Pantoja v. Citigroup Inc. et al

Filing 12

ORDER denying plaintiff's 10 Motion for Reconsideration for the reasons stated in the attached order. Ordered by Judge John Gleeson on 9/26/2013. (Merle, Natasha)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ex rel.
RAFAEL MANUEL PANTOJA,
Plaintiff,
- versus CITIGROUP, INC., CITIBANK, N.A., and
CITIMORTGAGE, INC.,
Defendants.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ORDER
12-CV-4964 (JG)

JOHN GLEESON, United States District Judge:
By Order dated February 5, 2013, I dismissed pro se plaintiff Rafael Manuel
Pantoja’s September 23, 2012 action against Citigroup, Inc. and two of its subsidiaries, filed
ostensibly on behalf of the United States, under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act,
31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq. (“FCA”). Judgment was entered on February 6, 2012. On February 6,
2012, I issued a subsequent Order acknowledging plaintiff’s January 22, 2013 Amended
Complaint and dismissing the Amended Complaint based on the same rationale set forth in my
previous order. On March 19, 2013, Pantoja filed a motion to reconsider the February 5, 2013
Order. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to reconsider the February 5, 2013 Order is
denied.
The standard for granting a motion to reconsider under Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or Local Civil Rule 6.3 of the Local Rules of the United States District
Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York is strict. Reconsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to either controlling decisions or factual
matters that the court overlooked, and which, had they been considered, might have reasonably
altered the result before the court. See Shrader v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257
(2d Cir. 1995).

Pantoja’s March 19, 2013 submission fails to allege any controlling legal
arguments or facts that this Court overlooked. Pantoja argues that the Court erred in its
conclusion that “Pantoja cannot proceed pro se as a relator in a qui tam case.” Dkt. No. 5 at 1.
Pantoja acknowledges that a qui tam suit must be brought on behalf of the United States
Government and that the relator must be represented by counsel where the United States is the
real party in interest. Mot. for Recon. at 4. However, he argues, “the pro se status of the Relator
is only relevant in a qui tam non-intervened case.” Id. (emphasis in original). Pantoja offers
no legal support for this distinction. The FCA specifically holds that “[t]he action shall be
brought in the name of the Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (b)(1). Therefore, the qui tam
relator stands in the shoes of the government; he is not acting on his own behalf. A person “who
is not licensed as an attorney ‘may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause.’”
Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553,
558 (2d Cir. 1998)). The government’s subsequent decision whether or not to intervene in the
FCA action does not change the initial proceeding on its behalf.
I find no error in law or overlooked factual information that would alter my prior
conclusion. Pantoja’s motion for reconsideration is denied. The Court certifies pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith, and
therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
So ordered.
John Gleeson, U.S.D.J.
Dated: September 26, 2013
Brooklyn, New York

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