Rao v. Rodriguez et al
MEMORANDUM & ORDER re 163 Motion for Attorney Fees. Defendants' fee application is DENIED. So Ordered by Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis on 8/1/2017. (Lee, Tiffeny)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DR. ADDAGADA C. RAO,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
RAMON RODRIGUEZ and WYCKOFF HEIGHTS
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS,United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Dr. Addagada C. Rao brought this employment discrimination action against
Defendants Ramon Rodriguez and Wyckoff Heights Medical Center, Inc.("Wyckoff"), asserting
claims of discrimination on the basis ofrace, national origin, and age,in violation offederal,
state, and municipal law. (See Compl.(Dkt. 1).) On May 11, 2017, after a nine-day trial, the
jury returned a defense verdict on all claims. (Jury Verdict(Dkt. 160).) Now before the court is
Defendants' application for attomey's fees (the "Fee Application"). (Defs. Appl. for Att'y Fees
(Dkt. 163).) For the reasons stated below,the Fee Apphcation is DENIED.
Attomey's fees may be awarded to the prevailing party on claims asserted under Title VII
ofthe Civil Rights Act("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; Section 1981 ofthe Civil Rights Act
of 1866("Section 1981"),42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); and the New York City Human Rights Law
("NYCHRL"),N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(g). "'[A] district court may in its discretion award
attomey's fees to a prevailing defendant' only 'upon a fmding that the plaintiff's action was
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not [necessarily] brought in
subjective bad faith.'" Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach. 759 F.Sd 159, 163(2d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emprt Opportunity Comm'n.434 U.S. 412,421
Even where "[hjindsight proves" that a plaintiffs allegations are "very weak," attorney's
fees will be denied unless the court finds the plaintiffs claims to be "completely without
foundation." Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.. 378 F.3d 220,230(2d Cir. 2004); see also
Christiansburg Garment,434 U.S. at 421-22. The Second Circuit has cautioned that "a court
cannot properly consider a claim to be frivolous on its face" ifthe court previously found "that >
the plaintiff must be allowed to litigate the claim." LeBlanc-Stemberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 765,
770(2d Cir. 1998)(citation omitted). In particular,"a claim [may not] properly be deemed
groundless where the plaintiff has made a sufficient evidentiary showing to forestall summary
judgment and has presented sufficient evidence at trial to prevent the entry ofjudgment against
him as a matter oflaw." Id at 771 (and discussing Am. Fed'n of State. Ctv. & Mun. Bmplovees,
AFL-CIO V. Ctv. ofNassau("AFSCME"!96 F.3d 644(2d Cir. 1996)).
The court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment, as well as their motions for
judgment as a matter oflaw under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). (Mar. 30, 2017, Mem.
& Order(Dkt. 101); Trial Tr. 1376:24-1377:1.) Defendants submit that the denial ofa "Rule 50
motion should not serve as a bar to attomey's fees." (Defs. Reply in Supp. ofFee Appl.
(Dkt. 167)at 3.) The only authority they cite for that proposition, however, is Dangler ex rel.
Dangler v. Yorktown Central School. Ill F. Supp. 1175 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), a district court case
Christiansburg Garment established a standard for Title VIFs fee-shifting provision, but that standard has been
"interpreted consistently" as applied to Section 1988 and the NYCHRL. Carter. 759 F.3d at 163 & n.l (discussing
Section 1988); McGrath v. Toys"R" Us. Inc.. 3 N.Y.3d 421,428-30(N.Y. 2004)
(commenting that the NYCHRL
"attomey's fee provision is indistinguishable fi*om provisions in comparable federal civil rights statutes," and
explaining that "[w]here[New York's] state and local civil rights statutes are substantively and textually similar to
their federal counterparts, our Court has generally interpreted them consistently with federal precedent").
that predates the Second Circuit's ruling in LeBlanc-Stemberg. The court finds the reasoning in
Dangler persuasive, but sees no leeway under the clear language in LeBlanc-Stenberg. and
therefore denies Defendants' Fee Application.
"In reviewing a Rule 50 motion, all credibility determinations and reasonable inferences
ofthe jury are given deference and we may not weigh the credibility of witnesses." Vangas v.
Montefiore Med. Ctr., 823 F.3d 174,180(2d Cir. 2016) rciting Bradv v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
531 F.3d 127,133(2d Cir. 2008)). That standard creates a difficult hurdle in cases such as this,
in which Plaintiffs discrimination claims rested almost entirely on disputed allegations that
Defendant Rodriguez made certain remarks to or about Plaintiff. Most ofthe witnesses who
testified to overhearing those remarks were individuals who had themselves been terminated or
demoted, and some had initiated their own private actions against Defendants. Certain
witnesses, including Plaintiff himself, seemed to have trouble remembering what, exactly,
Rodriguez allegedly said, or to whom he said it. Though certain comments were allegedly made
at group meetings. Plaintiff did not produce corroborating testimony fi om other meeting
attendees. Combative or evasive demeanor on the stand further undermined the credibility of
certain key witnesses. The court recognizes, however,that a "claim is not necessarily jfrivolous"
merely "because a witness is disbelieved." LeBlanc-Stemberg, 143 F.3d at 770(quoting
AFSCME.96 F.3d at 652).
Even setting aside questions of credibility. Plaintiffs claims arguably suffered from
inadequate evidence of discriminatory intent. Notably, witnesses disagreed with each other over
the meaning of Rodriguez's alleged comments. Even if it is true that Rodriguez said Plaintiffs
"face looks like an oyster shell," that comment could be interpreted as a comment on Plaintiffs
age, race, or national origin, or something else entirely. The term "Indian Mafia" could, in a
vacuum, be interpreted as referring to all doctors ofIndian descent, but at least one witness
testified that the term was a commonly used moniker for a particular tight-knit group of doctors
who worked together and supported each other, most of whom were Indian, but who represented
only a small proportion ofthe many Indian staff members at Wyckoff. Meanwhile, Defendants
offered multiple legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for seeking Plaintiffs departure,^ and
also highlighted the absence of evidence that Defendants had sought the removal or demotion of
other employees on the basis of age. South Asian race, or Indian national origin.
At the close ofPlaintiffs affirmative case. Defendants moved forjudgment as a matter of
law. The court expressed skepticism about the merits of Plaintiffs case, especially with regard
to claims asserting race-based discrimination. The court asked Plaintiff whether there has "been
evidence here of racial animus ... beside one alleged comment" more than a year after
Plaintiffs departure,"which is usually not enough in these discrimination cases." (Trial
Tr. 1168:16-21.) Plaintiff did not offer any additional examples, but emphasized that the
comment in question was allegedly made by Rodriguez himself, a key decision maker, and thus
constitutes evidence of discriminatory animus. Qd 1168:22-1169:2.) The court questioned
whether "that[was] really credible here" given the "ample evidence that many, many people of
Indian and other minority background have been hired or  remained on staff." (Id. 1169:3-6.)
^ Defense witnesses testified that Plaintiffs private medical practice collected millions of dollars in billings for
patients treated at Wyckoff, a non-profit hospital beset by financial difficulties, all while Plaintiff himself was a
highly compensated member ofthe Wyckoffpayroll. In his capacity as Chief of Surgery, Plaintiff oversaw a
department that was allegedly rife with dubious recordkeeping, disregard for patient safety, and abusive billing
practices that redounded to the benefit ofPlaintiffs own medical group. When viewed in that light. Plaintiffs
claims—which rely on testimony that is, at best, thin, and at worst, contrived—could be construed as vindictive or
avaricious. The Second Circuit has emphasized that "fee awards are at bottom an equitable matter,[and] courts
should not hesitate to take the relative wealth ofthe parties into account" when calculating the amount of attorney's
fees. Shaneold v. Walt Disnev Co.. 275 F. App'x 72, 74(2d Cir. 2008)(summary order)(emphasis added)(quoting
Faraci v. Hickev-Freeman Co.. 607 F.2d 1025, 1028(2d Cir. 1979)). This court is not aware of any authority,
however,that would permit such equitable consideration in determining whether fees ought to be awarded at all.
Nonetheless, the court reserved ruling on Defendants' Rule 50 motion, and invited Defendants to
reassert the motion at the close of evidence. (Id 1170:1-3.)
At a sidebar later in the trial, the court cautioned Plaintiff that the undersigned was "close
to directing a verdict." (Id 1335:21-22.) At the close ofevidence, however,the court denied
Defendants' renewed Rule 50(a) motion. (Id 1376:24-1377:1.) Despite the court's skepticism
as to the veracity oftestimony from Plaintiffs witnesses, and even as to the integrity of
Plaintiffs prima facie case,^ the court permitted all claims to proceed to ajury verdict. The court
was cognizant thatjudgment as a matter oflaw is an extraordinary remedy. The court
recognized, moreover,that certain among Plaintiffs claims had more support than others, both
due to the differential evidence adduced as to various asserted discriminatory motives, and also
thanks to the NYCHRL's uniquely plaintiff-friendly standards. As long as at least some of
Plaintiffs claims were fit for decision by jury, the court thought it wise to submit^claims for
jury review in the first instance, particularly in light of Plaintiffs inability to articulate with
certainty which allegedly discriminatory comments supported which bases for discrimination.
Cf. Dangler,111 F. Supp. at 1178 ("Directed verdicts are  disfavored because they require a
retrial if improvidently granted.").
In so doing, the court recognized that, when denying a motion forjudgment as a matter of
law under Rule 50(a),"the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to
the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). Had
the jury found for Plaintiff on any of his claims. Defendants could have moved forjudgment
notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b). The court will not, at this time, articulate
definitive rulings on hypothetical motions, but notes that, with regard to certain among Plaintiffs
^ In denying Defendants' motions for summaryjudgment before trial, the court "assume[d], without deciding," that
Plaintiff had established a prima facie case on all claims. (Mar. 30,2017, Mem.& Order at 12.)
claims, a 50(b) motion would have received serious consideration."* LeBlanc-Stemberg brooks
no exception, however, declaring that a claim may not be "deemed groundless where the
plaintiff... has presented sufficient evidence at trial to prevent the entry ofjudgment against
him as a matter of law." 143 F.3d at 771.
Because the court denied Defendants' motions for summary judgment and forjudgment
as a matter oflaw, and because the court lacks evidence that Plaintiff actually acted in bad faith
or knowingly presented false testimony, the court is compelled to deny Defendants' Fee
For the reasons stated above. Defendants' Fee Application(Dkt. 163)is DENIED.
s/Nicholas G. Garaufis
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
NICHOLAS G. GARA
United States District Judge
Had the court done so, Defendants would have a stronger argument in favor of awarding fees. If a court finds that
a "plaintiff asserted both frivolous and non-frivolous claims," the court may grant the defendant's fee motion as to
reasonable "costs that the defendant would not have incurred but for the frivolous claims." Fox v. Vice. 563 U.S.
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