Boykin et al v. 1 Prospect Park ALF, L.L.C. et al

Filing 100

MEMORANDUM, ORDER, AND JUDGMENT granting 15 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 17 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 60 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 62 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 59 Motion to Certify Class. No costs or disbursements are ordered. The case is dismissed. Ordered by Judge Jack B. Weinstein, on 1/21/2014. (Barrett, C)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SAMUEL BOYKIN, as administrator of the
Estate of JOHN L. PHILLIPS, MELVIN
DOZIER and KELVIN DOZIER, as CoGuardians of IRENE DOZIER, an Incapacitated
Person, and GEORGIA LEVIS as administrator
of the Estate of MARY JOAN BARNETT,
Individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM, ORDER,
AND JUDGMENT
12-CV-6243

/

&-iLEu
. IN CLERK'S OFFICE
LI.S. DISTRICT COURT ED.N. Y.

* JAN 2 3 2014

-against1 PROSPECT PARK ALF, LLC, PROSPECT
PARK RESIDENCE HOME HEALTH CARE,
INC., PROSPECT PARK RESIDENCE LLC,
KOHL ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC., and
KOHL PARTNERS, LLC

*

BROOKLYN OFFICE

Defendants.

Appearances:
For Plaintiffs:

Hunter Shkolnik and Brian Howard Brick
Napoli Bern Ripka Shkolnik, LLP
New York, NY
John O'Hara
Law Office of Dennis Kelly
Glen Head, NY

For Defendants:

Joel A. Drucker
Randolph, NJ
Kenneth McLellan and Keith R.M. Roussel
Winget, Spadafora & Schwartzberg, LLP
New York, NY

JACK B. WEINSTEIN, Senior United States District Judge:
I.

Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 2
1

II.

Facts ......................................................................................................................................... 4

Ill. Procedural History ................................................................................................................... 9
A.

State Court Proceedings ................................................................................................. 9

B.

Federal Court Proceedings ........................................................................................... 11

IV. Summary Judgement ............................................................................................................. 12
Article 46-B I Section 2801-d Claim ..................................................................................... l2

V.

A.

Law .............................................................................................................................. 12

B.

Application of Law to Facts ........................................................................................ 14

VI. Other State Claims ................................................................................................................. 18
A.

Law .............................................................................................................................. 18

B.

Application of Law to Facts ........................................................................................ 19

VII. Federal Claims ....................................................................................................................... 26
A.

Law

............................................................................................ 26

1.

RICO ............................................................................................. 26

2.

Section 1983 I FNHRA ........................................................................ 28

B.

Application of Law to Facts ........................................................................................ 29
1.

RICO ........................................................................................... 29

2.

Section 1983 I FNHRA ....................................................................... 31

VIII.

Class Certification ............................................................................................................. 32

IX.

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 33

I.

Introduction
Named plaintiffs are the legal representatives of three former residents of Prospect Park

Residence ("the Residence"), an assisted living facility located in Brooklyn. The Residence is a
high-rise, well maintained building near the Central Public Library, Brooklyn Museum,
Brooklyn Botanic Gardens, Prospect Park, good public transportation, and other amenities. See
Minute Entry, May 28, 2013, ECF No. 35 (describing court visit to the Residence).
Sought are money damages for the named plaintiffs and on behalf of a putative class.
Defendants either have an ownership stake in, or manage, the Residence.

2

Claimed is that defendants in a common course of conduct intentionally misrepresented
that the facility was a licensed Assisted Living Residence under New York law from 2006 to
2012. No such license was acquired until November 30, 2012, when the New York State
Department of Health conditionally approved the Residence's Assisted Living Residence license
application.
No evidence has been offered of a material difference in the quality of services offered by
the Residence as compared to what a similarly-situated licensed facility would have provided.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs seek damages for the difference between the amounts they paid at the
Residence and the amounts they would have paid if they had known that the Residence lacked a
license. There is no evidence that a comparable licensed assisted living residence was available
during the relevant period.
Several causes of action rooted in defendants' alleged wrongdoing with respect to the
facility's licensing status are asserted. Federal questions are presented by a claim pursuant to the
civil cause of action in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of a right created by
the Federal Nursing Home Reform Amendments (FNHRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396r. Am.
Compl.

~~

164-87, June 14, 2013, ECF No. 36. Other claims are based upon common law and

statutory rights under New York State law.

!d.~~

129-63.

Federal jurisdiction is asserted based on plaintiffs' RICO and section 1983 allegations
and provisions in the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). The CAFA
provides federal jurisdiction over class actions seeking to enforce State law where complete
diversity among the parties is absent. In the event that federal jurisdiction over their State law
claims cannot be premised on CAF A, plaintiffs assert supplemental federal jurisdiction over

3

these claims by virtue oftheir RICO and FNHRA-related section 1983 allegations. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367.

Defendants move for summary judgment. Plaintiffs move for class certification. Since
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw on all asserted claims, FED. R. Civ. P. 56,
it is not necessary to reach the class certification question. See generally Linda S. Mullenix,
Dropping the Spear: The Case for Enhanced Summary Judgment Prior to Class Certification, 43
AKRON L. REv. 1197, 1207-12 (2010) (arguing in favor of pre-certification resolution of
dispositive motions).
The case is dismissed.

II.

Facts
Plaintiffs sue on behalf of all residents "who lived, or currently live, at Prospect Park

Residence ... from 2006 through the present." Am. Compl.

~

1. The named plaintiffs are the

legal representatives for three individuals who previously resided at the Residence.
Samuel Boykin sues in his capacity as administrator for the estate of John L. Phillips, a
deceased resident. !d.
February 16, 2008.

~

5. Phillips lived at the Residence from May 19, 2007 until his death on

!d.~

91. He moved into the Residence pursuant to an order of the Supreme

Court, Kings County. Pls.' Counter-Statement of Material Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule
56.1 ("Pls.' Rule 56.1 Statement"), ECF No. 79-1, at 5.
Melvin Dozier and Kelvin Dozier sue in their capacity as co-guardians of Irene Dozier.
She lived at the Residence from July 2008 through August 2012. Am. Compl.

~~

7, 98.

The third plaintiff is Georgia Levis, as administrator of the estate of Mary Joan Barnett.
Mrs. Barnett was at the Residence from August 2007 until her death on May 14, 2012.

4

!d.~

8.

Two sets of defendants are sued: the "Prospect Park Defendants" and the "Kohl
Defendants." The Prospect Park Defendants consist of three entities-1 Prospect Park ALF,
LLC; Prospect Park Residence Home Health Care, Inc.; and Prospect Park Residence LLCalleged to own the Residence and to provide limited health care services to some of the
building's residents through an on-site home health care agency. /d.

~~

9-13. The Kohl

Defendants-alleged to provide operational and financial management services for the
Residence-consist of Kohl Asset Management, LLC and Kohl Partners, LLC. /d.

~~

14-17.

Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed defendant Prospect Park Residence, LLC. Hr' g Tr. (1 0:15 a.m.
Hr' g) 20, Dec. 12, 2013.
The alleged fraudulent scheme began in May 2006, when Kohl Asset Management, LLC
("KAML") entered into an agreement with 1 Prospect Park ALF, LLC, agreeing that KAML
would serve as the "sole and exclusive manager" of the Residence. See Affirmation of Adam J.
Gana in Supp. ofPl. Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss., Ex. E (Management
Agreement), Apr. 8, 2013, ECF No. 22-1. Section 2.19 ofthe agreement requires KAML, in its
capacity as manager, to "prepare ... applications for licensing and other approvals by the
appropriate government agencies, as required for the operation of the Facility, if any, to the
extent not previously obtained." /d. KAML agreed to "promptly obtain all necessary operating
certificates after a determination that [the Residence] is required to be licensed." /d. Aside from
KAML, no other defendant is alleged to have entered into an agreement to take any action with
respect to obtaining a license for operation of an assisted living residence.
New York State law requires that facilities providing assisted living services be licensed
by the State's Department of Health. See N.Y. Pub. Health Law§ 4653; see generally Boykin v.
1 Prospect Park ALF, LLC, 293 F.R.D. 308 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (Mem. and Order on Background

5

of Assisted Living Industry). By contrast with continual medical or nursing care provided to all
residents in a nursing home, State law recognizes Assisted Living Facilities as providing only
non-health care services such as residential space, room, board, and basic assistance with daily
living tasks to some residents. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law§ 2(21); 18 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &
Regs. § 485(a)-(c).
Notwithstanding representations made in the management agreement between KAML
and 1 Prospect Park ALF, LLC, no defendant or entity associated with any defendant applied for
a license until2009. Am. Compl.

~

69; Pis.' Rule 56.1 Statement, at 7-8. Not until November

2012 did the New York State Department of Health grant the Residence a conditional license to
operate as an assisted living residence. Pis.' Rule 56.1 Statement, at 8. The Residence enjoys
"conditional approval ... to continue operating as a licensed" Assisted Living Residence through
March 31,2014. Letter from Valerie A. Deetz, Director, Division of ACF and Assisted Living
Surveillance, to Lori Sievers (Dec. 19, 2013) (attached as Ex. A to Supplemental Decl. of
Haysha Deitsch, Dec. 31, 2013, ECF No. 92).
Although the New York State Department of Health maintains a publicly available list of
facilities that have been licensed to provide assisted living services, Pis.' Rule 56.1 Statement, at
8-9, plaintiffs submit that defendants concealed and misrepresented the Residence's lack of a
relevant license in personal conversations, marketing materials, and monthly billing statements.
Asserted are several related types of wrongdoing related to article 46-B ofthe New York Public
Health Law, which establishes license requirements for Assisted Living Facilities: (1) defendants
affirmatively misrepresented that the Residence was a licensed Assisted Living Facility, when in
fact it was unlicensed; (2) defendants impermissibly "called themselves 'assisted living,"' a
description reserved for licensed Assisted Living Facilities, see N.Y. Pub. Health. L. § 4652; and

6

(3) defendants unlawfully operated the Residence-which was functionally an Assisted Living
Facility-without obtaining a required license, see N.Y. Pub. Health. L. § 4653.
Plaintiffs allege that Residence employees made affirmative misrepresentations regarding
the Residence's license status on two occasions. Georgia Levis states that in the spring of2007
she was informed by Jim McWilliams, then the Executive Director ofthe Residence, that the
facility "was a licensed assisted living residence" when she was evaluating potential housing
options for her mother, Mary Joan Barnett. Levis Dep. 58, Oct. 2, 2013, ECF No. 67. Kelvin
Dozier claims that Me Williams and another Residence employee made similar oral
representations in August 2008 when Dozier was exploring housing for his mother. Dozier Dep.
57-58, Oct. 3, 2013, ECF No. 67-1. There is no documentary evidence corroborating these
recollections, and plaintiffs do not allege that the defendants ever represented--orally or in
writing-that the Residence was "licensed" at any other time.
Plaintiffs also point to evidence suggesting that the Residence was being "held out as"
and "operated as" an Assisted Living Residence, which plaintiffs argue was unlawful absent the
requisite license. Offered by plaintiffs is a document signed in August 2008-when it is
undisputed that the Residence lacked a license-detailing the "rights and responsibilities" of the
facility's residents. The document is titled "Rights of Residents in Assisted Living Residences."
Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mots. for Summ. J., Ex. 31, Nov. 18,2013, ECF No. 79. Marie Gustave,
the Residence's former assistant director of nursing, states in her deposition that Jim McWilliams
told her the Residence was an "assisted living facility." Gustave Dep. ("Exhibit 17") 41-46, Oct.
2, 2012, ECF No. 79-19. Gustave assumed the Residence was licensed, but could not remember
whether McWilliams ever affirmatively represented as much. Compare id. (Gustave's
deposition) with Pis.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mots. for Summ. J., at 5, 54 (representing Gustave

7

"testified Mr. McWilliams told her the Residence was a licensed assisted living residence.").
Finally, several documents originating from the defendants-a welcome letter to new families, a
Resident Application form, monthly rent bills, and a health evaluation intake form-bear the
name "1 Prospect Park ALF" or "Prospect Park Residence, ALF." See, e.g., Pis.' Opp'n to
Defs.' Mots. for Summ. J., Exs. 32-36, Nov. 18,2013, ECF No. 79.
As a result of representations, it is contended that plaintiffs and the class they seek to
represent were tricked into paying for services they did not receive. Am. Compl.

~

4. In short,

they were overbilled for monthly rent and service fees.
Defendants do not dispute that the Residence lacked a license until 2012, but counter that
the Residence was never an "Assisted Living Facility" within the meaning of article 46-B ofthe
New York Public Health Law. They deny that they held themselves out as operators of an
"Assisted Living Facility," licensed or otherwise, until after they procured the proper license.
They emphasize that all three of the named plaintiffs signed virtually identical residential
applications containing the following sentences: "Applicant acknowledges that the Residence
does not provide health care services and that such services may be provided by any source
selected by the Applicant. However, for the convenience of the residents, a licensed home health
care agency is located on the premises." Pis.' Rule 56.1 Statement, at 6. This language was on
every resident application up until the granting of the conditional license. Id Residents who
opted to use the on-site health care agency received two separate bills each month: one from
Prospect Park ALF, LLC (for money due under the lease and food and services agreement), the
other from Prospect Park Residence Home Health Care, Inc. (for home health care services
rendered). Jd at 7. Because these services were provided by separate entities, the defendants
maintain, the Residence fell outside the scope of article 46-B.

8

III.

Procedural History
A.

State Court Proceedings

Before the initiation of this suit, legal representatives for Phillips, Dozier, and Barnett
started actions in New York State court alleging many ofthe same facts and bringing many of
the same causes of action now asserted.
On January 7, 2010, Samuel Boykin, the lead plaintiff in the instant case, in his capacity
as administrator for the estate of John L. Phillips, initiated a State wrongful death action against
all but two of the present defendants. See Am. Compl.

~

93; Samuel Boykin, as Adm 'r of the

Estate ofJohn L. Phillips, v. Prospect Park Residence Home Health Care, Inc., Prospect Park
Residence L.L. C., Castle Senior Living, L.L. C., Castle Senior Living at Prospect Park, Castle at
Prospect Park, I Prospect Park ALF, L.L. C., Castle Mgmt. Grp., L.L. C., Jane Doe I and Jane
Doe II as employees, Index No. 2851110 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Jan. 27, 2010) (attached as Ex. C
to Decl. of Kenneth A. McLellan in Supp. of Kohl Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("McLellan Decl. "),
Mar. 25, 2013, ECF No. 19). Boykin's attorney in his State court action also represents him in
the present action. Originally asserted in State court were claims for negligence, wrongful death,
negligent hiring and retention, breach of contract, medical malpractice, violation of New York
State Public Health Law§ 2801-d, and violation ofFNHRA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
Boykin's State court action was removed to this federal district court on March 10,2011.
See Notice of Removal, Samuel Boykin, as administrator ofJohn L. Phillips v. Prospect Park
Residence Home Health Care, Prospect Park Residence, LLC, Castle Senior Living, LLC, Castle
Senior Living at Prospect Park, Castle Management Group, LLC, Jane Doe I, Jane Doe II, I
Prospect ParkALF, LLC, No. 11-CV-1148 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2011). By stipulation, Boykin's

9

federal causes of action were dismissed on April 21, 2011, and the case was remanded to State
court. See id., Stip. & Order, Apr. 21,2011, ECF No.7.
On September 12, 2012, approximately three months before the instant class action was
filed, Melvin Dozier and Kelvin Dozier, in their capacity as guardians of Irene Dozier, filed a
State personal injury action against all but one of the defendants sued here. See Am. Compl.
~ 102; Melvin Dozier and Kelvin Dozier, as Co-Guardians of Irene Dozier, an Incapacitated

person and Melvin Dozier and Kelvin Dozier, Individually v. 1 Prospect Park ALF, LLC,
Prospect Park Residence Home Health Care, Inc., Kohl Asset Mgmt., Inc., and Kohl Partners,
Index No. 502761/12 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Sept. 12, 2012) (attached as Ex. D to McLellan
Decl., Mar. 25,2013, ECF No. 19). Like Boykin, the Doziers are represented in their State court
action by two of the same attorneys that represent them and the proposed class in this action. !d.
Asserted in the Doziers' State court proceedings are claims for negligence, unlawful
confinement, fraud, civil RICO, and violation ofNew York State Public Health Law section
2801-d. See Pis.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mots. for Summ. J., at 16.
Mary Joan Barnett's State court action was filed on August 19,2013. She alleges
negligent treatment and care, mismanagement of dementia, and unlawful confinement. The
complaint asserts claims for negligence, violation of section 280 1-d of the New York Public
Health Law, gross negligence, breach of contract, medical malpractice, unlawful confinement,
fraudulent representations as to the defendants' status as an enhanced assisted living facility with
a secure dementia/Alzheimer's unit, and civil RICO. See Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mots. for Summ.
J., at 17.

Four additional residents, not named as plaintiffs here, have filed State court actions
advancing similar allegations. Hr'g Tr. (10:15 a.m. Hr'g) 6-7, Dec. 12,2013. Named plaintiffs in

10

the instant litigation emphasize that, despite some significant factual overlap, the "claims in [the]
state action[s] do not concern over-billing by Defendants," which is the main focus ofthis
federal court litigation. Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mots. for Summ. J., at 15-19.

B.

Federal Court Proceedings

The instant litigation, styled as a class action, was commenced on December 19,2012.
See Compl., Dec. 19,2012, ECF No. 1. By separate motions, the Prospect Park Defendants and
Kohl Defendants sought dismissal on the pleadings. See Prospect Park Defs. Mot. to Dismiss,
Mar. 25, 2013, ECF No. 15; Kohl Defs. Mot. to Dismiss, Mar. 25, 2013, ECF No. 17. Their
motions were converted to motions for summary judgment. ECF No. 33, May 31, 2013.
Expedited discovery was conducted over the following months.
All defendants filed motions for summary judgment at the close of discovery. Prospect
Park Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Oct. 31,2013, ECF No. 60; Kohl Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., Oct.
31, 2013, ECF No. 62. Plaintiffs simultaneously filed a motion for class certification. Oct. 31,
2013, ECF No. 59.
An evidentiary hearing on the motions for summary judgment and the motion for class
certification was conducted on December 12, 2013. At that time, plaintiffs sought leave to
conduct limited additional discovery on the issue of rent increases around the time the Residence
received its conditional license in late 2012. Hr'g Tr. (10:15 a.m. Hr'g) 31-32, Dec. 12,2013
("[COURT:] I will give you a very brief time, but I am not going to open up discovery now ....
I will allow two weeks for any further discovery that the magistrate judge allows"); Hr' g Tr.
(11 :45 a.m. Hr'g) 2-3, Dec. 12, 2013, ECF No. 97 (plaintiffs' request to magistrate judge).
Defendants were also directed to provide limited additional information regarding the licensing
dates for other Assisted Living Facilities in the New York City area. Hr'g Tr. (10:15 a.m. Hr'g)

11

9, Dec. 12, 2013. The parties submitted these additional materials, as well as several
"supplemental affidavits" discussed below, in early January 2014.

IV.

Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." FED. R. Crv. P. 56(a); see Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Where, as here, the non-moving party bears the
burden of proof, it is incumbent upon that party to identify specific admissible evidence
demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. See FED. R. Crv. P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. A
non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986),
and "may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to
overcome a motion for summary judgment." Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted). If the non-movant fails "to come forth with evidence sufficient to permit a
reasonable juror to return a verdict in his or her favor on" an essential element of the claim,
summary judgment is granted. See Burke v. Jacoby, 981 F.2d 1372, 1379 (2d Cir. 1992); see also

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248--49.
Summary judgment for the defendants is granted on all claims. As detailed below,
plaintiffs' article 46-B claim fails for lack of a private right of action, and their remaining State
and federal claims fail because plaintiffs have presented no evidence of injuries caused by
defendants' alleged misdeeds. Plaintiffs' two federal claims suffer from additional shortcomings.

V.

Article 46-B I Section 2801-d Claim
A.

Law

12

The crux of the action is defendants' alleged violation of several requirements for
Assisted Living Facilities set forth in article 46-B ofthe New York Public Health Law. N.Y.
Pub. Health. L. §§ 4650-4663. The origins and structure of article 46-B are addressed in detail in
a "Memorandum and Order on Background of Assisted Living Industry in Preparation for
Argument on Motions for Summary Judgment and Class Certification." Boykin, 293 F.R.D. at
321-327.
At least three distinct claims related to article 46-B are discernible. Plaintiffs contend
that the defendants' impermissibly "called themselves 'assisted living"' without applying for a
license, receiving approval, and complying with the other requirements of article 46-B. See §
4652 (authorizing certain facilities to "call themselves assisted living" if they apply for license,
receive approval, and comply with other requirements); § 4656 ("No entity shall ... hold itself
out as an entity which otherwise meets the definition of assisted living or advertise itself as
assisted living or by a similar term, without obtaining the approval of the department .... ").
Plaintiffs argue that the defendants "operate[d] [the Residence] as assisted living" without
applying for and being approved for licensing, as required by sections 4653 and 4656. And
plaintiffs contend that the defendants affirmatively represented to Dr. Levis and Mr. Dozier that
the Residence was a licensed Assisted Living Facility, when in fact the Residence was
unlicensed. See § 4651 (defining "assisted living").
These delicts give rise to a private right of action, plaintiffs urge, by operation of section
2801-d ofthe New York Public Health Law ("Private actions by patients of residential health
care facilities"). This provision appears in article 28 of the Public Health Law, which governs
"Hospitals" and other health-related services. See N.Y. Pub. Health Law§ 2800.

13

Section 280 1-d provides in relevant part: "Any residential health facility that deprives
any patient of said facility of any right or benefit, as hereinafter defined, shall be liable to said
patient for injuries suffered as a result of said deprivation .... " The phrase "residential health
care facility" is broadly defined in article 28, and includes "a nursing home or a facility
providing health-related services." N.Y. Pub. Health Law. § 2801(3). "Health-related service"
means "service in a facility or facilities which provide or offer lodging, board and physical care
including, but not limited to, the recording of health information, dietary supervision and
supervised hygienic services incident to such service."§ 2801(4)(b).
The licensing requirements for Assisted Living Facilities are not found in article 28, but
rather in a separate, much newer portion ofNew York's Public Health Law. See N.Y. Pub.
Health Law, Art. 46-B; see also Boykin, 293 F.R.D. at 321-22 (describing passage of Assisted
Living Reform Act of2004).

B.

Application of Law to Facts

Plaintiffs maintain that they enjoy a private right of action to challenge defendants'
failure to comply with article 46-B's licensing requirements because: (1) the Residence was,
during the relevant period, a "residential health facility" within the meaning of section 2801; (2)
the defendants' non-compliance with article 46-B denied them a "defined ... right or benefit";
and (3) the plaintiffs suffered pecuniary injuries-overbilling-as a result of the defendants'
violations.
Reading sections 2801 and 2801-d in isolation, it could be argued that the Residence met
the definition of a "residential heath facility." Even though plaintiffs signed contracts
emphasizing that health-care services were not provided as part of the residential lease
agreement, the Residence did provide or make available to its senior residents, in addition to

14

lodging and board: physical care, dietary supervision, hygienic services, and recording of health
information. These services were provided in large part, though not entirely, through the use of a
related on-site home health care agency.
The plaintiffs' expansive reliance on article 28's application, however, suffers from a
fatal defect: it overlooks the fact that article 46-B, which governs the operation and licensing
requirements for Assisted Living Facilities, expressly provides that Assisted Living Facilities are
not "residential care facilities." N.Y. Pub. Health Law§ 4651 ("As used in this article ...
[a]ssisted living and enhanced assisted living shall not include[] residential health care facilities
or general hospitals licensed under article twenty-eight of this chapter."). This is one of many
signals that the private right of action contemplated in article 28, involving claims brought by
"patients" of "residential care facilities," does not extend to alleged violations of rights and
benefits established under article 46-B-i.e., to claims brought by residents of Assisted Living
Facilities. Plaintiffs cannot maintain that they were residents of an unlicensed Assisted Living
Facility-which, by definition, is not a "residential care facility"-and then invoke a private
right of action reserved for patients of residential care facilities.
Bolstering the conclusion that violations of the Assisted Living Facility licensing
requirement do not give rise to a private right of action is section 4663, the "Penalties and
enforcement" section of article 46-B. Section 4663 provides for penalties imposed, not damages
suffered. It reads:
Any person who violates any provision of this article or any rule or regulation
promulgated by the department, or the terms or conditions of any order or permit
issued by the department pursuant to this article, shall be subject to the maximum

penalties which may be levied against a licensed adult care facility.

15

(emphasis added). The Commissioner of the Department of Health is expressly "authorized to
... exercise all other powers and functions as are necessary to implement the provisions of this
article." !d. § 4662(e). The "knowing operation" of an Assisted Living Facility without the prior
written approval of the Department is a criminal offense, punishable as a class A misdemeanor.
!d. § 4656(5).
Unlike article 28, which expressly creates a private right of action for "patients" of
"residential health facilities," see id. § 2081-d, there is no mention of a private right of action
anywhere in article 46-B. Conspicuously missing from a lengthy list of"Rights of residents in
assisted living residences" in article 46-B is any mention of a right of action for private parties.
!d. § 4660.
The Department of Health promulgated comprehensive regulations to implement article
46-B in 2008. They vest enforcement authority in the agency. See 10 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &
Regs.§§ 1001-1002. The regulations specify administrative enforcement procedures:
No civil penalty shall be assessed, and no operating certificate shall be revoked,
suspended or limited, without opportunity for a hearing held in accordance with
the procedures established in 18 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 493 [establishing administrative
hearing procedures for residential care programs for adults]; provided, however,
that an operating certificate may be temporarily suspended or limited without a
hearing for a period not in excess of 60 days upon written notice to the facility
that the department has found that the public health, or an individual's health,
safety or welfare is in imminent danger ...
!d. § 1001.15(e) (emphasis added). Civil penalties are capped at $1,000 per day for any facility.
Compare id. § 1001.15(£) (establishing maximum administrative penalties for Assisted Living

16

Residences) with N.Y. Pub. Health Law§ 2801-d ("[C]ompensatory damages [in section 2801-d
actions] shall be assessed in an amount sufficient to compensate such patient for such injury, but
in no event less than twenty-five percent of the daily per-patient rate of payment established for
the residential health care facility"); see also Empire State Ass 'n ofAssisted Living, Inc. v.

Daines, 887 N.Y.S.2d 452, 463 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2009) (article 78 challenge to assisted
living facility regulations).
The private tort model can play a valuable role in bolstering administrative schemes to
compensate victims and deter future wrongdoing, but it can also work mischief when alternative
enforcement devices to enforce public policy act at cross-purpose. See Jack B. Weinstein,

Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles ofAdministrative, Criminal, and Tort
Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 947 (2001); see also Carrier v. Salvation Army, 88 N.Y.2d 298 (N.Y.
1996) (holding that individual residents of adult care facilities do not enjoy implied private right
of action for certain relief because it "would be entirely inconsistent with the purposes,
mechanism and the underlying legislative and statutory enforcement scheme.") (citation
omitted).
Here, the New York State Legislature vested enforcement authority for the new licensing
requirements for Assisted Living Facilities with the Commissioner, who, in turn, promulgated
regulations implementing the new regime. In addition to the authority to make necessary rules
and regulations, article 46-B endows the Commissioner with authority to develop a consumer
information guide, "receive and investigate complaints," "make necessary investigations," and
"exercise all other powers and functions as are necessary to implement the provisions of this
article." Id. § 4662. Cf Carrier, 88 N.Y.2d at 330 (rejecting private right of action for adult care
facility residents where Department of Social Services implements similar regulatory scheme).

17

Recognizing a private right of action for lack of licensing could complicate these efforts and
reduce pressure for administrative oversight. It would render operators of Assisted Living
Facilities liable to many private parties and dramatically increases potential penalties for
violations. Compare Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mots. for Summ. J. at 23 (offering "conservative[]"
estimate of class-wide damages exceeding $5 million) with 10 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. §
1001.15(e) (capping civil penalties at $1,000 per facility per day, or approximately $2.19 million
during disputed six-year period). It would also bypass the administrative hearing process favored
by the agency's regulations and upheld by the State's courts. Empire State Ass'n, 887 N.Y.S.2d
at 463.
Whatever the potential benefits of a robust private enforcement model, it is not the
approach established when the New York Legislature vested the Commissioner with
responsibility to ensure the effective operation of the laws and complex institutional
arrangements for the aged and others needing special protection. Conflicting pressures from a
variety of sources might increase costs and confusion, thus reducing overall protections for this
class of people in need of assistance and protection.
Plaintiffs may not bring a private action under New York Public Health Law to challenge
the defendants' alleged failure to obtain an Assisted Living Facility license. The claim is
dismissed.

VI.

Other State Claims
A.

Law

The lack of a private right of action under article 46-B does not preclude plaintiffs from
asserting related claims derived from the common law or other State and federal statutes. See

Henry v. Isaac, 632 N.Y.S.2d 169, 171 (App. Div. 2d Dep't. 1995).
18

Each remaining State claim-negligence per se, breach of contract, common law fraud,
violations ofN.Y. General Business Law§§ 349 and 350, and unjust enrichment-requires
plaintiffs to establish more than a bare licensing violation. The plaintiffs must persuade a jury
that they suffered harm causally linked to the defendants' wrongdoing. Sheehan v. City of New
York, 40 N.Y.2d 496, 501 (N.Y. 1976) ("Evidence of negligence is not enough by itselfto

establish liability. It must also be proved that the negligence was the cause of the event which
produced the harm sustained by one who brings the complaint."); F.D.lC. v. Drysdale, 10-CV4778, 2013 WL 5965723, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2013) ("The elements of a breach of contract
claim in New York [include] damages attributable to the breach."); Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v.
Esses, 12-CV-4424, 2013 WL 5972481, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2013) ("Proving a claim of

common law fraud under New York law requires facts demonstrating, by clear and convincing
evidence, ... damages caused by the misrepresentation or omission."); Andre Strishak &
Assocs., P.C. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 752 N.Y.S.2d 400, 402 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2002) ("The

elements of [a section 349] action [include an] injury resulting from such [a deceptive consumeroriented] act."); id. ("A [section 350] plaintiff must demonstrate that the advertisement ...
resulted in injury."); Design Strategies, Inc. v. Davis, 384 F.Supp.2d 649, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
("To recover on a theory of unjust enrichment under New York law, a party must establish not
only that there was enrichment, but that the enrichment was at the plaintiffs expense.").

B.

Application of Law to Facts

As the parties were previously advised, May 29, 2013, ECF No. 33, "[a] core issue [at the
summary judgment stage] will be whether the plaintiffs can show a compensable injury caused
by defendants' conduct. ... " See also Boykin, 293 F .R.D. at 310 (emphasizing parties should
address "what damages, if any, flow from lacking a license").
19

On this record, there is no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude
the plaintiffs were actually "overbilled" or otherwise harmed by the defendants' alleged
wrongdoing. Summary judgment is granted on each of plaintiffs' remaining State claims.
To illustrate the sorts of injuries that are not at issue in this case, consider the deficiencies
identified by the Department of Health when the Residence eventually received conditional
licensing in late 2012. In order to receive final approval, the Department of Health wrote, the
Residence needed to submit a "disaster plan ... [including] a transfer agreement with a facility
outside of the flood zone"; certain stairwells and handrails needed to be repaired; and the agency
needed to receive verification that the dishwasher sanitizing temperature reached 180 degrees
Fahrenheit. See Decl. ofHaysha Deitsch in Supp. of Prospect Park Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J.,
Oct. 31, 2013, ECF No. 60-3. Plaintiffs do not allege that they suffered any direct injury as a
result of these shortcomings, or that they would have materially benefitted had the defendants'
remedied these problems at an earlier date. Their complaint makes no mention of a disaster
requiring the transfer of residents to another facility; physical injuries resulting from poorly
maintained stairwells or handrails; or illnesses stemming from inadequately sanitized dishes.
Plaintiffs stake their case on the theory that they were harmed by the defendants' practice
of"overbilling." See, e.g., Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mots. for Summ. J., at 20 ("Here, Plaintiffs'
state law claims [all] focus on Defendants' overbilling of residents .... "). They assert that the
defendants were able to command an inflated price for rent and services-some unspecified
premium-that they would not have been able to charge had they truthfully represented their
licensing status. Implicit in this argument is the premise that the plaintiffs are legally entitled to
recover this "premium," even if the quality of the goods and services they received were
otherwise identical to what they would have received in a licensed facility.

20

In the abstract, this issue presents a perplexing question. Consider a homeowner who
seeks a plumber for a particularly difficult repair job. The homeowner hires someone she
believes to be a "Grade A Master Plumber," a title reflecting the plumber's experience and skill,
at $1 00/hour. In fact, the plumber is only a "Grade B Junior Plumber," whose ordinary rate is
$50/hour. Nevertheless, the plumber handles the job flawlessly, fixing the problem with dexterity
and swiftness surpassing that of any Grade A Master Plumber available in the area. Has the
homeowner suffered a legal injury under New York or federal law?
The instant case does not require reaching this hypothetical. The plaintiffs' evidence falls
short on a logically antecedent point: they have failed to introduce any form of evidence from
which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that a credential premium for properly licensed
Assisted Living Facilities existed during the relevant period.
Despite thorough discovery and exhaustive briefing-the record in this case now exceeds
5,100 pages-there is no evidence that licensed Assisted Living Facilities generally (or the
Residence in particular) commanded higher rates during the relevant period when the Residence
was unlicensed than comparable unlicensed Assisted Living Facilities in the New York City
area. There is no evidence that the Residence charged higher rents for space alone than
comparable (non-Assisted Living Facility) apartments in the high-rent neighborhood of Prospect
Park, one of the most desirable areas in Brooklyn, or that the sums charged by the defendants for
other services (e.g., food, medical care, etc.) exceeded those generally charged by other thirdparty providers.
Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that, had they known that the Residence lacked an
Assisted Living Facility license, they would have sought to negotiate lower monthly payments.
They have presented no evidence that, if they had tried to do so, they might have been

21

successful. They have presented no evidence that they would have taken their business to a
different Assisted Living Facility if they had known that the Residence lacked a license. See,

e.g., Levis Dep. 42-43, Oct. 2, 2013, ECF No. 67 ("The reason I chose Prospect Park [over other
area facilities was that] it reminded me of West Virginia .... I thought I could take [my mother]
out into the park and we could walk in the park and she would feel some sense ofhome ... And
I thought that the facility physically was appealing, and it was across the street from the park.
And for those reasons, I chose Prospect Park Assisted Living .... ").
There is no evidence that alternative Assisted Living Facilities with proper licenses
existed in New York during the relevant period. See Hr'g Tr. (10:15 a.m. Hr'g) 8, Dec. 12,2013
("In 2006,2007,2008, '09, '10, '11, there were no licenses, no certifications that had been given
by the state. The state hadn't gotten around to it for whatever, due to the bureaucracies. Finally in
2012, they started to issue certifications."); Decl. of Kathy Sindoni, Dec. 31, 2013, ECF No. 92-1
("From the information on the Department of Health's database, it appears that the Department
of Health did not start to issue licenses to assisted living residences until late in 2011."); see also
New York Department of Health, Licensed Assisted Living Residences, available at:
http :I/www .health.ny .gov/facilities/assisted_living/licensed_programs_residences.htm (accessed
Jan. 15, 2013) (listing seven licensed assisted living facilities in New York, Kings, and Queens
Counties at present time).
Plaintiffs have attempted to cure some of the above shortcomings, explored at length
during the December 12, 2013 hearing, by filing "Supplemental Affidavits" from Georgia Levis,
Kelvin Dozier, and Samuel Rausman (who originally assisted the State court in finding a suitable
facility for plaintiff John L. Phillips). See Supplemental Decl. of Brian Brick in Pls.' Opp'n to
Defs.' Mots. for Summ. J. (Exs. D-F), Dec. 31, 2013, ECF No. 93. For the first time since the

22

instant litigation began over twelve months earlier, plaintiffs allege that they relied on
defendants' affirmative misrepresentations when opting for the Residence in 2007 and 2008.
These affidavits arrive more than two months after the close of discovery, see Order, Oct. 1,
2013, ECF No. 57, and forty-four days after the plaintiffs filed their Local Rule 56.1 statement
and summary judgment brief, see Nov. 18, 2013, ECF No. 79. While the court allowed the
parties an additional fourteen days to conduct limited additional discovery on a specified
separate issue, at no time did the plaintiffs seek or receive leave to file these supplementary
affidavits. See Hr'g Tr (11 :45 a.m. Hr'g). 2-3, Dec. 12, 2013, ECF No. 97 ("[W]hat we're asking
for specifically ... are the invoices that at least go with the lead plaintiffs [and] a census list that
shows the residents and information that shows what those rates were [and] very limited
interrogatories."). Because plaintiffs have not explained why they failed to come forward with
this evidence in the regular course of discovery, it is not considered in evaluating defendants'
motions for summary judgment. See Gualandi v. Adams, 385 F.3d 236, 244 (2d Cir. 2004)
(explaining plaintiffs opposing summary judgment must describe "what efforts the affiant has
made to obtain [the additional facts] ... and ... why the affiant's [prior] efforts were
unsuccessful" when seeking supplemental discovery).
Plaintiffs' only evidence that might tend to show "overbilling" by the defendants are
reports prepared by the New York City Rent Guidelines Board showing average rents for
Brooklyn during most of the class period. These reports show average rents (throughout
Brooklyn) of$714 per month (2005), $748 per month (2006), $795 per month (2007), $833 per
month (2008), $848 per month (2009), $873 per month (2010), and $925 per month (2011). See
Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mots. for Summ. J., at 22-23 (citing attached Exs. 2-13). It is undisputed
that Phillips and Barnett paid significantly more than this amount in monthly rent, see Pls.' Rule

23

56.1 Statement, at 16, 22, and that Dozier paid significantly less, id. at 18. By comparing rents
charged by the defendants with rents paid by average Brooklynites (many in depressed areas)
during the relevant period, the plaintiffs offer a "conservative" estimate that Phillips and
Barnett's "overcharge damages" total $1,262.50 and $1,000 per month, respectively. Pls.' Opp'n
to Defs.' Mots. for Summ. J., at 23.
Given intra-borough variations in rent, the plaintiffs' data reveal nothing about whether
the plaintiffs were overcharged for rent and other services at a facility located at a prime location
near Prospect Park. See, e.g., Elena Milin and Lore Croghan, 1 Boro, 2 Worlds: Statistics show a
Brooklyn with a case of split personality, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 23, 2012, at 35 ("Now more

than ever, Brooklyn has become a tale of two boroughs, with rich and poor in parallel worlds.").
Plaintiffs also emphasize that the total monthly fees paid by the three named plaintiffs
comfortably exceeded the average monthly rent paid in Brooklyn. This comparison fails for the
additional reason that plaintiffs' total charges included fees for meals and other valuable
services.
Plaintiffs' proffered an expert witness, Richard Mollot, who testified that 100% ofwhat
the plaintiffs paid for rent, food, and other services was an "overcharge." See Mollot Dep. 117,
Oct. 8, 2013, ECF No. 67-3 ("Q: So, again, just to be clear, are you contending that the services
received by Judge Phillips, by Mary Joan Barnett and by Irene Dozier, the three named plaintiffs
in this case, were worth nothing between 2006 and 2012?" A: "I would say that they were worth
nothing, I would."). Plaintiffs, understandably, make relatively little mention of this untenable
testimony in opposing defendants' motions for summary judgment. See Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.'
Mots. for Summ. J., at 1-73. An expert whose opinion is based on comparative costs of licensed
and unlicensed senior living residences might have had some probative force. See also Pls.' Rule

24

56.1 Statement, at 23-25 (conceding that plaintiffs' expert failed to review plaintiffs' rental
leases, Food and Service Agreement, or medical invoices in forming "overcharge" opinion; did
not engage in any empirical calculations regarding average "base rates" for assisted living; and
was unaware ofthe cost of any assisted living facilities in Kings County, including two
comparable Senior Living Residences). This expert has provided no useful proof.
Finally, plaintiffs highlight evidence that rent charges throughout the Residence
immediately before and after licensing remained relatively constant; this is proof, plaintiffs
maintain, that the Residence was improperly charging inflated prices in the years before it
obtained a license. See Supplemental Decl. of Brian Brick in Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mots. for
Summ. J., Dec. 31, 2013, ECF No. 93, at 3 ("Because Defendants acknowledge that their receipt
of an assisted living residence license did not impact costs, Defendants were already charging
their residents the rates that a licensed facility would charge before they were licensed.") (bold
and italics in original); see also id., Ex. A (Rent Spreadsheet) (showing rent increases for three
Residence apartments on December 1, 2012, and for three additional Residence apartments on
April30, 2013).
This argument is flawed in at least two respects. First, in order for the absence of a rent
increase at the Residence in November 2012 to have any evidentiary significance, it must be
assumed that obtaining a New York State Assisted Living Facility license ordinarily leads to rent
increases (as a general matter). That critical premise, of course, is the very point that the
plaintiffs have failed to establish with evidence. Second, plaintiffs' interpretation of the rent data
is sound only if defendants made comparable representations regarding the Residence's licensing
status before and after November 30, 2013. Two plaintiffs maintain that they were informed that
the Residence was "licensed" facility in 2007 and 2008, but there is no evidence that similar

25

misrepresentations were made to residents as a whole. Nor is there evidence that the named
plaintiffs or any other tenants surmised, from the occasional use of the term "1 Prospect Park
ALF" or "Prospect Park Residence, ALF," that the Residence had obtained a license from the
State. In contrast, when it appeared the Residence was poised to obtain a license in October
2012, the defendants issued an announcement to all tenants and their family members. See Am.
Compl.

~

82 (noting letter from Executive Director: "I am pleased that Prospect Park Residence

anticipates receiving licensure from the New York State Department of Health as an Assisted
Living Residence by year's end."). Given such a record, one would expect a sizable increase in
tenant charges in late 2012, ifthe alleged "credential premium" existed during the relevant
period.
In any event, a host of economic factors could explain why rents have increased,
decreased, or remained the same at the Residence in recent years. The evidence presented is not
sufficient to create a "genuine issue of material fact" on the issue of overbilling.
The existence of an "overcharge" cannot be inferred. There is an absence of any credible
evidence on the point. Since evidence of overbilling is necessary to prove an element of each of
the plaintiffs' remaining State claims, summary judgment for the defendants is granted on all of
them.

VII.

Federal Claims
Plaintiffs also assert two federal claims: a claim pursuant to the civil cause of action in

the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, and a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of a right created by the Federal Nursing Home
Reform Amendments (FNHRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396r.

26

These claims fail because of the plaintiffs' failure to adduce any evidence of cognizable
harm and for the additional reasons discussed below.
A.

Law

I.

RICO

RICO provides a private right of action for "[a]ny person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 ofthis chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). "In order
to bring suit under§ 1642(c), a plaintiff must plead (1) the defendant's violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962, (2) an injury to the plaintiff's business or property, and (3) causation of the injury by the
defendant's violation." Lerner v. Fleet, N.A., 459 F.3d 273,283 (2d Cir. 2006). Section 1962
provides in relevant part, "[it] shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection ofunlawful debt." Id. § 1962(c).
In order to prevail on the RICO claim, the plaintiffs must establish "seven constituent
elements: (1) that the defendant (2) through the commission of two or more acts (3) constituting
a 'pattern' (4) of 'racketeering activity' (5) directly or indirectly invests in, or maintains an
interest in, or participates in (6) an 'enterprise' (7) the activities of which affect interstate or
foreign commerce." Hinterberger v. Catholic Health Sys., Inc., 2013 WL 4437095 (2d Cir. Aug.
21, 2013)(quoting Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1983)).
The federal offenses of mail fraud and wire fraud-alleged to have been committed by
defendants in this case-are considered predicate offenses that qualify as "racketeering
activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). An essential element of mail or wire fraud is a "scheme or
artifice to defraud," which requires "proof that defendants possessed a fraudulent intent." United

27

States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 820 F .2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1987) ("In general, the mail and wire fraud statutes require, inter
alia, a showing of intentional fraud."), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Indelicato,
865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989).

2.

Section 1983 I FNHRA

Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for persons who, "under color of [State law]," have
suffered a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Whether a statutory violation may be enforced through section 1983
hinges on "whether Congress intended to create a federal right." Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S.
273, 283 (2002) (emphasis omitted). "For a statute to create such private rights, its text must be
'phrased in terms ofthe persons benefited."' !d. (quoting Cannon v. Univ. ofChicago, 441 U.S.
677,692 n.13 (1979)).
Congress passed the Federal Nursing Home Reform Amendments in 1987 "to provide for
the oversight and inspection of nursing homes that participate in Medicare and Medicaid
programs." Grammar v. John J Kane Regional Centers-Glenn Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 523 (3d Cir.
2009). To ensure that "the Federal Government, through the Medicaid program, [did not]
continue to pay nursing facilities for providing poor quality care to vulnerable elderly and
disabled beneficiaries," FNHRA established quality of care requirements for facilities receiving
federal funds and an enforcement regime to halt payments to facilities that have not been
properly "certified" by State agencies. H.R.Rep. No. 100-3901, at 471 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 23130272; see also Edward J. Cyran, Implied Causes ofAction Under§

1396r: Why Grammar Reminds Nursing Home Residents to Actively Participate in Their Own
Care, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 253, 258-61 (2010).

28

The federal courts are split as to whether various provisions ofFNHRA confer individual
rights that are enforceable through section 1983 for Medicaid beneficiaries who reside at
substandard, state-run nursing homes. Compare Grammar, 570 F.3d at 529 (FNHRA creates
enforceable individual rights) with Baum v. Northern Dutchess Hosp., 764 F.Supp.2d 410
(N.D.N.Y. 2011) (FNHRA does not create enforceable individual rights) and Hawkins v. Cnty.

Of Bent, Colo., 800 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (D. Colo. 2011) (same).

B.

Application of Law to Facts
1.

RICO

In addition to the absence of any discernible "injury to the plaintiffs business or
property," see Section VI.B, supra, plaintiffs' RICO claim fails because of a lack of evidence of
a "pattern of racketeering activity." See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc.,
483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987) ("[T]he heart of any RICO complaint is the allegation of a pattern of
racketeering.") (emphasis omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that the defendants committed hundreds of acts of mail fraud, one of
RICO's predicate acts, by sending monthly rent bills through the mail. Mail fraud "occurs
whenever a person, 'having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,'
uses the mail 'for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do."'

Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647 (2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341). A
mailing that is "incident to an essential part of the scheme satisfies the mailing element ... even
if the mailing contains no false information." !d. (citation omitted).
There is insufficient evidence that the defendants undertook a "scheme or artifice to
defraud" necessary to support the mail fraud allegations. 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Central to plaintiffs'
allegations is the May 2006 "Management Agreement" signed by 1 Prospect Park ALF, LLC and

29

Kohl Asset Management. Plaintiffs allege that, pursuant to the agreement, "Defendants falsely
marketed their Facility as being an ALR/EALR/SNALR licensed Facility," and "[c]onsequently,
both Defendants directed and/or coordinated the unlawful activity, including but not limited to,
circumventing New York State licensing requirements." Am. Compl.

~~

172, 173. The cited

contract, however, is a pledge to do just the opposite. The Management Agreement reveals
nothing more than the parties' intent to follow State law, not subvert it. See Management
Agreement,~~

2.19, 2.19.1 ("[DUTIES OF MANAGER:] Manager shall prepare, with the

assistance of Client and at the expense of Client in accordance with applicable Approved
Budgets, applications for licensing and other approvals by the appropriate government agencies,
as required for the operation ofthe Facility, if any, to the extent not previous obtained ....
Should it be determined that the Facility is required to be licensed by the State ofNew York,
then Manager hereby agrees to act as, and Client hereby agrees to approve Manager as, the
Operator of the Facility. Manager shall promptly obtain all necessary operating certifications
after a determination that the Facility is required to be licensed.").
The plaintiffs have uncovered no convincing evidence that the Residence was ever
"falsely marketed" as a "licensed" Assisted Living Residence-let alone a joint scheme to
market the Residence as such. Two isolated remarks allegedly made to prospective tenants in
2007 and 2008 do not suffice.
The defendants' remaining alleged wrongdoing is of an altogether different ilk. Plaintiffs
insist that the defendants misled prospective and current tenants through the improper use of
terms like "assisted living," "Prospect Park, ALF," and "1 Prospect Park ALF." Yet plaintiffs
concede that the Residence was, as a functional matter, "assisted living" throughout the relevant
period: otherwise, the Residence would not be subject to article 46-B. The defendants'

30

representations were accurate descriptions of the level of services offered at the Residence, even
if the State's new licensing regime prohibited the defendants from using the "assisted living"
label until after they obtained the requisite license-a prohibition enforced by administrative and
criminal law.
To the extent plaintiffs argue that prospective tenants reasonably inferred-based on the
defendants' use ofthese terms and their familiarity with the New York Assisted Living Reform
Act of 2004-that the Residence was therefore licensed, there is a lack of evidence on this point.
None of the plaintiffs have suggested that they were familiar with the legal requirements
imposed by the 2004 reforms, let alone that they were misled into believing the Residence was a
"licensed" facility by virtue of the State law requirement that only licensed facilities use the label
"assisted living."
In sum, there is insufficient evidence of a "scheme or artifice to defraud" to allow a
reasonable jury to conclude the defendants engaged in mail or wire fraud, and thus insufficient
evidence to support the civil RICO claim. At most, there is evidence that the defendants were
negligent, or perhaps reckless, with respect to their obligation to seek the appropriate license
from the State Department of Health. There is also evidence, accepted as true for present
purposes, that the Residence's former Executive Director made false statements on two
occasions. Mail fraud and civil RICO claims, however, require "a showing of intentional fraud"
on the defendants' part that animates a corrupt "scheme or artifice." Beck, 820 F.2d at 49.
Evidence of such a scheme is absent.

2.

Section 1983 I FNHRA

Plaintiffs' FNHRA-related section 1983 allegations are misplaced. It is assumed for the
purposes of plaintiffs' argument that the Residence met the statutory definition of a "nursing

31

home" and FNHRA created "a right ... enforceable by an action for damages under§ 1983,"

Grammer, 570 F.3d at 525, for both Medicaid beneficiaries and other nursing home residents.
Compare id. at 527 ("The provisions are obviously intended to benefit Medicaid beneficiaries
and nursing home residents") (emphasis added) with id. at 530 ("FNHRA ... place[ s] an
unmistakable focus on the benefitted class-Medicaid recipients who are residents of Medicaid
participating nursing homes").
Plaintiffs' section 1983 claims would still require proofthat the deprivation oftheir
federal rights occurred "under color of [State] law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants here are
private parties, not state actors, and it is undisputed that at all relevant times the Residence "was
private pay-not Medicaid." Pls.' Rule 56.1 Statement, at 30.
Plaintiffs have not contended that residents of privately-run nursing homes enjoy a
private cause of action directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1396r. See Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mots. for
Summ. J., at 12-13 ("Section 1983 is a broad vehicle that may be used to bring a wide variety of
different claims-and Section 1983 claims require a substantive legal predicate .... [Here,]
Section 1983 is the vehicle used to bring claims for violations ofFNHRA in this action .... ");

see generally Cyran, Implied Causes ofAction Under§ 1396r, at 269-86 (assessing viability of
hypothetical FNHRA claims brought against private parties). This issue is not before the court.

VIII. Motion for Class Certification
"The decision to award summary judgment before acting on class certification [is] well
within the discretion ofthe district court ... ."Schweizer v. Trans Union Corp., 136 F.3d 233,
239 (2d Cir. 1998); accord Mullenix, Dropping the Spear, 43

AKRON

L. REv. at 1209 n.61

(listing cases); Barbara J. Rothstein, Managing Class Action Litigation: A Pocket Guide for

32

Judges (Federal Judicial Center 2009) (encouraging judges to rule on dispositive motions prior to
class certification).
Because summary judgment is granted on each of the named plaintiffs' claims, it is
unnecessary to reach plaintiffs' motion for class certification.
IX.

Conclusion
Summary judgment on each of the plaintiffs' claims is granted. The class certification

issue is not reached. No costs or disbursements are ordered.
The case is dismissed.

ack B. Weinstein
Senior United States District Judge

Dated: January 21, 2014
Brooklyn, New York

33