Creddille v. MTA NYC Transit Authority et al

Filing 66

MEMORANDUM & ORDER denying 53 Motion for Recusal. For the reasons in the attached Memorandum & Order, the Court denies plaintiff's motion for recusal. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann on 2/20/2013. (Williams, Jennifer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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GARY CREDDILLE,
Plaintiff,
-against-

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
11-CV-5442 (SLT)(RLM)
11-CV-5443 (SLT)(RLM)
11-CV-5444 (SLT)(RLM)

THE MTA TRANSIT AUTHORITY and
CORE ENVIRONMENTAL CORP.,
Defendants.
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ROANNE L. MANN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
Currently pending before this Court is a motion by pro se plaintiff Gary Creddille
(“plaintiff”), requesting that the undersigned magistrate judge recuse herself from these
consolidated actions. See Motion for Recusal (Feb. 4, 2013) (“Pl. Motion”), Electronic Case
Filing (“ECF”) Docket Entry (“DE”) #53.1 For the reasons explained below, plaintiff’s
motion is denied.2

1

2

All ECF docket entry references relate to the first-filed action, 11-CV-5442.

In the same motion, plaintiff also seeks the recusal of the presiding District Court judge,
Sandra L. Townes, see, e.g., Pl. Mot. at 1, claiming that “I know that Judge Sandra L.
Townes had consulted with Judge Roanne L. Mann, on a lot of [Judge Townes’] bias[ed]
decisions . . . .” Pl. Motion, DE #53 at 5. In fact, the two assigned judges had never
consulted about this case, either orally or in writing. On February 6, 2013, Judge Townes
issued a memorandum and order denying plaintiff’s motion for recusal as to her. See
Memorandum and Order (Feb. 6, 2013), DE #56. Plaintiff thereafter wrote to Judge Townes
to “apologize for requesting [that she] be recused . . . .” Letter dated 2/12/2013 to Judge
Sandra L. Townes, DE #60.

BACKGROUND
In November 2011, plaintiff filed three separate actions, in which he alleged that
defendant MTA Transit Authority (the “MTA”) unlawfully discriminated against him on the
basis of his race and national origin. See Complaint (Nov. 1, 2011), DE #1; see also
Amended Complaint (Feb. 27, 2012) (“Am. Compl.”), DE #16 at 3. Plaintiff also asserted
that the MTA and defendant Core Environmental Corp. (“Core”) (collectively, with the MTA,
“defendants”) unlawfully retaliated against him for complaining about the MTA’s
discriminatory treatment. See Am. Compl., DE #16 at 3. Shortly after their filing, the cases
were consolidated for purposes of discovery and settlement. See Order (Nov. 14, 2011), DE
#3; see also Order (Jan. 4 2012), DE #5 (noting that defendants would have to move separately
for consolidation of trials).
After more than a year of discovery, on January 18, 2013, this Court held a settlement
conference, which was attended by plaintiff, counsel for Core, counsel for the MTA and a
MTA representative. See Minute Entry (Jan. 18, 2013), DE #50. At the conference, the
Court heard on-the-record presentations from all parties as to what each expected to prove at
trial based on the facts adduced in discovery. See Transcript (Jan. 18, 2013) (“Tr.”) at 7-59,
DE# 63. Following those presentations, and having heard no objection from any of the parties
see id. at 5, 59-60, the undersigned magistrate judge met with each party separately and offthe-record to discuss their respective claims and defenses, including the weaknesses thereof.
See id. After the private sessions concluded, the Court, still off-the-record, made a settlement
proposal and directed each party to respond in confidence to the Court’s proposal by the
following week. See id. at 59.
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Ultimately, no settlement was reached. See Order (Jan. 25, 2013), DE #51. Shortly
thereafter, on February 4, 2013, plaintiff moved to recuse the undersigned magistrate judge on
the basis that the Court had made biased and prejudiced comments during the settlement
conference. See, e.g., Pl. Motion, DE #53 at 6 (alleging that this Court made a “bias[ed],
prejudice[d], corrupted comment” with respect to plaintiff’s reputation at work); id. at 8
(arguing that the Court “promot[ed] racism” when it pointed out that the alleged racially
discriminatory treatment ceased in 2010).3
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, “[a]ny justice, judge or magistrate judge of the United
States shall disqualify [her]self in any proceeding in which h[er] impartiality might reasonably
be questioned,” or where she “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party . . . .” 28
U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b)(1); accord ISC Holding AG v. Nobel Biocare Fin. AG, 688 F.3d 98, 107
(2d Cir. 2012). “The question . . . is whether an objective, disinterested observer fully
informed of the underlying facts, [would] entertain significant doubt that justice would be done
absent recusal.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Whether a judge should recuse herself is
“committed to the sound discretion of the judge whose recusal is sought.” Kwiatkowski v.
Polish & Slavic Fed. Credit Union, No. 11-CV-3947 (JG)(CLP), 2011 WL 3876983, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2011) (citation omitted).
As an initial matter, the undersigned magistrate judge unequivocally states that she feels

3

Notably, in pointing out the weaknesses in plaintiff’s claims, the Court intentionally did so
ex parte and off-the-record, so as not to prejudice plaintiff’s case vis-à-vis his adversaries. But
for plaintiff’s disclosures in his pending motion, defendants would be unaware of the Court’s
comments (which, in any event, are not accurately recounted by plaintiff).
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no bias or prejudice toward any party in this matter. Her comments during the January 18,
2013 settlement conference -- whether on-the-record or off-the-record -- were not biased or
prejudiced or in any way meant to promote racism or belittle plaintiff and the claims he has
asserted in this matter.
More importantly, the Court concludes that no objective, disinterested observer would
reach a different conclusion and find that recusal is warranted. This Court has conducted
hundreds of settlement conferences, much in the same manner as she did in this matter -- to
wit, she has frank ex parte discussions with parties about the weaknesses of their claims or
defenses, in order to assist them in reasonably estimating their chances of succeeding at trial or
on summary judgment.4 So too here, during the private conference with plaintiff, without the
presence of defendants, the Court identified problems with plaintiff’s claims, based on the
Court’s knowledge of the relevant law and available, admissible facts.5
Plaintiff unreasonably interprets the Court’s candor about the merits of his case as bias
or prejudice in favor of defendants, which is not supported by law. See Stone v. Kicki, No. 04

4

Plaintiff also takes offense that, in anticipation of defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
this Court set a schedule for filing requests for a pre-motion conference, and argues that doing
so violates his constitutional right to a jury trial. See Pl. Motion, DE #53 at 10 (concerning
this Court’s statements regarding plaintiff’s chances of surviving summary judgment); id. at
14. As the Court explained at the settlement conference, if plaintiff loses at the summary
judgment stage, there would be no jury trial. See McClamrock v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2012 WL
5951842 (2d Cir. Nov. 29, 2012) (A party’s “Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial . . . is
not violated by an award of summary judgment, where . . . there are no disputed issues of
material fact.”).
5

For brevity’s sake, the Court will not address each statement or facial expression that
plaintiff alleges was indicative of bias or prejudice. Needless to say, the undersigned
magistrate judge takes a different view of what was said, the relevant context, and what
implications may reasonably be drawn from those remarks.
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Civ. 7337 (BSJ) (THK), 2005 WL 1870162, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2005) (“A judge does
not exhibit impermissible bias simply because he holds or forms an opinion about the merits of
a case or a party in litigation, as a result of what the judge learned in the proceeding.”) (citing
Lewis v. Tuscan Dairy Farms, Inc., 25 F.3d 1138, 1141 (2d Cir. 1994)). Moreover, it is well
settled that a party’s dissatisfaction with a Court’s settlement proposal is not a basis for
recusal. See, e.g., Shah v. Kuwait Airways Corp., No. 08 Civ. 7371 (RJH) (JCF), 2011 WL
3278912, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2011) (“Here, the plaintiff [] complains that I made a
recommendation to her with respect to settlement and that I pointed out to her the risks and
costs involved in further litigation. That is, of course, precisely the role of a mediator.
[Plaintiff] may well disagree with my analysis of the value of her claim and of what must be
proven on remand, but that is no basis for recusal.”).
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion for recusal. Any objection to
this Memorandum and Order must be filed with the Honorable Sandra L. Townes no later than
March 11, 2013, or will be deemed waived.

SO ORDERED.
Dated:

Brooklyn, New York
February 20, 2013

Roanne L. Mann

/s/
ROANNE L. MANN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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