Corbitt v. Queens Health Network

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM, ORDER AND JUDGMENT re 19 Motion for Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is granted to the defendant on all of plaintiff's claims. The case is dismissed. No costs or disbursements are awarded. So Ordered by Judge Jack B. Weinstein on 11/20/2012. (Lee, Tiffeny)

FILED

IN CLERK'S OFFICE
U S DISTRICT COURT E.D.NY

* NOV 2 6 2012 *

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BROOKLYN OFFICE

WILLIAM CORBITT,

MEMORANDUM, ORDER, AND
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

ll-CV-3095

- againstQUEENS HEALTH NETWORK,
Defendant.

I.

Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1

II.

Facts and Procedural History ................................................................................................... 2

III. Law .......................................................................................................................................... 5
a.

Summary Judgment Standard .............................................................................................. 5

b.

Race and Gender Discrimination ......................................................................................... 6

c.

Retaliation ............................................................................................................................ 7

IV. Application of Law to Facts .................................................................................................... 7
V. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 10

I.

Introduction

Plaintiff, formerly a housekeeping aide at Queens Hospital Center, a part of the Queens
Health Network, was disciplined and suspended over allegations of his sexual harassment of a
fellow worker. He was later terminated because he stopped showing up for work. He claims he
did not learn of his termination until two years after it happened, but he made virtually no
inquiries to the hospital in the interim, nor did he ever appear to do his job.
Corbitt sues his employer for discrimination and retaliation on the basis of race and gender.
Brought are claims under 42 U.SC. § 1981 and the New York State Human Rights Law

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(NYSHRL), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290 et seq. See generally Verified Complaint, attached to Notice
of Removal, No. ll-CV-3095, Jun. 28, 2011, ECF No.1.
Defendant has moved for summary judgment. The motion is granted for the reasons set forth
below.
II.

Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff William Corbitt, an African-American male, began working for the defendant in
November of 1993. PI. Counterstatement of Facts Pursuant to Rule 56.1 ("PI. 56.1 Ctrstmt.") ~
2.1, Aug. 16,2012, ECF No. 17. He was a housekeeping aide at the Queens Hospital Center, a
part of the Queens Health Network, which in turn is a part of the New York City Health and
Hospitals Corporation. Answer ~ 1, Aug. 12,2011, ECF No.5. Defendant terminated his
employment on February 27, 2010. PI. 56.1 Ctrstmt.

~

20.1.

Until March 22, 2008, Corbitt worked in the Radiation Oncology Department. Id

~

5.1.

That was where he met Denise Taylor, an employee of Mount Sinai Hospital who also worked in
the department. Defendant's Rule 56.1 Statement ~ 4 ("Def. 56.1 Stmt."), Aug. 17,2012, ECF
No. 20.
On March 18,2008, Ms. Taylor complained to plaintiffs supervisor that Corbitt was
sexually harassing her. PI. 56.1 Ctrstmt.

~

11.4. She alleged that Corbitt had engaged in a

pattern of behavior that included, among other things, making repeated advances, asking to buy
her lunch, and leaving her love notes and cards. Def. 56.1 Stmt.
disputes most of the allegations, e.g., PI. 56.1 Ctrstmt.

~~

~~

6-11. Although plaintiff

5-8, he admits giving Ms. Taylor a

card; a handwritten note, including his phone number and asking her to call him if she wanted to
get together; and football tickets. Id

~~

8.1, 10.1; Dep. of William Corbitt ("Corbitt Dep.) 9:23-

10:11, Aug. 17,2012, ECF No. 22-B. Because of Ms. Taylor's complaints, the supervisory staff

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of the Housekeeping Office convened a meeting with the two employees. PI. 56.1 Ctrstmt. ~
11.4. As a remedial measure, on March 22, 2008, he was transferred from the Radiation
Oncology Department to the Emergency Room, where he had no interaction with Ms. Taylor
until May 2008 /d.

~~

11.8-11.10.

In May, the plaintiff saw Ms. Taylor hugging another co-worker in the hallway. Id. ~ 11.11.
Unprompted, he commented to the co-worker that Ms. Taylor had filed false charges against him
and that was the reason for his transfer to the Emergency Room. Id. Ms. Taylor promptly filed
another sexual harassment complaint against him. Id. ~ 11.13. Although plaintiff claims he was
not interviewed by anyone about the incident, he spoke with at least two supervisors the next day
and requested a transfer because he felt his "reputation was being tarnished." Id.

~

11.14; see PI.

Mem. Of Law in Opp. to Def. Mot. for Summ. Judgment ("PI. Mem.") at 5, Aug. 16,2012, ECF
No. 18. He then formally requested a transfer in writing and submitted the letter to the Chief
Operating Officer of Queens Hospital. PI. 56.1 Ctrstmt.

~~

11.18-11.19.

On June 27,2008, plaintiff was re-assigned to another building several hundred yards away
from where Ms. Taylor worked; he was "happy" the defendant had granted his request for a
transfer. Declaration of William Corbitt ("Corbitt Decl.") ~ 29, Aug. 16,2012, ECF No. 16; PI.
Mem. at 5. Shortly after, on July 2,2008, the hospital suspended plaintiff for thirty days. PI.
Mem. at 5; PI. 56.1 Ctrstmt.

~~

17-17.6. It had concluded an investigation into another

complaint made by Ms. Taylor for which it found probable cause of sexual harassment. PI. 56.1
Ctrstmt. ~ 17.3.
While suspended, plaintiff retained present counsel, who sent two letters to the defendant
alleging reverse gender discrimination based on spurious harassment charges and requesting that
it be involved in any disciplinary investigation. Id.

3

~

17.9-17.12. See Declaration of-Steven A.

Morelli ("Morelli DecI.") Ex. F, Aug. 16,2012, ECF No. 15. The defendant then convened a
meeting with plaintiff and his counsel on August 22, 2008. PI. Mem. at 6. One week later, all
parties reached a settlement through which, among other things, plaintiff was granted medical
leave for one year effective September 1, 2008. PI. 56.1 Ctrstmt. ~ 17.14. His prior suspension
was re-categorized as authorized leave and he received backpay for that time. Verified CompI.

~

47.
Plaintiff decided to return to work on November 3,2008, two months into his year of medical
leave. PI. 56.1 Ctrstmt. ~ 18.1. When Ms. Taylor saw him in the hospital that day, she called the
police. Id ~ 18.2; Def. 56.1 Stmt. ~18. Corbitt was arrested and eventually pled guilty to
disorderly conduct. Def. 56.1 Stmt. ~ 18. Ms. Taylor received a two-year order of protection
against him. Id
After this incident, plaintiff never again showed up for work. PI. 56.1 Ctrstmt.

~

18.5. He

says he feared that he might be arrested again. Id. ~ 18.7. On August 3 rd , 2009, defendant's
Office of Labor Relations sent plaintiff a letter outlining disciplinary charges and recommending
his termination because of his failure to show up for work since November 2008 and the
allegations of sexual harassment. Id.

~

19.14; Morelli Decl. Ex. L. Plaintiff claims neither he

nor his counsel received this notice of charges or of the conference that preceded the charges
because all documents were sent to the incorrect address. PI. 56.1 Ctrstmt.
was, however, represented by his union at the conference. Id

~

~

19.11-19.14. He

19.14.

On January 12,2010, an administrative hearing was held on the charge of his "absen[ce]
without official leave since November 3,2008." Declaration of Daniel Chiu ("Chiu Decl.") Ex. E
at 2, Aug. 17,2012, ECF No. 22. Plaintiff was again represented by his union representative but
defaulted because he failed to contact his union. Chiu Decl. Ex. E at 2. See Transcript of Oral

4

Argument ("Arg. Tr.") 4:12-5:9, Nov. 14,2012. The administrative lawjudge recommended
termination of employment for "lengthy, unexplained absence." Chiu DecI. Ex. Eat 3. In
accordance with the administrative decision, defendant ended employment on February 17,2010.
PI. Mem. at 8; Def. 56.1 Stmt.

~

20.

Plaintiff commenced the instant lawsuit in state court on June 3, 2011. Notice of Removal,
Jun. 28, 2011, ECF No.1. Defendant removed the case to federal court on June 28, 2011. Id

III.

Law
a. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see, e.g., Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1,5
(2d Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is warranted when, after construing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-50,255. Evidence offered or pointed to
in order to demonstrate a genuine dispute regarding a material fact may not consist of "mere
conclusory allegations, speculation or conjecture." Cifarelli v. Vill. Of Babylon, 93 F .3d 47, 51
(2d Cir. 1996); see De!. & Hudson Ry. V Conso!. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 1990)
("Conclusory allegations will not suffice to create a genuine issue"). If the non-movant fails "to
come forth with evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to return a verdict in his or her
favor on" an essential element of the claim, summary judgment is granted. Burke v. Jacoby, 981
F.2d 1372,1379 (2d Cir. 1992). See e.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.

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b. Race and Gender Discrimination
Claims of discrimination under Section 1981 (race) and the NYSHRL (race and gender) are
analyzed under the same Title VII burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See e.g., Spiegel v. Schulman, 604 F.3d 72,80 (2d Cir. 2010);
Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000); Chambers-English v. Unisys
Corp., No. 05Civ.2976(DC), 2007 WL 256441, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31,2007).

"Under this test, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that:
(1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was competent to perform the job in question, or

was performing the job duties satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and
(4) the action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination."
Spiegel, 604 F .3d at 80 (internal citation omitted). If the plaintiff is successful in making his
prima facie case, "a presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden shifts to the defendant,

who must proffer some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action." Id. "If the
defendant proffers such a reason, the presumption of discrimination created by the prima facie
case drops out of the analysis, and the defendant 'will be entitled to summary judgment. .. unless
the plaintiff can point to evidence that reasonably supports a finding of prohibited
discrimination." Mario v. P&C Food Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 767 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting
James v. N. Y Racing Ass 'n, 233 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2000)). The plaintiff has "the

opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by
the defendant were not its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination." Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (internal citation omitted).

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c. Retaliation
Retaliation under Section 1981 and the NYSHRL are both analyzed under the same standards
as a Title VII claim of retaliation. E.g., Little v. Northeast Utilities Service Co., 299 Fed. Appx.
50,52 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 455-57 (2008);
Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hasp., 514 F.3d 217,226 n.9 (2d Cir. 2008) ("We typically treat

Title VII and NYHRL discrimination claims as analytically identical").
A prima facie case of retaliation requires that plaintiff show: "( 1) participation in a protected
activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action;
and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action."
Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). lfthe

plaintiff satisfies this burden, "[t]he defendant must ... articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason for the adverse employment action." Id. The plaintiff must then show that "retaliation
was a substantial reason for the adverse employment action." Id. "The term 'protected activity'
refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination." Cruz v. Coach
Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560,566 (2d Cir. 2000).

IV.

Application of Law to Facts
The essence of plaintiff's claims is that the hospital discriminated and retaliated against him,

based on his race and gender, by crediting a colleague's allegedly spurious complaints; failing to
adequately consider or investigate his version of events leading up to those complaints;
suspending and otherwise disciplining him; causing him to be arrested; and terminating him
without notice. See PI. Mem. at 1-3. Summary judgment is granted to the defendant on all of
plaintiff's causes of action. He has not shown that the hospital did anything wrong.

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Plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of race or gender discrimination. None of the
defendant's actions in any way give rise to an inference of such discrimination. The hospital
took measures in each instance not to discriminate against him, but to protect against complaints
of discrimination by him. Although plaintiff categorically asserts that the complainant's
accusations are baseless, he does admit to unwanted romantic advances towards her, including
buying Ms. Taylor a card, writing her a note with his phone number, asking to spend time with
her, and giving her football tickets. PI. Ctrstmt.

~~

8.1, 10.1. The defendant's responsive

measures in this context do not raise any inference of discrimination.
Even if plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, he has failed to rebut the defendant's
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The defendant disciplined, suspended, and
terminated his employment based on multiple complaints of sexual harassment and his failure to
show up to work after his arrest. His arrest, stemming from the same employee's call to the
police, cannot be imputed to the defendant. Even if all of Ms. Taylor's allegations of sexual
harassment turned out to be untrue, the hospital had a good faith and legitimate interest in acting
the way it did to investigate and prevent potential discrimination in the workplace. Plaintiff has
provided no evidence to demonstrate those interests were pretextuai.
Plaintiffs retaliation claim also fails for similar reasons. As an initial matter, even while
disciplining him, the defendant repeatedly provided plaintiff with relief he requested. The
hospital consented to his request for a departmental transfer, a result he was "happy" with
(Corbitt Deci.

~

29), re-classified his suspension as authorized leave, gave him backpay, and then

allowed him to take a year of medical leave. No reasonable juror could conclude that the
defendant retaliated against plaintiff when it reasonably accommodated him in each instance,
despite the continuing harassment complaints.
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Assuming without deciding that plaintiff engaged in "protected activity," he has also failed to
show any causal connection between that activity and defendant's adverse employment actions.
The evidence unequivocally indicates that defendant's actions did not depend in any way on
plaintiffs protected activity. It disciplined him only when Ms. Taylor filed a harassment
complaint. And it ultimately terminated him for his failure to show up for work. But, even if
plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, he has not rebutted the defendant's
legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its disciplinary actions.
Plaintiff maintains that he did not learn of the disciplinary charges, the administrative
hearing, or his termination until discovery in this lawsuit in February 2012. Id. ,-r 19.21. But he
was represented by his union at both the disciplinary conference and the administrative hearing.
PI. 56.1 Ctrstmt.,-r 19.14; Arg. Tr. 5:5-9. He also took no steps to vacate the administrative
decision through an appeal or special proceeding. Arg. Tr. 6:4. Plaintiff claims he did not learn
of his termination until two years after it happened. Id. 6:21-24. Yet, the undisputed fact is that
plaintiff, represented by present counsel, stopped showing up for work after his arrest and release
on November 3, 2008. Id. 9:18-22, 10:6-7. And, with the exception of one letter sent to the
defendant in December 2008, stating that he "would like to return to work" but was "afraid" of
another arrest, neither plaintiff nor his counsel ever again contacted the defendant about
continuing with his job. See PI. 56.1 Ctrstmt. ,-r 18.7. The hospital cannot be charged with any
wrongdoing because of plaintiff s fear of arrest. He sat on his rights, if any, for two years with
no justification. See Arg. Tr. 13 :4-11.
Defendant cannot be held liable for discrimination or retaliation. The complaint mentions in
passing that defendant created a hostile work environment. There is no factual basis for that
charge.
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v.

Conclusion
Summary judgment is granted to the defendant on all of plaintiff s claims. The case is

dismissed. No costs or disbursements are awarded.
SO ORDERED.
I

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kl~ 11 ii~;/rhl' L--::t-::-

./jack B. W~instein
.
I .. i Senior United States District Judge
L/
!

Date: November 20,2012
Brooklyn, New York

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