Nguyen v. Ridgewood Savings Bank et al
MEMORANDUM & ORDER granting 8 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. For the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum and Order, the Court grants Defendants motion to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a clai m. Plaintiff is granted thirty days to file an amended complaint to correct any of the identified deficiencies as to his Fair Credit Reporting Act claim. Defendants' 21 letter request for a supplemental briefing schedule is denied as moot. Ordered by Judge Margo K. Brodie on 12/17/2014. (Krause, Aimee)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
RIDGEWOOD SAVINGS BANK and
--------------------------------------------------------------MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Thomas Nguyen, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on February 18,
2014, against Defendants Ridgewood Savings Bank (“Ridgewood”) and Peter Boger, the
President, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Ridgewood. Plaintiff asserts claims under
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging denial of his Fifth Amendment rights and “rights guaranteed by many statutes.”1
(Compl. 1 ¶ V.)2 On March 11, 2014, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to
In his Complaint, Plaintiff does not specify any statutes. In a letter dated December 4,
2014, received by the Court on December 5, 2014, Plaintiff refers to the New York Fair Credit
Reporting Act, the New York False Claims Act, the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531,
5536(a), 5563, 5565, 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), and federal criminal law, 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
The Court declines to construe Plaintiff’s December 4, 2014 letter as an amendment to his
Complaint. To the extent Plaintiff has any factual allegations sufficient to state a claim under
any of the enumerated civil statutes, Plaintiff should include all of the necessary allegations in an
amended complaint. The Court notes that there is no private right of action under 18 U.S.C.
Section 1519. See Peavey v. Holder, 657 F. Supp. 2d 180, 190 (D.D.C. 2009) (collecting cases),
aff’d, No. 09-CV-5389, 2010 WL 3155823 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2010).
For the purposes of this Memorandum and Order, the Court will refer to the Complaint
and the documents annexed to the Complaint as the “Complaint.” See Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d
57, 67 (2d Cir. 2004) (“A complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as
an exhibit.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c))). For ease of reference the Court refers to the
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion.
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint.
According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, in or about October 2007, Plaintiff obtained a secured
loan of approximately $7,000 from Ridgewood. (Compl. 10.) Between the date of the loan and
June 2013, Ridgewood furnished information to credit reporting agencies which indicated
Plaintiff had missed payments on his loan on approximately 22 occasions. (Id. at 1 ¶ IV, 11.)
Sometime in 2013, Plaintiff reported to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s
(“FDIC”) Consumer Response Center that he had concerns regarding the accuracy of
Ridgewood’s bank records as they related to the timeliness of his loan payments. (Id. at 4.) The
FDIC Consumer Response Center contacted Ridgewood on Plaintiff’s behalf. (Id.) On or about
November 19, 2013, Ridgewood, through its Vice President Vito DiBona, issued a response to
the FDIC Consumer Response Center’s inquiries and sent a copy directly to Plaintiff. (Id.) This
response outlined Ridgewood’s analysis which led it to conclude that Plaintiff’s payments were
delinquent, as reported to the credit reporting agencies. (Id.) The FDIC Consumer Response
Center requested additional information, and on December 9, 2013, Ridgewood issued a second
response indicating that it had reconsidered its original analysis, decided to expunge the entire
delinquency history from Plaintiff’s account and would update the records provided to the credit
electronic case filing (ECF) page numbers. Citations to paragraphs, when included, are to the
paragraphs as numbered in the Complaint.
reporting agencies to reflect the corrected account information. (Id.) On December 16, 2013,
the FDIC Consumer Response Center sent a letter to Plaintiff stating these facts.3 (Id.)
On or about December 29, 2013, Plaintiff sent a letter to Boger stating that Ridgewood’s
reports of delinquent payments had affected Plaintiff’s credit score and financial livelihood. (Id.
at 5.) Plaintiff also stated in the letter that the inaccurate reports were a reason that two of his
bank accounts, held at another bank, were closed in 2012, and that the situation contributed to his
“cardiac problem.” 4 (Id. at 13.)
Standard of Review
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a court “must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true.” Pension
Ben. Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent Catholic Med. Centers Ret. Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv.
Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 717 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)); see also Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir.
2013) (quoting Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 2009)); Matson v. Bd. of Educ.,
631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 320
(2d Cir. 2009)). A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
Between the receipt of the December 16, 2013 letter and January 17, 2014, Plaintiff
again contacted the FDIC’s Consumer Response Center regarding Ridgewood. (Compl. 3.)
Plaintiff has not specified the reason for this second contact, whether the FDIC has responded to
his questions or concerns, and what, if any, resolution was reached. (See generally Compl.)
In his Complaint, Plaintiff states: “That’s why I am now having a cardiac problem that
is probably, in part (largely), caused by the ‘illegal’ closing of those 2 accounts as I found out,
but not surely, sometimes [sic] in 2012 at a 456BANK branch on Flatbush Avenue in Brooklyn.”
(Compl. 13.) Plaintiff later states that “[f]or professional reasons and confidentiality, the name
of the financial institution . . . [has] been withheld.” (Id. at 15.)
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Matson, 631 F.3d at 63 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678); see also Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 712 F.3d at 717–18. A complaint need not contain
“detailed factual allegations,” but a plaintiff must do more than present “an unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Matson, 631 F.3d at 63 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it
has not ‘show[n]’ — ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 712 F.3d
at 718 (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Although all allegations
contained in the complaint are assumed true, this principle is “inapplicable to legal conclusions”
or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.”5 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must be mindful
that the plaintiff’s pleadings should be held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, the court
“remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”). If a liberal reading of the
complaint “gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated,” the court must grant leave to
When deciding a motion to dismiss, a court’s review is limited to the four corners of
the complaint, as well as (1) documents attached to the complaint, (2) any documents
incorporated in the complaint by reference, (3) any documents deemed integral to the complaint,
and (4) public records. See Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 2014) (Dennis, J.
dissenting) (documents attached to the complaint and those incorporated by reference); Global
Network Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 2006) (documents
integral to the complaint); Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Canada), Ltd. v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts
Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2004) (public records).
amend the complaint. Shabazz v. Bezio, 511 F. App’x 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Branum v.
Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)).
Fair Credit Reporting Act
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., regulates consumer
credit reporting agencies to ensure the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization
of consumer credit information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b). “As part of this regulatory scheme, the
[FCRA] imposes several duties on those who furnish information to consumer reporting
agencies.”6 Longman v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 702 F.3d 148, 150–51 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1681s–2); Redhead v. Winston & Winston, P.C., No. 01-CV-11475, 2002 WL
31106934, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2002) (“The FCRA places distinct obligations on three
types of entities: consumer reporting agencies, users of consumer reports, and furnishers of
information to consumer reporting agencies.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.; Aklagi v.
Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1192 (D. Kan. 2002); Thomasson v. Bank
One, La., N.A., 137 F. Supp. 2d 721, 722 (E.D. La. 2001))). In essence, these obligations involve
the duty to provide accurate information and to correct inaccurate information, 15 U.S.C.
Under the statute, “consumer reporting agencies,” sometimes referred to as “credit
reporting agencies,” are defined as certain entities which “regularly engage in whole or in part
in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on
consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(f). A “furnisher” is “an entity that furnishes information relating to consumers to one or
more consumer reporting agencies for inclusion in a consumer report.” 16 C.F.R. § 660.2.
Defendants state, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Ridgewood is a furnisher. (Def. Mem. in
Support of Mot. to Dismiss, Docket Entry No. 10 (“Def Mem.”), at 4; Pl. Opp’n Letter dated
April 16, 2014, annexed to Pl. Aff. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss, Docket Entry No. 15 (“Pl.
Opp’n Letter”), at 2.) Cf. Caltabiano v. BSB Bank & Trust Co., 387 F. Supp. 2d 135, 140–41
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting defendant bank, with whom plaintiff had an outstanding loan, was a
furnisher of information and not a consumer reporting agency); DiGianni v. Stern’s, 26 F.3d 346,
348–49 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding retail stores that merely provide information on consumer’s
creditworthiness are not consumer reporting agencies).
§ 1681s–2(a),7 and to conduct an investigation after receiving notice of a credit dispute from a
consumer reporting agency, § 1681s–2(b). See Longman, 702 F.3d at 150 (“Among these are
duties to refrain from knowingly reporting inaccurate information, see § 1681s–2(a)(1), and to
correct any information they later discover to be inaccurate, see § 1681s–2(a)(2).”); Redhead,
2002 WL 31106934, at *4 ( “The FCRA imposes two [general] duties on furnishers of
information, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s–2(a) and (b).”).
Under certain circumstances, an individual may bring a civil cause of action against any
entity who “‘willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under’ the [FCRA] and
[may] recover actual or statutory damages, punitive damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees.”8
Longman, 702 F.3d at 151 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)); see also Trikas v. Universal Card
Servs. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d 37, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (same). However, certain requirements
are only triggered when a furnisher receives notice of a credit dispute from specified parties. See
15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(a)(8), (b). “Consumers have the right to dispute any information reported
to a credit reporting agency.” Corcia v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, No. 13-CV-6404, 2014 WL
3656049, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g(c)(1)(B)(iii),
1681i(a)(1)(A), 1681s–2(a)(8)). If a consumer files a dispute directly with the furnisher of the
disputed information, the furnisher must investigate the dispute in accordance with the
procedures outlined in the statute and regulations. Id. (citing § 15 U.S.C. 1681 s–2(a)(8); 16
C.F.R. § 660.4; Longman, 702 F.3d at 151). If the consumer files a dispute with the consumer
Among the listed duties in subsection (a) is the duty to conduct an investigation after
receiving notice from a consumer that the consumer disputes the accuracy of the furnished
information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(a)(8).
Actual damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees are also available against entities who are
negligent in failing to comply with certain provisions of the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.
Plaintiff does not allege negligence in this action.
reporting agency, both the consumer reporting agency and the furnisher of the disputed
information have a duty to investigate the dispute. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681i(a)(1)(A),
No private cause of action under Section § 1681s–2(a)
Plaintiff argues that Defendants are liable to him for inaccurately reporting missed
payments and non-payments to credit bureaus on 22 occasions. (See Compl. 5.) Plaintiff claims
this violation was knowing and willful, (id. 2 ¶ IV), and attaches to his Complaint a December
29, 2013 letter to Boger which raised the issue of the inaccuracy. (Compl. 5–7.) Defendants
argue that Plaintiff cannot state a claim to enforce the duty to provide accurate information and
to correct inaccurate information provided in Section 1681s–2(a) because only government
officials can enforce this section of the statute. (Def. Mem. 4.)
“[T]here is no private cause of action for violations of [Section] 1681s–2(a).” Longman,
702 F.3d at 151 (collecting cases); Barberan v. Nationpoint, 706 F. Supp. 2d 408, 427 (S.D.N.Y.
2010). The statute expressly provides that Section 1681s–2(a) “shall be enforced exclusively . . .
by the Federal agencies and officials and the State officials identified in section 1681s of this
title.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(d); see Kane v. Guar. Residential Lending, Inc., No. 04-CV-4847,
2005 WL 1153623, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2005) (“[T]here is no private cause of action under
Section 1681s–2(a), for the FCRA limits the enforcement of this subsection to government
agencies and officials.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). To the extent Plaintiff
alleges violations of subsection (a) of section 1681s–2 — which prohibits knowingly reporting
inaccurate information, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(a)(1), failing to correct and update information, id.
§ 1681s–2(a)(2), and failing to investigate a dispute raised directly to the furnisher by a
consumer, id. § 1681s–2(a)(8) — the Complaint fails to state a claim and is dismissed.
Limited private cause of action under Section § 1681s–2(b)
As noted above, upon proper notice, furnishers of information must investigate credit
disputes in accordance with the statute and attendant regulations. Section 1681s–2(b) provides
that furnishers of information, “after receiving notice pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this title
of a dispute with regard to the completeness or accuracy of any information provided . . . to a
consumer reporting agency,” must investigate the disputed information according to specific
procedures. Section 1681i(a)(2) requires consumer reporting agencies to notify furnishers of
information regarding an underlying credit dispute if the furnisher provided the information in
Defendants argue that, as a furnisher of information, Ridgewood was required to conduct
an investigation pursuant to Section 1681s–2(b) only if it received notice of the underlying credit
dispute from a consumer reporting agency, but not where it received notice from the FDIC
Consumer Response Center. (Def. Mem 4–5.) Plaintiff repeatedly refers to the investigation
conducted by the FDIC Consumer Response Center and argues that Defendants were “keeping
silen[t]” in response to the complaints lodged by Plaintiff with the FDIC. (Pl. Opp’n Letter 2.)
Although the Second Circuit has not directly addressed the issue, the majority of courts to
address whether a private right of action exists for willful or negligent noncompliance with
Section 1681s–2(b) have recognized one. Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 35
(1st Cir. 2010) (“We join the vast majority of courts to have considered this issue in holding that
a plain reading of the FCRA’s text indicates that a private cause of action exists for individuals
seeking remedies for furnishers’ violations of § 1681s–2(b).”); Redhead, 2002 WL 31106934, at
*5 (collecting cases); see also Stafford v. Cross Country Bank, 262 F. Supp. 2d 776, 783, 783 n.4
(W.D. Ky. 2003) (same). “A claim is stated pursuant to that section, however, only if plaintiff
shows that: (1) the furnisher received notice of a credit dispute from a credit reporting agency,
and (2) the furnisher thereafter acted in ‘willful or negligent noncompliance with the statute.’”
Markovskaya v. Am. Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(quoting Redhead, 2002 WL 31106934, at *5). A reading of the plain language of Section
1681s-1(b) makes it clear the duty to investigate a credit dispute is triggered only upon notice of
the dispute from a consumer reporting agency. Id. at 344 (“Plaintiff’s only claim can be pursuant
to Section 1681s–2(b). As noted, such a claim is stated only when [p]laintiff can show that the
furnisher received information regarding a consumer’s credit directly from a credit reporting
agency, and not only from the consumer.”); Dickman v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 876 F. Supp.
2d 166, 172-74 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[U]nder § 1681s–2(b), [a] defendant ha[s] no duty to
investigate [a] credit dispute unless defendant received notice of the dispute from a consumer
reporting agency.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Prakash
v. Homecomings Fin., No. 05-CV-2895, 2006 WL 2570900, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2006)));
Kane, 2005 WL 1153623, at *4 (“[T]he duty to investigate in Subsection (b) is triggered only
after a furnisher of information receives notice from a credit reporting agency of a consumer’s
Ridgewood Savings Bank
Thus, to state a claim against Ridgewood for a violation of 15 U.S.C § 1681s–2(b),
Plaintiff must allege that Ridgewood received notice from a consumer reporting agency stating
that Plaintiff disputed the accuracy of the reported information. Plaintiff has alleged that
Ridgewood received such notice from the FDIC Consumer Response Center,9 but the FDIC
To the extent Plaintiff may have personally notified Ridgewood of the credit dispute,
this would trigger Ridgewood’s duty to investigate direct disputes from consumers under Section
Consumer Response Center is not a consumer reporting agency. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (A
consumer reporting agency is an entity which, in exchange for a monetary fee, “regularly
engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to
third parties.”). However, even if the notice received from the FDIC Consumer Response Center
was sufficient to trigger Ridgewood’s duty under Section 1681s–2(b), Plaintiff has not alleged
that Ridgewood’s investigation failed to comport with the requirements under the statute.
Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that Ridgewood investigated the credit dispute, provided
responses to both the FDIC Consumer Response Center and to Plaintiff, and ultimately
determined that the reported information would be modified and the delinquency history would
be expunged — all actions which are appropriate pursuant to the terms of the statute. (Compare
Compl. 4 with 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(b).) Beyond these facts, Plaintiff merely alleges in a
conclusory fashion that Defendants “knowingly, willfully, and deliberat[ely] violated Plaintiff’s
right(s) under statutes.” (Compl. 2 ¶ IV.) Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a
claim, and in fact, directly contradict Plaintiff’s factual allegations in the Complaint. See
Matson, 631 F.3d at 63 (noting a plaintiff must do more than present “an unadorned, the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678)).
The Court dismisses, without prejudice, Plaintiff’s FCRA claim against Ridgewood.
Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that Ridgewood received notice of Plaintiff’s dispute from a
1681s–2(a)(8) of the FRCA. As discussed above, there is no private right of action to enforce
subsection (a). See Longman v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 702 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 2012)
(upholding grant of summary judgment for claims alleging violations of 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681s–2(a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(8), holding “there is no private cause of action for violations of
consumer reporting agency, and failed to plausibly allege that Ridgewood violated its duty to
investigate pursuant to the statute. If Plaintiff can allege a plausible claim that Ridgewood
violated § 1681s–2(b), and can ultimately support such an allegation with credible evidence,
such allegations should be included in an amended complaint.
Plaintiff has not alleged, and has presented no facts that would support a finding that,
Boger had any duty to Plaintiff under the FCRA. There is no allegation that Boger himself
provided information about Plaintiff to any consumer reporting agency, or in any other way
acted as a furnisher of information, which would give rise to an independent duty on the part of
Boger. Furthermore, as discussed above, Plaintiff does not allege that Boger had notice of
Plaintiff’s dispute from a consumer reporting agency. See Fashakin v. Nextel Commc’ns, No.
05-CV-3080, 2006 WL 1875341, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2006) (dismissing claim brought under
Section 1681s–2(b) when “nowhere in the pleadings does Plaintiff allege that Defendant
Donahue, the CEO of Nextel, received notice from a credit reporting bureau of Plaintiff's
complaint” (citing Kane, 2005 WL 1153623, at *4)). Thus, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts
to support a plausible claim for relief against Boger. See Matson, 631 F.3d at 63 (quoting Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678).
The Court dismisses, without prejudice, Plaintiff’s FCRA claim against Boger. If
Plaintiff can allege a plausible claim that Boger had responsibilities under § 1681s–2(b) and
violated those responsibilities, and can ultimately support such an allegation with credible
evidence, such allegations should be included in an amended complaint.
Section 1983 claim
Plaintiff argues that Defendants deprived him of his “right to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness.” (Compl. 3 ¶ V.) This claim is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order
to sustain a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that the challenged
conduct was “committed by a person acting under color of state law,” and (2) that such conduct
“deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States.” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pitchell v.
Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)). “[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983
excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.”
American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (citation and internal quotation
Plaintiff has not stated a claim under Section 1983 against either Defendant. Plaintiff has
acknowledged that Ridgewood is a private corporation and Boger is a private individual, acting
as Ridgewood’s CEO. (Compl. 2 ¶ II.) Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants were, in any
way, acting under color of state law, nor has he provided any facts which would support such an
allegation. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges no specific violation of his constitutional or federal
rights, other than his vague invocation of the “right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,
and the rights guaranteed by many statutes.” (Compl. 3 ¶ V.) In support of his claims, Plaintiff
merely argues that “by using default and logic,” requiring state action and a deprivation of a
federally protected right is “based on a false interpretation of the law.” (Pl. Opp’n Letter 2.)
This argument is meritless, and Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are dismissed with prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint
in its entirety for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff is granted thirty days to file an amended
complaint to correct any of the identified deficiencies as to his Fair Credit Reporting Act claim.
MARGO K. BRODIE
United States District Judge
Dated: December 17, 2014
Brooklyn, New York
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