Morris v. Katz et al

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The complaint is dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Defendants' motions, [15, 27], are denied to the extent they seek sanctions. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and close the case. A copy of this memorandum and order will be mailed to Morris. Ordered by Judge John Gleeson on 7/2/2012. (Gonen, Daniel)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ELECTRONIC PUBLICATION ONLY

PEGGY MORRIS,
Plaintiff,
- versus -

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
11-CV-3556 (JG) (LB)

SHELDON J. ROSEN, P.C., SHELDON J.
ROSEN, ESQ., MICHAEL J. MOTTO,
MARIBEL TEJADA BOLIVAR, LISA
PETERSON, ROCHDALE VILLAGE, INC.,
John Doe #1-10, and Jane Doe #1-10,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
PEGGY MORRIS
191-36 116th Avenue
St. Albans, New York 11412
Plaintiff, Pro Se
FURMAN KORNFELD & BRENNAN LLP
61 Broadway, 26th Floor
New York, New York 10006
By:
A. Michael Furman
Joshua B. Abrams
Attorneys for Defendants Sheldon J.
Rosen, P.C., Sheldon J. Rosen and
Maribel Tejada Bolivar
BAKER GREENSPAN & BERNSTEIN, ESQS.
2099 Bellmore Avenue
Bellmore, New York 11710
By:
Robert L. Bernstein, Jr.
Attorneys for Defendant Rochdale
Village, Inc.

JOHN GLEESON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Peggy Morris filed this pro se civil rights action on July 25, 2011, alleging a
conspiracy among the named defendants to unlawfully evict her from an apartment in Queens, New
York. On September 4, 2011, I granted Morris’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, dismissed sua sponte the claims against 18 of the 24 named defendants as well
as the claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. See Morris v. Katz, No. 11-CV-3556
(JG) (LB), 2011 WL 3918965, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2011). I allowed Morris’s claim brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to proceed against the six remaining defendants – Maribel Tejada

Bolivar, Sheldon J. Rosen, Sheldon J. Rosen, P.C. (collectively, the “Rosen Defendants”),
Rochdale Village, Inc. (“Rochdale”), Michael J. Motto and Lisa Peterson. See id.
The Rosen Defendants and Rochdale have moved to dismiss the remaining § 1983
claim against them. They have also moved for an order declaring Morris to be a vexatious
litigant and enjoining her from instituting further actions against them or, in the alternative, the
imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the
reasons set forth below, the case is dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte and the Defendants’ motions
are denied insofar as they seek sanctions.
BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background
Rochdale Village is a federally-subsidized cooperative apartment complex for

low-income families. Compl. ¶ III.E, ECF No. 1. Morris began residing at an apartment there in
2000. Id. ¶ III.F. She lived there with the apartment’s shareholder of record, Osborne Miller.
See id. Miller died on December 16, 2009. Id.

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Morris’s conflict with the Defendants arises from her eviction following Miller’s
death. Rochdale commenced a holdover proceeding against Morris in the Civil Court of the City
of New York, Queens County, Rochdale Village, Inc. v. Miller, Index No. 57347/2010, asserting
that she had no rights to the apartment. Rochdale retained Rosen and his firm, Sheldon J. Rosen,
P.C., to prosecute the holdover proceeding. Bolivar was a legal secretary employed by Rosen’s
firm and, in that capacity, she notarized certain documents in connection with the proceeding.
On April 22, 2012, the civil court conducted a hearing with respect to the
holdover proceeding. Because Morris had failed to appear, the court conducted an inquest,
resulting in a default judgment of possession in Rochdale’s favor. A warrant of eviction was
issued on May 17, 2010.
On May 25, 2010, Morris moved by order to show cause to vacate the default
judgment and stay her eviction. She argued that she had not been properly served with notice of
the holdover proceeding. She also claimed that she had succession rights to the apartment. At a
June 7, 2010 hearing, the civil court denied her motion. The court held that Morris had been
properly served in the holdover proceeding and had “no rights to the apartment.”
Morris appealed the June 7, 2010 decision to the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, Appellate Term. Although the Appellate Term initially stayed Morris’s eviction, it
vacated the stay on October 19, 2010, after Morris failed to pay Rochdale for her use of the
apartment as directed. Morris’s appeal remains pending in the Appellate Term.
Morris again sought to vacate the default judgment and stay her eviction in the
civil court. On October 22, 2010, the civil court denied the requested relief. Morris was evicted
from the apartment on July 25, 2011.

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B.

Other Litigation in State Court
Morris commenced three cases in the Supreme Court of New York, Queens

County, all relating to her eviction. In late summer 2010, she commenced a civil action, Morris
v. Sheldon J. Rosen, P.C., Index No. 22934/2010, in which she alleged, inter alia, that the Rosen
Defendants had violated New York Judiciary Law§ 487 in commencing and prosecuting the
holdover proceeding. Morris filed a notice of discontinuance of the case on December 20, 2010.
In November 2010, Morris commenced a proceeding under Article 78 of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules, Morris v. Katz, Index No. 29202/2010, against the Rosen
Defendants – as well as judges, court clerks and police officers involved in her eviction. The
Court dismissed Morris’s petition in an order dated May 31, 2011.
Finally, on December 15, 2010, Morris again filed a civil action, Morris v.
Rochdale Village, Inc., Index No. 30831/2010, naming the Rosen Defendants, Rochdale and
others as defendants. On July 11, 2011, the court granted the Rosen Defendants’ motion to
dismiss.
C.

Procedural Background of This Case
Morris commenced this case on July 25, 2011, the same day she was evicted. She

sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction barring the eviction and was
heard in this Court on that same day. However, because the eviction had been effected earlier
that morning, I denied her request for injunctive relief as moot. In an application dated July 27,
2011, Morris sought an order restoring her to possession of the apartment or, alternatively,
barring Rochdale from reletting it. I denied this requested relief on July 28, 2011, on the ground
that Morris had not demonstrated a likelihood that she would succeed on the merits of her claim.

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Morris’s complaint named 24 defendants, including judges, legislators, the New
York City Marshal, a Deputy Mayor of New York as well as state and city agencies. She
asserted claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 & 1986. On September 4, 2011, I
dismissed the claims against 18 of the defendants sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, on
the grounds that either those defendants were immune from suit or the claims against them were
insufficiently alleged. See Morris, 2011 WL 3918965, at *3–7. I also dismissed her §§ 1985 and
1986 claims because she did not allege sufficient facts supporting a claim that the defendants
were engaged in a conspiracy or that they targeted her on account of her race. See id. at *7–8. I
allowed her § 1983 claim to proceed against the remaining defendants.
Motto answered the complaint on January 16, 2012, asserting an affirmative
defense of res judicata. Peterson was never served with a summons and complaint and the claim
against her was therefore dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Order Adopting Report & Recommendation, ECF No. 38.
The other remaining defendants – the Rosen Defendants and Rochdale – have
moved to dismiss the complaint. They argue that Morris has failed to allege a violation of due
process because she had no property interest in the apartment. The Rosen Defendants also argue
that the claims against them are barred by res judicata.
DISCUSSION
A.

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine – named for the Supreme Court’s decisions

in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) – “federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are, in
substance, appeals from state-court judgments.” Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422
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F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006). The doctrine is
premised on “the principle, expressed by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, that within the federal
judicial system, only the Supreme Court may review state-court decisions.” Hoblock, 422 F.3d
at 85. It bars cases in federal district courts “brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Skinner v. Switzer, 131
S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011).
Neither the Rosen Defendants nor Rochdale have argued that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine applies to this case; they have moved to dismiss on other grounds. However, “[b]ecause
Rooker-Feldman goes to subject-matter jurisdiction,” Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 83, it “may be raised
at any time by either party or sua sponte by the court.” Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court
Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir.1996), abrogated in part on other grounds, Exxon Mobil Corp.,
544 U.S. 280; see also, e.g., Forjone v. Federated Fin. Corp. of Am., 816 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146
n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[T]he Court may address the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine sua sponte because the doctrine relates to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”); Bey
v. State of New York, No. 10-CV-1446 (NGG) (RER), 2010 WL 1688066, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
21, 2010).
Application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires that:
(1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of
injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff invites
district court review of that judgment, and (4) the state court
judgment was entered before the plaintiff’s federal suit
commenced.
McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97,
101 (2d Cir. 2009); Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85. “The first and fourth of these requirements may be
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loosely termed procedural; the second and third may be termed substantive.” Hoblock, 422 F.3d
at 85.
The procedural requirements – the first and fourth – are plainly satisfied. Morris
lost in the holdover proceeding in civil court. And both the default judgment in the holdover
proceeding and the denial of her motion to vacate the default judgment were issued prior to the
commencement of proceedings in this Court.
The substantive requirements – the second and third – are satisfied as well.
Morris is complaining about an injury caused by the civil court’s judgment and seeks it reversal.
She argues that she was not properly served with notice of the holdover proceeding and that the
civil court’s judgment therefore deprived her of property without due process. The relief she
seeks in this case would effectively reverse the state court’s judgment granting possession of the
apartment to Rochdale.
In Hoblock, the Second Circuit provided the following example of an injury
caused by a state court judgment:
Suppose a state court, based purely on state law, terminates a
father’s parental rights and orders the state to take custody of his
son. If the father sues in federal court for the return of his son on
grounds that the state judgment violates his federal substantive
due-process rights as a parent, he is complaining of an injury
caused by the state judgment and seeking its reversal.
Id. at 87; see also Green, 585 F.3d at 103.
The situation in this case is analogous to this example. The only differences are
that this case involves an eviction rather than the loss of custody and a procedural due-process
claim rather than a substantive one. Cf. Congregation Adas Yereim v. City of New York, 673
F. Supp. 2d 94, 104 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Just as a father’s federal court challenge to the
termination of his parental rights by a state court order will run aground on the shoals of Rooker7

Feldman, so too, does plaintiffs’ challenge to [the state] Court’s order terminating the
[plaintiff’s] rights to the . . . property here.” (citations omitted)).
It makes no difference that the precise harm Morris complains of – her eviction –
was brought about by third parties. “Where a state-court judgment causes the challenged thirdparty action, any challenge to that third-party action is necessarily the kind of challenge to the
state judgment that only the Supreme Court can hear.” Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88; see also
Swiatkowski v. Citibank, 745 F. Supp. 2d 150, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (claimed injuries arising
from “defendants’ conduct in obtaining and enforcing [a state court] judgment” were caused by
the judgment), aff’d, 446 F. App’x 360 (2d Cir. 2011); Caldwell v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker &
Sonnenfeldt, P.C., 701 F. Supp. 2d 340, 348–49 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). The state court judgment
brought about Morris’s subsequent eviction, which could not have happened absent the
judgment. The judgment therefore caused her injury for Rooker-Feldman purposes. See
Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 88 (“[I]f the state has taken custody of a child pursuant to a state judgment,
the parent cannot escape Rooker-Feldman simply by alleging in federal court that he was injured
by the state employees who took his child rather than by the judgment authorizing them to take
the child.”).
Rooker-Feldman thus bars Morris from claiming that the state court judgment
violated her right to due process. Indeed, courts have repeatedly dismissed analogous claims as
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Town of Southampton, 738
F. Supp. 2d 353, 365–66 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (Rooker-Feldman barred challenge to constitutional
sufficiency of notice provided in state court proceeding); Reyes v. Fairfield Props., 661
F. Supp. 2d 249, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (Rooker-Feldman barred claim that state court eviction
proceeding was unlawful); Tsabbar v. Madden, No. 07-CV-4923 (DLI) (LB), 2007 WL

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4300115, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2007) (same), aff’d, 326 F. App’x 61 (2d Cir. 2009);
Jacobowitz v. City of N.Y. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., No. 07-CV-658 (ARR) (VVP), 2007 WL
594962, at *6–7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2007) (same).
Although Morris may not bring her claims attacking the civil court’s judgment in
this Court, she may appeal the civil court’s decision “to higher New York courts and, eventually,
to the U.S. Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257,” Green, 585 F.3d at 103 – a process she has
already begun.
B.

Sanctions
Federal courts have the power to impose sanctions even if they lack subject-

matter jurisdiction over the merits of an underlying dispute. See Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate
of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 333 (2d Cir. 1999); Fuerst v. Fuerst, 832 F. Supp. 2d 210, 218
(E.D.N.Y. 2011). Thus, my conclusion that Rooker-Feldman bars Morris from asserting her
claims in this Court does not prevent me from considering the Defendants’ request for sanctions.
The Defendants seek an order declaring that Morris is a vexatious litigant and
enjoining her from filing additional actions. In determining whether this relief is warranted, the
following factors are relevant:
(1) the litigant’s history of litigation and in particular whether it
entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the
litigant’s motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant
have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing?;
(3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the
litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed
an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and
(5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts
and other parties.

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Persaud v. United States, No. 04-CV-2862 (CBA), 2010 WL 538823, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11,
2010) (quoting Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 23–24 (2d Cir.1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Having considered these factors, I conclude that enjoining Morris from filing
future lawsuits is unwarranted at this time. Morris is proceeding pro se and would
understandably be unfamiliar with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as well as the res judicata
argument raised by the Defendants. In addition, I find there is no evidence of an improper
motive, such as harassment, in her bringing this lawsuit. Although Morris filed three civil
actions prior to this one, she voluntarily discontinued the first one. The fact that she filed two
more actions in state court may have been the result of confusion as to whether to bring an
Article 78 proceeding or a civil action. Although her filing of multiple actions involving related
claims may have caused some burden and expense to the Defendants, I find this is insufficient to
warrant restricting Morris’s access to the courts. Instead, Morris is warned that if she continues
to file duplicative actions, she may be enjoined from commencing future actions in this Court
without obtaining leave to do so.
For similar reasons, I conclude that sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are unwarranted. See, e.g., Boggs v. Die Fliedermaus, LLP, 286
F. Supp. 2d 291, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Babigian v. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., 144
F.R.D. 30, 33–34 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In addition, sanctions under Rule 11 are unavailable here
because the Defendants have not complied with the Rule’s “safe harbor” provision, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11(c)(2), which requires that the motion for sanctions be served on the allegedly
offending party at least 21 days before it is filed with the court. See Hadges v. Yonkers Racing
Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1327–28 (2d Cir. 1995); Ajuluchuku-Levy v. Schleifer, No. 08-CV-1752

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(SJF) (AKT), 2009 WL 4890768, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2009) (“Compliance with the safe
harbor provision is mandatory, and failure to do so will result in denial of the motion for
sanctions.”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the complaint is dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. The Defendants’ motions are denied to the extent they seek sanctions. The Clerk of
Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and close the case.
So ordered.

John Gleeson, U.S.D.J.
Dated: July 2, 2012
Brooklyn, New York

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