Armstead v. Dept. Of Corrections and Community Supervision et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, granting pltff's 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 USC sec. 1915, but his claims against all defts are dismissed. In line with the foregoing, pltff's complaint is dismissed in its entir ety, and no summons shall issue as to any deft. Normally, a pro se pltff is granted leave to amend a complaint at least once prior to dismissal when a liberal reading of the complaint suggests that a valid claim might be stated. But leave to replead is not necessarily granted. When it is clear that a pro se pltff's claims are meritless as a matter of law and that any repleading would be futile, leave is inappropriate. Armstead's grievances are incumbent on his belief that he was relea sed to parole when he left Willard. Yet, as CPL sec. 410.91 specifically provides, this in incorrect; he was released to or remained on parole supervision when he entered Willard. Accordingly, even if Armstead has named proper defts, his claims would fail as a matter of law, and repleading would be futile. Leave to amend, as a result, will not be granted. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 USC sec. 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. Therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment and to close this case. (Ordered by Judge Eric N. Vitaliano on 3/21/2013) c/m Fwd. for Judgment. (Galeano, Sonia)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------------------- X

ANTHONY ARMSTEAD,
Plaintiff,

13R00Kl.YN OFFICE

-againstMEMORANDUM AND ORDER

13- CV-88 (ENV)(JMA)

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION; NEW YORK
CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
STATE OF NEW YORK EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT DIVISION OF PAROLE,
Defendants.
X

VITALIANO, D.J.
On January 3, 2013, plaintiff Anthony Armstead, currently incarcerated at Coxsackie
Correctional Facility, filed this prose action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that
he was detained 112 days beyond the expiration of his prison term on a prior conviction and
sentence. Complaint at 5. Armstead's request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915, but his claims against all defendants are dismissed.
BACKGROUND
For two 2002 convictions, Armstead was sentenced to five years incarceration followed
by five years of post-release supervision. He was released· from prison on March 3, 2006, but
returned to custody on January 9, 2009 for a parole violation. He was held at Rikers Island until
June 3, 2009, at which point he was transferred to Downstate Correctional Facility. "[A]fter
going through reception" at Downstate, he was immediately transferred again to Willard Drug
Treatment Campus, where he stayed for 97 days until leaving on September 22, 2009. He then
returned to custody on July 16, 2011 on a parole violation, and was held until May 22, 2012.
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Armstead alleges that the date on which he was released back to parole supervision was actually
September 22, 2009 (the date he exited Willard), rather than June 3, 2009 (the date he entered
Willard). He claims that, because of the miscalculation, he was held 112 days beyond the
expiration of his sentence. He also contends that he filed multiple claims in state court and wrote
letters to various officials in an effort to remedy this error, and now seeks damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for the 112 days he allegedly served in excess of his sentence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), a district court "shall review, before
docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a
civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity." 28 U.S. C. § 1915A(a). Upon review, a district court shall dismiss a
prisoner's complaint sua sponte if the complaint is "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief." !d. § 1915A(b). See also Liner v. Goard, 196 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1999)
(noting that under the PLRA, sua sponte dismissal of frivolous prisoner complaints is not only
permitted but mandatory); Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F. 3d 8, II (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
(upholding sua sponte dismissal of frivolous complaint under § 1915A(b)).
Similarly, a district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it is satisfied
that the action is "(i) frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relie£" 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). However, regardless the results, prose pleadings are held to less
stringent standards than those drafted by attorneys, and the Court must read a prose complaint

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liberally and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments it suggests. See Erickson v. Pare/us, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Ahlers v. Rabinowitz, 684 F.ld 53,60 (2d Cir. 2012). The Court must be
particularly solicitous when reviewing a complaint that alleges civil rights violations, as
Armstead's does. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #I, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008).
At the pleadings stage, the Court must assume the truth of "all well-pleaded,
nonconclusory factual allegations" in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621
F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 201 O)(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009)). A
complaint must plead facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facially plausible claim includes factual
content that "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1930. At the same t.irue, "a pleading that offers labels
and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor
does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement."
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal citations and quotations omitted). On the other hand, "a

complaint need not pin plaintiffs claim for relief to a precise legal theory." Skinner v. Switzer,
131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 (20 11 ). All that is required is "a plausible 'short and plain' statement of the
plaintiffs claim, not an exposition of his legal argument." !d.
DISCUSSION

A.

The Statutory Framework of§ 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) "the conduct complained of
must have been committed by a person acting under color of state law," and (2) "the conduct
complained of must have deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the

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Constitution or laws of the United States. Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994).
Armstead maintains that by detaining him in prison for 112 days past the date his sentence
allegedly expired, defendants violated his federally safeguarded civil rights. See Moore v.

Tartler, 986 F .2d 682, 686 (3rd Cir. 1993) ("Subjecting a prisoner to detention beyond the
termination of his sentence has been held to violate the eighth amendment's proscription against
cruel and usual punishment.").
It is unclear, however, who the precise defendants are. In the caption, Armstead lists the
New York City Department of Correction ("DOC"), the [New York State] Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"), and the New York State Division of
Parole ("DOP"). In the body of his complaint, he also discusses two individual officers whom he
seems to consider defendants: Andrea Evans, the CEO and Chairwoman of the DOP, and the
Commissioner of the New York City Department of Correction, whose name he does not specify(together, "the supervisory defendants"). However, on these facts, as discussed below, none of
these entities are liable to suit under§ 1983.

B.

DOC Is Not Suable

DOC, an agency of New York City government, is not a proper defendant to a § 1983
action since such agencies cannot be sued independently under that statute. See, e.g., Nne be v.

Daus, 644 F.3d 14 7, 158 n.6 (2d Cir. 2011) ("1t is well settled in this Court that, asa general
matter, agencies ofNew York City are not suable entities in§ 1983 actions."); Graham v. City of

New York, 869 F.Supp.2d 337, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("All actions and proceedings for the
recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New
York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.") (quoting N.Y.
City. Charter, Ch. 17 § 396); Adams v. Galletta, 966 F.Supp. 210, 212 (S.D.N.Y.I997) ("where a
plaintiff has named the Department of Corrections as a defendant he has sued a non-suable
entity"). Thus, the claim against DOC is dismissed because it "seek[s] monetary relief from a
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defendant who is immune from such relief' and fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii}-(iii), 1915A(b)(l)-(2).
C.

DCCS and DOP Are Immune from Suit

Amstead's claims against DOP and DOCCS also fail because these entities are arms of
the State ofNew York. As such, they are immune under the 11th Amendment from suits for
damages in federal court. Jones v. New York State Division of Military and Naval Affairs, 166
F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the 11th Amendment bars § 1983 suits against state
agencies); Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of§ 1983
claims against DOCCS on 11th Amendment grounds); McCloud v. Jackson, No. 00·31, 2001 WL
99820, at **2 (2d Cir. Feb. 02, 2001) (affirming dismissal of§ 1983 claims against DOP on 11

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"

Amendment grounds). However, although the 11th Amendment's jurisdictional bar would not
apply if Congress had expressly abrogated the state's immunity pursuant to its valid
constitutional authority or if the state had waived that immunity, see Kostok v. Thomas, 105 F .3d
65,68 (2d Cir. 1997), neither exception applies here.
First, the Supreme Court has held that "Congress, in passing § 1983, had no intention to
disturb the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity." Will v. Michigan Dept. ofState Police, 491
U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Second, a state will be found to have waived its 11th Amendment immunity
"only ... by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as
will leave no room for any other reasonable construction." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,673
(1974) (internal quotations omitted). There is no evidence at all that New York has waived its
11th Amendment immunity with respect to the DOP and DOCCS. On the contrary, each agency
has successfully asserted 11th Amendment immunity to dismiss claims against it. See, e.g., Stone
v. New York City Dept. of Homeless Services, 159 Fed. Appx. 324, 326 (2d Cir. 2005)

(dismissing§ 1983 claim against DOP on 11 1h Amendment grounds); Davis v. New York, 316

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F. 3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2002) (dismissing§ 1983 claim against DOCCS on 11 <h Amendment
grounds). Accordingly, since neither exception applies, Armstead's claims against DOP and
DOCCS are dismissed in this case as well.

D.

The Supervisory Defendants

To the extent Armstead intends to sue the supervisory defendants, he fails to allege facts
sufficient to overcome dismissal under 28 U.S. C. §§ 1915(e )(2XB)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2).
"Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely for the acts of others; 'there
must be some showing of personal responsibility.'" Garrido v. Coughlin, 716 F.Supp. 98, 100
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (quoting Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 830 (2d Cir. 1977)). Personal
involvement may be shown by evidence that
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the
defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to
remedy the wrong, (3) the defendant created a policy or custom under which
unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or
custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who
committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the
rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts
were occurring.

Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865,873 (2d Cir. 1995).
Armstead's only allegations against the supervisory defendants is that they failed to
respond to letters he sent them complaining of his detention. Standing alone, this is not enough to
state a claim under§ 1983. There are no facts at all indicating that the first, third or fourth
liability-supporting scenarios described in Colon apply. Notwithstanding that the second and
fifth scenarios appear somewhat more tenable, Armstead's complaint still falls short, since it
offers no facts to show that either of the supervisory defendants actually received and read his
letters, or that they were at any point aware of the circumstances of his detention. Persuasively,
courts have dismissed§ 1983 claims on similar facts. See, e.g., Garrido v. Coughlin, 716 F.Supp.

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98, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (DOCCS Commissioner's "only alleged connection to this case-that
he ignored [plaintiffs] letter of protest and request for an investigation of the allegations made in
this action-is insufficient to hold him liable" under § 1983); Rivera v. Goord, 119 F .Supp.2d
327, 344 (S,D,N, Y, 2000) (allegations that supervisory officials had ignored plaintiffs written
complaints about the conduct of subordinate prison officials were "insufficient to hold these
Official/Supervisory Defendants liable under§ 1983"); Batista v. Goard, 03-CV0523(DNH/GHL), 2005 WL 2179420, at '7 (N,D,N,Y, Aug, 28, 2005) (rejecting prisoner's §
1983 claim because he had "offered no evidence indicating that DOCS Commissioner Goord
actually received Plaintiffs sole letter to him," and because the letter would not demonstrate
Commissioner's personal involvement in any event); Smart v. Goard, 441 F .Supp.2d 631, 643
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Commissioner Goord cannot be held liable on the sole basis that he did not
act in response to letters of protest sent by [plaintiff] on July 12 and July 20, 2003."). But cf
Wright v, Smith, 21 F,3d 496, 502 (2d Cir, 1994) (prison superintendent could be liable under§
1983 where facts indicated that he had actually been served prisoner's habeas corpus petition
alleging ongoing violations). Accordingly, Armstead's claims against the supervisory defendants
are dismissed.
E.

Status of Willard Drug Treatment Facility

Furthermore, Armstead's complaint is fundamentally flawed at its core. Even if he had
named a suable defendant, his claim would still fail as a matter of law. Armstead's causes of
action all hinge upon his assertion that he was released to parole supervision not on the date he
entered Willard- June 3, 2009-but on the date he left Willard-September 22, 2009. In effect,
he contends that the time he spent in the Willard Drug Treatment Program counted as time spent
in prison, rather than time spent on parole supervision. His theory, presumably, is that his prison

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sentence had expired and without some sort of parole revocation process, he could not be reincarcerated. Yet, it is readily apparent that, under New York statutory law, enrollment in the
Willard Drug Treatment Program is considered a condition of parole supervision, and those who
participate in it remain on parole status rather than correctional custody status. See CPL §
410.91(1), (6)-(8) (describing the enrollment in the program as a "condition[] ofparo1e" and
designating its participants as "parolees). There is no claim by Armstead that the disputed 112
days he would have improperly extended the length of his parole supenrision. Since the issue is
unchallenged, it must be assumed that Armstead was properly determined to have been on parole
release during his stay at Willard. His claim that he was detained past the expiration of his prison
date is therefore wholly without merit. Repleading it in any form would be futile.
CONCLUSION
In line with the foregoing, plaintiffs complaint is dismissed in its entirety, and no
summons shall issue as to any defendant. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). Normally, a
pro se plaintiff is granted leave to amend a complaint at least once prior to dismissal when a
liberal reading ofthe complaint suggests that a valid claim might be stated. Cuoco v. Moritsugu,
222 F .3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). But leave to replead is not necessarily granted. When it is clear
that a pro se plaintiffs claims are meritless as a matter of law and that any repleading would be
futile, leave is inappropriate.Jd. Such is the case here. Armstead's grievances are incumbent on
his belief that he was released to parole when he left Willard. Yet, as CPL § 410.91 specifically
provides, this is incorrect; he was released to or remained on parole supenrision when he entered
Willard. Accordingly, even if Armstead had named proper defendants, his claims would fail as a
matter of law, and repleading would be futile. Leave to amend, as a result, will not be granted.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order

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would not be taken in good faith. Therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an

appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,444-45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is directed
to enter judgment and to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

ERIC N. VtfALIANO
United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
March 21,2013

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