Dauphin v. Crownbrook ACC LLC

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, Docket # 36 is hereby ordered unsealed in its entiretly. Ordered by Judge Allyne R. Ross on 4/10/2013. (Greene, Donna)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

---------------------------------------------------------------------

x
12-CV-2100 (ARR)(SMG)

RICHARD W. DAUPHIN,

NOT FOR ELECTRONIC
OR PRINT PUBLICAnON

Plaintiff,
-against-

MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER

CROWNBROOK ACC LLC,

FILED

Defendant.
------------------------------------------------------ ---------~-----

us

x

ROSS, United States District Judge:

*

IN CLERK'S OFFICE
DISTRICT COURT E.D.N.Y.

APR 1 2 2013

*

BROOKLYN OFFICE

In response to plaintiff Richard W. Dauphin's motion for partial summary judgment,
defendant Crownbrook ACC LLC sought permission to submit supplemental opposition papers
under seal. See Dkt. #34. Chief Magistrate Judge Steven M. Gold permitted filing under seal,
but "with the understanding that the Court may order unsealing to the extent the submission
forms the basis for a judicial ruling." Dkt. #35. In a related memorandum and order issued
today, I granted plaintiffs motion (I assume familiarity with the facts recounted in that
memorandum and order). Because I rely in part on defendant's supplemental opposition in that
decision, I hereby order the supplemental opposition papers unsealed.
"The common law right of public access to judicial documents is firmly rooted in our
nation's history." Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006). The
Second Circuit has instructed that before any such common law right can attach, a court must
conclude that the documents at issue are indeed "judicial documents." Id. "[T]he mere filing of
a paper or document with the court is insufficient to render that paper a judicial document subject

to the right of public access." United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Amodeo I"). Rather, "[i]n order t.o p~ design~ted a judicial document, 'the item filed must be
relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process. ", Lugosch,
435 F.3d at 119 (quoting Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145).
"Once the court has determined that the documents are judicial document.s and that
therefore a common law presumption of access :attaches, it must determine the weight of that
presumption." Id.
[T]he weight to be given the presumption of access must be governed by the role
of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the
resultant value of such informat.ion to those monitoring the federal courts.
Generally, the information will fall somewhere on a continuum from matters that
directly affect an adjudication to matters that come within a court's purview solely
to insure their irrelevance.
United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044,

1049(~d

Cir. 1995) ("Amodeo II").

Finally, the court must "balance competing considerations" against the presumption of
access. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit has
identified the "privacy interest of the person resisting disclosure" as one such consideration.
Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1050. In determining the weight to be accorded to an assertion ofa right
of privacy, a court must consider (1) the degree to which the subject matter is traditionally
considered private rather than public; and (2) the nature and degree of injury. Id. at 1051.
Here, defendant put forward the affidavit and financial statements to est.ablish an
affirmative defense of insolvency under New York Business Corporation Law § 513 and
analogous provisions of the Limited Liabilit.y Company Law. Defendant filed these materials
-I

specifically in connection with a request for this court to deny plaintiff s motion for partial

2

summary judgment. Cf. id. (holding report "not filed in connection with a request for action by
the district court" was not a judicial document). I have therefore considered them in adjudicating
plaintiff s motion. Accordingly, they are "relevant to the performance of the judicial function
and useful in the judicial process," Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted),
and are consequently judicial documents.
Further, as judicial documents, the presumption of access to the affidavit and financial
\'

statements should be given substantial weight since they are dispositive of the court's
adjudication of the affirmative defense of insolvency. See Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377
F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2004) (presumptive right to public access "is at its apogee when asserted
with respect to documents relating to matters that directly affect an adjudication") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Finally, I have considered defendant's countervailing assertion of a right to privacy, and
have found that it does not overcome the presumption of public access. Although "[ fJinancial
records of a wholly owned business ... will weigh more heavily against access than conduct
affecting a substantial portion of the public," Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051, I find no potential for
significant injury to defendant's privacy from unseaiing the financial documents. Defendant has
already stated in several unsealed filings that it is either insolvent or would be rendered insolvent
if compelled to make the payments set forth in the complaint. See Dkt. #6 ~ 26; Dkt. #13

~

26;

Dkt #17, at 2; Dkt #29, at 10-12. Defendant has made no particularlized showing of injury other
than to state generally that the financial statements are "confidential" and "contain competitionsensitive information." Dkt. #39, at 2. These generalized statements are insufficient to
overcome the presumption of public access, meant to ensure "democratic control" over the
3

judiciary. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119 (quoting Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1048) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, Dkt. #36 is hereby ordered unsealed in its entirety.

SO ORDERED.

s/Allyne R. Ross
ss
Allyne R.
United States Distric
Dated: April 10,2013
Brooklyn, New York

4

udge