Durant v. New York City Housing Authority et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, granting pltff's 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons discussed below, pltff's claims against Walter McKinley Crowe and Gerald Sternberg are dismissed. Pltff's remaining claims shal l proceed. No summons shall issue as to these defts. The US Marshal Service is directed to serve the summons, complaint, and this Order upon the remaining defts without prepayment of fees. A courtesy copy of the same papers shall be mailed to Corp. Counsel for the City of NY. All pretrial matter are referred to USMJ Azrack pursuant to 28 USC sec. 636(b)(1)(A). (Ordered by Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis on 3/15/2012) c/m (Galeano, Sonia)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRJCT OF NEW YORK

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JUANITA DURANT,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
12-CV-00937 (NGG) (JMA)

-againstNEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORJTY;
MARY MOHAN; YOLANDA RJVERA;
GABEL US MONES TIME; TYREE HAS LIP;
Attorney GERALD STERNBERG; Trial Officer
WALTER MCKINLEY CROWE,
Defendants.

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NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Juanita Durant brings this action pro se pursuant to, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title
VII"). Plaintifrs request to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is granted.
For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff's claims against Walter McKinley Crowe and Gerald
Sternberg are dismissed. Plaintifrs remaining chUms shall proceed.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that from Augost 18,2003 to November 10,2011, she was employed by
defendant New York City Housing Authority in the job title of Caretaker J. (Compl. (Docket
Entty # I)~ 6.) On June 8, 2011, a disciplinary hearing was conducted before the New York City
Housing Authority, Employee Disciplinary Division. (Compl., 21.) Attorney Gerald Sternberg
represented the agency at the hearing and Trial Officer Walter McKinley Crowe presided.

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(Compl. 1 26; ~also Hr'g Tr. (Ex. 2) at 84: 15-19.) Plaintiff alleges two Defendants testified
falsely against her at the hearing. (Compl. ,, 23-25, 28, 30.) Plaintiff was represented by counsel
at the hearing. (Hr'g Tr. At 84: 17-18.) Plaintiff alleges that "Trial Officer Walter McKinley
Crowe and Attorney Gerald Sternberg allowed witness Gabel us Monestime to proceed after he
stated ... he did not recall anything."

ili!. 11 26.) Plaintiff states that she "was terminated from her

employment on November 10, 2011, (d]ue to retaliation, hostile work environment, disparate
treatment." (Id.1j34.) Plaintiff seeks "injunctive orders, damages, costs and attorney's fees." QQ..
Wherefore Clause.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
At the pleadings stage of a case, the court assumes the truth of"all well-pleaded,
nonconclusory factual allegations" in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621
F.3d Ill, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v.lqba!, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009)). A
complaint must plead sufficient facts to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell
At!. Com. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Moreover. it is axiomatic that pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and the court is required to read the plaintiffs pro se complaint
liberally and interpret it as raising the strongest arguments it suggests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89,94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Sealed Plaintiffv. Sealed Defendant
#I, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d Cir. 2008).
However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss an in forma
pauperis action where it is satisfied that the action is "(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief."

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DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs claims against Trial Officer Crowe must be dismissed because judges have
absolute immunity from suits for damages arising out of judicial acts performed in their judicial
capacities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, II (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (I 988).
Absolute judicial immunity extends to officers such as administrative law judges and hearing
officers. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,514 (1978)("(P]ersons subject to [restraints designed
to guarantee the independence of hearing examiners] and performing adjudicatory functions
within a federal agency are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial
acts.") The absolute judicial immunity of the court and its members "is not overcome by
allegations of bad faith or malice," nor can a judicial officer "be deprived of immunity because the
action he took was in error or was in excess of his authority." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 13
(quotations and citations omitted). The exceptions to judicial immunity are "nonjudicial actions,
i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity" and "actions, though judicial in nature,
taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Id. at 11-12 (citations removed).
This absolute judicial immunity has been further applied to non-federal administrative
hearing officers, such as Crowe. See O'Connor v. NYC Housing Auth., No. 08-CV-3623 (CBA)
(LB), 2010 WL 1741369, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2010) (New York City Housing Authority
hearing officer is entitled to absolute immunity under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity
because proceedings were adversarial in nature); B.D.S. v. Southhold Union Free Sch. Dist., No.
08-CV-1319 (SJF) (WDW), 2009 WL 1875942, at *29 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 2009) (state
department of education hearing officer is entitled to absolute immunity); Bloom v. NYS Comm'n
of Health, 573 F.Supp.2d 732, 739 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (administrative law judge presiding over

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professional medica] conduct bureau is entitled to absolute immunity); Gyadu v. Workers'
Compensation Comm'n, 930 F.Supp. 738, 748 (D.Conn. 1996) (Workers' Compensation
Commissioner entitled to absolute immunity).
Here, Plaintitrs allegations against Crowe concern his official actions in ruling on witness
testimony and in issuing an official decision. These are clearly judicial acts that are protected by
absolute immunity. Plaintiff has not alleged that Crowe took nonjudicial actions or that he acted
in the absence of jurisdiction. (See Compl.

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26.)

Moreover, "[a]s with administrative law judges, the common law precedents also extend
absolute immunity to prosecutors participating in the administrative process." Bloom, 573
F.Supp.2d at 740 (citations omitted). See also Butz, 438 U.S. at 516 ("We can see no substantial
difference between the function of the agency attorney in presenting evidence in an agency
hearing and the function of the prosecutor who brings evidence before the court."). Thus,
Sternberg, who prosecuted the agency's disciplinary case against Plaintiff, is also immune from
Plaintitr s claims.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. Plaintiff's claims against
Walter McKinley Crowe and Gerald Sternberg are dismissed pursuant to 28 U .S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). No summons shall issue as to these defendants. Plaintiff's remaining claims
shall proceed.
The United States Marshal Service is directed to serve the summonses, complaint, and this

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Order upon the remaining defendants without prepayment of fees. A courtesy copy of the same
papers shall be mailed to the Corporation Counsel for the City of New York. All pretrial matters
are referred to Magistrate Judge Azrack pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b}(l)(A).

SO ORDERED.

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
March

IS. 2012

United States District Judge

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