Coleman v. Hynes et al

Filing 5

ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis: Coleman's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted solely for the purpose of the attached Order. For the reasons stated in the attached Order, the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). A copy of this Order will be mailed to Coleman. Ordered by Judge John Gleeson on 6/8/2012. (Sheketoff, Julia)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DAWSON COLEMAN,
Plaintiff,
- versus CHARLES J. HYNES, JOSEPH E. GUBBAY,
and EMILY WILLIAMS,

ORDER
12-CV-2599

Defendants.

JOHN GLEESON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Dawson Coleman, currently incarcerated at the Brooklyn Detention
Complex, brings this pro se action for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Coleman seeks
permission to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), which I grant solely for the purpose of this
Order. For the reasons discussed below, I dismiss the Complaint.
BACKGROUND
On March 29, 2012, Coleman was arraigned in the Supreme Court of the State of
New York, Kings County, on the charge of Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor
Vehicle in the First Degree, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. § 511.3. Compl. at 5. Coleman alleges that the
judge presiding over his arraignment proceedings, Judge Joseph E. Gubbay, unconstitutionally
“impos[ed] unwarranted counsel upon [Coleman] . . . and . . . excessive bail in the amount of
$15,000.” Id. Coleman further alleges that the attorney that Gubbay appointed for him, Emily
Williams, was “complicit” in Gubbay’s impermissible conduct by refusing to decline assignment
of his case, and that Williams refused to conduct the case as Coleman desired and intentionally
caused him to be remanded. Compl. at 6. Coleman also contends that the Kings County District

Attorney, Charles Hynes, prosecuted Coleman without justification and knew or should have
known that he would be unable to afford the bail set by Gubbay. Compl. at 5, 7. 1
DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review
In reviewing the Complaint, I am mindful that Coleman is proceeding pro se and

that his pleadings should be liberally construed and held “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (quotation marks omitted);
accord Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.
2009). Nevertheless, I must screen “a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks
redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” and
thereafter “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,” if it is “frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §1915A. See generally
Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). Similarly, I am required to dismiss sua
sponte an IFP action if I determine it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
B.

Analysis
Coleman’s claims against Gubbay and Hynes are claims for acts performed in

their judicial and prosecutorial functions, respectively. As such, they are squarely barred by the
doctrine of absolute immunity, Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976), and I dismiss them. With respect to Coleman’s claim against Williams, a

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Although Coleman broadly alleges that the actions of Gubbay, Williams, and Hynes violated his
First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Compl. at 1, he does not clearly articulate which actions violated
which rights. Because the Complaint must be dismissed regardless of the source(s) of the right(s) that Coleman
seeks to vindicate through each claim, I do not here consider the various possibilities.

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§ 1983 action is properly brought only against a person acting under color of state law. 42
U.S.C. § 1983; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). Public defenders,
like Williams, do not act under color of state law when “performing a lawyer’s traditional
functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
312, 325 (1981); accord Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, I
dismiss the claims against Williams as well.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Complaint is dismissed in its entirety pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for purpose of
an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

So ordered.

John Gleeson, U.S.D.J.
Dated: June 8, 2012
Brooklyn, New York

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