Mehmeti v. Jofaz Transportation, Inc.

Filing 74

ORDER granting 61 Motion for Summary Judgment Ordered by Judge I. Leo Glasser on 5/22/2015. (Russell, Alexandra)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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SUBI MEHMETI,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
12 Civ. 5880 (ILG) (JO)
- against JOFAZ TRANSPORTATION, INC.,
Defendant.
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GLASSER, Senior United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Subi Mehmeti brings this action against his former employer, Jofaz
Transportation, Inc. (“Jofaz” or Defendant), alleging violations of the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq., the New York State
Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290, et seq. and the New York City Human
Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101, et seq. Before the Court is Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For
the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. In September 2010,
Mehmeti began his employment with Jofaz as a bus driver. Mehmeti Decl. ¶ 2. He was
responsible for transporting students to and from two high schools in Manhattan. Jofaz
Statement of Facts (“Jofaz SOF”) ¶ 1. His morning bus run began at 6:30 and ended by
8:20 a.m. Id. ¶ 4. After his morning bus run, he was required to return the bus to the
Jofaz depot in Brooklyn. Id. ¶ 7; Def. Ex. C at 4. Although personal use of the bus was
unauthorized, he was free to do what he pleased until his afternoon bus run began
between 2:15 and 3 p.m. Jofaz SOF ¶¶ 5-6.

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At 4:30 a.m. on October 3, 2012, Mehmeti awoke with sharp pains in his head.
Id. ¶ 17. He took Advil and Tylenol and went to work. Id.; Mehmeti Dep. at 62:5-11. He
testified that despite the pain, he felt “okay to drive” and was able to operate the bus
normally. Mehmeti Dep. at 74:6-12. After his morning bus run ended, he drove to a gas
station in Brooklyn to refill the bus tank. Jofaz SOF ¶ 18. At around 9:15 a.m., while
still at the gas station, he called his son from his cell phone and told him that he was not
feeling well. Id. He asked his son to meet him at P.S. 259, a school located near his
home in Brooklyn, and drive him to Maimonides Medical Center (“Maimonides”). Id. ¶
18; Mehmeti Dep. at 76:19-77:7; 94:6-8. He then drove to P.S. 259, where he parked the
bus and met his son. Jofaz SOF ¶ 19. He did not inform anyone at Jofaz that he was in
pain and going to the hospital. Id. ¶ 45. He intended to return in time for his afternoon
run, which he ultimately did not do. Id. ¶ 43; Mehmeti Dep. at 100:6-8.
The parties dispute the timing and number of Mehmeti’s visits to Maimonides
that day. In his Complaint and Interrogatory Responses, Mehmeti stated that he was
treated at Maimonides at around 10 a.m. on October 3, 2012 and left the hospital at
around 11:30 a.m. Jofaz SOF ¶ 19; Compl. ¶¶ 6(k)-(m), (r). In his deposition, Mehmeti
expanded upon his previous account and explained that he traveled to Maimonides in
the morning of October 3, 2012 to see his primary physician, Dr. Nona Roze. Jofaz SOF
¶ 20. He testified that a receptionist at the hospital informed him that Dr. Roze was not
available to see him immediately, but might be available at 4 p.m. that day. Id. ¶ 21. He
did not request to see another doctor and left the hospital at around 11:30 a.m. Id. ¶ 22.
Maimonides has no record of Mehmeti visiting the hospital and asking to see a doctor
that morning. See Declaration of Elaine Gunn ¶¶ 4-5.

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At some point on that day, after Mehmeti’s morning bus run ended, Pedro Rivera,
a Field Supervisor for Jofaz, phoned Mehmeti but could not reach him and was unable
to locate the bus at the Jofaz depot. Rivera Decl. ¶¶ 3-5. He then drove to Mehmeti’s
house and on the way, found the bus parked in front of P.S. 259 and not at the Jofaz
depot where it was supposed to be. Id. ¶ 5. He returned the bus to the depot and called
Leonard D’Amico, Mehmeti’s supervisor and the General Manager of Jofaz to inform
him that Mehmeti left the bus in front of P.S. 259. Jofaz SOF ¶ 13; D’Amico Decl. ¶ 1.
When Mehmeti returned to P.S. 259 at around noon, he discovered that his bus
was gone and called D’Amico. Jofaz SOF ¶ 46. During that phone call, D’Amico
terminated him for his unauthorized use of the bus. Id. ¶ 15; D’Amico Decl. ¶ 6. After
that call ended, Mehmeti traveled to the Jofaz headquarters, where he told D’Amico that
he was in “excruciating pain” and left the bus at P.S. 259 so that he could see his doctor.
Mehmeti Decl. ¶ 27. D’Amico allegedly told him that he “did not care for [his] stories”
and that he was fired for parking the bus in an unauthorized area. Id. ¶ 29.
After meeting with D’Amico, Mehmeti returned to Maimonides. At around 4:30
p.m. on that same day, Dr. Ranjan Dahal examined Mehmeti; he diagnosed him as
having an upper respiratory tract infection and discharged him that afternoon. Id.; Def.
Ex. C at 8.
Mehmeti commenced this lawsuit on November 28, 2012. Dkt. No. 1. Jofaz filed
its motion for summary judgment on October 1, 2014. Dkt. No. 61. Mehmeti filed his
Opposition on November 12, and Jofaz replied on December 1. Dkt. Nos. 67, 72.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
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law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. . . . A fact is material if it
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Fincher v. Depository
Trust & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 720 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of
any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must “construe the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all
reasonable inferences against the movant.” Brod v. Omya, Inc., 653 F.3d 156, 164 (2d
Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).
DISCUSSION
I.

Violation of the FMLA
Mehmeti claims that D’Amico terminated him after he took an “emergency leave

of absence” on October 3, 2012, which violated his rights under the FMLA. The FMLA
provides that an employee who suffers from a “serious health condition that makes the
employee unable to perform the functions of [his job]” is entitled to twelve weeks of
unpaid leave per year. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612. The statute is clearly inapplicable here.
Nothing in the record suggests that Mehmeti suffered from a “serious health condition”
and was “unable to perform the functions of [his job]” when he decided to park the bus
in front of P.S. 259 rather than returning it to the Jofaz depot the morning of October 3,
2012. He testified that prior to leaving his bus at P.S. 259, he felt “okay to drive,”
completed his morning bus run successfully, and intended to complete his afternoon
bus run. Furthermore, the undisputed record reflects that D’Amico did not terminate
Mehmeti after he took a “leave of absence.” Rather, Mehmeti was fired after he left the
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bus in an unauthorized location for two-and-a-half hours during a break between bus
runs. The Court finds that Mehmeti’s FMLA claim is without merit and grants summary
judgment in favor of Jofaz.
II.

State Law Claims
Having dismissed Mehmeti’s FMLA claim, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). It would be error for the Court to retain jurisdiction over the state law
claims where the federal claim is dismissed and leaves the Court with no jurisdiction.
See Dunton v. Suffolk Cnty., 729 F.2d 903, 911, amended on other grounds, 748 F.2d 69
(2d Cir. 1984). Accordingly, the Court dismisses the state law claims without prejudice
to their renewal in state court.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court
is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and close this case.  
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

Brooklyn, New York
May 22, 2015

/s/
I. Leo Glasser
Senior United States District Judge

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