Williams v. Frank Martz Coach Company et al

Filing 65

ORDER denying 58 Motion for Reconsideration. For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum and Order, Defendants' motion for reconsideration is denied. Ordered by Judge Margo K. Brodie on 6/30/2014. (Ramos, Christopher)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------JEROLD WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
13-CV-1860 (MKB)

v.
FRANK MARTZ COACH COMPANY, PATRICK
GRAHAM and LIANG TIAN,
Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------------MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:
On February 27, 2013, Plaintiff Jerold Williams commenced the above-captioned case
against Defendants Frank Martz Coach Company (“Martz”), FH Family LP (“FH Family”),
Patrick Graham, and Liang Tian, in New York State Supreme Court, Kings County. On April 3,
2013, Defendants removed the case to this Court. On July 10, 2013, the parties stipulated to the
dismissal of all claims against FH Family (“July 10, 2013 Stipulation”). (Docket Entry No. 34.)
On July 10, 2013, Martz and Graham (“Defendants”) requested a pre-motion conference in
anticipation of, inter alia, moving to transfer this action to the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
(Docket Entry No. 33.) At the pre-motion conference on September 12, 2013, the Court heard
oral argument and denied Defendants’ application to transfer venue without prejudice. (Minute
Entry dated Sept. 12, 2013.) On January 6, 2014, Defendants again moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) to transfer this action to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. By Memorandum and
Order dated May 14, 2014, the Court denied Defendants’ motion. Defendants now move the
Court to reconsider its May 14, 2014 decision. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’
motion for reconsideration is denied.

I.

Background
a.

The Parties

Martz is a bus company, based in Pennsylvania, that operates bus routes throughout the
United States. (Compl. ¶ 3.) Martz leased and operated a 2008 MCI M819 bus bearing a
Pennsylvania license plate (the “Bus”). 1 Graham, employed by Martz, operated the Bus in the
course and scope of his employment with Martz. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 10.) Tian was and is a resident of
Rochester, New York. (Id. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff was and is a resident of Kings County, New York. (Id.
¶ 1.)
b.

March 6, 2011 accident

On or about March 6, 2011, Graham drove the Bus to New York, where he picked up
passengers, including Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 14.) While traveling north on Interstate 380 in
Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania, the Bus and a 2007 Nissan (the “Car”), operated by Tian,
“crashed,” and the Bus overturned. (Id. ¶¶ 15–18.) Another vehicle, occupied by Rene Phillips
and operated by her husband Lamont Phillips, also crashed. 2 (Def. Mem. 2.) Mr. Phillips
sustained fatal injuries. (Id.) Plaintiff “sustained severe, serious and permanent personal
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FH Family owned the Bus, which it leased to Martz. (July 13, 2013 Stipulation ¶¶ 1–2;
Compl. ¶ 6.) Martz operated the Bus and was responsible for its repair and maintenance. (July
13, 2013 Stipulation ¶¶ 3–4.)
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Defendants submitted a “police crash report” from the accident which sets forth the
details of the crash. (Police Crash Report dated July 22, 2011, annexed to the Affirmation of
Christina M. Rogers-Spang (“Rogers-Spang Aff.”) as Ex. B.) According to the police crash
report, the Phillips’ vehicle was stopped on the left lane/shoulder area of the interstate after their
vehicle was involved in a crash. (Id. at 14.) Another vehicle, Tian’s Nissan, was stopped in the
“right lane and middle of the interstate.” (Id. at 15–16.) The Bus, was traveling north on the
interstate when it moved from the right lane to the left lane/shoulder area to avoid colliding with
the Nissan. (Id. at 15) As the Bus moved to the left lane, it struck Mr. Phillips and the Phillips’
vehicle. (Id.) The Bus continued north and struck a guard rail located off the right side of the
interstate. (Id.) The Bus then rolled over, coming to a final rest on its passenger side facing
north in the left lane of the interstate. (Id.)

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injuries.” (Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff alleges that the accident and Plaintiff’s injuries were caused
by the carelessness, recklessness and negligence of Defendants in the ownership, operation,
management, control and supervision of their respective motor vehicles. (Id. ¶ 20.)
II. Discussion
a.

Standard of Review

The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration “is strict, and reconsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the
court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995);
see also Local Civ. R. 6.3 (The moving party must “set[] forth concisely the matters or
controlling decisions which counsel believes the Court has overlooked.”); Smith v. New York
City Dep’t of Educ., 524 F. App’x 730, 734 (2d Cir. 2013). It is thus “well-settled” that a motion
for reconsideration is “not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new
theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a ‘second bite at the apple.’”
Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sequa
Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)), as amended, (July 13, 2012). In other
words, “[r]econsideration of a court’s previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed
sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” Hidalgo v.
New York, No. 11-CV-5074, 2012 WL 3598878, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2012) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). A motion for reconsideration “should not be used as a vehicle
simply to voice disagreement with the Court’s decision, . . . nor does it present ‘an occasion for
repeating old arguments previously rejected or an opportunity for making new arguments that
could have previously been made.’” Premium Sports Inc. v. Connell, No. 10-CV-3753, 2012

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WL 2878085, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (citations omitted). Moreover, “a party may not,
on a motion for reconsideration, raise an argument for the first time.” Image Processing Tech.,
LLC v. Canon Inc., No. 10-CV-3867, 2012 WL 253097, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2012)
(alteration, citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases). In order to prevail
on a motion for reconsideration, “the moving party must demonstrate that the Court overlooked
controlling decisions or factual matters that were put before the Court on the underlying
motion.” Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Grp. Inc., 28 F. App’x 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Henderson v. City of New York, No.
05-CV-2588, 2011 WL 5513228, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2011) (“In order to have been
‘overlooked,’ the decisions or data in question must have been put before [the court] on the
underlying motion . . . and which, had they been considered, might have reasonably altered the
result before the court.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Stoner v. Young
Concert Artists, Inc., No. 11-CV-7279, 2013 WL 2425137, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013) (“A
motion for reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy, and this Court will not reconsider issues
already examined simply because a party is dissatisfied with the outcome of his case. To do
otherwise would be a waste of judicial resources.” (alteration, citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
b.

Defendants are not entitled to reconsideration

Defendants argue that “new information that was not available to them or to the Court” at
the time they submitted their motion will alter the Court’s analysis with respect to the
convenience of the parties, and thus change the Court’s underlying decision. (Def. Mem. 4.)
Specifically, Defendants state that Plaintiff has been incarcerated in Lackawanna County Prison

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in Scranton, Pennsylvania since September 2013. (Id.) Defendants note that Plaintiff’s “current
residence” is now less than two miles from the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s incarceration was not a fact presented to the Court during its initial
consideration of Defendants’ motion to transfer venue. (See id. (“new information that was not
available to . . . the Court”).) As such, the Court did not overlook Plaintiff’s incarceration and
therefore, Plaintiff’s incarceration cannot serve as the basis for Defendants’ motion for
reconsideration. See Lee v. Torres, No. 11-CV-2659, 2013 WL 125925, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9,
2013) (“A motion for reconsideration may not be used to advance new facts, issues or arguments
not previously presented to the Court, nor may it be used as a vehicle for relitigating issues
already decided by the Court.” (quoting Montblanc–Simplo GmbH v. Colibri Corp., 739 F. Supp.
2d 143, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 2010))); Simms v. City of New York, No. 10-CV-3420, 2011 WL
4344202, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2011) (“The law in this Circuit is clear: a party is not
permitted to put forth new facts, issues or arguments that were not presented to the court on the
original motion.” (quoting Cohen v. Federal Express Corp., No. 07-CV-1288, 2007 WL
1573918, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2007))); Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel
Employees & Rest. Employees Int’l Union, No. 00-CV-3613, 2004 WL 1943099, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2004) (“The Court cannot overlook legal arguments it was not presented
with in the motion papers. . . . It is well established that [a] motion for reconsideration is [also]
not a vehicle for plugging the gaps of the lost motion with additional matters.” (alterations in
original) (quoting Wechsler v. Hunt Health Sys., Ltd., 186 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410–11 (S.D.N.Y.
2002))); Bueno v. Gill, 237 F. Supp. 2d 447, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“A motion for reconsideration
is limited to bringing to the Court’s attention controlling authority or factual matters presented to
the Court in the underlying motion and overlooked.”).

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In addition, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s deposition was held at Lackawanna County
Prison on April 29, 2014, (see Ex. B, annexed to Defendants’ Mot. for Reconsideration), over
two weeks before the Court issued its May 14, 2014 Memorandum and Order denying
Defendants’ motion to transfer venue to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. At no point did
Defendants attempt to contact the Court to apprise it of this, allegedly important, fact. 3
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to reconsider the Court’s May 14, 2014
Memorandum and Order denying transfer of action to the Middle District of Pennsylvania is
denied.
SO ORDERED:

s/ MKB
MARGO K. BRODIE
United States District Judge
Dated: June 30, 2014
Brooklyn, New York

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Furthermore, Plaintiff’s “walking distance” proximity, (Def. Mem. 5), to the Middle
District of Pennsylvania does not make that forum more convenient for Plaintiff than the Eastern
District of New York since Plaintiff cannot freely travel to either district while incarcerated. See
Mohsen v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., No. 11-CV-6751, 2013 WL 5312525, at *8 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 23, 2013) (noting that the plaintiff’s incarceration in Arizona made it impossible for him to
travel to the current forum of the Southern District of New York or to the proposed forum of the
Central District of California).

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