Acorne Productions, LLC et al v. Tjeknavorian et al
Filing
26
ORDER granting 16 Motion to Remand to State Court. For the reasons stated in the attached Memorandum and Order, the court finds that plaintiffs' claims and defendants' counterclaims do not arise under the Copyright Act and that there is no basis for federal jurisdiction in this case. The case is therefore remanded. Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees is, however, denied. The Clerk of Court is directed to remand this case to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County and to close the case. Ordered by Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto on 7/9/2014. (Keefe, Reed)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------X
ACORNE PRODUCTIONS, LLC and
SHANT MARDIROSSIAN,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiffs,
14-CV-2179 (KAM)
-againstZAREH TJEKNAVORIAN and ALINA
TJEKNAVORIAN,
Defendants.
-------------------------------X
MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
On March 12, 2014, plaintiffs Acorne Productions, LLC
and Shant Mardirossian (“plaintiffs”) commenced this case in
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County, alleging
various New York state law causes of action against Zareh
Tjeknavorian and Alina Tjeknavorian (“defendants”) in connection
with defendants’ alleged failure to deliver a film they had
agreed to create about the Armenian Genocide.
Am. Compl., ECF No. 1, at 67.)
(See generally
On April 7, 2014, defendants
removed the case to federal court asserting that plaintiffs’
claims arise under the Copyright Act.
No. 1, at 1.)
(Notice of Removal, ECF
In addition, following removal, defendants
answered plaintiffs’ amended complaint and asserted
counterclaims for a declaratory judgment and for breach of
contract.
(Defs. Am. Answer & Counterclaims (“Defs. Am.
Answer”) ¶¶ 185-203, ECF No. 13.)
Presently before the court is plaintiffs’ motion to
remand the instant case to New York state court and for
attorneys’ fees and costs.
Plaintiffs argue that this court
does not have jurisdiction over the parties’ claims.
Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 16.)
(See Pls.
Defendants oppose the remand.
The
court heard oral argument on the motion, at the parties’
request, on June 17, 2014.
For the reasons set forth below, the
plaintiffs’ motion to remand is granted and the case is
remanded.
Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees is denied.
BACKGROUND
This case involves a dispute about whether the parties
adhered to their agreement to produce a film about the Armenian
Genocide and the work of the humanitarian organization Near East
Relief.
Plaintiff Mardirossian is a board member and chairman
of the Near East Foundation (“NEF”), which succeeded Near East
Relief, as well as the sole member of Acorne Productions, LLC.
Defendants are filmmakers.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6-9, 16.)
The parties entered into an agreement in October of
2009 regarding the production of a film about Near East Relief’s
work and the role of the United States during the Armenian
genocide.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 22(b); Defs. Am. Answer ¶¶ 21,
22(b), 133; Pls. Answer to Defs. Counterclaims (“Pls. Answer”) ¶
2
133, ECF No. 18.)
The parties concur that they, at least
initially, entered into an oral contract.
(See Defs. Am. Answer
¶ 145; Pls. Answer ¶ 145 (stating that, in October 2009,
plaintiff Mardirossian and the defendants entered into an oral
contract).)
Plaintiffs state, however, that elements of their
agreement with defendants were memorialized in additional
writings, including emails and a “Treatment” for the film
provided by defendants to Mr. Mardirossian.
(See Am. Compl. ¶
21; Defs. Am. Answer ¶ 21; see also Pls. Reply Mem. at 4, ECF
No. 21.)
It is undisputed that the parties agreed that
Mardirossian or Acorne would pay defendants $5,000 per month,
plus expenses, and would provide filmmaking equipment for use by
defendants in exchange for the making of a feature-length
documentary film by defendants.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 22(a)-(c); Defs.
Am. Answer ¶¶ 22(a)-(c), 146; Pls. Answer ¶ 146.)
According to
plaintiffs, the parties also agreed to a funding limit of
$150,000 after which the parties would cooperate in seeking
additional funding, and that the film would be finished and
released before the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide,
April 25, 2015.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22-23.)
Defendants aver,
however, that they never agreed to a funding limit or a specific
due date for the film, but admit that Mr. Mardirossian informed
them that he wanted to release the film before April 2015.
(See
Defs. Am. Answer ¶¶ 22-23, 148-49, 161, 169; Pls. Answer ¶¶ 161,
3
169.)
As previously noted, a treatment for the film was
provided by defendants to Mardirossian, describing the film’s
themes and possible interview subjects.
A; Defs. Am. Answer ¶ 21.)
(Am. Compl ¶ 21 and Ex.
The treatment was not signed by the
parties and does not discuss rights to the film.
(Id.)
Between January 2010 and April 2012, defendants worked
on the film and were in regular communication with plaintiffs.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 27; Defs. Am. Answer ¶ 27.)
In May of 2012, the
parties met to discuss the progress of the film.
Plaintiff
Mardirossian recalls informing defendants that the previously
agreed to funding limit for the film had been exceeded and that
his contributions to the film would cease on June 30, 2012.
The
parties agree that Mr. Tjeknavorian agreed to Mr. Mardirossian’s
request to prepare a marketing package, operating budget, and
outline for the film.
32-34.)
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32-34; Defs. Am. Answer ¶¶
Defendants allege, and plaintiffs deny, that
Mardirossian informed them with no advance warning that he would
no longer fund the film after June 30, but that he in fact
stopped making payments on May 29, 2012.
161, 163; Pls. Answer ¶¶ 161, 163.)
(Defs. Am. Answer ¶¶
Defendants further allege,
and plaintiffs deny, that, for the period plaintiffs funded the
film, plaintiffs missed seven monthly payments and failed to pay
for expenses during 2012 and that, despite the cessation of
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plaintiffs’ funding, defendants continued to work on the film.
(Defs. Am. Answer ¶¶ 164, 166-67; Pls. Answer ¶¶ 164, 166-67.)
Also in May of 2012, the parties agreed that
defendants would create a marketing package, in order to attract
additional donors.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 33; Defs. Am. Answer ¶ 33.)
Defendants agreed to provide an operating budget and film
outline to Mardirossian, but never provided those materials,
despite numerous requests.
(See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33, 43, 45-47
(describing requests for an operating budget and film outline on
April 17, 2013, June 20, 2013, and September 1, 2013).)
Defendants admit that they agreed to prepare these materials and
anticipated being able to do so by May of 2013, but they never
in fact provided the budget or outline to plaintiffs.
(Defs.
Am. Answer ¶¶ 33, 35, 42, 44, 46, 160.)
On November 15, 2012, Mardirossian proposed that the
parties enter into a written agreement and that plaintiffs would
resume funding the film if defendants met the conditions of the
agreement.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38-39; Defs. Am. Answer ¶¶ 38-39.)
Mr. Tjeknavorian agreed in principle to enter into a written
agreement, and Mr. Mardirossian provided a draft agreement to
defendants in February of 2013.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 39, Ex. B (copy
of draft “Producer Agreement”); Defs. Am. Answer ¶¶ 39, 176;
Pls. Answer ¶ 176.)
The draft “Producer Agreement” provides
that the copyright to the film would be owned by Acorne.
5
(Am.
Compl. Ex. B ¶ 7.)
Defendants did not agree with all the terms
of the draft contract, and, therefore, did not sign it.
Am. Answer ¶ 178.)
(Defs.
Defendants allege, and plaintiffs deny, that
defendants instead informed Mardirossian that they would sign a
mutually agreeable contract when they had completed the
marketing package.
(Defs. Am. Answer ¶ 178; Pls. Answer ¶ 178.)
On November 4, 2013, plaintiffs sent a letter to
defendants, attached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit C,
stating that, due to defendants’ failure to meet deadlines and
present a budget, outline or preview of the film, plaintiffs no
longer had confidence in defendants’ ability to produce the
film.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 48 and Ex. C.)
Plaintiffs demanded that
defendants return “all equipment, documents, reference
materials, film footage, and versions of the Documentary and a
complete inventory of the products of work, [as well as] a full
detailed accounting” and that defendants respond to the letter
by November 15, 2013.
(Id. Ex. C.)
Defendants informed
plaintiffs by email on November 14, 2013 that they would be
unable to respond to the letter by the following day.
Compl. Ex. D.)
(Am.
Defendants state that they ceased working on the
film in November of 2013.
(Defs. Am. Answer ¶ 184.)
On March
12, 2014, plaintiffs filed an action in Supreme Court in Kings
County.
(Notice of Removal ¶ 1.)
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DISCUSSION
There are two issues in dispute between the parties:
1) whether plaintiffs’ claims arise under the Copyright Act and,
therefore, whether this court has exclusive jurisdiction over
the case based on those claims; 1 and 2) whether, even if
plaintiffs’ claims do not arise under the Copyright Act,
defendants’ counterclaims for declaratory judgment and breach of
contract vest this court with jurisdiction.
For the reasons
stated below, the court finds that neither plaintiffs’ claims
nor defendants’ counterclaims arise under the Copyright Act and
that this court lacks jurisdiction over the instant case.
Therefore, plaintiffs’ motion to remand is granted.
I.
Standard of Review on Motion for Remand
Following the removal of an action to federal court,
“[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall
be remanded.”
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Defendants bear the burden
of demonstrating that federal subject matter jurisdiction
exists.
See, e.g., Wilds v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 262 F.
Supp. 2d 163, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing, inter alia, United
Food & Comm. Workers Union, Local 919, AFL-CIO v. Centermark
Props. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994))
1
There is no dispute that plaintiff Mardirossian and both defendants are all
citizens of New York and thus that there is no diversity jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in this case. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 10; Defs. Am.
Answer ¶ 10.)
7
(“On a motion to remand, the party seeking to sustain the
removal, not the party seeking remand, bears the burden of
demonstrating that removal was proper.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). “Unless that burden is met, the case must be
remanded back to state court.
At [the motion to remand] stage
. . . , the party seeking remand is presumed to be entitled to
it unless the removing party can demonstrate otherwise.”
Id.
(quoting Bellido-Sullivan v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 123 F. Supp.
2d 161, 163 (S.D.N.Y 2000)).
Therefore, in the context of a
motion to remand, “federal courts construe the removal statute
narrowly, resolving any doubts against removability.”
Sherman
v. A.J. Pegno Constr. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 2d 320, 325 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (quoting Lupo v. Human Affairs Int’l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269,
274 (2d Cir. 1994)).
II.
Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims Arise Under the Copyright Act
Having reviewed the Amended Complaint, as well as the
parties’ briefs and the arguments made before the court on June
17, 2014, the court finds that plaintiffs’ claims do not arise
under the Copyright Act.
Therefore, this court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims.
a. Legal Standard for Federal Jurisdiction Based on
Copyright Claims
It is axiomatic that “[f]ederal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction.
They possess only that power authorized
8
by Constitution and statute.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted).
Congress has mandated that the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over actions arising under the Copyright Act.
28
U.S.C. § 1338(a) (“district courts . . . have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress relating to . . . copyrights.
No State court shall
have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any
Act of Congress relating to . . . copyrights.”).
The mere fact that “a case concerns a copyright does
not necessarily mean that it is within the jurisdiction of the
federal district court,” however.
Jasper v. Bovina Music, Inc.,
314 F.3d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Bassett v. Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Whether a
complaint asserting factually related copyright and contract
claims ‘arises under’ the federal copyright laws for the
purposes of [28 U.S.C.] Section 1338(a) poses one of the
knottiest procedural problems in copyright jurisprudence.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The well-
established test for determining whether a case arises under the
Copyright Act was first articulated by the Second Circuit in
T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
See
Bassett, 204 F.3d at 349-50 (reaffirming the applicability of
the T.B. Harms test in the Second Circuit and noting that the
9
test “has been adopted by all the circuits that have considered
the question [of] whether a suit arises under the Copyright Act
. . ., if the disputed issues include non-copyright matters.”).
Under the T.B. Harms test, “a suit ‘arises under’ the Copyright
Act if: (1) ‘The Complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by
the Act, e.g. a suit for infringement or for the statutory
royalties for record reproduction;’ or (2) ‘The Complaint
asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act.’” 2
Cohen v.
Versatile Studios, Inc., No. 13-CV-8280, 2014 WL 1584055, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2014) (quoting Bassett, 204 F.3d at 349).
b. Application to Plaintiffs’ Claims
In their Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege the
following claims under state common law: 1) constructive trust;
2) preliminary and permanent injunctive relief; 3) promissory
estoppel; 4) quantum meruit; 5) unjust enrichment; 6) negligent
misrepresentation; 7) breach of contract; and 8) an action for
an accounting.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56-114.)
Plaintiffs’ requested
relief includes: the creation of a constructive trust consisting
of the film, any equipment, notes and other relevant materials,
and the transfer of the corpus of that trust to plaintiffs; an
injunction requiring the delivery of the completed film and
2
A suit may also arise under the Copyright Act if “a distinctive policy of
the Act requires that federal principles control the disposition of the
claim;” however, the Second Circuit called this basis for jurisdiction “more
doubtful[]” and noted that the “general interest that copyrights . . . should
be enjoyed by their true owner is not enough to meet this last test.” T.B.
Harms, 339 F.3d at 828.
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related materials to plaintiffs; a judgment ordering the
delivery of the film and related materials to plaintiffs,
including the assignment of the copyrights, or, in the
alternative, an award of compensatory damages; a complete
accounting; and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
(Id. at
23-26.)
None of plaintiffs’ claims meet the T.B. Harms test
for causes of action that arise under the Copyright Act.
First,
none of the remedies plaintiffs seek is expressly provided for
in the Act.
See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 348 (citing 17 U.S.C.
§§ 502-05) (noting that injunctive relief to restrain
infringement of a copyright, impoundment remedies, statutory
damages, and attorney’s fees and costs are remedies expressly
provided by the Copyright Act).
Second, plaintiffs’ claims do
not necessitate construction of the Act; instead, they require
interpretation of the parties’ agreement to determine whether
defendants have met or breached their obligations under that
agreement.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims, while
ostensibly state law causes of action, nonetheless arise under
federal copyright law because plaintiffs seek ownership of the
rights to the film.
The Second Circuit has made clear, however,
that “if [a] case concerns a dispute as to ownership of a
copyright, and the issue of ownership turns on the
11
interpretation of a contract, the case presents only a state law
issue.”
Jasper, 314 F.3d at 46 (citing T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at
826); see also Estate Examinations Co., Inc. v. ECG Enters.,
Inc., No. 06-CV-3024, 2006 WL 3248003, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7,
2006) (“Where disputes arise under an agreement between parties,
resolution depends on state contract law, not the Copyright
Act.”).
Any question of ownership implicated by plaintiffs’
common law claims can be resolved through interpretation of the
parties’ agreement under state law.
As such, plaintiffs’ claims
do not requirement interpretation of the Copyright Act and this
court lacks federal question jurisdiction over those claims.
III. Whether Defendants’ Counterclaims Arise Under the
Copyright Act
Defendants have brought counterclaims for breach of
contract and for a declaratory judgment that defendants are
owners of the copyright.
For the reasons set forth below,
defendants’ counterclaims do not arise under the Copyright Act,
and the court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction over the
counterclaims.
a. Legal Standard for Federal Jurisdiction Based on
Copyright Counterclaims
Generally, “the presence or absence of federal
question jurisdiction is governed by the well-pleaded complaint
rule.
That rule provides that federal question jurisdiction
exists only when the plaintiff’s own cause of action is based on
12
federal law, and only when plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint
raises issues of federal law.”
Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d
46, 52 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).
In 2011,
however, Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(“AIA”), which permits “any party [who] asserts a claim for
relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to . . .
copyrights” to remove the action to district court.
28 U.S.C.
§ 1454(a), (b)(1) (emphasis added); see also Andrews v.
Daughtry, No. 13-CV-408, 2014 WL 184398, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Jan.
15, 2014) (noting that this provision of the AIA was enacted in
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes Group, Inc.
v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002),
which held that a counterclaim could not form the basis for
federal question jurisdiction). 3
Defendants did not invoke 28
U.S.C. § 1454 at the time they removed plaintiffs’ complaint
and, instead, relied only on the general removal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1441 and the procedures provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1446.
If defendants’ counterclaims, which were asserted
after removal, arise under the Copyright Act, this court would
3
The scope of section 1454 has not yet been discussed by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit or by any district court in New York. All district
courts that have interpreted this provision of the America Invents Act have
concurred, however, that the statute permits removal of copyright or patent
counterclaims. See, e.g., Inselberg v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., No. 14CV-1317, 2014 WL 2763464, at *7 n.7 (D.N.J. June 18, 2014); Mirowski Family
Ventures, LLC v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 13-CV-2627, 2014 WL 2574615, at
*4 (D.Md. June 5, 2014); Daughtry, 2014 WL 184398, at *3; Univ. of Ky.
Research Found. v. Niadyne, Inc., No. 13-CV-16, 2013 WL 5943921, at *5
(E.D.Ky. Nov. 5, 2013).
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have jurisdiction over the counterclaims, and could exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims.
See 28
U.S.C. § 1454(d)(1) (“If a civil action is removed solely under
this section, the district court” “shall remand all claims that
are neither a basis for removal under subsection (a) nor within
the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the district
court”).
b. Application to Defendants’ Counterclaims
As previously noted, after the removal of plaintiffs’
action, defendants asserted counterclaims for (1) a declaratory
judgment that defendants are the sole owners of materials
created in connection with the film and (2) for breach of
contract. 4
(Am. Answer ¶¶ 194, 203.)
Because the court agrees
with the parties that the breach of contract counterclaim does
not arise under the Copyright Act, only the declaratory judgment
counterclaim will be discussed here.
at 36.)
(See Tr. of Oral Argument
The court finds that the declaratory judgment
counterclaim does not arise under the Copyright Act and that,
consequently, the court lacks jurisdiction over the counterclaim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1454.
4
As noted, defendants’ counterclaims were asserted in their Amended Answer,
which was filed after removal of the case to federal court. In light of the
recent enactment of Section 1454 and the lack of case law interpreting it,
even if defendants had invoked § 1454 as a basis for removal, it is doubtful
that § 1454 would justify removal based only on the complaint, before the
counterclaims were filed. In any event, the court finds that the
counterclaims do not arise under the Copyright Act, and, thus, will not
address this question.
14
Like plaintiffs’ claims, defendants’ declaratory
judgment counterclaim does not arise under the Copyright Act
but, rather, asks the court to parse the terms of the agreement
between the parties.
The declaratory judgment remedy is not
expressly stated in the Copyright Act; it is available by virtue
of a separate statute, The Declaratory Judgment Act.
U.S.C. § 2201.
See 28
The counterclaim also does not require
interpretation of the Copyright Act because the issue of who
owns the copyright is dictated by the parties’ agreement, and
not a term of the Act.
See, e.g., Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51,
55 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Unlike a case where a dispute as to
copyright ownership arises under an agreement between the
parties, resolution of which depends on state contract law,
copyright ownership by reason of one’s status as a co-author of
a joint work arises directly from the terms of the Copyright Act
itself.” (internal citation omitted)).
Defendants argue, relying on the Second Circuit’s
decision in Jasper, that it will be necessary for any presiding
court to determine whether the agreement between the parties
constituted a writing sufficient under the Copyright Act to
transfer ownership of the copyright. 5
5
The court finds Jasper to
In general, copyright “vests initially in the author or authors of the
work.” 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). An exception to this rule is the “work for hire
doctrine.” Pursuant to this doctrine, “an employer or other person for whom
the work was prepared” is deemed the author for purposes of the Copyright Act
and owns the copyright, unless the parties agree otherwise in a signed,
15
be distinguishable, however.
In that case, an action for
royalties, the issue was whether the “addendum agreeing to a
contract that purports to transfer a copyright owner’s rights
[was] a [17 U.S.C.] Section 204(a) writing,” thus requiring
interpretation of that section of the Copyright Act.
at 47.
314 F.3d
The Second Circuit found that Jasper was “the rare
contract interpretation case that does present a substantial
issue as to whether the contract qualifies as a section 204(a)
writing.”
Id.
But the Second Circuit cautioned “that almost
every case involving contract interpretation, appropriate for
state court determination, could be recharacterized as . . .
appropriate for a federal court simply by framing the issue to
be whether the disputed contract qualified as a writing within
the meaning of section 204(a).”
Id.
In the instant case, the dispute involves what the
parties agreed to, not the compatibility with, or interpretation
of, that agreement within the context of the Act.
In this
respect, the court finds T.B. Harms, where the Second Circuit
held that federal jurisdiction did not exist, to be more readily
analogous to the instant case.
In T.B. Harms, it was unclear
written agreement. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). The work for hire doctrine does not
apply in this case, however, because the parties agree that the film was not
a work for hire. (Defs. Am. Answer ¶ 190; Pls. Answer ¶ 190.) Copyright
ownership may be transferred “in whole or in part by any means of
conveyance.” § 201(d)(1). Pursuant to the Copyright Act, copyright
ownership may only be transferred by a written instrument that has been
signed by the owner. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a).
16
whether one of the defendants had validly assigned his interest
in the copyright to plaintiff, and plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment that he was a sole owner of the copyright.
See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 348 (summarizing the background of the
T.B. Harms decision).
Here, defendants’ counterclaim seeks a declaratory
judgment that they are the sole owners of all materials relating
to the film and monetary damages for their breach of contract
claim.
Defendants’ requested relief is not dependent on or
derived from the Copyright Act.
As in T.B. Harms, none of the
claims or counterclaims allege a copyright claim, such as
infringement, or otherwise seek relief expressly provided by the
Copyright Act.
See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828; see also
Bassett, 204 F.3d at 355.
For these reasons, the court finds
that defendants’ declaratory judgment counterclaim does not
arise under the Copyright Act and that this court does not have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1454.
Moreover, the court is unable to find prior federal
cases, where, as here, ownership is dictated by the terms of the
parties’ agreement and a party has sought a declaratory judgment
regarding ownership.
The court must “construe the removal
statute narrowly, resolving any doubts against removability,”
Sherman, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 325, and accordingly grants
plaintiffs’ motion to remand.
17
IV.
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiffs have moved for an award of attorneys’ fees
and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which provides that
“[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs
and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a
result of the removal.”
Granting this award is within the
district court’s discretion.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s
London v. Art Crating, Inc., No. 12-CV-5078, 2014 WL 123488, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2014).
The Supreme Court has held,
however, that, “absent unusual circumstances, attorney’s fees
should not be awarded when the removing party has an objectively
reasonable basis for removal.”
Martin v. Franklin Capital
Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005).
Although the court finds that there is no basis for
federal jurisdiction in this case, defendants’ rationales for
removal were objectively reasonable, particularly given the
complexity and uncertainty of the law in this area.
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is
denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that
plaintiffs’ claims and defendants’ counterclaims do not arise
under the Copyright Act and that there is no basis for federal
jurisdiction in this case.
The case is therefore remanded.
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Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees is, however, denied.
Clerk of Court is directed to remand this case to the Supreme
The
Court of the State of New York, Kings County and to close the
case.
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