vacate all entries of default dated April
12, 13, 15, 19, 21, and 25, 2011; March 12, 2012; and September
26, 2012 (ECF Nos. 20, 22, 24-27, 93, and other undated ECF docket
entries) in light of the court’s grant of defendants’ motions for
summary judgment on the sole federal RICO claim and the court’s
decision to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction on

5

plaintiffs’ state law claims. See Negrin v. Kalina, No. 09-CV6234, 2012 WL 4074992, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2012) (“[T]he
court may set aside an entry of default sua sponte, for good
cause.”); Leonard J. Strandberg & Assocs. v. Misan Const. Corp.,
No. 08-CV-2939, 2010 WL 1565485, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2010)
(dismissing complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and
sua sponte vacating entries of default judgment as “void”). The
Clerk of Court is further respectfully requested to enter judgment
in favor of defendants on the federal claim and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

September 30, 2015
Brooklyn, New York
_________/s/________________
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York

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