Raghunath v. State Of New York et al
Filing
6
MEMORANDUM & ORDER: Raghunath's 2 request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The Court dismisses her claims on behalf of her minor siblings and against all defendants except for Miller, the John Doe Police Officer, Detective Sommerville, Detective Rodriguez, and Goulda. However, with respect to all her claims except those on behalf of her siblings, those against New York state and its agencies, and those against the Famil y Court judges, she may file an amended complaint within 30 days of this Order. If Raghunath fails to do so, the Court shall enter judgment as to those claims. Raghunath's complaint shall proceed against ACS caseworker Felicia Miller, the John Doe police officer involved in the 7/2/2007, incident, Detective Sommerville, Detective Rodriguez, and Goulda, of the Queens County District Attorney's Office. The Clerk of Court shall issue summonses as against them, and the United Stat es Marshals Service is directed to serve the summonses, Raghunath's complaint, and a copy of this Order upon Miller, Sommerville, Rodriguez, and Goulda without prepayment of fees. The Clerk of Court shall mail a courtesy copy of the same pap ers to the Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, Special Federal Litigation Division. The case is referred to the Honorable Lois Bloom, United States Magistrate Judge, for pretrial supervision, including the identification of and service o f process on the John Doe defendant. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. SO ORDERED by Chief Judge Carol Bagley Amon, on 7/30/2015. C/mailed. (Latka-Mucha, Wieslawa)
PILED
W~90FFICE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
u.•. IMWiit COt.M1' 1.D.N.Y.
* JUL 3 o2015 *
-------------------------------------------------------------)(
PRINCESS JASHODA RAGHUNATH;
ABIGAIL BELLA RAGHUNATH; REBECCA
RAGHUNATH; JEREMIAH ISHW ARDAT
RAGHUNATH; ZACHARIAH RAGHUNATH,
Plaintiffs,
-against-
l!lltOOKLYN OF~
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
14-CV-4218 (CBA)(LB)
STATE OF NEW YORK; CITY OF NEW YORK;
COUNTY OF QUEENS; ADMINISTRATION OF
CHILDREN SERVICES; NEW YORK STATE
OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES;
FAMILY COURT CITY OF NEW YORK; POLICE
DEPARTMENT CITY OF NEW YORK; OFFICE
OF THE COMPTROLLER; OFFICE OF THE STATE
COMPTROLLER; LEGAL AID SOCIETY QUEENS
COUNTY JUVENILE RIGHTS DIVISION;
MERCY FIRST FOSTER CARE AGENCY; MARY
IMMACULATE HOSPITAL; CORPORATION
COUNSEL N.Y.C.; FAMILY COURT QUEENS
COUNTY; ANGEL GUARDIAN CAMPUS;
QUEENS COUNTY ADVOCACY CENT;
FELICIA MILLER, CASEWORKER, CPS FOR ACS;
NATALIE ARTHUR, CASEWORKER, CPS FOR
ACS; EFRIM N, CPS CASEWORKER ACS;
SHA WEY A POPE, CASEWORKER, MERCY FIRST
FOSTER CARE AGENCY; ALICE BACON,
CASEWORKER, MERCY FIRST FOSTER CARE
AGENCY; MICHELLE HODGES; CASEWORKER,
MERCY FIRST FOSTER CASE AGENCY; DEBORAH
SAVOURY, SUPERVISOR, MERCY FIRST FOSTER
CARE AGENCY; RADICA PERSAUD, FOSTER MOTHER,
MERCY FIRST FOSTER CARE AGENCY; PHYLLIS
SEEMONGAL, STEPMOTHER; JANICE BENNETT,
PHYSICIAN, MERCY FIRST FOSTER CARE AGENCY;
MARGARET CONNERS, PHYSICIAN, MERCY FIRST FOSTER
CARE AGENCY; DR. LEW, PHYSICIAN, MERCY
FIRST FOSTER CARE AGENCY; MURIEL POLL YCOCK,
PHYSICIAN, MERCY FIRST FOSTER CARE AGENCY;
JOY WOO, PHYSICIAN, MERCY FIRST FOSTER CARE
AGENCY; EMELITA MENDOZA, PHYSICIAN, MERCY
FIRST FOSTER CARE AGENCY; LOIS ABRAMHIK,
PHYSICIAN, MERCY FIRST CARE AGENCY; MARSHA
WRIGHT, ATTORNEY, LEGAL AID SOCIETY; MELLENIE
SHAPIRO, ATTORNEY AT LAW, LEGAL AID
SOCIETY; ANGELA HULL, LEGAL AID ATTORNEY, LEGAL
AID SOCIETY; EMILY KAPLAN, LEGAL AID ATTORNEY,
LEGAL AID SOCIETY; STEPHEN FORBES, LEGAL AID
ATTORNEY, LEGAL AID SOCIETY; ERA ERAS, ATTORNEY
AT LAW, WARREN & WARREN LLC; NAOMI CAVANUGH,
SOCIALWORKER/ATTORNEY, LEGAL AID
SOCIETY; SOMMERVILLE CITY POLICE
OFFICER; RODRIGUEZ, NEW YORK CITY
POLICE OFFICER, QUEENS COUNTY; ROMPUES,
DETECTIVE NEW YORK CITY, QUEENS COUNTY;
CRAIG RAMSEUR, JUDGE, FAMILY COURT
QUEENS COUNTY; CAROL A. STOKINGER, JUDGE,
FAMILY COURT QUEENS COUNTY; EDWINA
RICHARDSON-MEDLESON, JUDGE, FAMILY COURT
QUEENS COUNTY,
Defendants.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------)(
AMON, Chief United States District Judge.
On July 3, 2014, plaintiff Princess Jashoda Raghunath ("Raghunath") filed this prose
action on her behalf and on behalf of her four minor siblings. Raghunath herself, who was
twenty years old when she filed her complaint, is an adult. (See Complaint ("Compl.") at 34.)
The complaint alleges a host of civil rights violations, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, related to
the removal of Raghunath and her siblings from parental custody and their placement in foster
care. Raghunath seeks damages and injunctive relief, as well as the reversal of orders by the
Family Court in Queens County, New York. Raghunath has requested to proceed in forma
pauperis, (Docket Entry ("D.E.") 2), and this request is granted. For the reasons that follow, the
complaint is dismissed without prejudice as to the four minor siblings: Abigail Bella Raghunath,
Rebecca Raghunath, Jeremiah Ishwardat Raghunath, and Zachariah Raghunath. As to
Raghunath herself, the complaint is dismissed as to all defendants except for Felicia Miller, the
John Doe police officer involved in the July 2, 2007, incident, Detectives Sommerville and
Rodriguez, and "Queens County district attorney[] Goulda," (Compl. at 20). However, as to the
2
other defendants, the Court grants Raghunath leave to amend her complaint subject to certain
limitations set forth below.
BACKGROUND
Raghunath's 130-page complaint seeks damages and injunctive relief based on her
removal from her home on July 2, 2007, and her siblings' placement in foster care "given no
evidence of wrongdoing on the part of plaintiff(s) parents" (Id. at 7(t)). Raghunath alleges the
following facts. On July 2, 2007, Felicia Miller, an employee of the Administration for
Children's Services ("ACS"), and Police Officer John Doe, who were responding to an
anonymous child abuse complaint, illegally searched her home. (Id. at 13.) While in her home,
they forced her to remove her clothing in order to ascertain whether her body bore signs of
bruising or physical abuse. (Id. at 13-14.) Thereafter, plaintiff and her siblings were removed, by
force and against their will, from their home and taken to Mary Immaculate Hospital to be
examined by a physician. (Id. at 17-18.) There, she was "to be interviewed for possible child
abuse, sexual abuse, neglect or maltreatment before Queens County district attorney[] Goulda
and detectives Sommerville and Rodriguez." (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff then returned to her home,
which she shares with her father, her grandmother, and her aunt, but her siblings remained with
ACS for further evaluation. (Id.)
Proceedings were held before the New York City Family Court, and Raghunath's siblings
were placed with another aunt, Radica Persaud, as a foster parent. (Id. at 22.) In February 2008,
Raghunath and her father were allowed supervised visitation with her siblings, but Raghunath
alleges that visitation was not administered fairly by Mercy First Foster Care Agency or the
foster parent. (Id. at 28-31.) Raghunath's minor siblings remained in foster care until October 10,
2013, when they were returned to their mother, Phyllis Seemongal. (Id. at 35.) Since then,
3
Raghunath has not been able to see her siblings, in part because Seemongal refuses to allow her
to visit them. (Id. at 36.) Raghunath alleges that various investigations and examinations of her
and her siblings "reveal[] that [they] suffer[ed] no abuse physically or sexually, or exposed to
harm or danger or maltreatment .... "(Id. at 8(e).)
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW
A district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it is satisfied that the
action "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted if it does not
plead enough facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint plausibly states a claim if the facts alleged
"allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While "'detailed factual allegations'" are
not required, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do."' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Similarly,
a complaint does not state a claim "if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual
enhancement."' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
However, a court must construe a prose litigant's pleadings liberally and interpret them
to raise the strongest arguments they fairly suggest. Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d
Cir. 20 I 0) (internal quotation marks omitted). Liberal construction is especially important when
a prose litigant's pleadings allege civil rights violations. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1,
537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Lastly, a prose complaint should not be dismissed without
granting a pro se plaintiff leave to amend "at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint
4
gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171
F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. Raghunath Cannot Represent her Siblings
As an initial matter, Raghunath cannot represent her siblings. "[A] prose litigant cannot
represent anyone other than him or herself." S.B. ex rel. J.B. v. Suffolk Cnty., No. 13-cv-446,
2013 WL 1668313, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2013) (citing Berrios v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 564
F.3d 130, 133 (2d Cir. 1999)). Moreover, when, as here, "it is apparent to a court that a lay
person is suing on behalf of a minor, the court has a duty to protect the child by enforcing, sua
sponte, the prohibition against unauthorized representation." Fayemi v. Bureau of Immigration &
Custom Enforcement, No. 04-cv-1935, 2004 WL 1161532, at *l (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2004).
Accordingly, Raghunath can only represent herself in this action and cannot represent her
siblings, whom her complaint identifies as minors. The claims related to Abigail Bella
Raghunath, Rebecca Raghunath, Jeremiah Ishwardat Raghunath, and Zachariah Raghunath are
dismissed without prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
II. Sovereign Immunity
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Raghunath's claims against the state of
New York and its agencies. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. "It has long been settled that the
reference to actions 'against one of the United States"' in the Eleventh Amendment
"encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also
5
certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities." Regents of the Univ. of
California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997). Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment
speaks only to "Citizens of another State," the Supreme Court has long held that it also covers
suits by citizens of the state named as defendant. Nat'l Foods, Inc. v. Rubin, 936 F.2d 656, 659
n.2 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, IO (1890)).
Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity by: "( 1) unequivocally expressing its
intent to do so, and (2) acting pursuant to a valid exercise of power." Kozaczek v. N.Y. Higher
Educ. Servs. Corp., 503 F. App'x 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996)). However, "it is well established that Congress did not abrogate state
sovereign immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Sargent v. Emons, 582 F. App'x 51, 52 (2d
Cir. 2014) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979)). It is equally "well[] established
that New York has not consented to§ 1983 suits in federal court." Mamot v. Bd. of Regents, 367
F. App'x 191, 192 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d
35, 38-40 (2d Cir.1977)). With respect to injunctive relief, although the doctrine in Ex parte
Young permits "suits against state officers in their official capacity for prospective injunctive
relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law," Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261,
287 (2d Cir. 2003), that doctrine "has no application in suits against the States and their agencies,
which are barred regardless of the relief sought," Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Raghunath's claims against
the State of New York, the New York State Office of Children and Family Services ("OCFS"),
the Office of the State Comptroller, and the Family Court. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii); see also
McKnight v. Middleton, 699 F. Supp. 2d 507, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that New York City
6
Family Court is "a part of the New York State Unified Court system and is, therefore, also
protected by the State's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court."), aff d, 434 F. App'x 32
(2d Cir. 2011).
III. Municipal Liability
Raghunath's complaint likewise cannot sustain its municipal liability claims. As to
municipalities themselves, in order to sustain a § 1983 claim against a municipal defendant, a
plaintiff must show the existence of an officially adopted policy or custom that caused injury and
a direct causal connection between that policy or custom and the deprivation of a constitutional
right. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City ofN.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). "The failure
to train or supervise city employees may constitute an official policy or custom if the failure
amounts to 'deliberate indifference' to the rights of those with whom the city employees
interact." Wray v. City ofNew York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)). However, a mere allegation that a municipality failed to train its
employees does not suffice. Plair v. City of New York, 789 F. Supp. 2d 459, 469 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) ("Following Iqbal and Twombly, Monell claims must satisfy the plausibility standard.").
"Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under
Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing,
unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker."
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985); see also Hartnagel v. City ofNew
York, No. 10-cv-5637, 2012 WL 1514769, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012) (single incident
involving actor below policy-making level cannot give rise to Monell liability).
As to city agencies, they are not amenable to suit. That is because the New York City
Charter requires that suit "be brought in the name of the City of New York and not in that of any
7
agency." N.Y.C. Charter§ 396; see also Ximines v. George Wingate High Sch., 516 F.3d 156,
159-60 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting that § 396 "has been construed to mean that New
York City departments [and agencies], as distinct from the City itself, lack the capacity to be
sued").
As for the municipal defendants, Raghunath does not allege, and nothing in her complaint
suggests, that any of the allegedly wrongful acts or omissions on the part of any city employee
are attributable to a municipal policy or custom. Additionally, the complaint does not plead facts
from which the Court could infer a failure to train that rises to the level of deliberate
indifference. As to the city agencies, they are not amenable to suit. See Jenkins v. City of New
York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007) (NYPD is not a suable entity.); Bloch v. Comptroller,
No. 11-cv-469, 2011WL607118, at *1 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2011) (City Comptroller's office is
not a suable entity.); Preston v. New York, 223 F. Supp. 2d 452, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (ACS is
not a suable entity.), affd sub nom. Preston v. Quinn, 87 F. App'x 221 (2d Cir. 2004); Cincotta
v. N.Y.C. Human Resources Admin., No. OO-cv-9064, 2001 WL 897176, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
9, 2001) (Corporation Counsel's office is not a suable entity.) Raghunath's complaint against the
municipal defendants and their agencies must therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 1
IV. Judicial Immunity
Raghunath names as defendants three Family Court judges who have presided over
proceedings concerning her and her siblings: Judge Craig Ramseur, Judge Carol A. Stokinger,
and Judge Edwina Richardson-Medleson. Her claims against them must be dismissed. Judges
"generally have absolute immunity" from suit for judicial acts performed in their judicial
1
Raghunath also names the "Queens County Advocacy Center." It is unclear if this entity is part of the
municipality or the state. In any event, Raghunath does not provide any facts against this defendant to
support a claim under§ 1983.
8
capacities. Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
11 (1991)). This absolute ''judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or
malice," nor can a judge "be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error ... or
was in excess of his authority." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, 13. Rather, judicial immunity is
overcome in only two instances. The first is "liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not
taken in the judge's judicial capacity." Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209 (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11).
The second is liability arising from actions taken "'in the complete absence of all jurisdiction."'
Basile v. Connolly, 538 F. App'x 5, 7 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis in the original) (quoting Mireles,
502 U.S. 11-12). Section 1983 prohibits injunctive relief "against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d
53, 74 (2d Cir. 2004).
Nothing in Raghunath's complaint alleges facts suggesting the applicability of either of
the exceptions to absolute judicial immunity in the damages context. Moreover, she has
"allege[d] neither the violation of a declaratory decree, nor the unavailability of declaratory
relief." See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (affirming
dismissal of pro se complaint that failed to allege either exception to the bar on injunctive relief).
Accordingly, Raghunath's claims against the judge-defendants are foreclosed by absolute
immunity. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii).
V. Non-State Actor Defendants
Raghunath fails to state a claim as against the non-state actor defendants. To maintain a
§ 1983 action, plaintiff must allege that the conduct at issue: (1) was "committed by a person
acting under color of state law" and (2) "deprived [plaintiff] of rights, privileges, or immunities
9
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). "A plaintiff pressing a claim of violation of his constitutional rights under§ 1983 is ..
. required to show state action." Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir.
2003) (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982)). "[A] private actor acts under
color of state law when the private actor is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or
its agents," but "[a] merely conclusory allegation that a private entity acted in concert with a
state actor does not suffice to state a§ 1983 claim against the private entity." Ciambriello v.
County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Alternatively, to support a claim against a private party on a§ 1983 conspiracy theory, a plaintiff
must show "(1) an agreement between a state actor and a private party; (2) to act in concert to
inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing
damages." Id. at 324-25. The mere provision of federal subsidies to a defendant does not, by
itself, transform otherwise private conduct into state action. See Horvath v. Westport Library
Ass'n, 362 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-41, and
noting that "public funding alone" cannot transmute a private actor into a state actor).
In this case, Raghunath has sued a number of individuals and entities that do not appear
to be state actors: (1) the Legal Aid Society of Queens County and employees Marsha Wright,
Mellenie Shapiro, Angela Hull, Emily Kaplan, Stephen Forbes, and Naomi Cavanugh (the
"Legal Aid Defendants"); (2) Mercy First Foster Care Agency, a charitable organization, see
http://mercyfirst.org (last visited Feb. 16, 2015), and its Angel Guardian Campus, as well as
employees Shaweya Pope, Alice Bacon, Michelle Hodges, Deborah Savoury, Janice Bennett,
Margaret Conners, Dr. Lew, Muriel Pollycock, Joy Woo, Emelita Mendoza, and Lois Abramhik
10
(the "Mercy First Defendants"); (3) Mary Immaculate Hospital, see Richard Perez-Pena, 2 Small
Queens Hospitals in a Struggle for Survival, N.Y. Times, May 12, 2006, available at
http://w\\w.nytimes.com/2006/05/ 12/nyregion/ 12hospital.html (describing Mary Immaculate
Hospital as a "Catholic hospital[]"); (4) Radica Persaud, who Raghunath says is her foster
mother; (5) Phyllis Seemongal, who Raghunath says is her step-mother; and (6) Era Eras, a
private attorney. However, Raghunath has failed to allege facts showing that any of these private
defendants acted in concert with or conspired with state actors so as to bring them within the
ambit of§ 1983.
To the extent that any allegations in Raghunath's complaint allege a nexus between the
private defendants and state actors, they are vague and conclusory, and fail to demonstrate that
any of these defendants should be treated as state actors. In addition, the fact that the Legal Aid
Defendants were acting as court-appointed attorneys did not render them state actors, as "it is
well-established that court-appointed attorneys performing a lawyer's traditional functions as
counsel ... do not act 'under color of state law' and therefore are not subject to suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983." Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1997) (collecting cases); see
also Brown v. Legal Aid Soc., 367 F. App'x 215, 216 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of§
1983 case against Legal Aid Society with citation to Rodriguez). The complaint must therefore
be dismissed as to the Legal Aid Defendants, the Mercy First Defendants, Mary Immaculate
Hospital, Persaud, Seemongal, and Eras. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
VI. Personal Involvement
With respect to ACS caseworkers Natalie Arthur and Efrim N. and Detective Rompues,
Raghunath's claim is dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement. As a prerequisite to a
damage award under§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege the defendant's direct or personal
11
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. "It is well settled in this Circuit that
personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an
award of damages under§ 1983." Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Raghunath has failed to make any allegations that Arthur, Efrim N. or Detective
Rompues were personally involved in, had knowledge of, or were responsible for any colorable
deprivation of her civil rights. Raghunath has therefore failed to state a claim under § 1983
against those defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 2
VII. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Family Court Orders
To the extent Raghunath's complaint asks the Court to reverse Family Court orders, the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. "Under the RookerFeldman doctrine, inferior federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over suits that seek
direct review of judgments of state courts, or that seek to resolve issues that are ·inextricably
intertwined' with earlier state court determinations." Vargas v. City ofNew York, 377 F.3d 200,
205 (2d Cir. 2004) "There is no question that Rooker-Feldman bars [a plaintiffs] challenges to
the family court's decisions regarding custody, neglect, and visitation." Phifer v. City of New
York, 289 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2002).
Here, to the extent Raghunath asks the Court to reverse Family Court rulings regarding
custody and visitation, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not permit the Court to take
jurisdiction over those claims.
2
Similarly, the affidavit Raghunath attached to her complaint does not allege acts committed by any particular
defendant or defendants. (D.E. 1-2.) Instead, it asserts a host offederal and state constitutional and statutory
violations in conclusory and abstract terms.
12
VIII. The July 2, 2007, Incident
Although Raghunath' s claims must be dismissed as against most of the defendants, they
may proceed with respect to the events of July 2, 2007, as against ACS caseworker Felicia
Miller, a John Doe police officer, Detectives Sommerville and Rodriguez, and Goulda, who
though not named in the caption appears to be a Queens assistant district attorney. Specifically,
Raghunath alleges that on July 2, 2007, Miller and the John Doe officer conducted an illegal
search of her residence and forced her to remove her clothing to search her body for signs of
physical abuse. (Compl. at 13-14.) She further alleges that she was thereafter forcibly removed
from her home against her will, taken to a hospital and then to the Queens County Child Abuse
Squad based on unsubstantiated charges of child abuse. (Id. at 17-18.) She alleges that
Detectives Sommerville and Rodriguez and Goulda, of the Queens County District Attorney's
Office, interviewed her after she was taken there. (Id. at 20.) The Court interprets her complaint
to allege that she was held for this "interrogation[]" against her will. (Id.) These facts raise
several potentially colorable legal claims, which may proceed.
IX. Leave to Amend
The Court grants Raghunath leave to amend her complaint with respect to the dismissed
claims, except for the claims brought on behalf of her siblings, her claims against New York
state and its agencies, and her claims against the Family Court judges. In the case of the latter
claims, the Court need not afford Raghunath an opportunity to amend her complaint because "the
court can rule out any possibility ... that an amended complaint [on those claims] would succeed
in stating a claim." Gomez, 171 F.3d at 796. With respect to her other claims, Raghunath must,
in amending her complaint, cure the errors identified in the foregoing discussion.
13
If she amends her complaint, she must also provide any and all additional identifying
information she possesses as to the John Doe police officer whom she alleges took part in the
July 2, 2007, incident along with Miller. She should also include any and all additional
identifying information with respect to Detectives Sommerville and Rodriguez and Goulda. If
Raghunath chooses to file an amended complaint, she should do so within thirty (30) days of this
Order. She is advised that an amended complaint replaces the complaint currently pending
before the Court in its entirety and therefore must include all of her claims and factual allegations
against all of the defendants against whom she wishes to proceed. That includes the claims
permitted to proceed pursuant to this Order. The amended complaint must be captioned "First
Amended Complaint" and bear the same docket number as this Order.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, Raghunath's request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. For the
reasons set forth above, the Court dismisses her claims on behalf of her minor siblings and
against all defendants except for Miller, the John Doe police officer, Detective Sommerville,
Detective Rodriguez, and Goulda. However, with respect to all her claims except those on
behalf of her siblings, those against New York state and its agencies, and those against the
Family Court judges, she may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of this Order. If
Raghunath fails to do so, the Court shall enter judgment as to those claims.
Raghunath's complaint shall proceed against ACS caseworker Felicia Miller, the John
Doe police officer involved in the July 2, 2007, incident, Detective Sommerville, Detective
Rodriguez, and Goulda, of the Queens County District Attorney's Office. The Clerk of Court
shall issue summonses as against them, and the United States Marshals Service is directed to
serve the summonses, Raghunath's complaint, and a copy of this Order upon Miller,
14
Sommerville, Rodriguez, and Goulda without prepayment of fees. The Clerk of Court shall mail
a courtesy copy of the same papers to the Corporation Counsel for the City of New York, Special
Federal Litigation Division. The case is referred to the Honorable Lois Bloom, United States
Magistrate Judge, for pretrial supervision, including the identification of and service of process
on the John Doe defendant.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
July
2015
1j) ,
/S/ Chief Judge Carol Bagley Amon
--Carol Bagley Amo~
I
Chief Unitetl State~District Judge
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