Gonzalez v. Weil Gotshal & Managers LLP et al
Filing
22
DECISION AND ORDER: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint is time-barred and the Court declines to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling. Plaintiff's Complaint is therefore dismissed with prejudice. Ordered by Judge William F. Kuntz, II on 4/30/2014. (Brucella, Michelle)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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SORAYA ROJAS GONZALEZ,
DECISION AND ORDER
13-CV-4992 (WFK)
Plaintiff,
-againstWEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP;
BARBARA SMITH; KEVIN HAGGERTY;
KATHY ORTIZ; and TYRA BOWENS,
Defendants.
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WILLIAM F. KUNTZ, II, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Soraya Rojas Gonzalez, prose, brings this Complaint alleging that the Defendants, Weil
Gotshal & Manges, LLP ("Weil Gotshal") and four individual Defendants, violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") by failing to accommodate her disability. Defendants
move to dismiss the Complaint arguing that Plaintiff's claim is procedurally flawed and timebarred because Plaintiff failed to file her EEOC complaint within 300 days of the last alleged
discriminatory act. This Court agrees. Plaintiff's Complaint is time-barred because of her
failure to file a timely complaint with the EEOC. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that the Court should invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling. Accordingly,
Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Soraya Rojas Gonzalez ("Plaintiff'), a former employee in Weil Gotshal's Accounting
Department, filed her federal Complaint on a court-supplied pro se form on September 4, 2013
alleging that Defendants violated the ADA. (Comp!. at 1). Plaintiff checked off the box for
"failure to accommodate [her] disability" and wrote "failure to prevent harassment and
aggression toward [her], not relocating" as the discriminatory conduct suffered.
(Id. at 3).
Plaintiff alleges that the discriminatory acts took place from March 2010 to July 2010 and
October 2010 to September 2011. 1 (Id) Plaintiff's alleged disabilities are post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) and anxiety/panic. (Id)
Plaintiff's handwritten narrative of events states that she was subject to discrimination,
harassment, and intimidation by Defendant Tyra Bowens, a Weil Gotshal co-worker. (Id at 4).
Plaintiff alleges that she was suffering from mental health issues because of her abusive father's
passing. (Id at 5). Plaintiff further alleges that she suffered a severe anxiety attack because of
Ms. Sowens's harassment and intimidation. (Id) Plaintiff alleges that Weil Gotshal did nothing
in response to her complaints about Ms. Bowens except to offer Plaintiff two to three months of
salary while she looked for another job.
(Id) Plaintiff argues that this was akin to "blaming
[her] for Tyra Sowens's behavior." (Id)
Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Bowens' s aggression and intimidation were taking a toll on her
mental health and Weil Gotshal allowed the conduct to occur. (Id at 5). Plaintiff alleges that
Weil Gotshal was aware that her psychiatrist recommended that she could no longer work at her
current location, but that the firm neither transferred her nor allowed her to work from home.
(Id at 6).
Plaintiff alleges that this constituted a failure to accommodate her disability and
claims that Weil Gotshal was negligent for allowing her to be subject to "discrimination,
harassment and intimidation." (Id 6-7).
Plaintiff twice took disability leave from Weil Gotshal because of her conditions. The
second leave commenced on September 7, 2011 and Plaintiff has not returned to the firm since.
(Id) Plaintiff filed a complaint with the NYCCHR (or the "Commission") on September 4,
2012, which was forwarded/dual-filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
1
In her NYCCHR complaint, Plaintiff stated that the last act of discriminatory conduct was in August
2011. (Aff., Ex. 2 at if 14). But, in reading the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff the
Court will use the September 2011 date written on the court-supplied prose complaint form as the
operative date for this motion.
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("EEOC") on the same date.
(Affirmation of Louis P. DiLorenzo ("Aff."), Ex. 2).
The
NYCCHR dismissed Plaintiffs claim, finding that she failed to file her complaint within one
year of the last alleged discriminatory act, as required by the Commission. (Aff., Ex. 3 at 2).
Furthermore, the Commission noted that even if the claim had been timely, it would have
nonetheless failed on the merits.
(Id.)
On July 5, 2013, the Commissioner/Chair of the
NYCCHR affirmed the dismissal. (Aff., Ex. 4). On August 13, 2013, the EEOC adopted the
findings of the NYCHHR and provided Plaintiff with her right to sue letter.
(Aff., Ex. 5).
Plaintiff brought this action in federal court on September 4, 2013 suing Weil Gotshal and the
individual Defendants, current and former Weil Gotshal employees, for violating her rights under
the ADA. (Comp!. at 1). Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint on January 9, 2014
arguing that the claim is time-barred because of Plaintiffs failure to bring an EEOC complaint
within 300 days of the last alleged discriminatory act. This Court held oral argument on April
25, 2014.
Plaintiff has continually responded to Defendants' allegations that her claim is time-barred
by recounting her interaction with the NYCCHR employee with whom she spoke on September 4,
2012-the day she filed her complaint with the Commission. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Andrew
Sonpron, Jr. of the NYCCHR told her that she had "barely made the date" for filing her NYCCHR
complaint and that his supervisor confirmed that her claim was timely. (Aff., Ex. 6). In her
papers, Plaintiff continues to assert that any procedural deficiency is the fault of the NYCCHR
employees and that "they should be held liable NOT [Plaintiff.]" (Pl. 's Br. in Opp. at 2).
ANALYSIS
I.
Plaintiff's ADA Claim is Time-Barred
In order to bring a lawsuit alleging unlawful employment practices in New York federal
court, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the last
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alleged unlawful employment action. Parks v. NY. City Dep't a/Corr., 253 F. App'x 141, 143
(2d Cir. 2007); see also Hoffman v. Williamsville Sch. Dist., 443 F. App'x 647, 649 (2d Cir.
2011) (applying the 300 day EEOC complaint rule to ADA claims); Cobian v. New York City, 23
F. App'x 82, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); 42 U.S.C. ยง 2000e-5(e)(l). "Where a plaintiff fails to file
a timely charge with the EEOC, either directly or through an authorized state or local agency, the
federal complaint is time-barred." Parks, 253 F. App'x at 143 (citing Ford v. Bernard Fineson
Dev. Ctr., 81F.3d304, 307 (2d Cir. 1996)).
Here, the last alleged date of discriminatory treatment was in either August 2011, (Aff.,
Ex. 2 at if 14), or September 2011, (Comp!. at 3). Plaintiff requested time off work for disability
leave, and was granted disability leave on September 7, 2011. (Comp!. at 6). She has not
returned to work since, (id), and did not file her NYCCHR/EEOC complaint until September 4,
2012, (Aff., Ex. 2 at 3). Reading the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, even if
the last discriminatory act occurred on Plaintiffs final day of work, September 7, 2011, her
EEOC complaint would still be time-barred by more than 60 days. 2 See Lloyd v. NY. Botanical
Garden, No. 03-Civ.-7557, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49066, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2006) (Jones,
J.) (finding a claim time-barred under the ADA when EEOC complaint was not brought until
more than a year after the plaintiff took a leave of absence). As no discriminatory treatment
could have occurred after September 7, 2011, Plaintiff was required to bring her EEOC
complaint within 300 days of that date. Predun v. Shoreham-Wading River Sch. Dist., 489 F.
Supp. 2d 223, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (Wexler, J.) ("Failure to file an administrative charge with
2
While the relevant inquiry for this Court is the date of the EEOC complaint, the NYCHRR held that
Plain~iff also failed. to bring her claim within the Commission's 365 day deadline as the last alleged
d1scnmmatory act m her NYCHRR complaint was in August 2011. (Aff., Ex. 3 at 2).
the EEOC within the 300 days extinguishes the [federal ADA] claim and prohibits recovery.").
Accordingly, Plaintiff is time-barred from brining her ADA claim in federal court.
II.
Plaintiff is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling
Plaintiff responds to the motion to dismiss arguing that: (I) her PTSD prevented her from
filing a timely claim; and (2) NYCCHR workers told her that she had filed her claim in time.
Defendants read these arguments as a request for equitable tolling, (Def.' s Reply Br. at 2), and
the Court views the prose litigant's arguments in this light as well.
"Equitable tolling ... is appropriate only in rare circumstances where a party is prevented
in some extraordinary way from exercising [her] rights, such as ... where the complainant has
been induced or tricked by [her] adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to
pass." Falso v. Gates Chili Cent. Sch. Dist., 408 F. App'x 494, 496 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal
citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the Court should invoke
equitable tolling. Thomas v. Burmax Co., No. 12-cv-6363, 2013 WL 6681616, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 18, 2013) (Bianco, J.). "When determining whether equitable tolling is applicable, a
district court must consider whether the person seeking application of the equitable tolling
doctrine (I) has acted with reasonable diligence during the time period she seeks to have tolled,
and (2) has proved that the circumstances are so extraordinary that the doctrine should apply."
Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations
omitted). Additionally, "filing charges as a prose litigant [and] having limited experience with
the law [are not] valid reason[s] for equitable tolling." Kantor-Hopkins v. Cyberzone Health
Club, 2007 WL 2687665, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 8, 2007) (Irizarry, J.).
Here, Plaintiff has not shown that she acted with reasonable diligence during the time
period she seeks to have tolled. Plaintiff has proffered no evidence that she "acted as
expeditiously as was feasible in the circumstances" and does not even allege that she attempted
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to file her NYCCHR/EEOC claims prior to September 4, 2012. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
"[E]xtensive delays in filing charges serve as sufficient evidence that a party was not reasonably
diligent in its efforts." Id. (citing Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiffs conversation with the NYCCHR employee does not alter the analysis. At the
time of that conversation, September 4, 2012, Plaintiffs claim was already deficient by more
than two months. The conversation occurred after the filing period had already lapsed and
therefore the employee's assurance that the claim was timely, while incorrect, did not prejudice
Plaintiff. Plaintiff could not have relied on the employee's misinformation in evaluating when to
bring her claim because she received his assurance simultaneously with her first attempt to file a
claim. In short, Plaintiffs failure to pursue an NYCHRR/EEOC complaint at any time prior to
September 4, 2012 is fatal to her request for equitable tolling.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to establish that her circumstances were so extraordinary
that she was completely prevented from filing her NYCCHRIEEOC complaint. "Only in a
limited number of cases do extraordinary circumstances exist such that equitable tolling is
warranted ... [s]uch cases include those where a plaintiffs mental or physical disability
prevented him from handling his legal affairs." Thomas, 2013 WL 6681616, at *4 (citing South
v. Saab Cars USA, Inc., 28 F.3d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1994) (principles of equitable tolling do not
extend to what "is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect")). Ultimately, few
medical ailments will justify invoking equitable tolling. Id.; see also Kantor-Hopkins, 2007 WL
2687665, at *6-7.
The facts here do not demonstrate that Plaintiffs circumstances were so extraordinary as to
justify equitable tolling. Plaintiff admits in her reply brief that she had the ability to and did in fact
take care of legal, financial, and medical matters during the time period between her final day at
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Weil Gotshal and the date she filed herNYCCHR/EEOC complaint. (Pl.'s Opp. Br. at 1, 24).
Plaintiff admitted that she visited her psychotherapist on a weekly basis and saw her psychiatrist
regularly during this time period. (Id.) Furthermore, Plaintiff applied for social security and longterm disability benefits between September 2011 and September 2012. (Id. at 1, 29-30). And
while Plaintiff's window to bring an EEOC complaint lapsed in June 2012, Plaintiff was actively
challenging her long-term disability benefit award in April 2012. (Id. at 29-30).
A recent decision in this District has made clear that a plaintiff suffering from PTSD who
is able to seek compensation and disability benefits, and visit her treating physicians between the
last alleged act of discrimination and the date she files her EEOC complaint, cannot seek
equitable tolling on the theory that her disability prevented her from filing a timely EEOC
complaint. Thomas, 2013 WL 6681616, at *5; see also Lloret v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs,
Inc., No. 97-CV-5750, 1998 WL 142326, at *4, 6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1998) (Sotomayor,
D.J.) ("[P]laintiff's post-termination depression [was] not sufficient to warrant" equitable tolling,
where plaintiff did not show how his depression "so affected [him] that he was unable to take
care of his legal affairs."). Here, as in Thomas, "[P]laintiff's own allegations demonstrate that
[she] was able to function in society and comprehend [her] legal rights." Thomas, 2013 WL
6681616, at *5. Plaintiffs conduct during the 300 days during which she should have filed her
EEOC complaint clearly demonstrates that she was capable of pursuing her legal rights, 3 and that
her PTSD was not an extraordinary circumstance justifying tolling the statute of limitations.
For these reasons, the Court declines to invoke equitable tolling here.
3
It is noteworthy that the NYCCHR website states that "if you are unable to travel to the Commission's
offices, [the Commission] will make alternative arrangements." (Def.'s Reply Br. at 7 n.3 (citing
NYCCHR website, "Filing a Complaint" http://www.nyc.gov/html/cchr/ html/complaint/filingcomplaint.shtml (last visited 4/16/14))). The EEOC also allows claimants to call the office, write to the
office, or complete an online assessment. (Def.'s Reply Br. at 7 n.3 (citing
http://eeoc.gov/field/newyork/charge.cfm (last visited 4/16/l 4 ))).
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s/WFK
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