Justice v. City of New York et al
MEMORANDUM & ORDER: By 6 Memorandum and Order dated 8/27/2013, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims in this action as duplicative. By 8 letter filed on 9/24/2014, Plaintiff moved to reopen her case. The Court construes Plaintiff& #039;s 8 motion as a motion for reconsideration and to set aside the judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiff's 8 motion for reconsideration of the Court's 8/27/2013 Memorandum and Order dismissing her Complaint is denied. So too is Plaintif f's request to set aside the judgment. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and in forma pauperis status is therefore denied for purposes of an appeal. SO ORDERED by Judge Margo K. Brodie, on 7/27/2015. C/mailed to pro se Plaintiff. (Latka-Mucha, Wieslawa)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
CITY OF NEW YORK, NYPD 5TH
PRECINCT, U.S. MARSHALLS [SIC], USA,
----------------------------------------------------------MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Brenda Justice filed this pro se action on July 12, 2013, alleging that she was
falsely arrested on October 15, 2012 in Brooklyn, New York, and that her son was wrongfully
taken away from her by a United States Marshal.
According to Plaintiff’s allegations, “U.S.
Marshall [sic] Greg Holme seized my child, never told me why, never returned him,” and “my
child was taken by NY US Marshalls [sic], NY held me 30 days, case was dismissed . . . NY
falsely accused me.” (Compl. 1.) Because Plaintiff’s claims were identical to claims brought
in a related action filed on February 1, 2013 that was pending before the Court, see Justice v.
Kuhnapfel, No. 13-CV-659, by Memorandum and Order dated August 27, 2013, the Court
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims in this action as duplicative.
(Docket Entry No. 6.) By letter filed
on September 24, 2014, Plaintiff moved to reopen her case.
(Docket Entry No. 8.) The Court
construes Plaintiff’s motion as a motion for reconsideration and to set aside the judgment.
the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to reopen the case.
Standard of Review
The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration “is strict, and reconsideration will
generally be denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the
court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.
1995); see also Local Civ. R. 6.3 (The moving party must “set forth concisely the matters or
controlling decisions which counsel believes the Court has overlooked.”); Smith v. N.Y.C. Dep’t
of Educ., 524 F. App’x 730, 734 (2d Cir. 2013). It is thus “well-settled” that a motion for
reconsideration is “not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new
theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a ‘second bite at the apple.’”
Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sequa
Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)), as amended, (July 13, 2012). In other
words, “[r]econsideration of a court’s previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed
sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.” Hidalgo v.
New York, No. 11-CV-5074, 2012 WL 3598878, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2012) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). A motion for reconsideration “should not be used as a
vehicle simply to voice disagreement with the Court’s decision, . . . nor does it present ‘an
occasion for repeating old arguments previously rejected or an opportunity for making new
arguments that could have previously been made.’” Premium Sports Inc. v. Connell, No. 10CV-3753, 2012 WL 2878085, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (citations omitted); see also Stoner
v. Young Concert Artists, Inc., No. 11-CV-7279, 2013 WL 2425137, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 20,
2013) (“A motion for reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy, and this Court will not
reconsider issues already examined simply because a party is dissatisfied with the outcome of his
case. To do otherwise would be a waste of judicial resources.” (alteration, citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
Moreover, “a party may not, on a motion for reconsideration, raise an argument for the
first time.” Image Processing Tech., LLC v. Canon Inc., No. 10-CV-3867, 2012 WL 253097, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2012) (alteration, citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
(collecting cases). In order to prevail on a motion for reconsideration, “the moving party must
demonstrate that the Court overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put
before the Court on the underlying motion.” Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Grp. Inc., 28 F. App’x 73,
75 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Henderson v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-2588, 2011 WL 5513228, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 10,
2011) (“In order to have been ‘overlooked,’ the decisions or data in question must have been put
before [the court] on the underlying motion . . . and which, had they been considered, might have
reasonably altered the result before the court.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
In addition, motions pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which allows a court to “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for . . . any other reason that justifies relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), are
disfavored and should only be granted upon a showing of “extraordinary circumstances, or
extreme hardship.” DeCurtis v. Ferrandina, 529 F. App’x 85, 86 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Harris v. United States, 367 F.3d 74, 81 (2d Cir. 2004)); see also Stevens v. Miller, 676 F.3d 62,
67 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that “courts require the party seeking to avail itself of [Rule 60(b)(6)]
to demonstrate ‘extraordinary circumstances’ warrant relief” (citing Liljeberg Health Services
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988))); DePasquale v. DePasquale, No. 12-CV-2564,
2013 WL 4010214, at * 2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2013) (“Granting a Rule 60(b)(6) motion requires a
showing of extraordinary circumstances to justify the reopening of a final judgment.” (citations
and internal quotations marks omitted)); Crawford v. Franklin Credit Management Corp., No.
08-CV-6293, 2013 WL 2951957, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2013) (“Motions for relief under
Rule 60(b) are disfavored, and are reserved for exceptional cases.” (citations omitted)).
Plaintiff is not entitled to reconsideration or the reopening of the judgment
Plaintiff is not entitled to reconsideration of the Court’s August 27, 2013 Memorandum
and Order because she has not shown that the Court overlooked controlling law or data, but is
instead attempting to relitigate the same issues raised in the Complaint. In her Complaint,
Plaintiff challenged the removal of her child from her custody and the warrant pursuant to which
she was “held” for “30 days” before the “case was dismissed . . . .” (Compl. 1.) The Court
dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint as duplicative because of the identical claims that were asserted
in her prior action. (Docket Entry No. 6.) Plaintiff’s current motion also challenges the
removal of her child from her custody. (Docket Entry No. 8.) Plaintiff does not assert in the
current motion that the Court overlooked controlling precedent or relevant facts. (Id.) Indeed,
the motion does not even address the Court’s decision. Similarly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated
extraordinary circumstances that warrant vacating the judgment. (Id.) Here, where Plaintiff
filed a prior action challenging the removal of her child, and the above-captioned action was
dismissed as duplicative of the prior action, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate extraordinary
circumstances that warrant vacating the judgment in this case.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s August 27, 2013
Memorandum and Order dismissing her Complaint is denied. So too is Plaintiff’s request to set
aside the judgment. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal
would not be taken in good faith and in forma pauperis status is therefore denied for purposes of
Coppedge v. United States, 269 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
MARGO K. BRODIE
United States District Judge
Dated: July 27, 2015
Brooklyn, New York
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