Yung v. Trump

Filing 90

ORDER denying 84 Motion for Reconsideration -- For the reasons set forth in the ATTACHED WRITTEN SUMMARY ORDER, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith, and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Electronic Order and the Attached Written Summary Order to pro se plaintiff. SO ORDERED by Judge Dora Lizette Irizarry on 3/3/2015. (Irizarry, Dora)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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J. TAIKWOK YUNG d/b/a WEB ADVISO, pro se,
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Plaintiff,
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-against:
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DONALD J. TRUMP,
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Defendant.
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DORA L. IRIZARRY, United States District Judge:

SUMMARY ORDER
11-cv-1413 (DLI)(VVP)

On February 28, 2013, this Court granted summary judgment against the pro se plaintiffcounterclaim defendant J. Taiwok Yung d/b/a Web-Adviso (“Plaintiff”), concluding that Plaintiff
had violated the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d),
through his ownership of four domain names that intentionally exploited the trademarked
surname of defendant-counterclaim plaintiff Donald J. Trump (“Defendant”). (See Opinion &
Order, Dkt. Entry No. 56.) Defendant then moved for statutory damages (see Defendant’s
Motion for Damages, Dkt. Entry No. 58), which this Court referred to the Honorable Viktor V.
Pohorelsky, United States Magistrate Judge, for a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). On
February 28, 2014, Magistrate Judge Pohorelsky issued a R&R, which recommended: (1)
denying Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a sur-reply brief; and (2) granting Defendant’s Motion
for Damages; (3) awarding Defendant $8,000 per infringing domain name, for a total judgment
of $32,000; and (4) ordering Plaintiff to transfer his interest in the domain names
trumpmumbai.com, trumpindia.com, trumpbeijing.com, and trumpabudhabi.com to the
Defendant. (See R&R, Dkt. Entry No. 75.) On March 26, 2014, the Court adopted the R&R (see
Summary Order, Dkt. Entry No. 79), over Plaintiff’s objections.

On April 25, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant motion, which the Court construes as a
motion for reconsideration of the Court’s summary judgment decision, as well as the Court’s
adoption of the R&R. (See Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (“Pl. Mot.”), Dkt. Entry No.
84.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied.
DISCUSSION
This Order is written for the benefit of the parties and familiarity with the underlying
facts and issues is presumed. 1 The Court construes Plaintiff’s motion liberally, as is required for
pro se submissions. 2
“The standard for granting [a motion for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration
will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that
the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transport, Inc., 70 F. 3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.
1995). “The major grounds justifying reconsideration are an intervening change in controlling
law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.” Hinds County, Miss. v. Wachovia Bank N.A., 708 F. Supp. 2d 348, 369 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Reconsideration is not a proper tool to
repackage and relitigate arguments and issues already considered by the court in deciding the
original motion. Id.; United States v. Gross, 2002 WL 32096592, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2002).
Nor is it proper to raise new arguments and issues. Gross, 2002 WL 32096592 at *4.
1

A detailed discussion of the factual background of this case is set forth in this Court’s February 28, 2013
summary judgment decision. (See Op. & Or., Dkt. Entry No. 56.)
2
Pro se pleadings are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (citation omitted). Courts should “interpret [such papers] to raise the strongest
arguments that they suggest.” Forsyth v. Fed’n Emp’t & Guidance Serv., 409 F. 3d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Though a court need not act as an advocate for pro se litigants, in such cases
there is a “greater burden and a correlative greater responsibility upon the district court to insure that constitutional
deprivations are redressed and that justice is done.” Davis v. Kelly, 160 F. 3d 917, 922 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted).

2

Plaintiff has made no showing of a change in the controlling law or the need to correct a
clear error or to prevent manifest injustice.

He has presented no new evidence or legal

arguments in support of his motion; rather, he seeks to relitigate issues previously resolved by
this Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied. The
Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be
taken in good faith, and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
March 3, 2015

/s/
DORA L. IRIZARRY
United States District Judge

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