Corrado v. New York State Unified Court System

Filing 110

ORDER denying #106 Motion for Reconsideration. Ordered by Magistrate Judge Marilyn D. Go on 1/26/2015. (Proujansky, Josh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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NICOLE CORRADO,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
12-cv-1748(DLI)(MDG)
- against NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, et
al.,
Defendants.
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Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of this Court's January
13, 2015 order granting the newly added individual defendants an
extension of time to answer the amended complaint.

See ct. doc.

106.
DISCUSSION
Local Civil Rule 6.3 provides that within 14 days of the
entry of an order a party may move for reconsideration identifying
"the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the
Court has overlooked."

Local Civil Rule 6.3.

The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is
"strict."
1995).

Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.

"[R]econsideration will generally be denied unless the

moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the
court overlooked –- matters, in other words, that might reasonably
be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court."

Id.

"[A] motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving
party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided."

Id.;

see In re Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., 2011 WL 4063685, *1-*2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2011); Dira Realty, LLC/CMP Improvements,
Inc. v. Local 1031, 2010 WL 5449851, *2-*3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28,
2010).
Plaintiff requests that the Court reconsider the extension
to the extent that the Court relied on the existence of section
1981 or 1983 claims which had been dropped in the amended
complaint and no longer give rise to an obligation by the Office
of the Attorney General to make a determination regarding
representation under N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 17.

Although plaintiff

is correct that the Court erred in referring only to one clause
of Section 17 regarding representation of individual defendants
sued under section 1983, the other provisions broadly cover the
remaining claims here; section 17 provides for the defense of an
employee of the State in any action "arising out of any alleged
act or omission which occurred or is alleged in the complaint to
have occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of
his public employment or duties" regardless of whether the claims
against the employee are brought under section 1983.
Off. Law § 17(2)(a).

See Pub.

The concerns expressed by the Second

Circuit in Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006),
that a governmental entity make a considered determination as to
representation of individual officers and employees still remain.
Thus, the absence of a section 1983 claim against the individual
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defendants does not "alter the conclusion reached by the Court."
Moreover, that certain of the defendants may not have yet
requested representation from the Attorney General's Office does
not bar the State from offering those employees representation.
Plaintiff also complains about the Court's statement that
plaintiff has "contributed to considerable delay, including
failing to provide her initial disclosures until more than two
years after commencement of this action."

See ct. doc. 105 at 3.

Plaintiff states that the Court "granted plaintiff approximately
three short extensions of 5-10 days to serve automatic
disclosures."

See ct. doc. 106 at 1.

Plaintiff's

characterization is belied by the record.

In fact, as plaintiff

acknowledges, this Court first ordered initial disclosures to be
served by October 25, 2012.

At a conference held on December 14,

2012, the Court noted that plaintiff "failed to serve automatic
disclosures as ordered" and extended her time to do so to January
4, 2013.

See minute entry dated 12/14/12.

was granted four further extensions.

Plaintiff sought and

See electronic order dated

12/21/12 (extension to 2/25/13); minute entry dated 2/8/13
(extension to 3/1/13); electronic order dated 3/6/13 (extension
nunc pro tunc to 3/13/13); electronic order dated 3/14/13
(extension nunc pro tunc to 3/29/13).

On March 28, 2013,

plaintiff sought a stay of the proceedings so that she could
obtain new counsel, which was granted up to May 15, 2013.
ct. docs. 31, 34.

See

On May 23, 2013, plaintiff filed a letter

stating that she served initial disclosures on May 20, 2013 and
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asking that the Court excuse the late disclosure.
39.

See ct. doc.

The Court reluctantly granted the request "[w]ithout

excusing the lateness of plaintiff's disclosures" and in the
interest of proceeding on the merits."

See electronic order

dated 6/4/13.
Given the Court's indulgence to plaintiff in the interest of
resolving this case on the merits, plaintiff's vigorousness in
opposing an extension here is unreasonable.

However, this case

is expected to proceed expeditiously after appearance of the
newly named defendants.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

January 26, 2015
Brooklyn, New York
/s/______________________________
MARILYN D. GO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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