Mallgren v. American Psychiatric Association et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM & ORDER: The Court grants Plaintiff's 2 requests to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. All of Plaintiff's claims contained in the three above-captioned Complaints are dismissed for fai lure to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. Plaintiff is warned that the future filing of vexatious and frivolous litigation may result in sanctions, including limitations on filing. SO ORDERED by Judge Margo K. Brodie, on 3/11/2014. C/mailed to pro se Plaintiff. (Forwarded for Judgment.) (Latka-Mucha, Wieslawa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------ANTHONY BRIAN MALLGREN,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
13-CV-2211 (MKB)

v.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N and
NORTH SHORE LI JEWISH HEALTH SYS.,
Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------ANTHONY BRIAN MALLGREN,
Plaintiff,
13-CV-2214 (MKB)
v.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
---------------------------------------------------------------ANTHONY BRIAN MALLGREN,
Plaintiff,
13-CV-2215 (MKB)
v.
JOHN DOE(S),
Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------------MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:
On April 8, 2013, Plaintiff Anthony Brian Mallgren, who was then committed at the
Zucker Hillside Hospital in Glen Oaks, New York, brought three separate pro se actions against
the American Psychiatric Association and North Shore Long Island Jewish Hospital, the United

States, and John Doe Defendants from the New York State Department of Health Centralized
Hospital Intake Program. The Court grants Plaintiff’s requests to proceed in forma pauperis
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the reasons discussed below, the Complaints are dismissed.
Plaintiff is warned that the future filing of vexatious and frivolous litigation may result in
sanctions, including limitations on filing.
I.

Background
At the time he filed the three above-captioned Complaints, Plaintiff was being held at the

Zucker Hillside Hospital, a psychiatric facility in Glen Oaks, New York operated by North Shore
Long Island Jewish Health System. The Complaints challenge the conditions of confinement at
the facility and allege limitations on Plaintiff’s access to the courts. The Court takes judicial
notice of the fact that Plaintiff was subsequently released from confinement a few days after
filing these actions. Plaintiff filed additional motions in other cases pending before the Court, in
person at the Eastern District of New York courthouse, on April 11, 2012. See Mallgren v. Louis
Vuitton North America, Inc. et al., No. 13-CV-416, Docket Entry No. 12; Mallgren v. New York
City, No. 13-CV-724, Docket Entry No. 32.
Plaintiff has an extensive history of litigation in this Court. Plaintiff has filed fifteen
different actions since January 23, 2013. See Mallgren v. Louis Vuitton North America, Inc. et
al., No. 13-CV-416 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2013) (transferred to the United States District Court for
the Central District of California and later dismissed, No. 13-CV-706, slip op. (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 12, 2013)), transfer appealed to the Second Circuit, which dismissed the appeal, for failure
to pay the filing fee, No. 13-CV-709 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 2013)); Mallgren v. New York City, No. 13CV-724, 2013 WL 816236 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2013) (dismissed in part, and leave to file an
amended complaint granted), appeal dismissed (2d Cir. July 24, 2013); Mallgren v. Metropolitan

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Transportation Authority, No. 13-CV-986 (pending); Mallgren v. Motion Recruitment Partners
Inc., et al., No. 13-CV-1054, 2013 WL 1873304 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2013) (dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction), appeal dismissed (2d Cir. July 24, 2013); Mallgren v. John Doe
Corporation, No. 13-CV-1265, 2013 WL 1873319 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2013) (dismissed as
frivolous and for failure to state a claim), appeal dismissed (2d Cir. July 24, 2013); Mallgren v.
Bloomberg, et al., No. 13-CV-1466, 2013 WL 1873334 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2013) (same), appeal
dismissed (2d Cir. July 24, 2013); Mallgren v. American Psychiatric Association, et al., No. 13CV-2211 (pending); Mallgren v. United States, No. 13-CV-2214 (pending); Mallgren v. John
Doe(s), No. 13-CV-2215 (pending); Mallgren v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 13-CV-2477
(pending); Mallgren v. U.S. Court Clerk, No. 13-CV-2654 (pending); Mallgren v. Marriott
International, Inc., 13-CV-2727 (pending); Mallgren v. Mallgren, No. 13-CV-2728 (pending); In
re Anthony Brian Mallgren, No. 13-CV-3622 (pending); Mallgren v. Bowery Residents
Committee Inc., No. 13-CV-6621 (pending).
Plaintiff has also filed multiple actions in the United States District Courts for the Eastern
District of Washington and Southern District of New York. See Mallgren v. Clerk’s Office,
No. 13-CV-0210, 2013 WL 3553397, at *2 (E.D. Wash. July 11, 2013) (“The Court recognizes
that Plaintiff has filed at least 29 cases in the United States District Courts and 12 cases in the
Circuit Courts of Appeal, this year. This case is one of eight actions which have been filed in
this District since May 10, 2013.”); Mallgren v. New York State Supreme Court, No. 12-CV7240, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2012) (dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and because the defendant is immune
from suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Mallgren v. New York State Supreme Court, et
al., No. 12-CV-7404, 2013 WL 586857 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2013) (dismissed for failure to

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comply with filing requirements); Mallgren v. Intellectual Ventures, No. 12-CV-7447, slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2012) (dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)); Mallgren v. Microsoft, et al., No. 12-CV-7517, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3,
2013) (dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)), appeal dismissed (2d Cir. Dec. 11, 2013); In Re Anthony Brian
Mallgreen, No. 13-CV-1124, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. March 6, 2013) (dismissed for failure to state a
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)), appeal dismissed (2d Cir. July 30, 2013);
Mallgren v. New York Hospital, No. 13-CV-1763 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2013) (dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction; appeal pending); Mallgreen v. Parties in this petition, No. 13-CV3660 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013) (denying petition for discretionary exemption from user access
fees for the Court Electronic Records (PACER) system). Plaintiff also filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, purporting to challenge the procedures of the
United States Supreme Court. See Mallgren v. Suter, No. 13-CV-1200, 2013 WL 4033704
(D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2013) (dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)).
On March 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Partially Amended Complaint” and
dated March 26, 2013 in Mallgren v. New York City, Docket No. 13-CV-724 (No. 13-CV-724,
Docket Entry No. 29-1), which provides some information about the circumstances that led to
Plaintiff’s confinement at Zucker Hillside Hospital.1 According to the Partially Amended

1

The Court did not have jurisdiction over the motion to amend the complaint or any
other motions related to the order dated March 4, 2013 in Docket No. 13-CV-724 while the
appeal was pending. See Negron v. United States, 394 F. App’x 788, 792 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is
well-established that ‘[t]he filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance
— it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over
those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.’” (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer

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Complaint and an earlier motion filed in the same case, Plaintiff received an airline ticket from
Project Reconnect, a program through the New York City Department of Homeless Services, to
allow him to fly to Spokane, Washington, on March 20, 2013. (No. 13-CV-724, Docket Entry
No. 27, Mar. 20, 2013 Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 3, 6; Docket Entry No. 29-1,
Mar. 28, 2013 Partially Amended Complaint ¶ 1.) Plaintiff claims that he was arrested by
officers from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey at JFK airport and then detained
by emergency medical responders from the Fire Department of New York. (No. 13-CV-724,
Docket Entry No. 29-1, Mar. 28, 2013 Partially Amended Complaint ¶¶ 11, 13.) Plaintiff was
allegedly taken to the Zucker Hillside Hospital, admitted to the psychiatric unit, and “converted
to involuntary status” and was “held against [his] will.” (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff demanded release
from involuntary confinement and other injunctive relief and damages. On April 8, 2013,
Plaintiff filed a motion for injunctive relief about the conditions of confinement, forced
medication, and his lack of access to postage and computer equipment at Zucker Hillside
Hospital. (No. 13-CV-724, Docket Entry No. 31, April 8, 2013 Motion for Injunctive Relief.)
On April 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed another motion for injunctive relief, stating that he had been
discharged from the hospital on April 8, 2013 and seeking to enjoin any authority from taking

Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)); Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1994)
(district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on a motion to amend a complaint after a notice of
appeal was filed); see also Ching v. United States, 298 F.3d 174, 180 n.5 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating
that “[t]he district court could not rule on any motion affecting an aspect of the case that was
before [the Second Circuit], including a motion to amend the motion, while that appeal was
pending); Ramirez v. United States, No. 05-CV-4179, 2013 WL 247792, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22,
2013) (citing Ching, 298 F.3d at 180, for the proposition that “the filing of a Notice of Appeal
divests [the district court] of jurisdiction over petitioner’s original . . . motion”). The Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal on July 24, 2013, because a final order had not been issued by this
Court. (No. 13-CV-724, Docket Entry No. 37, Mandate issued Aug. 14, 2013.)

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him into custody. (No. 13-CV-724, Docket Entry No. 32.) Plaintiff attached his discharge form
as an exhibit to his motion. (See id.)
Each of Plaintiff’s instant Complaints names different Defendants. In the Complaint
filed in Docket No. 13-CV-2211, dated April 2, 2013, Plaintiff names the American Psychiatric
Association and the North Shore Long Island Jewish Hospital as Defendants. The Complaint
states: “Mallgren observed many faulty practices, supposedly prescribed by the American
Psychiatric Association that caused a prognosis through diagnosis or controlled environmental
factors, such as access to personal hygiene supplies, temperature controlled invocation, access to
court hearings, or the denial or prolongation thereof, notification of meals, or the failure to do so
and other such practices and patient interactions.” (No. 13-CV-2211, Complaint, Background
Information, ¶ 3.) The Complaint alleges that the practices employed at psychiatric facilities,
jails, and shelters may contribute to “disorders, diseases and/or emotional damage.” (Id. ¶ 4.)
The only specific allegation lodged against any individual is a reported conversation between
“McDonald,” who brought him to the Zucker Hillside facility, and the admitting nurse, who is
alleged to have queried “What are we suppose[d] to do with him if he doesn’t have any
psychiatric history?” (Id. ¶ 2.)
In the Complaint against the United States, Docket No. 13-CV-2214, filed on April 8,
2013, Plaintiff states that “constitutional vulnerabilities result in voided citizenship and the
decoupling of governed efficiencies for individuals through the exploitation of limited
jurisdictional access and insight where statutory and regulative means prevent the application of
the constitutional abstract our forefathers articulated.” (No. 13-CV-2214, Complaint.) The
Complaint includes vague assertions of “circumventing due process” and “punitive measures
may be considered cruel and unusual punishment,” but does not provide specific details of any

6

alleged constitutional deprivation. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that “all mail is currently being held at
the front desk.” (Id.) He states that “mail has been held since the 28th of March, 2013, it being
April 5th, 2013 as this claim is being written.” (Id., Claim Details ¶ 4.) Plaintiff does not
identify the pieces of mail that were allegedly delayed. However, he makes reference to his
federal court cases and states that “there is no sufficient measures [sic] in place to ensure access
to Federal Jurisdiction.” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that he contacted several organizations
and government offices to raise his concerns about the mail. (Id., Claim Details ¶ 5; Exhibit A,
Call Log.) He alleges that the Federal Bureau of Investigations informed him that “holding mail
did not constitute obstructing justice.” (No. 13-CV-2214, Complaint, Claim Details ¶ 6.)
Plaintiff states that “our Federal Government has turned a blind eye to its citizens.” (Id.,
Practical Substantiation.)
In the Complaint in Docket No. 13-CV-2215, dated April 8, 2013, Plaintiff names
unspecified John Does from the New York State Department of Health Centralized Hospital
Intake Program. Plaintiff alleges that he “placed several calls to the Centralized Hospital Intake
Program to file complaints, report problems and discuss concerns, none of which have been
satisfactorily remedied.” (No. 13-CV-2215, Complaint, Background Information ¶ 7.) Plaintiff
asserts that he called “about concerns with mail being held, not receiving the ‘Your Rights as a
Hospital Patient in New York State’ . . . , not being notified when meal food was being served,
his room temperature being so warm as to discourage sleep and other such issues.” (Id. ¶ 9.)
Plaintiff alleges that he also called the Mental Hygiene Legal Service to request help in filing
motions in federal or state courts and was denied assistance, leaving him “without legal remedy
for these transgressions.” (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.) Plaintiff alleges that these failings violate his right to
due process and constitute cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16.)

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Each Complaint purports to incorporate by reference prior cases, including Docket
No. 13-CV-724, which included the later documents describing Plaintiff’s experience with his
involuntary commitment beginning on March 20, 2013. The Complaints each request
unspecified monetary damages and injunctive relief requiring “all applicable organizations being
issued cease and desist orders” (No. 13-CV-2211, Complaint), adherence to “proper statutes,
regulation and organizations” (No. 13-CV-2214, Complaint), and “court ordered review”
(No. 13-CV-2215, Complaint).
II. Discussion
a. Standard of Review
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this
tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must
be mindful that the Plaintiff’s pleadings should be held “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, the
court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”). Nevertheless, the court
must screen “a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity” and, thereafter, “dismiss the complaint,
or any portion of the complaint,” if it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir.

8

2007). Similarly, the court is required to dismiss sua sponte an in forma pauperis action, if the
court determines it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Abbas, 480 F.3d at 639.
A plaintiff seeking to bring a lawsuit in federal court must establish that the Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See, e.g., Monreal v. New York, 518 F. App’x 11 (2d
Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to establish subject matter
jurisdiction); Zito v. New York City Office of Payroll Admin., 514 F. App’x 26, 27 (2d Cir. 2013)
(same); Chestnut v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-5369, 2012 WL 1657362, at * 3
(E.D.N.Y. May 7, 2012) (“Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard afforded pro se
litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over cases if subject
matter jurisdiction is lacking.”). “[F]ailure of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and may
be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua sponte. If subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking, the action must be dismissed.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d
697, 700–01 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Federal subject matter jurisdiction is available
only when a “federal question” is presented, or when plaintiffs and defendants have complete
diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and
§ 1332. In order to invoke federal question jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s claims must arise “under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
b. Improper Defendants
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the conditions of his confinement and his access to the
courts could suggest a claim for deprivation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To state a claim pursuant to Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct was

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“committed by a person acting under color of state law,” and that the conduct “deprived [the
plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d
545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)). Section 1983 applies to state actors, not federal officials. However,
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), permits
recovery for some constitutional violations by federal agents, even in the absence of a statute
conferring such a right. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001) (“In Bivens . . . we recognized for the first time an implied
private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s
constitutional rights.”); Vasquez v. Klie, No. 03-CV-3905, 2012 WL 1107306, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 30, 2012) (“Under Bivens and its progeny, federal courts can hear suits for money damages
against federal government officials accused of violating constitutional rights.”), aff’d, 2013 WL
850236 (2d Cir. Mar. 8, 2013). Under both Section 1983 and Bivens, a plaintiff’s claims
generally must be brought against the individuals personally responsible for the alleged
deprivation of his constitutional rights, not against the government entities or agencies where
those individuals are employed. A plaintiff seeking to recover money damages “must plead that
each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated
the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff’s three above-captioned Complaints do not identify any individual defendant
who could be held liable for the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. The American
Psychiatric Association and the North Shore Long Island Jewish Health System are both private
entities that are not ordinarily amenable to suits for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Anderson v. North Shore Long Island Jewish Healthcare System’s Zucker Hillside Hosp.,

10

No. 12-CV-1049, 2013 WL 784391, *12 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2013) (“Private hospitals . . . have
consistently been held to be ‘private actors’ in the § 1983 context.”); Ganthier v. North ShoreLong Island Jewish Health System, 298 F. Supp. 2d 342, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (dismissing
§ 1983 claims against North Shore-Long Island Jewish Health System because it is a private
actor). As the Supreme Court has held, “the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes
from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” American
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Franks v. Laquila Grp. Inc., No. 13-CV-980, 2013 WL 790544, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4,
2013) (quoting American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 50); Elufe v. Lyons, No. 10-CV-2638,
2010 WL 2606649, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2010) (same). Plaintiff has not alleged that the
hospital or its staff members or the American Psychiatric Association were state actors, were
acting in concert with state actors, or were serving as an instrumentality of the state. See, e.g.,
Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 755–57 (2d Cir. 2000) (private hospital was not a state or
municipal facility and thus was not liable pursuant to § 1983, unless it was acting as an
instrumentality of the state). Moreover, the only claim against the American Psychiatric
Association, a private organization, is that it “supposedly prescribed” unspecified “faulty
practices” at mental health facilities. (No. 13-CV-2211, Complaint ¶ 3.) Plaintiff fails to state a
claim against either of the private entities named in the Complaint filed in Docket No. 13-CV2211.
Plaintiff’s Complaint in Docket No. 13-CV-2214 names the United States as a defendant,
but fails to state a claim against the United States or any federal agent. The only allegations
against any federal entity are Plaintiff’s vague assertion that “our Federal Government has turned
a blind eye to its citizens” and his claim that “the Federal Bureau of Investigation stated that

11

holding mail did not constitute obstructing justice.” (No. 13-CV-2214, Complaint, Practical
Substantiation and Claim Details ¶ 6.) Plaintiff has not identified any individual federal agent,
nor has he demonstrated that any federal government entity has violated his constitutional rights.
Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the United States in the Complaint filed in Docket No. 13CV-2214.
Plaintiff’s Complaint in Docket No. 13-CV-2215 names John Doe(s), “an unknown
individual or individuals within the New York State Department of Health” who “were
negligent, reckless or malicious in their fielding, recording and resolving of request[s] and
complaints.” (No. 13-CV-2215, Complaint, Jurisdiction ¶¶ 2, 4.) Plaintiff alleges that the
Centralized Hospital Intake Program, an agency within the Department of Health, failed to
resolve his complaints to his satisfaction. (Id., Background Information ¶¶ 8–12, 14.) The Court
declines to attempt to identify the John Doe defendants, as Plaintiff fails to state a claim against
them, as set forth below.
c. Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff’s vague allegations about “controlled environmental factors” fail to state a claim
related to the conditions of his confinement. Prisoners have constitutionally protected rights to
receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and security. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Bess v. R.N.D.C., No. 11-CV-6272, 2012 WL 34100, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 6, 2012), appeal dismissed (July 6, 2012). Humane conditions of confinement are
guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment of
convicted prisoners. Pre-trial detainees in state custody and persons who are subject to civil
commitment are protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982) (“Persons who have been involuntarily committed are

12

entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose
conditions of confinement are designed to punish.”); Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69 (2d
Cir. 2009) (detainees in state custody are protected against mistreatment by prison officials under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Groves v. Davis, No. 11-CV-1317, 2012
WL 651919, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2012) (applying the Eighth Amendment standard to the
Fourteenth Amendment claims of a plaintiff subject to involuntary civil commitment in a mental
health facility). A claim for inhumane conditions of confinement may assert a constitutional
violation where it alleges “unquestioned and serious deprivations of basic human needs” or
denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 757 F.2d
33, 35 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); see Vogelfang v.
Capra, 889 F. Supp. 2d 489, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 757 F.2d at 35); Bess,
2012 WL 34100, at *2 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). In addition to the seriousness of the
deprivation, the court may also consider its duration. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686–87
(1978) (“[T]he length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement
meets constitutional standards. A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet of ‘grue’ might be tolerable
for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.”); Hallett v. Davis, No. 11-CV-4646,
2012 WL 4378020, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012) (quoting Hutto, 437 U.S. at 686).
In the Complaint filed in Docket No. 13-CV-2211, Plaintiff complains that he “observed
many faulty practices . . . such as access to personal hygiene supplies, temperature controlled
invocation, . . . [and] notification of meals.” (No. 13-CV-2211, Complaint, Background
Information, ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his involuntary commitment —
approximately nineteen days — do not allege a serious deprivation of basic human needs that
would suggest a violation of his constitutional rights.

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d. Access to the Courts
Plaintiff’s allegations of lack of “access to court hearings,” and “access to reasonable
legal resources and/or aide” and “having all mail held at the front desk,” do not state a claim
based on deprivation of the right of access to the courts. Prisoners, detainees, and individuals
subject to civil commitment have a First Amendment right of access to the courts and a number
of derivative rights, including the right to access legal materials and legal research and to send
and receive legal mail. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350–353 (1996) (discussing right of
access to law libraries and assistance for prisoners); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir.
2003) (discussing right of access to legal mail for prisoners); see also Dorsey v. Hogan, 511 F.
App’x 96, 98–101 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing right of access to law library access for individual
subject to civil commitment); Ahlers v. Rabinowitz, 684 F.3d 53, 64 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing
right of access to legal mail for individual subject to civil commitment).
To state a claim for denial of access to the courts, including interference with mail, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendant “took or was responsible for actions that hindered a
plaintiff’s efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Goord, 320 F.3d at 351 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted) (quoting Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also
Ahlers, 684 F.3d at 64 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying Davis, 320 F.3d at 351, to the context of civil
commitment and holding that “[a] patient must show regular and unjustifiable interference with
incoming legal mail”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 466 (2012). The plaintiff must also show that the
defendant’s actions resulted in actual injury, “such as the dismissal of an otherwise meritorious
legal claim.” Razzoli v. Executive Office of U.S. Marshals, No. 10-CV-4269, 2010 WL 5051083,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2010) (quoting Cancel v. Goord, No. 00-CV-2042, 2001 WL 303713, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2001)); see also Walker v. Schriro, No. 11-CV-9299, 2013 WL 1234930,

14

at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013) (“In other words the plaintiff must show that a non-frivolous
legal claim had been frustrated or was being impeded due to the actions of prison officials.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff has not shown any actual injury arising from the alleged delay in sending mail.
He claims that his mail was delayed beginning March 28, 2013. The instant Complaints were
dated April 2, 5, and 8 and filed in this Court on April 8, 2013. Plaintiff has not alleged that any
other pending litigation has been delayed or disrupted or that he has suffered any other harm as a
result of a minor delay in his ability to send mail. As Plaintiff has failed to allege an actual
injury, his access to court claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim.
e. Frequent Frivolous Litigation
Of the fifteen cases Plaintiff has filed in this Court since January 23, 2013, with entry of
this Memorandum and Order, six will have been dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. By Orders dated May 2, 2013 in
Mallgren v. Motion Recruitment Partners Inc., et al., No. 13-CV-1054; Mallgren v. John Doe
Corporation, No. 13-CV-1265; and Mallgren v. Bloomberg, et al., No. 13-CV-1466, Plaintiff
was warned that the future filing of vexatious and frivolous litigation may result in sanctions,
including the imposition of an injunction prohibiting him from making future filings seeking in
forma pauperis status without leave of the Court. The federal courts have limited resources.
Frequent frivolous filings work to diminish the ability of the courts to manage their dockets for
the efficient administration of justice. “The district courts have the power and the obligation to
protect the public and the efficient administration of justice from individuals who have a history
of litigation entailing vexation, harassment and needless expense to other parties and an
unnecessary burden on the courts and their supporting personnel.” Lau v. Meddaugh, 229

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F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff is again
warned that the future filing of vexatious and frivolous litigation may result in sanctions,
including the imposition of an injunction prohibiting him from making future filings seeking in
forma pauperis status without leave of the Court. See In re Sassower, 20 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir.
1994) (“With respect to civil litigation, courts have recognized that the normal opportunity to
initiate lawsuits may be limited once a litigant has demonstrated a clear pattern of abusing the
litigation process by filing vexatious and frivolous complaints.”); see also Amaker v. Haponik,
125 F. App’x 375, 376 (2d Cir. 2005) (warning plaintiff that “filing of frivolous appeals . . . may
result in the imposition of leave-to-file sanctions,” as “[s]uch a measure is appropriately applied
to those litigants who have a ‘clear pattern of abusing the litigation process by filing vexatious
and frivolous complaints’” (quoting In re Sassower, 20 F.3d at 44)); In re Knows, No. 12-CV1908, 2012 WL 2923317, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012) (putting plaintiff “on notice that any
future filing of vexatious or frivolous complaints with the court may lead the court to impose an
injunction prohibiting her from filing a complaint without the court's prior authorization” (citing
In re Sassower, 20 F.3d at 44)).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, all of Plaintiff’s claims contained in the three above-captioned
Complaints are dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any

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appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for
purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
SO ORDERED:

s/ MKB
MARGO K. BRODIE
United States District Judge

Dated: March 11, 2014
Brooklyn, New York

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