Faltine v. City of New York et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. The second proposed amended complaint would fail to state a claim against Menendez under either § 1983 or parallel New York tort law. Accordingly, plaintiff's request for leave to amend his complaint is denied on grounds of futility. See Faster v. Humane Society of Rochester and Monroe County, Inc., 724 F.Supp.2d 382, 397 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). It is, of course, without prejudice to the assertion of any other state law claims he may have against Menendez and/or the City of New York in a state court of appropriate jurisdiction. Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 3/19/2013. (Siegfried, Evan)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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KIAMA FALTINE,
Plaintiff,
-against-

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
12-cv-03487 (ENV) (SMG)

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, POLICE OFFICER
MIGUEL VARGAS (Shield# 13912; Tal{# 945075),:
SERGEANT ERIC NOLAN (Tal{ #924256) and
POLICE OFFICERS JOHN DOE
1-3,
Defendants.

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VITALIANO, D.J.
On February 20, 2013, plaintiffKiama Faltine requested leave to file an amended
complaint adding Detective Harry Menendez as a defendant in this action. The Court denied
Faltine's request on the grounds of futility, since the proposed amended complaint would fail to
state a claim against Menendez under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Faltine now renews his request and has
submitted a new proposed amended complaint. Although this proposed pleading includes
significantly more detail than the previous proposal, the Court nonetheless finds once again that
the amendments would be futile, and that Faltine's claim against Menendez would fail as a
matter of law. His renewed motion, as a consequence, is denied.
DISCUSSION

The relevant factual allegations in the second proposed amended complaint are as
follows. Faltine contends that in 2008, Menendez issued an identification card, or "I-card,"
naming him as a witness to an assault that had taken place in the building where he lives.

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(Second Prop. Am. Compl. ~~ 25-26). Menendez and other detectives interviewed Faltine several
days after the incident under investigation. (!d.

~~

27-29). Faltine contends that, in spite of the

completion of the interview, Menendez "refused to revoke the I-card," and that he was arrested
on numerous occasions thereafter on account of the I-card. (!d.

~~

30-32). Plaintiff alleges that

his mother contacted Menendez following each incident, and that Menendez promised to have
the I-card removed "from the system," but failed to do so. (!d.

~~

33-36). He further claims that

his mother filed a complaint with the Civilian Complaint Review Board regarding the I-card in
2009, but has heard nothing other than that the complaint was being handled by the New York
Police Department's Internal Affairs Bureau. (!d.

~~

37-40).

With regard to the March 21, 2012 incident, Faltine claims that defendant officers Nolan
and Vargas unlawfully detained him in jail after learning about the existence of the I-card in the
system. (!d.

~~

46-58). He asserts that the officers kept him in jail because departmental protocol

directs arresting officers to treat an I-card as a kind of"hold;" they must notify a detective who
has issued an I-card that they have apprehended the individual in question, or notify some other
available detective if they are unable to contact the original detective. (!d.) Because Detective
Menendez was out of the office that day, and the available officers were unsure of the purpose of
the I-card for Faltine, the officers allegedly detained him until the following morning at 10:30
A.M., when they released him without filing charges. (!d.

~~

44, 46-54). There is no claim or

suggestion that the reason Faltine was arrested had any connection whatsoever with the issuance
of the I-card by Detective Menendez. Instead, Faltine claims that his initial detention was
extended when the arresting officers learned about the I-card after they had already arrested him
and taken him back to the police station.
Faltine's theory is that Detective Menendez "maliciously refused to remove the I-card

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'from the system', despite his knowledge and awareness that the plaintiff was being continually
arrested and detained by other NYPD officers, pursuant to said I-card." (!d. '1[60). Accordingly,
Faltine seeks to assert § 1983 claims against Menendez for having been a proximate cause of his
allegedly unlawful detention.
The Second Circuit has made clear that "[t]o establish a claim for false arrest under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intentionally confined him without his
consent and without justification." Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal
quotations omitted).' Yet, by all accounts, Menendez was away from work on March 21 and 22,
2012 and was not aware of, much less involved in, Faltine's arrest and detention on those dates.
(!d. '1[52 n.3). It is immaterial whether or not Menendez knew Faltine had previously been

arrested and/or detained on account of the I-card; he was not aware of this particular detention,
and therefore could not have "intentionally confined" Faltine---directly or indirectly--on the
dates in question. A remedy, if any, could only lie against those who actually did intentionally
confine him.
Moreover, Faltine has pleaded no facts to support his conclusory assertion that Menendez
"maliciously" failed to remove the I-card "from the system." At most, although not likely, his

claim that Menendez failed to fulfill his promise to Faltine's mother that he would remove the Icard amounts to an allegation of simple negligence. As the Supreme Court has made plain, in any
event, allegations of mere negligence cannot sustain a cause of action under § 1983. See Daniels
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,332 (1986) ("[I]njuries inflicted by governmental negligence are not

The same standard applies under New York law. See, e.g., Middleton v. State, 54 A.D.2d
450,451,389 N.Y.S.2d 159, 160 (3'd Dep't 1976) ("To establish a cause of action for false
imprisonment, a plaintiff must establish that he was intentionally confined by the defendant,
that he was conscious of his confinement and did not consent thereto, and that the
confinement was not otherwise privileged.").
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addressed by the United States Constitution .... "); Koulkina v. City ofNew York, 559 F.Supp.2d
300,333 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Claims sounding in negligence ... do not rise to the level of a
constitutional deprivation ... and, thus, cannot form the predicate of a Section 1983 claim.")
(internal citations omitted). Any claims against Menendez, if included in the complaint, would
thus fail as a matter of law. No other basis for federal jurisdiction is apparent.
CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the second proposed amended complaint would fail to state a claim
against Menendez under either § 1983 or parallel New York tort law. Accordingly, plaintiff's
request for leave to amend his complaint is denied on grounds of futility. See Faster v. Humane
Society of Rochester and Monroe County, Inc., 724 F.Supp.2d 382, 397 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). It is,
of course, without prejudice to the assertion of any other state law claims he may have against
Menendez and/or the City of New York in a state court of appropriate jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

s/ ENV
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ERIC N. VITALIANO == ----United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
March 19,2013

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