Suryadevara v. Unum Group

Filing 35

ORDER denying 25 Motion for Summary Judgment. Ordered by Judge I. Leo Glasser on 3/28/2014. (Parachini, Alexander)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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RAO SURYADEVARA,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

- against -

12 CV 3651 (ILG) (RER)

UNUM GROUP,
Defendant.
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GLASSER, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Rao Suryadevara (“Suryadevara”) brings this action against Unum
Group (“Defendant”) for breach of contract of a disability insurance policy, seeking
money damages and a declaratory judgment. Suryadevara claims that he suffered from
two separate and unrelated periods of disability and, therefore, is entitled to greater
benefits than he is currently receiving under the policy. Currently before the Court is
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion is hereby DENIED.
BACKGROUND
I.

Facts

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed. In 1992, Defendant
issued Suryadevara the disability insurance policy that underlies his claims in this action
(the “Policy”). Compl. [Dkt. No. 1] ¶ 7. Among other things, the Policy provided for an
initial maximum monthly benefit of $4,500 per month for total disability, Begos Decl.
[Dkt. No. 25-2], Ex. D at 60, which increased each year until 1997 according to the
following schedule:

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New Monthly Benefit for Total
Disability
$4,820
$5,160
$5,530
$5,920
$6,340

Update Increase Date
July 1, 1993
July 1, 1994
July 1, 1995
July 1, 1996
July 1, 1997

Id. at 62. The Policy provided that a “[b]enefit increase will apply only to a period of
disability which starts after the effective date of the increase. It must qualify as a
separate period of disability.” Id.
The Policy further provided that “‘period of disability’ means a period of disability
starting while this policy is in force. Successive periods will be deemed to be the same
period unless the later period: 1. is due to a different or unrelated cause, or 2. starts
more than twelve months after the end of the previous period . . . in which event the
later period will be a new or separate period of disability.” Id. at 63.
In 1995, Suryadevara began a cardiology fellowship at Harlem Hospital, where he
remained until 1998. Millman Aff. [Dkt. No. 32], Ex. B at 3. From 1998 through 2001,
he worked as an attending physician in the emergency department at New York
Community Hospital. Id. In 1996, Suryadevara began behaving erratically, which
behavior included following his supervisor, Dr. Eric Vanderbush (“Vanderbush”) out of
the hospital and continuing conversations after they ended. Id. at 4. At some point,
Suryadevara also began experiencing hallucinations and delusions, which in 2000, led
to his filing a lawsuit seeking $1,000,000,000 in damages against Vanderbush,
Paramount Pictures, 20th Century Fox, and James Cameron. Id. at 5. The lawsuit
alleged that they had conspired to steal the plot for a movie he had narrated and had
used it to write the screenplay for “Titanic.” Id. Suryadevara also expressed the belief
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that he had originated the plots of “Gone in 60 Seconds” and “Mission Impossible: 2.”
Id. at 5.
In 2001, Suryadevara joined the cardiology department at the Veterans Affairs
Hospital in Danville, Illinois. Id. at 3. On two occasions in 2002, Suryadevara called the
police as a result of hearing voices he thought were real. Id. at 6. On the second
occasion, on July 1, 2002, the police took Suryadevara to the emergency room, where he
was diagnosed with “acute psychosis.” Begos Decl., Ex. E; id. Ex. D at 103–04. As a
result, Suryadevara was placed on medical leave until September 16, 2002. Millman
Aff., Ex. B at 6; Begos Decl. Ex. D at 182–83. Following his return to work, he continued
to experience performance problems, and ultimately resigned on August 9, 2003.
Millman Aff., Ex. B at 6. On June 25, 2004, the New York Board for Professional
Medical Conduct revoked Suryadevara’s license to practice medicine, on the grounds
that he had practiced while mentally ill. Id. at 17. The determination was upheld on
administrative review on October 20, 2004. Begos Decl., Ex. D at 140.
On December 13, 2004, Suryadevara submitted a claim for disability benefits,
alleging that he became disabled as of August 9, 2003 due to mental illness. Compl. ¶¶
12–13. Defendant approved the claim on December 22, 2004 and began paying
Suryadevara disability benefits in the amount of $6,340 per month, retroactive to
October 15, 2003. Id. ¶ 13. Suryadevara thereafter sought additional disability benefits
dating back to January of 1996. Id. ¶¶ 14–17. Defendant investigated this new claim
and ultimately determined that Suryadevara was residually, or partially, disabled from
January 1996 through April 2002, with the exception of certain months in which his
earnings were too high to qualify for benefits. Id. ¶¶ 18–24; Begos Decl. Ex. D at 186–
87. In addition, Defendant determined that Suryadevara was totally disabled from July
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1, 2002 through September 16, 2002, and from August 10, 2003 through the present.
Compl. ¶¶ 18–24; Begos Decl. Ex. D at 186–87. Because Defendant determined that
Suryadevara became disabled in January of 1996, the maximum monthly benefit due to
Suryadevara pursuant to the benefits schedule in the Policy was $5,530 per month,
rather than the $6,340 per month it had been paying him. Compl. ¶ 18; Begos Decl. Ex.
D at 186–87.
Suryadevara disputed these determinations, and argued that he is entitled to the
higher monthly benefit for his claim from August 9, 2003 through the present. First, he
argued that the mental illness he suffered in August of 2003 was of a different kind than
the illness he had experienced during his prior period of disability from 1996 through
2002. Compl. ¶¶ 25–27. Second, Suryadevara argued that he had neither applied for
disability benefits nor suffered lost pay between July of 2002 and August of 2003, and
therefore he was not disabled for a continuous twelve-month period prior to becoming
totally disabled on August 9, 2003. Id. ¶ 29. Defendant rejected these claims and this
litigation followed.
II.

Procedural History

Suryadevara initiated this action on June 25, 2012 in the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, County of Queens, and defendant removed the case to federal court
on July 23, 2012. Dkt. No. 1. On December 10, 2012, Defendant moved to dismiss the
action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 8.
Defendant’s motion was denied by Memorandum and Order dated April 19, 2013. Dkt.
No. 21. Discovery, including expert discovery, followed.
On December 11, 2013, Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Suryadevara’s treating psychiatrist and expert witness admit that Suryadevara
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experienced psychotic symptoms and suffered from a psychotic disorder during both
purported periods of disability, and accordingly there is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding the existence of a second, distinct period of disability. Dkt. No. 25-4 (“Def.’s
Mem.”). Suryadevara filed his opposition on February 10, 2014. Dkt. No. 31 (“Pl.’s
Opp’n”). Defendant filed its reply on March 4, 2014. Dkt. No. 34 (“Def.’s Reply”).
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. A fact is material if it
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Fincher v. Depository
Trust & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 720 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of any genuine
issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A court
deciding a motion for summary judgment must “construe the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all
reasonable inferences against the movant.” Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d
Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). When the burden of proof at trial would fall on the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of evidence to go
to the trier of fact on an essential element of the non-movant’s claim. Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322–23. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party “must do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986)), and
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cannot “rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” Brown v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).
II. Breach of Contract
As both parties acknowledge, resolving this case ultimately involves a narrow
question. See Def.’s Mem. at 5–6; Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. The parties agree that Suryadevara’s
disability from 1996 through 2002 was caused by Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise
Specified (“NOS”). But they disagree as to the cause of Suryadevara’s disability from
2003 through the present. Defendant asserts, based largely on the testimony of its
expert, Dr. David Lowenthal (“Lowenthal”), that Suryadevara continued to experience
psychotic symptoms after 2003 and therefore continued to suffer from the same
disability. Def.’s Mem. at 8–11. Suryadevara disagrees, pointing to testimony from his
expert, Dr. David Salvage (“Salvage”), that he became disabled due to ObsessiveCompulsive Disorder beginning in 2003. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5–7. In addition, he argues that
the mere existence of psychotic symptoms does not establish that he still suffered from
Psychotic Disorder NOS. Id. at 8–9.
At the outset, it should be noted that “[w]here, as here, there are conflicting
expert reports presented, courts are wary of granting summary judgment.” Harris v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2002). This is unsurprising,
since the court’s task “is carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at
this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential
Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, where
“intelligent adjudication requires more than the use of lay knowledge and the resolution
of a disputed issue hinges in large measure upon conflicting opinions and judgments of
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expert witnesses, summary judgment is not appropriate.” Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610
F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1979).
This is precisely such a case. Whether Suryadevara is entitled to a higher
monthly benefit under the Policy ultimately rests on the diagnosis for the condition that
has caused him to be disabled since 2003. The parties have offered conflicting expert
testimony as to that diagnosis, and indeed Suryadevara’s treating psychiatrist has
offered a third alternative diagnosis. 1 See Begos Decl., Ex. G at 239, 248. It is clear,
then, that adjudicating this case “hinges in large measure”—if not entirely—on resolving
the “conflicting opinions and judgments of expert witnesses.” Accordingly, summary
judgment is inappropriate.
Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Notably, Defendant does
not seek to preclude Salvage’s testimony. Instead, Defendant asserts that Salvage’s
testimony is rife with contradictions and admissions, such that his conclusion—his
diagnosis—creates only a sham issue of fact. It is well established that a party cannot
defeat summary judgment simply by offering expert evidence that contradicts previous
sworn testimony. In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 707 F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 2013).
But a sham issue of fact exists only when “the contradictions in an expert witness’s
testimony are inescapable and unequivocal in nature.” Id. at 194. Salvage’s testimony
does not contain “inescapable and unequivocal” contradictions.
In the first place, some of the supposed contradictions and admissions are taken
out of context. For example, Defendant points to an instance where Salvage appears to
concede that in October of 2003—during the alleged second period of disability—
Suryadevara’s treating psychiatrist offered a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder (“BPD”).
Begos Decl., Ex. G at 239, 248. Unlike Salvage and Lowenthal, she disagrees that Suryadevara suffered
from Psychotic Disorder NOS from 1996 to 2002. She believes instead that Suryadevara suffered from
BPD during both periods of disability, and that his psychotic symptoms were the result of stress. Id.

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Suryadevara continued to suffer from the same psychotic disorder that caused his first
period of disability. Def.’s Mem. at 13 (quoting Begos Decl., Ex. I at 323). But
Defendant omits the fact that Salvage was responding to questions related to a
psychiatric evaluation of Suryadevara performed in October of 2003 that he had not
previously reviewed. Begos Decl., Ex. I at 321. And more importantly, Defendant omits
the fact that, after reviewing that evaluation in more depth, Salvage clarified his earlier
testimony. Id. at 324. He explained that the report was flawed because it was the result
of inadequate examination and attributed certain symptoms to Suryadevara without
justification, and that accordingly he no longer agreed with its conclusions. Id. In light
of this clarification, and construing the evidence in favor of the non-movant, the Court
cannot conclude that Salvage’s earlier statement was an inescapable and unequivocal
contradiction.
Defendant also points to admissions and contradictions in Salvage’s testimony
related to the existence of psychotic symptoms during Suryadevara’s second period of
disability. See Def.’s Mem. at 7–11. Neither Salvage nor Suryadevara’s treating
psychiatrist disputes the existence of these symptoms, but this does not render Salvage’s
conclusion contradictory. As both of these doctors explained, these symptoms, standing
alone, do not establish that Suryadevara continues to suffer from—or, more precisely, to
be disabled by—Psychotic Disorder NOS. Begos Decl., Ex. G at 277; id., Ex. I at 339.
Indeed, Salvage specifically considered those symptoms, but noted that they appeared to
be largely controlled by antipsychotic drugs, and ultimately concluded that Suyardevara
is disabled due to his Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder. Id., Ex. I at 310–11. To the extent
that Defendant asserts that Salvage’s conclusion is not credible, this is simply irrelevant
at the summary judgment stage. Scanner Techs. Corp. v. Icos Vision Sys. Corp., 253 F.
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Supp. 2d 624, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The credibility of competing expert witnesses is a
matter for the jury, and not a matter to be decided on summary judgment.”). The
conflicting conclusions of Suryadevara’s and Defendant’s expert witnesses as to the
cause of Suryadevara’s disability create a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly,
summary judgment is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

Brooklyn, New York
March 28, 2014
/s/
I. Leo Glasser
Senior United States District Judge

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