McIntosh v. The City of New York et al

Filing 86

MEMORANDUM and ORDER: Imans motion 64 is DENIED, and defendants motion 55 is GRANTED and the Complaint is DISMISSED. Ordered by Judge Frederic Block on 2/3/2017. (Innelli, Michael)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------x
IMAN MCINTOSH,
Plaintiff,
-against-

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THE CITY OF NEW YORK; POLICE
14-cv-00051 (FB) (ST)
OFFICER HAROLD TAYLOR;
SERGEANT HONG CHEN; POLICE
OFFICER CHONG YI; POLICE
OFFICER JAWAD JAVED; POLICE
OFFICER JAMES KELLY; POLICE
OFFICER JASON RAGOO; SERGEANT
RONALD WARNETT; SERGEANT
MICHAEL ELDERBAUM; and
JOHN/JANE DOE #1-20,
Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------x
Appearances:
For the Plaintiff:
GREGORY PAUL MOUTON
Law Office of Gregory P. Mouton, Jr.
305 Broadway, 14th Floor
New York, New York 10007

For the Defendants:
KARL J. ASHANTI
RYAN GLENN SHAFFER
The City of New York Law
Department
100 Church Street
New York, New York 10007

BLOCK, Senior District Judge:
On the night of August 26, 2013, Iman McIntosh (“Iman” or “McIntosh”) fought
with her boyfriend and was subsequently arrested for domestic assault. On September
12, 2013, the charges spawned by this incident were dismissed at the request of the

1

Queens County District Attorney’s Office (“DA”). Iman now sues the City of New York
(“City”) and, individually, eight officers of the New York City Police Department
(“NYPD” or “NYCPD”): Police Officers Harold Taylor (“Taylor”), Chong Yi (“Yi”),
Jawad Javed (“Javed”), James Kelly (“Kelly”), and Jason Ragoo (“Ragoo”), and
Sergeants Hong Chen (“Chen”), Ronald Warnett (“Warnett”), and Michael Elderbaum
(“Elderbaum”) (“defendant officers”).1 Against the City and the defendant officers
(collectively, “defendants”), Iman brings nine claims under 42 U.S.C. § 19832–unlawful
search; false arrest; denial of substantive due process; malicious abuse of process;
malicious prosecution; deliberate indifference to her medical needs; conspiracy; failure
to intervene; and municipal liability3--and two claims under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”) and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, as amended in 2008 (“ADA”).4 Having completed discovery, both parties now
1

Iman also sued twenty unnamed officers.

2

The Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) titles plaintiff’s first cause of
action as “42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 2nd Am. Compl. at 12. Section 1983, however, “‘is
not itself a source of substantive rights’”; “‘[i]t merely provides a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida,
N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144 n.3 (1979)). It cannot constitute an independent cause of action, as it does in
the Complaint. As such, while the Complaint enumerates twelve causes of action,
this Court counts only eleven cognizable claims.
Because the related claims do not appear sequentially, they are identified in
accordance with their number in the Complaint, not in the order in which they are
analyzed, throughout this Memorandum and Order.

3

In the Complaint, the RA forms the basis of one claim, the ADA the basis of
another. In this proceeding, the analysis of these two substantively similar laws is

4

2

move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the
following reasons, Iman’s motion is DENIED, defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
I
The following undisputed material facts5 are taken from the parties’ submissions,
including their Local Rule 56.1 Statements. The Court deems as undisputed only those
factual assertions, advanced by one party, which are supported by citations to the record
and are not controverted by the other party and which both parties acknowledged as
such at oral argument. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(3) (authorizing court to “grant
summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts
considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it”); Vermont Teddy Bear
Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[I]n determining
whether the moving party has met this burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue
for trial, the district court may not rely solely on the statement of undisputed facts
contained in the moving party’s Rule 56.1 statement” and “must be satisfied that the

conjoined, as the sole difference between them–the RA requires that the relevant
entity be a recipient of federal funds, Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286,
289–90 (2d Cir. 1990)–is not disputed.
5

A number of facts are disputed, from the precise degree of medical attention
plaintiff received to the extent to which every defendant officer participated in the
various wrongs alleged in plaintiff’s two pleadings. At oral argument, for example,
plaintiff again maintained that the defendant officers saw Vecchio straddling her
prostate form and slamming her body to the ground, an allegation that defendants
again deny. As shown below, however, none of these discrepancies affect the
outcome of the motions presently before the Court.
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citation to evidence in the record supports the assertion.”).
A.

Undisputed Facts

During the summer of 2013, Iman lived with Kristopher Vecchio (“Vecchio”),
her then-boyfriend, and her son at 149-29 34th Avenue, Apartment 2, Queens, New
York (“Apartment”). At the time, Iman worked for Brink’s Global Services. On August
26, 2013, Iman left work at approximately 7:00 p.m. and went to dinner with a friend.
At around 9:45 p.m., Iman took a cab directly home.
Later that night, Vecchio and Iman fought with fists, nails, and scissors. In the
midst of this altercation, Vecchio called 911 and reported that Iman, having been
drinking, had hit and bit him, resulting in injuries to his face and chest. The dispatcher
classified the matter as both an assault in progress and a domestic incident.
Five officers–Taylor, Chen, Yi, Javed, and Kelly–were dispatched to the
Apartment; they had been informed of these classifications as well as the substance of
When Chen and Taylor arrived, Vecchio expanded upon his telephoned account and
accused Iman of punching and scratching him and drawing blood. At the same time, the
defendant officers noticed and noted plaintiff’s own injuries, including lacerations on
her right leg. Based on the 911 call, these additional statements, and his observations of
Vecchio’s physical injuries, such as fresh cuts and bite marks, Taylor, with Chen’s
approval, arrested and searched Iman. Subsequently, as both parties agreed at oral
argument, Vecchio was also arrested.
Because Iman had sustained obvious lacerations and claimed to be suffering from
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a panic attack, Taylor and Kelly first took Iman to New York-Presbyterian Hospital in
Queens (“Hospital”). Handcuffed, Iman was referred to the Hospital’s Urgent Care
Center and treated for the physical injuries sustained during her fight with Vecchio. As
to this hospital stay, “[t]here is no indication anywhere in plaintiff’s medical records
that she actually was taken out of the hospital against medical advice.” Defs.’ L.R. 56.1
State. ¶ 20; see also Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 State. 11 (admitting allegations set
forth in paragraph 20). Upon her release, within hours of her arrival at the Hospital,
Iman was first transported to the local precinct and then to Queens Central Booking
(“QCB”).
Shortly afterwards, plaintiff was returned to the precinct and placed in a holding
cell. During this time, Ragoo and Elderbaum questioned Iman about her fight and
relationship with Vecchio. After this questioning, Iman was sent back to QCB. While at
QCB, Iman requested medical attention from, among others, Warnett. On the same day,
she was again taken to the Hospital for further evaluation. In regards to this second visit,
as with plaintiff’s first, “[t]here is no indication anywhere in plaintiff’s medical records
that she actually was taken out of the hospital against medical advice.” Defs.’ L.R. 56.1
State. ¶ 20; see also Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 State. 11 (admitting allegations set
forth in paragraph 20). Afterward, plaintiff was returned to QCB.
Based on Taylor’s paperwork and observations, a criminal complaint against
Iman was filed. Once her case had been docketed by the Criminal Court of the City of
New York and the complaint and her criminal history compiled, Iman was arraigned and
5

released. In total, Iman spent slightly less than forty-eight hours in custody. On
September 12, 2013, the charges against Iman were dismissed with the DA’s consent.
II
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a
court may not undertake credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or select
amongst competing but legitimate inferences from disputed facts. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Rather, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to
be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his [or her] favor.” Id.
Nonetheless, unless the nonmoving party “offers some hard evidence showing that its
version of the events is not wholly fanciful,” summary judgment should be granted to
the moving party. D’Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1988).
A.

Probable Cause

Seven of plaintiff’s causes of action (individually, “COA,” and collectively
“COAs”)–the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, and eleventh–depend on whether
probable cause existed for her arrest. “The existence of probable cause to arrest
constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an action for false arrest” under
federal law, a standard “substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New

6

York law.”6 Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Singer v.
Fulton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995) (“There can be no federal civil
rights claim for false arrest where the arresting officer had probable cause.”). “In
general, probable cause to arrest exists when the officers have knowledge or reasonably
trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a
person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed
or is committing a crime.” Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852. “This standard is a fluid one, which
does not demand hard certainties but only facts sufficient to establish the sort of fair
probability on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Thomas v.
City of New York, 562 F. App’x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The question of whether or not probable cause existed may be determinable
as a matter of law if there is no dispute as to the pertinent events and the knowledge of
the officers.” Id.
For purposes of this determination, only a few uncontested facts matter. As both
parties agree, the officers who arrived at the Apartment on August 26, 2013, had been
summoned by a 911 call in which a crime had been detailed and a perpetrator identified.
As both parties further concur, once there, the officers obtained confirmation of Iman’s
attack from both the victim, i.e. Vecchio, and the perpetrator, i.e. Iman, and saw
indications of physical assault, including fresh cuts and bite marks, on Vecchio’s body.
The one distinction is “§ 1983’s requirement that the tort be committed under
color of state law.” Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1991). That
requirement is not in dispute here.

6

7

These circumstances–a 911 call by a victim and both oral and physical corroboration at
the scene–establish probable cause sufficient for an arrest under the Fourth Amendment.
See, e.g., Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000) (“‘[I]t is
well-established that a law enforcement official has probable cause to arrest if he
received his information from some person, normally the putative victim or
eyewitness.”); Singer, 64 F.3d at 119 (holding that “[a]n arresting officer advised of a
crime by a person who claims to be the victim, and who has signed a complaint or
information charging someone with the crime, has probable cause to effect an arrest”);
Hogan v. Buttofocco, 379 F. App’x 35, 36 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding probable cause for an
arrest and a search based on a witness’ 911 call and statement to police at the scene).
Seizing on a single caveat in Singer, Iman argues that her statements at the scene,
in which she argued self-defense and accused Vecchio of gun possession, raised
credible doubts to Vecchio’s credibility and thus vitiated any such probable cause. See
64 F.3d at 119 (holding that probable cause may be vitiated by “circumstances that raise
doubts as to the victim’s veracity”). But an officer “is not required to explore and
eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest,”
Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2002), or “to prove plaintiff’s
version wrong before arresting him [or her],” Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65,
70 (2d Cir. 2001). He or she is not even “to consider plausible defenses,” including selfdefense, “offered by a suspect prior to making an arrest,” Arrington v. City of New York,
628 F. App’x 46 , 49 (2d Cir. 2015), as the Constitution “does not guarantee that only
8

the guilty will be arrested,” Baker, 443 U.S. at 145; see also, e.g., Radvansky v. City of
Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 308 (6ths Cir. 2005) (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 145). For
this reason, “conflicting accounts between a complainant and the accused do not negate
probable cause,” Distefano v. Sedita, No. 11-CV-1125 (MKB), 2014 WL 349251, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2014), and if any “legal basis for arresting [a] plaintiff[]” exists,
probable cause does so too. Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2015).
Because the 911 call, coupled with the officers’ observations and Vecchio’s later
statements at the scene, provided a legal basis for plaintiff’s arrest, Iman’s statements at
the scene could not negate the defendant officers’ probable cause for doing so. See, e.g.,
Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 396 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that it “does it matter that
an investigation might have cast doubt upon the basis for the arrest”); Krause v.
Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that an officer’s function is to
“apprehend those suspected of wrongdoing, and not to finally determine guilt through a
weighing of the evidence.”); United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834, 838 (2d Cir. 1985)
(“The fact that an innocent explanation may be consistent with the facts alleged,
however, does not negate probable cause.”); Dukes v. City of New York, 879 F. Supp.
335, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (requiring police officers to investigate exculpatory
statements of the accused before making an arrest “ ‘would be to allow every suspect,
guilty or innocent, to avoid arrest simply by claiming ‘it wasn’t me’” (quoting Criss v.

9

City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1988))).7
Thus, plaintiff’s claim for false arrest (third COA) fails as a matter of law.
Because there was probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest, six of plaintiff’s other COAs
must also be dismissed:
•

Unlawful stop and search (Second COA), see, e.g., United States v. Washington,
270 F. App’x 26, 27 (2d. Cir. 2008) (“Because the police had probable cause to
arrest him, the handgun and ammunition were admissible as the result of a search
incident to arrest.”);

•

Denial of substantive due process (Fourth COA), see, e.g., Jimenez v. City of
New York, No. 14-cv-2994 (SAS), 2015 WL 5638041, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24,
2015); Puller v. Baca, 781 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th Cir. 2015) (claim based on
substantive due process requires court to consider whether probable cause to
At oral argument, plaintiff brought to the Court’s attention one more case, Bullard
v. City of New York, 240 F. Supp. 2d 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Bullard, however, does
not support plaintiff’s position. First, the procedural posture is wholly different:
while the present motion are governed by Rule 56, the court in Bullard was bound
by Rule 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 56 attack, a plaintiff must provide more than a
scintilla of evidence for his or her allegations, but to withstand Rule 12, no such
proof is necessary. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 56, with FED. R. CIV. P. 12. Second,
the Bullard court relied on Singer’s caveat. Bullard, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 298. As
this section has shown, this exception is inapplicable to the present dispute based
on any number of cases. Lastly, per Bullard, while “a report of a crime alone will
not necessarily establish probable cause,. . . [p]robable cause can also be
established by information from an eye witness ‘who it seems reasonable to believe
is telling the truth.’” Id. As the uncontroverted facts here show, Vecchio’s account
was substantiated by the officers’ own observations at the scene. The officers thus
had, as Bullard alone required, “‘independent evidence to support at least some of
the victim’s assertions.’” Id. (quoting Marin v. Viggiani, No. 92 Civ. 3836 (LMM),
1993 WL 404098, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1993)).
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arrest existed); Anderson v. Larson, 327 F.3d 762, 769–70 (8th Cir. 2003)
(holding that an investigation, arrest, and prosecution were not violative of
substantive due process as they were supported by probable cause);
•

Malicious abuse of process (Fifth COA), Irish v. City of New York, No. 09 Civ.
5568 (RMB), 2010 WL 5065896, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010) (holding that
probable cause to arrest “negates a claim for abuse of process); accord Mangino
v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 814 F. Supp. 2d 242, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 2011);
Malicious abuse of prosecution (Sixth COA), see, e.g., Savino v. City of New

•

York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003); Coyle v. Coyle, 354 F. Supp. 2d 207, 213
(E.D.N.Y. 2005);
•

Conspiracy (Eighth COA), see, e.g., Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d
307, 324–25 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a § 1983 conspiracy claim cannot
survive absent the infliction of an unconstitutional injury); Singer, 63 F.3d at 119
(“[A] plaintiff alleging a § 1983 conspiracy claim must prove an actual violation
of constitutional rights.”);8 and

•

Failure to intervene (Eleventh COA), see, e.g., Ladoucier v. City of New York,
Further support for this conclusion comes from the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine. Per this policy, “the officers, agents, and employees of a single corporate
entity,” like the City, “each acting within the scope of [his or] her employment, are
legally incapable of conspiring together.” Little v. City of New York, 487 F. Supp.
2d 426, 441–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although an
exception exists where individuals are “motivated by an independent personal
stake in achieving the corporation’s objective,” Id. at 442, Iman has made no such
allegation. Consequently, even in the absence of probable cause, summary
judgment for defendants on this claim would be warranted.
8

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No. 10-CV-5089, 2011 WL 2206735, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2011) (recognizing
that failure to intervene claim requires, inter alia, that officers failed to intervene
to prevent another officer’s constitutional violation); Tavares v. City of New York,
No. 08-CV-3782, 2010 WL 234974, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2010) (same).
B.

Remaining Claims

Plaintiff’s four remaining claims either do not depend on the existence of
probable cause or compel a distinct analysis.
1.

Deliberate Indifference (Seventh COA)

Attacking defendants for overlooking her allegedly perilous medical state,
plaintiff asserts a claim for deliberate indifference. The constitutional rights of a pretrial
detainee, like Iman, held in state custody flow from the procedural and substantive due
process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536
(1979); Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2009); Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d
143, 168 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009). To establish an unconstitutional denial of medical care in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee must show that he or she had a serious
medical condition and that it was met with deliberate indifference. Cuoco v. Moritsugu,
222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994).
9

In contrast, the rights of inmates flow from the Eighth Amendment. Despite their
different constitutional anchors, courts similarly analyze the right to medical care
for pretrial detainees and inmates. See, e.g., Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F. 3d
633, 643 (5th Cir. 1996). Because the case law is thus interchangeable, both Eighth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment cases are cited below.
12

“Mere medical malpractice is not tantamount to deliberate indifference.” Chance v.
Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d
550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996)).
There is no evidence of callous indifference. On August 26 and 27, defendants
twice took plaintiff from QCB to the Hospital. Even if plaintiff were not treated with the
greatest speed, she was evidently provided with essential medical care soon after her
every complaint. See Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 215 (2d Cir. 1986) (“‘The
essential test [for purposes of a medical indifference claim] is one of medical necessity
and not one simply of desirability.’” (quoting Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 272 (5th
Cir. 1981))). The uncontested evidence thus shows that Iman received minimally
effective treatment for her apparent ills throughout her brief incarceration and not silent
and knowing inaction. Such a record is enough to foreclose plaintiff’s claim.10
2.

ADA (Ninth COA) & RA (Tenth COA)

Iman next faults defendants for disability discrimination. In order to state a claim
under section 504 of the RA, the plaintiff must show that she (1) has a disability for
purposes of the Act; (2) that she was “otherwise qualified” for a benefit that she was
denied; (3) that she was denied the benefit solely because of her disabilities; and (4) that
the benefit is part of a program or activity that receives federal financial assistance.
Romano v. SLS Residential, Inc., 246 F.R.D. 432, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Under Title II
To the extent plaintiff predicates this claim on her allegedly improper removal
from the Hospital, that argument too fails. As defendants correctly note, the
medical record reveals the opposite. Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 State. ¶¶ 21–22.

10

13

of the ADA, the plaintiff must establish that she (1) is a qualified individual with one or
more disabilities; (2) the defendant is subject to the ADA; and (3) she was denied the
opportunity to either participate in, or to benefit from the defendants’ services,
programs, or activities or were otherwise discriminated against because of plaintiff’s
one or more disabilities. United Spinal Ass’n v. Bd. of Elections in City of New York,
882 F. Supp. 2d 615, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d
261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003)). “‘Whether suit is filed under the . . . [RA] or under the . . .
[ADA], the substantive standards for determining liability are the same.’” Loeffler v.
Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 286 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting McDonald v.
Commonwealth of Pa., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Fatally for both her disability claims, plaintiff does not provide any evidence
demonstrating that she was discriminated against because of her disability. At worst,
plaintiff’s medical needs were negligently attended, but the ADA (and, by extension, the
RA) is not violated by a prison or jail failing to attend to its disabled prisoners’ medical
needs. See Lincoln CERCPAC v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 147 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir.
1998) (“[T]he disabilities statutes do not guarantee any particular level of medical care
for disabled persons, nor assure maintenance of service previously provided.”); see also,
e.g., Rodriguez by Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1999)
(observing that the ADA concerns itself with “‘the individual services offered’” and
“not the ‘amorphous objective of adequate health care’” (quoting Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985))); Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 84 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
14

that plaintiff's challenge to the “substance of the services provided to him through [the
Vocational Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities]” did not state a claim
under the ADA). Instead, for an ADA or RA claim to be cognizable, the relevant
institution must maltreat an individual due to that person’s disability, whether real,
perceived, or documented. In this case’s record, no proof for such a motive can be
detected, and no demonstration of how plaintiff was discriminated against or how she
was denied access to a program, service, or activity due to any perceived or real
disability has been made.
3.

Monell Liability (Twelfth COA)

In her final claim, plaintiff seeks Monell liability against the City. Under Monell,
“a municipality can be held liable under Section 1983 if the deprivation of the plaintiff’s
rights under federal law is caused by a governmental custom, policy, or usage of the
municipality.” Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). “Absent
such a custom, policy, or usage, a municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat
superior basis for the tort of its employee,” Id.; see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan
Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997), and a municipal policy must cause an
underlying constitutional violation be actionable under Monell, see, e.g., City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207,
219 (2d Cir. 2006). Both because plaintiff has offered no evidence of any specific
“custom, policy, or usage” from which any type of constitutional harm to her flowed
and because the Court has found no violation of a single constitutional right by
15

defendants, Monell liability cannot now attach to the City.
III
For the foregoing reasons, Iman’s motion is DENIED, and defendants’ motion is
GRANTED.11 Accordingly, the Complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED
/S/ Frederic Block________
FREDERIC BLOCK
Senior United States District Judge
Brooklyn, New York
February 3, 2017

11

Due to this order, plaintiff’s motion to strike defendants’ answer is denied as
moot.
16