Goodwine v. National RailRoad Passenger Corporation et al

Filing 221

ORDER denying 218 Motion for Recusal. For the reasons set forth in the attached document, I deny plaintiff Earl Goodwine's motion for my recusal. Ordered by Magistrate Judge James Orenstein on 1/6/2014. (Orenstein, James)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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EARL GOODWINE,
Plaintiff,
- against -

MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
12-CV-3882 (TLM) (JO)

NATIONAL RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
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JAMES ORENSTEIN, Magistrate Judge:
In a letter-motion filed on January 6, 2014, plaintiff Earl Goodwine "Goodwine") seeks my
recusal. Docket Entry ("DE") 218. In his motion papers, consisting of a narrative and some
supporting exhibits, Goodwine does not suggest that I have demonstrated any actual bias, but
instead points to several instances in which he contends I have erred as a matter of fact or law.
However, in a separate document filed on the same date and styled as an objection to an
unspecified report and recommendation I have previously made, Goodwine suggests that I have
been laboring under a conflict of interest because I was appointed by the same United States
President who also appointed the Chief Executive Officer of defendant National Railroad
Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"). See DE 219 at 1. For the reasons explained below, I deny the
motion.
As a threshold matter, I am ruling on Goodwine's motion, even though it inherently calls
into question my impartiality, because the statute governing disqualification explicitly refers to a
judge's obligation to "disqualify himself[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Consistent with that language,
courts uniformly recognize that a motion to disqualify a judge must be directed in the first instance
to the judge whose removal is sought, rather than to any other. See, e.g., In re Certain Underwriter,
294 F.3d 297, 302 (2d Cir. 2002) ("The discretion to consider disqualification rests with the district

judge in the first instance.") (citing In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d
Cir. 1988)); LoCascio v. United States, 473 F.3d 493, 498 (2d Cir. 2007) ("a judge has an
affirmative duty to inquire into the legal sufficiency of ... an affidavit" asserting a basis for his
disqualification”) (internal citations omitted); Alfano v. National Geographic Channel, 2007 WL
2982762, at *7 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2007).
The standard for assessing a motion to recuse is settled, although it can be stated in a
variety of essentially equivalent ways. The fundamental question presented by such a motion is
whether "a reasonable person knowing and understanding all the relevant facts" would doubt my
ability to be fair in this case. LoCascio, 473 F.3d at 496 (quoting United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d
116, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also United States v. Oluwafemi, 883 F. Supp. 885, 890 (E.D.N.Y.
1995) (standard is "whether an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying
facts would entertain significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal") (citing DeLuca
v. Long Island Lighting Co., Inc., 862 F.2d 427, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1988)). Stated differently, the
facts set forth in the papers supporting the motion "'must give fair support to the charge of a bent of
mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment.'" LoCascio, 473 F.3d at 498 (quoting
Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where
that standard is not met, there is no basis for recusal and the judge is therefore "obligated not to
recuse herself." Oluwafemi, 883 F. Supp. at 890 (citing Drexel Burnham Lambert, 861 F.2d at
1312; Wolfson, 396 F.2d at 124); see also United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 775 n.4 (2d Cir.
2007) ("a judge should not disqualify himself in the absence of a violation of § 455") (citing In re
Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 201 (2d Cir.2001)).

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To the extent Goodwine's motion is predicated on his belief that I have erred, perhaps even
egregiously, in any number of pretrial rulings in this case, I must deny the motion. The only
appropriate avenue for relief from any errors I have made is for Goodwine to ask the district judge
to reverse, reject, or modify, as appropriate, any erroneous decision or recommendation I have
made. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Neither my errors (if any) nor the fact that Goodwine has challenged
them is a basis for recusal. See, e.g., Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Omega S.A., 432 F.3d 437,
447-48 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Knowledge gained from the judge's discharge of his judicial function is
not a ground for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).") (citing Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d
270, 283 (2d Cir. 1984)); United States v. Kasman, 1993 WL 278440, *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 1993)
(referring to, and citing "just a few" of, “the countless cases which reiterate the principle that a
motion to recuse under § 455(a) may be made only on the basis of alleged bias or prejudice from an
extrajudicial source").
To the extent Goodwine believes me to be actually or apparently biased because the
President appointed both me and Amtrak's chief executive, his concern is baseless. I was appointed
by the Board of Judges of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
pursuant to the federal statute governing such appointments. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(a),
Administrative Order 2012-10 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9. 2012) (appointment order) (available at
https://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/general-ordes/adminorder2012-10.pdf).
Amtrak's chief executive was apparently appointed by that company's board of directors. See
http://www.amtrak.com/servlet/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=am%2FLayout&cid=125162
3383973. There is thus no reason for an objective, disinterested observer to believe that, as a result
of the process by which I was appointed, I am biased against any party in this case.

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Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, in the absence of any valid reason for me to
disqualify myself, I deny plaintiff Earl Goodwine's motion for my recusal.

SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
January 6, 2014
_
/s/
JAMES ORENSTEIN
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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