Jenkins v. Morris et al

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, This Court is in receipt of four submission from pro se pltff Matthew Jenkins relating to the above captioned action: an "Affidavit/ Affirmation in Opposition to Deft's Motion Objection/Court Orders" dated 5/29/12 (hereinafter "Pltff's Affirmation"); a "Declaration for Entry of Default," dated 5/29/11 [sic]; a letter dated 5/26/12; and a letter dated 6/22/12. This Memorandum and Order addresses these submissions. (MUST SEE DOCUMENT FOR FURTHER DETAILS) Ordered by Judge Sandra L. Townes on 7/18/2012. c/m (Galeano, Sonia)

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FILED

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JUL 24 2012

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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MATTHEW JENKINS,
Plaintiff,

IN CLERK'S OFFICE
US DISTRICT COURT E.D.NY.

BROOKLYN OFFICE
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
11-CV-4178 (SLT) (CLP)

-against-

*

DETECTIVE LIAMM MORRIS, et al.,
Defendants.

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TOWNES, United States District Judge:
This Court is in receipt of four submissions from prose plaintiff Matthew Jenkins
relating to the above-captioned action: an "Affidavit/Affirmation in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion Objection/Court Orders" dated May 29, 2012 (hereinafter "Plaintiff's Affirmation"); a
"Declaration for Entry of Default," dated May 29, 2011 [sic]; a letter dated May 26, 2012; and a
letter dated June 22, 2012. This Memorandum and Order addresses these submissions.

The First Submission: Plaintiff's Affirmation
Read liberally, the first of these submissions can be construed as requesting four types of
relief. First, Plaintiff's Affirmation appears to object to, or seek reconsideration of, that portion
of this Court's Memorandum and Order dated November 7, 2011, which dismissed plaintiff's
claims against Kings County District Attorney Charles J. Hynes. To the e]{tent that plaintiff is
seeking reconsideration, that motion is denied. "The standard for granting ... a motion [for
reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party
can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked - matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be e]{pected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing cases). Plaintiff does not state a basis for

reconsideration. While this Court recognizes that pro se submissions must be held "to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520 (1972) (per curiam), pro se litigants are not "exempt ... from compliance with relevant rules
of procedural and substantive law." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90,95 (2d Cir. 1983).
Second, Plaintiff's Affirmation appears to object to Magistrate Judge Pollak's orders
dated January 20,2012, February 10, 2012, March 12,2012, April 11,2012, and April16, 2012.
Any such objections, however, would be untimely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (requiring that
objections to a magistrate judge's order be served filed within 14 days of receipt of the order).
Moreover, this Court is satisfied that none of Judge Pollak's orders are clearly erroneous or
contrary to law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. It would be impractical and inefficient to conduct a
scheduling conference before all defendants are served. Moreover, by entering a Valentin order
and directing the United States Marshals Service to serve defendants Morris and Crosby at the
addresses supplied by Corporation Counsel, Judge Pollak has done everything in her power to
expedite service of process in this case.
Third, Plaintiff's Affirmation appears to seek to compel Kings County District Attorney
Charles J. Hynes, the New York City Police Department's Bureau oflnternal Affairs, and the
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Probation to conduct certain investigations.
Plaintiff's claims against District Attorney Hynes, the Director of the Bureau of Internal Affairs
and Vincent Schiraldi, the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Probation, were
previously dismissed. Accordingly, this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over these individuals
and does not have the power to grant the relief plaintiff seeks. Moreover, since the relief plaintiff
seeks is essentially injunctive relief relating to the dismissed claims, plaintiff cannot establish a

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likelihood of success on the merits, which is a prerequisite to the granting of such injunctive
relief.
Fourth and finally, plaintiff references his letters dated March 19,2012, and April18,
2012, and requests "a list of everything ... that [he is] entitled to from this Court's ProSe
Office." Plaintiff misapprehends the function of the Court's ProSe Office. That Office exists to
provide procedural advice to pro se litigants. Unlike public defenders, the Office is not assigned
to particular cases and cannot offer any assistance with substantive legal issues. In addition, the
Office is not a legal library and cannot provide help with legal research. However, if plaintiff has
specific procedural questions, he may address them to that Office.

The Second Submission: Plaintiffs "Declaration for Entry of Default"
Plaintiffs second submission is construed as a request for entry of default pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). That request is denied for the reasons set forth in this Court's
Memorandum and Order dated May 17, 2012. To the extent that this submission can be
construed as seeking reconsideration of that Memorandum and Order, that application is denied
for the same reasons set forth on pages 1-2, above. See Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257.

The Third Submission: Plaintiff's Letter dated May 26, 2012
Plaintiff's letter dated May 26, 2012, expressly states that its purpose is "to provide [the
Court] with [an] update as to [plaintiffs] current legal situation .... " Letter to U.S. District
Judge Sandra L. Townes from Matthew Jenkins, dated May 26,2012, at 1. In light of this
characterization, this Court does not construe this letter as requesting any relief.
Although no response to plaintiffs letter is necessary, this Court wishes to clarify some
things. First, since plaintiff is not suing a "municipal corporation, or any other state-created

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governmental organization," Rule 40)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is inapplicable.
Nothing in Rule 4 implies that individual police officers can be served by serving the police
commissioner. Moreover, even if the commissioner could accept service on an individual
officer's behalf, nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would require him to waive
service on the officer's behalf.
Second, the Court and defense counsel have taken prompt action to assist the incarcerated
plaintiff in locating and serving defendants Morris and Crosby. However, plaintiff must
understand that his is not the only pending prose action in the district. Accordingly, while
plaintiff may believe that two months is "more than enough time to serve" the detectives, id. at 2,
he may not be taking into account the other demands placed upon the limited resources of the
United States Marshals Service.
Third, as noted above, the Pro Se Office of this Courthouse exists to provide procedural
advice to pro se litigants. Accordingly, plaintiff should not expect the Pro Se Office to provide
him with "legal know-how" or a "legal education" concerning "how to conduct ... adequate
legal research." !d. at 6.
The Fourth Submission: Plaintiff's Letter dated June 22, 2012
Plaintiffs letter dated June 22, 2012, principally complains about his treatment at Upstate
Correctional Facility. Plaintiff states that he has had "a lot of issues with the correctional staff at
this facility," and alleges that staff abuses include assault, the unnecessary use of force, and
interference with his legal mail. Letter to District Judge Sandra L. Townes from Matthew
Jenkins, dated June 22,2012, at I. Plaintiff seeks "an injunction against [the] facility and its
officers," as well as assistance "in being produced for any court appearance, or hearing or
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conference" in connection with this action. Id. at 2. In addition, plaintiff seeks to be relocated to
another prison.
This Court does not have the power to grant the relief plaintiff seeks. This action relates
to the circumstances of plaintiff's August 2006 arrest and subsequent prosecution. It has nothing
to do with prison conditions and no prison officials are named in the lawsuit. Accordingly, this
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over these officials and cannot grant the relief plaintiff seeks.
However, if conferences or hearings prove necessary in this action, this Court will request the
assistance of prison officials. Based on past experiences, the Court expects that prison personnel
will prove responsive to any such requests.
SO ORDERED.

/SANDRA L. TOWNES ...
United States District Judge

/8 ,

Dated: July
2012
Brooklyn, New York

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