Mei v. Astrue
Filing
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER: The Commissioners motion 13 for judgment on the pleadings is granted, the final decision to deny benefits under the Act is affirmed, and Meis complaint is dismissed. Ordered by Judge Frederic Block on 7/12/2013. (Innelli, Michael)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------------x MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
QUI LI MEI,
12-CV-2545 (FB)
Plaintiff,
-againstMICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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Appearances:
For the Plaintiff:
MAX D. LEIFER, ESQ.
214 Sullivan Street, Suite 3-C
New York, NY 10012
For the Defendant:
LORETTA E. LYNCH, ESQ.
United States Attorney
CANDACE SCOTT APPLETON, ESQ.
Assistant United States Attorney
Eastern District of New York
271 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, NY 11201
BLOCK, Senior District Judge:
Plaintiff Qui Li Mei seeks review of the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability benefits under the
Social Security Act (the “Act”). Both parties move for judgment on the pleadings. For the
reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed; accordingly, the
Commissioner’s motion is granted and Mei’s complaint is dismissed.
I
In March 2009, Mei began experiencing symptoms of anxiety and depression.
These included difficulty sleeping, fatigue, delayed physical reactions, feelings of
worthlessness and guilt, poor concentration, and thoughts of death. At the time she was
employed as a clothing sample maker.1 Because of these problems Mei discontinued working
on September 13, 2009, and on August 28, 2011, she filed an application for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”). The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied her claim. Upon
Mei’s request the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) conducted a hearing, and subsequently
also denied her claim. Following an appeal of the ALJ’s determination, the Appeals Council
denied Mei’s request for review, rendering final the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits.
Mei timely sought judicial review.
II
In applying the familiar five-step process, the ALJ found as to the first four steps
that Mei: (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 13, 2009, the
alleged onset date; (2) had a “severe impairment” in the form of depression; (3) did not suffer
from an impairment meeting the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1; and (4) was unable to perform her past relevant work as a sample maker. AR
14-20. Turning to step five, the ALJ determined that Mei had the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, subject to the following
nonexertional limitations: that the work be limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks in
a job requiring only occasional decision-making and changes in work setting; that it require
only occasional interaction with the public or coworkers; and that it not require a fast-paced
A clothing sample maker, or garment sample stitcher, performs the following
work: “Marks and cuts out material and sews parts of new style garments, following
patterns, sketches, and design specifications, to prepare sample garments . . . . Sews
parts and attaches accessories and ornamentations, using needle and thread or sewing
machine.” U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES, 785.361.018
(1991).
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or high volume production quota. AR 16; see 20 C.F.R. 1520(g) (setting forth the fifth step in
the five-step analysis). Based upon the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded
that considering Mei’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, she was “capable of making
a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national
economy,” and consequently denied her application.2 AR at 21.
III
“In reviewing the final decision of the Commissioner, a district court must
determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence
supports the decision.” Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2004); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). “[S]ubstantial evidence . . . means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Selian v. Astrue, 2013 WL 627702, at *6 (2d Cir. Feb.
21, 2013). In determining whether the agency’s findings were supported by substantial
evidence, “the reviewing court is required to examine the entire record, including
contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn.”
Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1983).
In challenging the Commissioner’s determination upholding the ALJ’s decision
denying her application for disability benefits, Mei claims error at steps three, four and five.
As explained below, each of her claims are without merit.
The burden of proof is on the claimant in the first four steps, after which it shifts
to the Commissioner at the fifth step. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(2), 416.920(b)-(g).
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Step Three: Listed Impairment under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d)
Mei argues that the ALJ erred at step three because he should have found that
she was disabled since her depression met or medically equaled listed impairment 12.04,
“Affective disorders.”3 Mei claims that she satisfied the necessary requirements for this listed
impairment.
The ALJ’s determination that Mei’s depression did not meet or medically equal
listed impairment 12.04 was a “reasonable interpretation of the medical evidence in the
record.” Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1999). In order to meet or medically equal
listed impairment 12.04, and thus “conclusively [be] presumed to be disabled and entitled to
benefits,” an individual must demonstrate that her impairment meets the “required level of
severity.” See Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019, 1022 (2d Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Listed impairment 12.04 requires that an individual’s mental impairment
result in at least two of the following: “Marked restriction of activities of daily living;
[m]arked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; [m]arked difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, or pace; [r]epeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended
duration.” See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.04.
The record does not support the conclusion that Mei’s depression met the
“required level of severity.” Dr. Maddux performed a psychological consultative examination
and found that Mei was only “mildly impaired” in attention, concentration, and memory
Step three requires an ALJ to consider whether a claimant has an impairment
meeting the criteria of a listed impairment found in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. If the ALJ makes such a determination, the Commissioner “will find [the
claimant] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d).
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skills. AR 171. He noted that Mei reported “decreased socialization” but found that this was
limited to “occasional arguments with certain family members,” and overall her family was
“supportive.” AR 172. As to daily living, Dr. Maddux stated that Mei reported being able to
dress, bathe, groom, cook, clean, do laundry, shop, and take public transportation. AR 172.
Similarly, Dr. Apacible, a state psychiatric consultant, found that Mei failed to meet any of the
requisite functional limitations. Upon review of her file, Dr. Apacible concluded that Mei
displayed only “mild” restrictions in daily living, social functioning, concentration,
persistence, and pace; and had “never” experienced any extended episodes of deterioration.
AR 192. Finally, the record contained numerous medical reports stating that since the alleged
onset date, Mei’s depression had not required inpatient hospitalization, emergency room
treatment, or intensive outpatient therapy. AR 170 (Report of Dr. Maddux); 177 (Report of
treating physician Dr. Congzhen Ou); 198 (Report of Dr. Apacible); see also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 12.00(C)(4) (“Episodes of decompensation may be inferred
from . . . documentation of the need for a more structured psychological support system (e.g.,
hospitalizations, placement in a halfway house, or a highly structured and directing
household) . . . .”).
The ALJ’s decision demonstrates that in making the step three determination,
he thoroughly reviewed and considered all of the medical evidence. Accordingly, there is no
reason to disturb this conclusion.
Step Four: The RFC Determination
Mei argues that the ALJ erred in making his step four RFC determination
because he did not properly consider a number of medical opinions. She also contends that
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the ALJ should have afforded her testimony “substantial credibility,” and considered her
husband’s testimony.
1.
Medical Opinions
Mei takes issue with the ALJ’s consideration of medical opinions offered by Dr.
Congzhen Ou, Dr. Apacible, Dr. Maddux, and Dr. Kropsky.
a.
Dr. Congzhen Ou
Mei claims that the ALJ incorrectly determined that Dr. Ou reported Mei
exhibited a “normal mental state.” This assertion mis-characterizes the record—the ALJ
actually said that Dr. Ou’s “mental status examination” of Mei was “largely normal.” AR 20.
Regardless, the ALJ’s characterization of Dr. Ou’s mental status examination was wellsupported by the record. As Mei’s treating physician, the ALJ accorded Dr. Ou’s opinion
“significant weight,” acknowledging that he had treated her on a weekly basis for more than
three years. AR 20. The ALJ discussed at length Dr. Ou’s findings, including his report that
over the course of their years long treatment relationship, Mei had experienced only four
depressive episodes.4 AR 177. Dr. Ou found that each typically lasted one to two weeks, and
that Zoloft and Abilify, which he prescribed, alleviated Mei’s symptoms without side effects.
AR 177, 250 (noting that Mei had “tolerated [the] medications well”). Dr. Ou reported that
apart from experiencing these infrequent depressive episodes, Mei was not otherwise limited
in her abilities to sleep, communicate, work, interact socially, or perform other activities of
daily living. AR 175-81. And while Mei had once been hospitalized for depression in China
These occurred in February 2009, September 2009, February 2010, and February
2011. AR 177.
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in 1993, in the following 18 years she had not required any additional hospitalization. AR 177.
Finally, as the ALJ recognized, Dr. Ou reported that Mei did not display any suicidal features,
and that her abnormalities were limited to anxiousness and a constricted mood and affect. AR
178.
b.
Dr. Apacible
Mei next asserts that the ALJ erred in giving Dr. Apacible’s opinion “great
weight” without providing sufficient explanation. She contends that Dr. Apacible’s opinion
had “no probative value” because he was not an examining source. Dr. Apacible opined that
Mei retained the ability to perform entry-level unskilled work on a sustained basis. AR 198.
He made this determination after finding that Mei remained able to perform all personal
activities of daily living, was responsive and cooperative, displayed good insight and
judgment, had a coherent and goal directed thought process, and demonstrated fluent, clear,
and expressive speech. AR 198.
The regulations state that “evidence from nonexamining sources” constitutes
medical opinion evidence to be considered in making a disability determination. 20 C.F.R.
404.1527(e). The ALJ’s opinion acknowledged that Dr. Apacible was a nonexamining medical
consultant, and properly determined that Dr. Apacible was nonetheless “deemed an expert
for purposes of disability program rules.” AR 20; see 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(e). As the ALJ
explained, Dr. Apacible’s conclusions were well-supported by other medical evidence.
Indeed, as discussed, treating physician Dr. Ou noted that Mei’s activities of daily living were
impaired only during her infrequent depressive episodes. Moreover, his examinations
revealed that Mei displayed clear, goal-directed speech, thoughts, and perception; and that
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as to attitude, appearance and behavior she was well-groomed and cooperative. AR 178-79.
As noted, Dr. Maddux’s examination was also consistent with Dr. Apacible’s conclusions. AR
172 (finding Mei was able to dress, bathe, groom, cook, clean, do laundry, shop, and take
public transportation). Dr. Maddux determined that Mei was able to follow and understand
simple directions, perform simple tasks independently, maintain attention and concentration,
learn new tasks, make appropriate decisions, deal with stress, and maintain a regular work
schedule. AR 172. Finally, his examination revealed that Mei’s depression did “not appear
to be significant enough to interfere with [her] ability to function on a daily basis.” AR 172.
c.
Dr. Maddux
Mei argues that the ALJ should not have accorded “significant weight” to Dr.
Maddux’s opinion because he was not her treating physician. She also claims that Dr.
Maddux’s opinion was “inherently defective” because he relied upon her husband for
Chinese/English translations during the examination. As noted, Dr. Maddux found that Mei’s
depression did “not appear to be significant enough to interfere with [her] ability to function
on a daily basis.” AR 172. He arrived at this conclusion after determining that Mei remained
able to follow and understand simple directions, perform simple tasks independently,
maintain attention, concentration, and a regular work schedule, learn new tasks, make
appropriate decisions, and deal with stress. AR 172.
While the regulations provide that treating source opinions are accorded more
weight than those of non-treating sources, the ALJ nonetheless correctly determined that Dr.
Maddux’s opinion was entitled to greater weight because he was a “duly qualified examining
source.” See 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(c) (“Generally, we give more weight to the opinion of a source
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who has examined you . . . .”). Furthermore, the ALJ’s decision to give Dr. Maddux’s opinion
significant weight was well-supported by other medical evidence. Consistent with Dr.
Maddux, Dr. Ou concluded that Mei was “well groomed” and “cooperative” in mental status,
attitude, appearance, and behavior; that her speech, thought and perception were “clear and
goal directed”; and that her memory remained intact. AR 178. As previously noted, Dr. Ou
likewise reported that Mei’s activities of daily living, social interaction, understanding,
memory, and concentration were impaired only during her infrequent depressive episodes.
AR 179-80 (finding that these episodes lasted one to two weeks and were successfully treated
with prescription medications having no side effects).
Finally, Mei contends that Dr. Maddux improperly relied on her husband for
translations during the medical examination. Aside from her conclusory statements, Mei does
not provide any support for discrediting Dr. Maddux’s opinion on this basis—that is, she does
not contend that her husband was either incapable or unwilling to provide accurate
translations, or that his translations were flawed. If anything, she stood to benefit from her
husband’s services since he had no incentive to provide inaccurate translations.5
Dr.
Maddux’s report supports this conclusion. While he notes that Mei’s husband provided
interpretations, there is nothing in the report reflecting that this interfered with Dr. Maddux’s
ability to conduct a thorough and accurate medical evaluation. AR 170-73.
d.
Dr. Kropsky
Mei also argues that the ALJ erred by ignoring Dr. Kropsky’s determination that
Interestingly, Mei does not take issue with Dr. Kropsky’s reliance upon her
husband’s interpretations during that doctor’s examination.
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she had “only a ‘fair’ prognosis.” Dr. Kropsky was an internal medicine consultive examiner
who saw Mei to assess whether her depression resulted in physical limitations.
The ALJ’s decision demonstrates that he thoroughly considered the entirety of
Dr. Kropsky’s medical opinion. As the ALJ noted, Dr. Kropsky found that Mei’s symptoms
had improved with psychiatric treatment, and that her episodes of depression were limited
to “every few months.” AR 166. The ALJ recognized that Dr. Kropsky diagnosed Mei with
depression, and that despite her self-proclaimed restrictions in activities of daily living, his
own physical examination revealed that she “has no physical limitation.” AR 168. Finally, the
ALJ noted that Dr. Kropsky’s examination had shown “no abnormalities in terms of general
appearance, gait and station, or her musculoskeletal or neurological systems.” AR 18. Dr.
Kropsky’s opinion thus supported the ALJ’s conclusion that “the objective evidence of
record . . . does not support [Mei’s] allegations of a disabling psychiatric impairment that
causes significant daily symptoms and leaves her unable to accomplish much productive
activity.” AR 18. While the ALJ’s opinion does not explicitly discuss Dr. Kropsky’s “fair”
prognosis, this is not a basis for finding error. See Mongeur, 722 F.2d at 1040 (“Where, as here,
the evidence of record permits [the Court] to glean the rationale of an ALJ’s decision, [the
Court] do[es] not require that he have mentioned every item of testimony presented to him
or have explained why he considered particular evidence unpersuasive or insufficient to lead
him to a conclusion of disability.”).
2.
The ALJ’s Credibility Determination
Mei asserts that the ALJ failed to properly afford her “substantial credibility” in
light of her “successful work history of more than ten years.” The ALJ credited Mei’s “strong
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recent work history, which would ordinarily be a point in her favor.” AR 19. However, he
also noted that Mei had “opted to receive unemployment insurance benefits for over two
years”—benefits that required her “to certify that she was ready, willing and able to work.”
AR 19. The ALJ found that this was “another factor” to be considered, and that the medical
evidence “tend[ed] to indicate that the extent of [her] symptoms [we]re not as significant as
she alleged during the hearing.” AR 19.
The regulations provide that a fact-finder “will consider all of the evidence
presented, including information about [an applicant’s] prior work record.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.929(c)(3). Although “[a] claimant with a good work record is entitled to substantial
credibility when claiming an inability to work . . . [w]ork history [ ] is but one of many factors
to be utilized by the ALJ in determining credibility.” Marine v. Barnhart, 2003 WL 22434094,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003). Thus, while “a plaintiff with a long work history is entitled to
‘substantial credibility,’ the Commissioner may discount a plaintiff’s testimony to the extent
that it is inconsistent with medical evidence [in the record] . . . .” Carvey v. Astrue, 2009 WL
3199215, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009).
Review of the record supports the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff’s claims
about her symptoms and limitations were not fully credible. The ALJ first found that despite
Mei’s assertions to the contrary, the medical evidence did not “reveal a significant duration
or persistence of her [depression].” AR 17. As Dr. Ou reported, he had been Mei’s treating
physician for close to three years, yet during that time she had experienced only four
depressive episodes, each lasting one to two weeks, and which were successfully treatable
with prescription medications. AR 177. Dr. Kropsky similarly found that while Mei
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experienced periods of depression, these were limited in frequency to “every few months.”
AR 166.
The ALJ also correctly concluded that Mei’s statements about the side effects of
her prescription medications were inconsistent with the record medical evidence. While she
testified that the medications used to treat her depression “messed [her] up,” AR 19, 39, Dr.
Ou repeatedly found that there were “no side effects reported” in conjunction with her use of
Zoloft and Abilify. AR 177, 250. Furthermore, although Mei also testified to experiencing
hallucinations and thoughts of suicide, Dr. Ou stated that she never reported this to him. AR
178, 250. Dr. Maddux similarly noted that Mei had “denied” having thoughts of suicide, AR
170, and Dr. Apacible found “no evidence of hallucinations, delusions, or paranoia.” AR 198.
Lastly, the ALJ noted discrepancies in the record and Mei’s testimony concerning
her ability to perform daily activities. During the hearing, Mei testified that she “generally []
stays home, [and] doesn’t go out,” and that she also experienced limitations in her abilities to
bathe, dress, and use the bathroom. AR 33. However, once again, Dr. Kropsky’s examination
revealed “no physical limitation[s],” AR 168, and Dr. Maddux reported Mei was able to
“dress, bathe, groom, cook, clean, do laundry, shop, and take public transportation.” AR 172.
Finally, Dr. Apacible likewise concluded that the record demonstrated Mei’s retention of “the
ability to perform all personal [activities of daily living] [including] cook, clean, [] do
laundry . . . shop and travel independently using public transportation.” AR 198.
3.
Mei’s Husband’s Testimony
Finally, Mei asserts that the ALJ ignored her husband’s testimony and found
that it was “exaggerated” and “inaccurate.” However, it is evident from the ALJ’s opinion
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that he thoroughly considered her husband’s testimony. His decision discusses Mr. Mei’s
testimony that his wife “used to love her work,” but that her depression caused her to
“experience[] emotions . . . and difficulty doing chores like taking care of her children or
herself.” AR 17. While the ALJ concluded that Mr. Mei’s testimony could “not be given full
credit to establish the presence of a disabling impairment,” AR 20, this decision was wellsupported. The ALJ explained that although he found Mr. Mei’s testimony “sincere,” it was
not sufficient to outweigh contrary evidence. Mr. Mei testified that Mei was unable to “do
anything else . . . like tak[e] care of the kids,” and that she had to be fed and “force[d] to go to
the bathroom.” AR 41. However, these statements were inconsistent with the reports of Drs.
Kropsky, Maddux, and Apacible, who collectively found that she exhibited “no physical
limitation[s],” AR 168, that she was able to “dress, bathe, groom, cook, clean, do laundry,
shop, and take public transportation,” AR 172, 198, and that she retained “the ability to
perform all personal [activities of daily living] [including] cook, clean, [] do laundry . . . shop
and travel independently using public transportation.” AR 198.
The ALJ’s step four RFC determination, therefore, was supported by careful
consideration of the full administrative record. See SSR 85–15 (“The reaction to the demands
of work (stress) is highly individualized . . . impairment-related limitations created by an
individual’s response to demands of work . . . must be reflected in the RFC assessment.”).
Accordingly, his conclusion that Mei is capable of working in low-stress environments was
based upon substantial evidence. See Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1551, 1553 (2d Cir.
1983) (an ALJ determination was supported by substantial evidence where the decision
contained “a complete and detailed recitation of the medical records and reports”).
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Step Five: The Vocational Expert’s Testimony
Finally, the Commissioner satisfied his step five burden by demonstrating that
Mei was able to perform other work available in the national economy. In so concluding, the
ALJ relied upon the testimony of vocational expert Christina Boardman. During the hearing,
the ALJ questioned Ms. Boardman about the work prospects of a hypothetical individual “of
the same age, education, and work experience as the claimant,” whose work “should be
limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, and a low-stress job . . . define[d] as having
only occasional decision-making and only occasional changes in the work setting, and only
occasional interaction with the public.” AR 42-43. The expert opined that “past work [would
be] eliminated,” yet stated that there were “other jobs in the regional or national economy”
that an individual with these limitations could perform. AR 43. Ms. Boardman testified that
this individual could work as a retail trade marker, linen room attendant, or a silver wrapper.6
She also testified that her conclusions would not change if the individual was precluded from
work that was “fast-paced” and “high-volume product,” and that was limited to having
occasional interactions with coworkers. AR 44. On this basis, the ALJ concluded that Mei was
“not disabled” within the meaning of the Act. AR 21.
The expert relied upon the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational
Titles, and further testified to the following estimated employment figures: retail trade
marker (63,730 jobs in the region, 1,795,970 nationally) (DOT 209.587-034), linen room
attendant (63,730 jobs in the region, 1,795,970 nationally) (DOT 222.387-030), silver
wrapper (18,510 jobs in the region, 505,950 nationally) (DOT 318.687-018). Ms.
Boardman explained that a linen room attendant stores linens and keeps inventory of
towels “in establishments such as hotels, hospitals, and clinics.” AR 43. A retail trade
marker “[m]arks and attaches price tickets to articles of merchandise to record price and
identifying information,” and a silver wrapper “[s]preads silverware on absorbent cloth
to remove moisture.” U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES,
209.587-034, 318.687-018 (1991).
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Mei argues that the ALJ should have accepted as determinative Ms. Bordman’s
opinion that an individual who “couldn’t sustain sufficient concentration or persistence or
pace to do even simple, routine, and repetitive tasks on a regular and continuing basis,” would
be precluded from work. “It is standard practice for the Commissioner to use vocational
expert testimony to satisfy his burden of showing that there exist jobs that the claimant is
capable of performing, and the ALJ may rely on the testimony of such an expert, including
responses to hypotheticals.” Matta v. Astrue, 2011 WL 4975841, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2011);
see also Butts, 388 F.3d at 384 (2d Cir. 2004) (same). Mei erroneously seeks to rely upon Ms.
Bordman’s response to an irrelevant hypothetical—that is, a hypothetical individual having
limitations not exhibited by Mei. Thus, the ALJ’s decision not to credit this portion of Ms.
Bordman’s testimony was justified. See Mongeur, 722 F. 2d at 1040. (“Where, as here, the
evidence of record permits [the Court] to glean the rationale of an ALJ’s decision, [the Court]
do[es] not require that he have mentioned every item of testimony presented to him or have
explained why he considered particular evidence unpersuasive or insufficient to lead him to
a conclusion of disability.”).
The ALJ properly based his disability determination on a thorough analysis of
Mei’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. The ALJ considered substantial evidence in
reaching his conclusion that Mei was “not disabled,” including numerous medical records
pertaining to Mei’s symptoms, their frequency, duration, and ability to be remedied with
medication, as well as the corresponding limitations she experienced as a result. After
performing a thorough RFC assessment, he noted that Mei was “34 years old, which is defined
as a younger individual [], on the alleged disability onset date . . . has at least a high school
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education,” and had past relevant work as a clothing sample maker. AR 20. Thus, “the ALJ
based its decision on the substantial evidence,” and there is no reason to disturb the disability
determination. Lazore v. Astrue, 443 F. App’x 650, 653 (2d Cir. 2011) (affirming the district
court’s judgment denying benefits, where the ALJ considered the claimant’s “relative youth
and his past work experiences” in concluding that he was “not materially restricted in
engaging in ‘the full range of unskilled, light work’.”).
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings is granted, the final decision to deny benefits under the Act is affirmed, and Mei’s
complaint is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
_/s/ Frederic Block_______________
FREDERIC BLOCK
Senior United States District Judge
Brooklyn, New York
July 11, 2013
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