Zere v. Cooper

Filing 4

ORDER granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis for purposes of this Order Only and Dismissing the Complaint - For the reasons set forth in the ATTACHED WRITTEN SUMMARY ORDER, pro se plaintiff's application for < i>in forma pauperis status is granted for purposes of this Order only and this action is DISMISSED, with prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be take n in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Electronic Order and the Attached Written Summary Order to pro se plaintiff and to close this case. SO ORDERED by Judge Dora Lizette Irizarry on 2/28/2013. (Irizarry, Dora)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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EDEM ZERE, pro se,
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Plaintiff,
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-against:
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ANDERSON COOPER,
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Defendant.
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:
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DORA L. IRIZARRY, U.S. District Judge:

SUMMARY ORDER
13-CV-0723 (DLI)(LB)

On February 4, 2013, pro se plaintiff Edem Zere (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against
television personality Anderson Cooper by way of a six-page handwritten complaint, alleging
essentially that Cooper has been harassing Plaintiff and his brother. Plaintiff also seeks to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The court grants Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP solely for
the purpose of this Summary Order, however, for the reasons set forth below, the complaint is
dismissed.
In reviewing the complaint, the court is mindful that, “a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court construes pro se pleadings “to
raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F. 3d
471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (emphasis omitted). A district court must nevertheless
dismiss an IFP action at any time when it is frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief can
be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An action is “frivolous” when either: (1) “the factual
contentions are clearly baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy;
or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Livingston v. Adirondack

Beverage Co., 141 F. 3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court
has observed that a “finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to
the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable
facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Here, reading the complaint liberally, it appears that Plaintiff accuses Cooper of: 1)
implanting Plaintiff with electronic chips without first seeking his permission; 2) attempting to
murder Plaintiff’s brother; 3) attempting to murder Plaintiff at least four times; 4) blackmailing
Plaintiff; and 5) damaging Plaintiff’s health. (See generally Compl., Dkt. Entry 1.) Plaintiff
wants Cooper arrested and requests that Cooper be prevented from using Twitter. Plaintiff also
seeks explanations as to why all of this is happening to him.
The court finds these allegations irrational and incredible on their face. The events
described in the complaint appear to have occurred in Plaintiff’s mind, rather than in the physical
world.

Moreover, large parts of the complaint are incomprehensible.

Accordingly, the

complaint also does not comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
requires: “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction . . .; (2) a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a
demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Generally, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without granting leave to
amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid
claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F. 3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). However, a court
may deny an opportunity to amend “when amendment would be futile.” Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.
3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 2009). Here, it is clear from Plaintiff’s complaint that he does not have any
possibility of asserting a plausible claim. Therefore, any attempt to amend the complaint would

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be futile. See Cuoco, 222 F. 3d at 112 (denying leave to amend a pro se complaint where
amendment would be futile). Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to
conform to Rule 8 and because the action is frivolous, and amendment of the complaint would be
futile. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for the
purpose of any appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
February 28, 2013
_______________/s/_____________
DORA L. IRIZARRY
United States District Judge

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