Mancini v. John Doe et al

Filing 5

ORDER DISMISSING CASE: Plaintiff's 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is granted; however, for the reasons set forth in the attached order, the action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A copy of the order will be mailed to the plaintiff at his address of record. Ordered by Judge John Gleeson on 2/25/2014. (Herling, Adam)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
HENRY MANCINI,
Plaintiff,
- versus -

ORDER
14-cv-767

COMMISSIONER DORA SCHIRO,
WARDEN ROSE ARGO, OFFICER JOHN
DOE,
Defendants.

JOHN GLEESON, United States District Judge:
Henry Mancini, currently incarcerated at the Anna M. Kross Center at Rikers
Island, brings this pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. I grant Mancini’s request to
proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915; however, for the reasons set forth
below, the action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
BACKGROUND
Mancini complains that on September 25, 2013, and December 4, 2013, he was
forced to pass through a SecurPASS full-body scanning machine that is used to detect
contraband and weapons hidden on or in a person’s body. Compl., ECF No. 1, at 4. He argues
that this machine causes “a very high possibility of cont[r]acting cancer as well as many other
ailments for just the brief time going through the machine.” Id. Mancini states that on both
occasions he was threatened with reprisals if he did not pass through the scanner. Id. Mancini
alleges that he is suffering from an “intense mental reaction” from these incidents and he seeks
$100,000,000 in damages. Id. at 5.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by
attorneys; I am required to read the Mancini’s pro se complaint liberally and interpret it as
raising the strongest arguments it suggests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007);
accord Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that
pleadings of pro se litigants are accorded “special solicitude”). At the pleadings stage of the
proceeding, I assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the
complaint, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009)), but the complaint must plead sufficient facts to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Even after Twombly,
though, we remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.”).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, I must dismiss a prisoner’s complaint sua sponte if it
“(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2)
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1)-(2); see also Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that
sua sponte dismissal of prisoner complaints for the reasons listed above is mandatory); see also
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (A district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action if it “(i) is
frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”).
DISCUSSION
“In every federal case, the party bringing the suit must establish standing to
prosecute the action.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). The
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minimum standing requirement under the Constitution derives from Article III, Section 2,
“which limits federal judicial power to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 710 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
To establish that a case or controversy exists so as to confer standing
under Article III, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (a) the plaintiff
must suffer an injury in fact, (b) that injury must be fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (c) the injury must be likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision of the federal court.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 710 F.3d at 79 (quotation marks omitted).
Here, there is no case or controversy at issue: Mancini has not suffered an injury
in fact but only the speculative alleged possibility of contracting cancer. See id.; see also, e.g.,
Blasingame v. Sisto, No.10-cv-0514, 2011 WL 4344122, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2011)
(dismissing claims asserted by prisoners for future suffering or costs of medical care arising from
tuberculosis treatment as “too speculative to adjudicate”). Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e bars
civil actions brought by prisoners “for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(e). The complaint here does not allege any physical injury or sexual act. For these
reasons, Mancini’s complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. I certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis
status is denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45
(1962).
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So ordered.
John Gleeson, U.S.D.J.

Dated: February 25, 2014
Brooklyn, New York

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