Garcia et al v. AKR Corporation et al

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: For the reasons stated in this Court's Memorandum and Order, plaintiffs' request is granted in part. Plaintiffs are granted permission to move for default judgments on liability against the defaulting defendants, without the need for a pre-motion conference. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann on 6/28/2012. (Maynard, Pat)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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JEOVANNY GARCIA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
-against-

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
11-CV-6184 (RRM)

AKR CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
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ROANNE L. MANN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
Currently pending before this Court, on a referral from the Honorable Roslynn R.
Mauskopf, is a letter filed on behalf of the three plaintiffs in this Fair Labor Standards Act
case, requesting a pre-motion conference and permission to move for a default judgment
against the two defaulting defendants, Ghulem Mohammad and Palace Fried Chicken
(collectively, “defaulting defendants”). See Letter Motion for Default Judgment [Request for
Premotion Conference] (“Pl. Letter”) (June 25, 2012), ECF Docket Entry (“DE”) #23; see
also Referral Order (June 25, 2012). In that letter, plaintiffs ask that they be permitted to
proceed against the defaulting defendants “rather than requiring the plaintiffs to wait until after
a trial against the non-defaulting parties.” Pl. Letter at 2. The only reason proffered for this
latter request is that the non-defaulting defendants “deny responsibility and have taken a nopay position,” whereas the defaulting defendants “were, without question, plaintiffs’
employers.” Id.
Plaintiffs’ request is granted in part. Plaintiffs are granted permission to move for

default judgments on liability against the defaulting defendants, without the need for a premotion conference. However, assuming that plaintiffs secure default judgments on liability
against the defaulting defendants, this Court will defer the inquest on damages until plaintiffs’
claims against the answering defendants are resolved. As this Court explained in an analogous
case:
As a general rule, where, as here, an action against several defendants
charges them with joint and several liability and where fewer than all
defendants are in default, the preferred practice is to defer the damages
inquest until after disposition of the claims against the non-defaulting
defendants. See, e.g., Miele v. Greyling, No. 94 Civ. 3674 (WK)(AJP),
1995 WL217554, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 1995); accord Meltzer v.
Bullard, No. 95 Civ. 4502 (KMW)(AJP), 1995 WL 580201, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1995). Deferring the inquest on damages will “avoid
possible inconsistent judgments and [best serve] judicial economy . . . .”
Miele, 1995 WL 217554, at *4.
Clement v. United Homes, LLC, 10-CV-2122 (RRM)(RLM), 2010 WL 4941489, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010); accord, F.D.I.C. v. Hodge, No. 09-CV-3234 (CBA)(JO), 2012
WL 1004788, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2012).
Plaintiffs offer no persuasive reason for deviating from the preferred practice in this
case. Notably, plaintiffs and the non-defaulting defendants are scheduled to complete
discovery in a month, and to file their joint pretrial order by the middle of August. See Minute
Entry (June 13, 2012), DE #19. Accordingly, the case against the answering defendants will
be trial ready in less than two months, and deferring the inquest on damages will not result in
undue delay.
Any objections to this Memorandum and Order must be filed with the Honorable

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Roslynn R. Mauskopf on or before July 16, 2012. Failure to file objections in a timely
manner may waive a right to appeal this order and the resulting District Court order.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

Brooklyn, New York
June 28, 2012

Roanne L. Mann

/s/
ROANNE L. MANN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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